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Emerging planetary-scale environmental problems, such as climate change and 
space debris, indicate a growing need for effective governance regimes for domains 
beyond the borders of territorial nation-states. This dissertation addresses the basic 
question: what explains patterns of success and dysfunction in regimes for non-terrestrial 
spaces? Under what conditions can global commons regimes function to achieve their 
goals? The answer depends in a fundamental way on scientific knowledge and 
technological capability, which create, define, and describe the problems, interests, and 
practices that shape the formation and features of governance regimes, and thus create the 
conditions for their effective functioning. This project employs and extends recent 
revivalist geopolitical approaches examining the influences of material factors 
(geography, ecology, and technology), and applies them to explain important features of 
regimes for the ocean and orbital space. This approach claims that geography, ecology, 
and technology together constitute an influencing context, which creates specific problem 
structures and constrains possible solution sets, and thereby sets conditions for regime 
performance. In contrast, recent post-modernist and constructivist approaches discount 
the importance and influence of material contexts in shaping politics, and are incapable of 
explaining important aspects of regimes. Rationalist (interest-centered) approaches to 
theorizing regimes employ thin treatments of the material context, limiting their ability to 
explain regime content and effectiveness. The explanatory traction of material-contextual 
factors is demonstrated by a detailed examination of regime formation, content and 
effectiveness over four periods of ocean governance across five centuries, and orbital 
space over the last sixty years. These cases demonstrate that successful regime formation 
 iii 
must foreground scientific uncertainty, ecological dynamics, and the balance of 
technological capability. To the extent that global commons regimes ignore the existence 
and dynamism of these material structures, they are more likely to fail to achieve their 
goals. Greater consideration of material contexts produces a strengthened International 
Relations theory of regimes. These findings also suggest ways to improve regime design, 
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Planetary Geopolitics and Global Commons Regimes: A New Theoretical 
Agenda 
 
“Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.” 
H.G. Wells, The Outline of History (1920) 
 
The dominant mode of social and political organization on the planet – the 
modern territorial state system – entails a form of order that does not easily translate onto 
the non-terrestrial domains. The construction and maintenance of borders, and the 
regulation of interactions across them, is extremely challenging in the vast, fluid, and 
relatively inaccessible spaces of the ocean, atmosphere, and orbital space. While terra 
firm is parceled and partitioned into distinct political units, the contemporary 
international institutions that govern the ‘global commons’ are a complicated 
amalgamation of jurisdictional zones, normalized practices, and poorly enforced rules 
and regulations. This incongruence between the dominant mode of political ordering and 
the majority of planetary space is significantly explained by the scientific and 
technological context in which the state system first emerged. In short, when the 
territorial state system emerged, activities in the ocean, atmosphere, and outer space were 
not salient in human affairs. Non-terrestrial domains were ‘late breaking’ relative to the 
land as sites of conflict and competition, and strategic, economic, and political bordering. 
When human activities did expand into these domains, the search for profit and 
advantage preceded real knowledge about the domains themselves. 
Science and technology have played a central role in defining and shaping world 
order. The emergence of modern European states and the state system occurred in the 
absence of real scientific understanding about the properties, features, opportunities, and 
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constraints of the ocean, atmosphere, and orbital space. But the globalization of human 
activities, first in the ocean, and then much later in the atmosphere and outer space, was 
enabled by technological advances that permitted the penetration and exploitation of 
these fluid domains beyond terra firma. The first non-terrestrial domain subject to 
modernization and globalization, starting 500 years ago, was the ocean, as explorers, 
traders, and imperialists took advantage of, and gave incentive to, new improvements and 
innovations in navigation and ship technology. The European ‘global reconnaissance’ 
also produced discoveries about the existence, contours, and resources of new terrestrial 
landmasses, which were deemed terra nullius and then incorporated into the spreading 
system of states. The economic growth that accompanied state consolidation was 
propelled in part by new technologies for the exploitation of atmospheric and oceanic 
resources, including industrial fishing and coal-fired power plants. Technological 
advancement facilitated the emergence of modern states, and was directed, invested in, 
and utilized by those states to productively penetrate and exploit the non-terrestrial 
domains. In contrast, Earth system sciences, the primary source of authoritative and 
coherent knowledge about these spaces, did not coalesce into coherent and 
professionalized academic disciplines until the 20th century. And when disciplines like 
oceanography, astrophysics, and aeronomy did emerge, they were often coopted, 
directed, or confined within the boundaries of state agencies serving the ‘national 
interest.’  
In the early and middle 20th century, an “explosion of movement” associated with 
technological advance changed the human relationship with non-terrestrial spaces.1 As 
                                                 




the progressive development of advanced technology made these global spaces into 
important domains of human activity, triggered conflicts among multiple users and uses, 
stoked fears of over-use, and generated imperatives to formally and collectively manage 
spaces that began to be described and understood as ‘global commons.’ In addition to the 
emergence of what would come to be called ‘common pool resources,’ new ‘global 
public goods’ came into being. Global public goods, and especially common sinks, 
created new types and degrees of interdependence and therefore presented a unique 
regulatory challenge.2 Yet the political geography constructed by the international 
community was anything but innovative. Although the territorial state system was 
developed on and for terrestrial spaces, its prevalence made partition and nationalization 
the default order for managing non-terrestrial global spaces. In cases where 
territorialization could not be readily applied, the international community was forced to 
develop governance arrangements that have come to be called ‘regimes.’ 
The history of ‘global commons regimes’ (GCRs) can be understood as the 
modification of state-centric ordering principles to fit with prevailing knowledge about 
the nature of global spaces, their resources, and the technology that allows access to both. 
This adaptation to non-terrestrial spaces is often incomplete. The state-centric framework 
is evident in both the slow accumulation of ‘customary international law,’ which 
normalizes on-going practices, and the negotiated multilateral agreements that created the 
central institutions of GCRs. Unfortunately, regime building based on the imperatives 
and interests of states, many of which have entrenched economic and security interests in 
technological penetration, has generated management regimes that are often ill-suited to 
                                                 
2 John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance, 2nd ed (Chichester, 
West Sussex, England ; New York: Wiley, 2000), 9–11. 
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the realities of the Earth systems and processes of the actual non-terrestrial planetary 
spaces. Transnational networks, interactions, and environmental problems “openly 
challenge” the ability of sovereign territorial states to govern non-terrestrial spaces, and 
make effective international action “politically complex and conceptually confusing.”3 
Despite these regimes, in the 21st century humanity finds itself in the midst of multiple 
and escalating ecological and geophysical crises, including massive species loss, climate 
change, and ocean acidification. We are now on the verge of an “earth system 
transformation,” which will present significant challenges for politics and society.4 The 
sources of and solutions to these collective action problems are significantly located 
within the non-terrestrial planetary domains, so repairing or replacing ineffective regimes 
is critical to ensure a stable, secure, and prosperous human future. 
This project seeks to address a basic question: how can we better explain 
persistent dysfunction in regimes for non-terrestrial spaces? Under what conditions can 
global commons regimes function to achieve their goals? The answer depends in a 
fundamental way on scientific knowledge and technological capability, which create, 
define, and describe the problems, interests, and practices that motivate the formation of 
GCRs, and create the conditions for their effective functioning. When regimes are built 
under conditions of scientific uncertainty and rapid technological change, it is particularly 
difficult to design a functional institution. Scientific and technological change alters what 
needs to be governed and why, and how it can be governed effectively. The extension of 
                                                 
3 Agnew and Muscarà, Making Political Geography, 167; Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The 
Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), xi; Peter 
M. Haas, Robert Owen Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective 
International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 416. 
4 Frank Biermann, Earth System Governance: World Poltics in the Anthropocene (Cambride, MA: MIT 
Press, 2015), 7. 
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the territorial state system into and onto non-terrestrial domains has often proceeded 
without concerns about acquisition of an accurate and precise domain image: the struggle 
for a regime design that serves everyone’s interests results in no one’s interests being 
well-served. The impulse to extend the territorial state system – either as territorialization 
or nationalization – creates pathological regimes that superficially function to redress 
problems and satisfy interests, but are actually woefully ineffective at achieving their 
basic goals. 
There have been some important successes in managing non-terrestrial spaces: the 
ozone hole is closing, acid rain is decreasing, and outer space remains nuclear weapons-
free. A central argument of this project is that the pace and progress of technological 
advancement and scientific knowledge accumulation, and their relationship with regime 
design, significantly explain the successes and failures of GCRs. The variables I focus on 
can be described as the ‘material context’ because they are based on the physical 
environment; science reveals the contours of geography and ecology, and technology 
relies on physical phenomena.5 In the last century, the state-centric orientation towards 
non-terrestrial domains encouraged, protected, and amplified technological penetration of 
the global commons, and channeled resources towards the research agendas within Earth 
system sciences that best served parochial state, military, and corporate interests. The 
material context has therefore been responded to and incorporated into GCRs in an ad 
hoc, half-hearted, and incomplete way. Technology has been used to justify interests in 
maintaining status quo uses, but generally ignored as a set of potentially empowered and 
mobilized enforcement capabilities. Science is repeatedly called upon to provide models, 
                                                 




counts, quotas and limits, but much of what scientific knowledge implies about 
stakeholders and negative consequences is overlooked or downplayed. Because collective 
problems are often extremely complex, scientific uncertainty provides an opening for 
politicization of scientific knowledge and authority. 
Normative Motivations 
Despite decades of activity, research, and theorizing, global governance has still 
failed to redress global environmental problems, which are worsening and growing in 
scale. Existing international institutions are not suited to the challenge at hand, and not 
ready for the challenges of the future. Negotiations and agreements over carbon 
emissions remain stalled, watered down, unenforced, and resisted. The ocean is being 
thoughtlessly polluted with industrial chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, and organic waste in 
ways that directly harm marine ecosystems, and will come to harm most of the human 
population – but only indirectly, and in the long run. The regime for outer space, built 
during a bipolar era to manage the security competition of two superpowers, is 
unprepared for commercialization of space activities, the multiplication of space actors, 
and the environmental problem of space debris. There are reasons to believe that the 
human species can effectively manage shared global spaces, and some notable success 
stories, but in general non-terrestrial planetary spaces are degraded, over-exploited, and 
under-regulated. 
As a result of this situation, scholars, activists, and educators who focus on global 
environmental governance often have to confront feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, 
and despair.6 The failures of global governance in the ocean, atmosphere, and outer space 
                                                 
6 Karen T. Litfin, “Person/Planet Politics: Contemplative Pedagogies for a New Earth,” in New Earth 
Politics: Essays from the Anthropocene (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 115–16; Michael Maniates, 
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often result in outcomes that can only be described as tragic. The collapse of renewable 
resources because of over-use has serious negative ramifications, especially for future 
generations and the world’s poor. Changes in Earth systems processes can make existing 
resources unusable or downright harmful to humans. And yet, there seems to be very 
little learning occurring with regard to treaty making; we are largely repeating the same 
mistakes. The political science community is not doing enough to formulate alternatives 
and articulate rationales. Although a large number of International Relations (IR) scholars 
describe global environmental problems as a major issue for international politics, very 
few top scholars and publications address the topic. There is a “vast gap between 
perceived importance and actual work” in global environmental governance.7 This 
project aims to close the gap between recognized problems and constructed solutions, by 
improving the tools of IR theory, and especially regime theory. 
It is important to make the normative motivations animating this project explicit, 
because the intuitions, commitments, and values that drive any author are reflected in the 
structure and focus of their text. The impulse to conduct this research starts with a basic 
observation: the ‘Anthropocene’ era is marked by the permanent and costly 
reorganization of planetary systems, and the full extent of this transformation is dawning 
on the human species at a late hour. This project reinforces the urgency associated with 
catastrophic risks by illustrating the ways regimes are ill-suited to confront them.8  
                                                                                                                                                 
“Make Way For Hope: A Contrarian View,” in New Earth Politics: Essays from the Anthropocene 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 135. 
7 Jessica F. Green and Thomas N. Hale, “Reversing the Marginalization of Global Environmental Politics 
in International Relations: An Opportunity for the Discipline,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 02 
(April 2017): 474. 
8 Sebastian Farquhar et al., “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project 2017 
(University of Oxford: Future of Humanity Institute, February 2017). 
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There is a real risk of what Jon Mooallem refers to as “environmental 
generational amnesia” or shifting baselines of expectation, such that the normalization of 
regime failures lowers our standards for success.9 Humans have been living with visions 
of catastrophic collapse for several decades, and now ecological risk has become 
expected and quotidian.10 A historical approach to governance of the global commons 
holds regimes to their own standards of success, as articulated at the time of their 
negotiation. In this way, it holds the standards for effectiveness relatively constant after 
the regime has been formed. Regimes are best understood in their full history. Although 
this project shares with environmentalism a lament about the present and trepidation for 
the future, it looks to the past for explanations of how we got here, and how to better steer 
in the future. 
The overall goal of this project is to provide a theoretical foundation for superior 
ways of thinking about shared challenges situated in non-terrestrial planetary spaces. 
There are several strong reasons to believe that now is the critical time to re-think the 
foundations and implications of GCRs. Most obviously, continued failure to successfully 
confront collective action problems in the global environment will be extremely 
damaging to human interests. But, from a strategic perspective, now is also a critical time 
to link theoretical arguments about political order in the global commons to the emerging 
forces of environmentalism.11 Drawing the blueprints for future world order improves the 
chances of timely adaptation, and provides a focal point for progressives and 
                                                 
9 Jon Mooallem, “Our Climate Future Is Actually Our Climate Present,” The New York Times Magazine, 
April 19, 2017. 
10 Ursula K. Heise, Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global 
(Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27. 
11 Daniel Deudney and Elizabeth Mendenhall, “Green Earth: The Emergence of Planetary Civilization,” in 
New Earth Politics, ed. Simon Nicholson and Sikina Jinnah (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 43–72. 
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environmentalists. Environmentalists like Stewart Brand are increasingly embracing 
technology as a solution to environmental problems.12 The accelerating globalization of 
information and knowledge production means that society – as well as the economy – can 
be usefully understood globally, because knowledge and ideas can circulate much more 
rapidly on larger scales. Scientific consensus building is rapidly internationalizing, and 
collaborative data sets are increasingly commonplace.13 Both environmentalism and 
globalized information systems represent fertile ground for the adoption of a new 
orientation towards the global commons.  
Commitment to Science 
 This project adopts a normative commitment to the scientific method as a means 
for acquiring reliable knowledge about the physical world, and thus a concomitant 
rejection of post-modernism and strong social constructivism. A defense of this position 
is provided in the following chapter, because it is central to the approach of this project. 
Embracing a view of science as a source of useful, authoritative, and accurate knowledge 
enables communication with a broader and more influential audience. Embracing science 
also helps fill a lacuna in the literature on global environmental governance, because “we 
know relatively little about how scientific knowledge affects cooperation.”14 This project 
aims to explain how and why scientific knowledge contributes to effective international 
cooperation in non-terrestrial domains. The message throughout is that more and better 
science is a ‘good’ for humanity, which should be pursued with urgency, vigor, and 
                                                 
12 Stewart Brand, Whole Earth Discipline: An Ecopragmatist Manifesto (London: Atlantic Books, 2010). 
13 Joe Palca, “Why Some Scientific Collaborations Are More Beneficial Than Others,” Joe’s Big Idea, 
December 15, 2014; Kate O’Neill et al., “Methods and Global Environmental Governance,” Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 38, no. 1 (October 17, 2013): 456. 




expanded resources if the worst calamities of global environmental disruption and 
degradation are to be avoided. 
Skepticism about Technology 
 This project adopts an orientation towards global technological systems that does 
not assume – as do so many – that technologies are universally and inevitably positive 
and benign. Technology – a complicated concept unpacked in the following chapter – 
entails more than a neutral and growing toolbox for human capability. It is also the 
source of complex and pernicious collective action problems. Technological advance 
does not automatically or reliably contribute to the collective benefit of humanity or the 
problem-solving capabilities of human beings. Although technology creates possibilities 
for effective management – especially in terms of surveillance and enforcement – it also 
enables more capable and available forms of access and exploitation. New employments 
of technology create new parochial interests in resource exploitation, and generate new 
problems as externalities. The design of GCRs must be attentive to two sides of the 
technological coin: global technological systems have both “a tendency to multiply and 
amplify hazards, and an ability to reduce and control them.”15 
 Theoretically, this project occupies a middle ground between the Promethean 
techno-optimism found in works such as Buckminster Fuller’s Operating Manual for 
Spaceship Earth, and the profound techno-pessimism of the ‘technics-out-of-control’ 
tradition articulated in the work of Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul, and Langdon Winner. 
These two sharply differing views range from optimistic instrumentalism to pessimistic 
                                                 
15 Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, 1. 
Vintage Books ed (New York: Random House, 1997), 19. 
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determinism, and therefore make starkly different assessments of the promise and perils 
of technology. 
On one hand, the Prometheans (such as Edward Teller, John von Neumann, and 
Herman Kahn) hold an optimistic view of technology and argue that the solutions to the 
collective problems of humanity are to be found in the expansion and acceleration of 
technological exploitation. The philosophical economist Robert Heilbroner describes the 
“Promethean spirit” behind the grand project of subjugating nature, and the ability of 
technology to endow humans with “literally superhuman abilities to control…nature.”16 
This perspective, in which technology is a neutral and powerful tool for human use, 
assumes that technology is “always constructive and beneficial,” even when it has 
negative side effects.17 In this view, the project of controlling and managing nature for 
human ends is bound to succeed, because technology will provide a cornucopia of 
capabilities, including the ability to address any negative consequences of operating 
technological systems. From this perspective, technology is not the problem, and its 
advancement and application should be guided, but not restrained. 
 On the other hand, the techno-pessimists suggest that technology progressively 
restricts human agency. Even when humans believe that they are in control, the 
superhuman powers enabled by technology generate hubris and poor decision-making. 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus is often cited as the first 
argument about the unintentional negative consequences of Promethean technology.18 
The idea that technology is out-of-control was also articulated by early American 
naturalists, who lamented the unthinking expansion and extension of technology systems. 
                                                 
16 Robert L. Heilbroner, “The Human Prospect,” The New York Review of Books, January 24, 1974. 
17 John von Neumann, “Can We Survive Technology?,” Fortune, 1955. 
18 Tenner, Why Things Bite Back, 11. 
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Henry David Thoreau noted in Walden that “we do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon 
us.”19 This basic insight was expanded upon in the post-World War II era, when 
technology was seen as a “source of genuine perplexity” and “puzzlement and 
disorientation” in terms of the possibilities for agency, planning, design, and control.20 
Critics like Winner and Ellul came to the conclusion that “technology in a real sense now 
governs its own course, speed, and destination.” In this account, technology is something 
that confounds rather than enables the achievement of “desired and rational ends.”21 
More specifically, technology is understood to create ironic unintended consequences, or 
“revenge effects,” in addition to chronic, intractable, degenerative problems that may be 
global in scale. Many apparent solutions are simply the replacement of an acute problem 
with a chronic one; “we have resolved problems by broadening their base in space and 
time.”22 This deterministic and pessimistic view of technology suggests that the only 
beneficial course of action is comprehensive relinquishment and restraint. 
This project charts a middle course between the Promethean modernists and the 
techno-pessimists, and between instrumentalism and determinism. It adopts a skeptical 
attitude to the benefits of technological advancement and the expansion of technological 
systems, while recognizing that new and more technology can be a critical source of 
solution sets. Instead of prescribing either wholesale commitment or relinquishment, this 
project advises that regime designers engage in systematic assessment of consequences, 
adopt caution in regime design, and expend resources on serious technological 
forecasting and assessment. In terms of determinism and instrumentalism, the project 
                                                 
19 H.D. Thoreau, Walden, or, Life in the Woods (London: J.M. Dent, 1908). 
20 Langdon. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 5. 
21 Ibid., 16. 
22 Tenner, Why Things Bite Back, 25. 
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entails a version of ‘soft determinism’ that sees technology (and the material context 
generally) as a set of boundaries, constraints, and limitations in addition to providing 
opportunities, possibilities, and probabilities. It guides, influences, and channels social 
and political behavior, but does not fully determine it. This type of structural causation is 
explained in more detail in the following chapter. The project especially focuses on how 
global technological systems shape the requirements of functionality in particular GCRs. 
International Regimes 
International regimes are the basic political unit of analysis in this project. The 
concept of a ‘regime’ emerged in political science in the late 1970s and 1980s, around the 
time that several domain-specific political arrangements were being supplemented by 
new international agreements. The regime concept is now the dominant way of thinking 
about institutionalized international cooperation among theorists of IR. Although there 
are many theories about regimes, there is no integrated regime theory.23 Stephen 
Krasner’s widely cited 1983 definition describes regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”24 Thus regimes can 
include multiple governance institutions, which focus converging expectations, establish 
normative frameworks, and include behavioral injunctions. Other definitions of regimes 
exist, such as Oran Young’s social interaction approach, which describes the evolutionary 
process through which patterned behavior becomes normalized and conventionalized.25 
This project speaks to all major conceptions of global regimes, but focuses on Krasner’s 
                                                 
23 Vogler, The Global Commons, 20. 
24 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 11. print, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004), 2. 




account due to its status as a “consensus definition.”26 A preliminary version of the main 
hypothesis is that rules, norms, and principles of GCRs will be effective to the degree that 
they are informed by and tailored to prevailing and evolving conditions in the material 
context.  
The regime concept facilitates comparative analysis and generalizations within 
and across cases.27 Regimes can be distinguished based on the specific ‘issue areas’ they 
are designed to address, although issue areas fluctuate over time and have fluid 
boundaries.28 This project assumes that there is an ocean governance regime and an outer 
space governance regime, each of which contain several distinct institutions and 
organizations. Regimes can be characterized by their structure and type, including 
integrated and centralized regimes, nested regimes, fragmented regimes, or regime 
complexes. Robert Keohane and David Victor argue that the type of regime that emerges 
depends on interests, power, uncertainty, and issue linkages.29 This project argues that 
structural conditions set by the material context span and underlie each of these four sets 
of variables, and that therefore something more foundational is at work in the 
construction and implementation of functional regimes than current approaches 
recognize. The intuitive presence of this structure is evident when regime theorists 
describe what is being governed. 
 Regimes are often conceptually and practically tied to a domain or issue area. The 
notion of a ‘domain’ suggests a realm of activity, whereas ‘issue area’ is defined by 
                                                 
26 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of 
International Regimes,” Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (October 1996): 179. 
27 Vogler, The Global Commons, 23. 
28 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 1st 
Princeton classic ed, A Princeton Classic Edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 61. 
29 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on 
Politics 9, no. 01 (March 2011): 7–23. 
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conflicting uses, shared interests, or existing institutional cooperation. The definition of 
issue area as pre-existing areas of cooperation is analytically empty because it simply 
lists current treaties instead of revealing anything important about the conditions of 
regime formation.30 The notions of ‘domain’ and ‘issue area’ both carry implicit – but 
very important – material content. If the issue area is defined by overlapping (competitive 
or shared) interests, these are significantly enabled and defined by technological 
capability, and weighed using a science-driven cost benefit analysis of short-term private 
and long-term common interests.31 Political scientists frequently refer to the nature or 
structure of the “problem,” the “resource,” or the “situation” in a given area.32 All of 
these conceptions refer to, or at least gesture towards, the same thing: technologically 
mediated access and use within the opportunities and obstacles of planetary geography 
and ecology. It is these material features that generate distributional patterns in terms of 
access, interests, and consequences of using the global commons. 
This project is especially concerned with the degree and conditions of regime 
effectiveness, which has been a major focus of the global environmental governance 
literature. International regimes may be flawed, but they are also “the most developed 
way for nation-states to respond to transboundary environmental problems.”33 The 
regimes for the ocean and outer space are understood as intervening variables between 
the structural foundation of the material context and regime outcomes, specifically 
                                                 
30 Keohane, After Hegemony, 61. 
31 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, “Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation,” 
International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (March 2003): 143. 
32 Barrett, Environment and Statecraft, xii; R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, “Forcing Squares, 
Triangles and Ellipses into a Circular Paradigm: The Use of the CommonsDilemma in Examining the 
Allocation of Common Resources,” The Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 3 (September 1979): 277; 
Oran Young, “Land Use, Environmental Change, and Sustainable Development: The Role of Institutional 
Diagnostics,” International Journal of the Commons 1, no. 5 (2011): 82. 
33 Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist, “The Role of Science in Environmental Regimes: The Case of 
LRTAP,” European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (2002): 79. 
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whether or not regimes achieve their goals. This new approach foregrounding the 
structural-material conditions for governance is needed, because the nature and features 
of global environmental problems are increasingly salient to the search for international 
solutions. This approach can be understood as a revival of earlier approaches to global 
commons regimes. The importance of technology for creating conditions of 
interdependence was explicitly recognized by John Ruggie’s 1975 article that is credited 
with introducing the concept of a regime, and was incorporated into early reviews of 
existing global commons regimes.34 Unfortunately, this early appreciation of the 
importance of technology has been increasingly lost, along with a concomitant de-
emphasis on science. Although Krasner’s 1982 review article lists “knowledge” as one of 
the five types of regime theories, this strand has been mostly limited to the epistemic 
communities literature that “[explains] outcomes not with science but with scientists,” 
and has been largely appropriated by constructivist theorists, who largely discount or 
ignore the influence of the material context.35 
Case Selection 
 This dissertation will utilize case studies of two global commons regimes: the 
ocean and outer space. A planned expanded version of the project will also incorporate 
the atmosphere case, but other places generally described as ‘global commons’ will be 
excluded. Antarctica is a frequently cited case, but it is not suited to this analysis for two 
reasons. First, fundamentally, Antarctica is ‘terra firma’ and the other global commons 
are not. Although the Antarctic is structurally a ‘global’ commons, insofar as it is 
intimately connected to global ocean and climate systems, it is politically an 
                                                 
34 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International 
Organization 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 557–83. 
35 Dimitrov, “Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation,” 127. 
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‘international’ commons because its treaty system includes a very limited set of members 
(a ‘club’). This means that its management challenges are different – transaction costs are 
lower and domestic politics (like Chilean and Argentinian nationalism) have a larger 
influence. There are also multiple territorial claims on the frozen continent, which the 
Antarctic Treaty System only puts in abeyance. Second, Antarctica is an easy case for the 
influence of science and technology. The Antarctic Treaty System is explicitly based on 
science: its formation followed a collective scientific research endeavor during the 
International Geophysical Year, full participation in the regime requires active scientific 
research, and its evolution over time has been widely explained with primary reference to 
new environmental and ecological knowledge.36  
In contrast, the ocean, atmosphere, and outer space are ‘global’ (or more 
accurately, ‘planetary’) in both their material contours and their collective management. 
Although specific physical features characterize each domain, the success and failure of 
their regimes have been almost entirely explained with reference to the changing power, 
interests, and ideologies of negotiating parties, regime members, and domain users. These 
cases share important similarities, which makes the effect of their material contextual 
features easier to discern. Clusters of international institutions, which were developed and 
implemented over time, constitute each domain-specific regime. All of them are usefully 
analyzed starting in the 1950s, and each regime negotiated its major central institutions in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In each case, lawyers and diplomats initially attempted the 
straightforward extension of territorial models of ownership and control, which had to be 
modified or rejected to fit the non-terrestrial circumstances. They were also all subject to 
the ideological ferment of the ‘New International Economic Order’ movement and the 
                                                 
36 Vogler, The Global Commons. 
 
 18 
‘Group of 77’ coalition, which is reflected in the common theme of ‘technology transfer’ 
as a regime mandate, and ‘equity’ as a regime principle. These historical similarities 
make commons regimes well suited for cross-domain comparison because their material 
and technological foundations exhibit substantial variation, while the power, interest, and 






Table 1 - Ocean and Outer Space Cases 
 Ocean Outer Space 
Geophysics 74% of planet surface  
Circulation at multiple scales 




Orbital pathways, orbital decay 
Cosmic radiation 
Ecology Plentiful and diverse None 






Primary activities Renewable resource extraction 
Spatial extension resources  
Sink resources 







Potential activities Renewable energies  
Non-renewable resource extraction 
Weapons basing 
Renewable energies 











International Seabed Authority 
UNEP Regional Seas 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty 
London Convention (1972)  
MARPOL 1973/78 
IMCO/IMO (1958, 1982) 
ICRW/IWC (1946, 1982) 
ITLOS 
OST + Protocols/Conventions 
Bogota Declaration (1976) 




Scope of Regime All ocean activities  
All ocean areas (minimal in ABNJ) 
‘Space objects’ 
Highly permissive 




U.N. organizations  
No specific adjudication 
 
The Geopolitical School 
 In the colloquial sense, ‘geopolitics’ has come to be used as a synonym for inter-
state rivalry and competition, especially in the realm of security. But there is a larger and 
more theoretical tradition of geopolitics that analyzes the influence of the material 
context on human affairs, and especially international politics. The idea that the natural 
environment shapes human political institutions – both their formation and outcomes – is 
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very old.37 This project sits squarely within the geopolitical school of IR, which can be 
described as either nascent or renascent in the existing literature on regimes, depending 
on one’s historical perspective. Geopolitical theory attempts to discern relationships 
between the material world of geography and technology, and the social world of politics. 
In particular, geopolitical theory explains the dependent variables of order/disorder, 
cooperation/competition, and peace/conflict with reference to spatial and environmental 
aspects of the material context. As a school of thought, geopolitics has origins in early 
naturalist arguments about the relationship between climate and topography on one hand, 
and human identity and political forms on the other. Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Bodin 
all made such arguments, connecting natural laws and limits to human capacity, will, and 
behavior, as well as the emergence of particular political forms.38  
In addition to their rigid and strong determinism, these early naturalist theories 
have been widely criticized for their inability to account for technological change. The 
industrial revolution prompted the inclusion of technology as a primary variable in 
geopolitical thinking about international politics, in addition to the geographical and 
topographical features highlighted in earlier iterations of naturalism and materialism. In 
adding technology as a primary variable, naturalism was recast as ‘historical 
materialism.’39 Liberal internationalists like John Dewey and H.G. Wells focused on the 
political and social implications of the “ubiquitous notion of technologically produced 
                                                 
37 Daniel Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era,” in 
Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, ed. Daniel. Deudney and 
Richard Matthew (SUNY Press, 1999), 26. 
38 Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient 
Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century, 7. (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1996); Daniel 
Deudney, “Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism,” European Journal of International 
Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 77–107; Ladis K.D. Kristof, “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 1 (March 1960): 15–51. 
39 Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 195–97. 
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interdependence.”40 In general, however, the adoption of technology as a “master 
variable” in geopolitical thought was somewhat uneven during the early 20th century.41 
Partially as a result of adding technology to the core set of material-contextual 
variables, the early twentieth century school of ‘global geopolitics’ was less deterministic 
than earlier naturalistic theories.42 Ideas about the material context directing (or directly 
causing) social and political outcomes were replaced with a broader, and more structural 
notion of causation: the material context (geography and technology) creates and entails 
constraints, limitations, and influences on international politics.43 According to Ladis 
Kristof, three schools of geopolitical thought – the American, Anglo-Saxon, and German 
– focused on the relationships between world politics, global geography, and the 
technological systems of the industrial revolution (communication, destruction, and 
transportation). American and Anglo scholars – especially Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford 
Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman – evaluated the security-viability of particular 
political forms in the larger political system, and provided diplomatic, strategic, and 
military advice to their respective Western hegemons.44 These geopolitical thinkers 
focused on the state as the primary unit of international politics, and sought to explain the 
influence of geography and technology on interstate interaction. The American school of 
global geopolitics generally argued that the changing material context necessitates new 
and different political forms for achieving welfare and security. Within geopolitics as a 
type of historical security materialism, Anglo-American theorists analyzed not just the 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 205. 
41 Harold Sprout, “Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective,” World Politics 15, no. 2 
(January 1963): 187–212. 
42 Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Pr, 
1985), 174. 
43 Kristof, “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics.” 
44 Daniel Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change,” in New Thinking in International Relations, ed. Michael W. 
Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 98. 
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role of states and empires, but also various republican unit types and interstate federations 
and union.45 
Another important advance and refinement of geopolitical theorizing in recent 
decades is found in work by Harold and Margaret Sprout, who begin The Ecological 
Perspective on Human Affairs (1965) with a recognition that international political theory 
relies on ideas about the material context, “variously designated the situation, setting, 
stage, arena, environment, or milieu,” yet theories still employ environmental variables 
“loosely and imprecisely.”46 The Sprouts explicitly adopt an ‘ecological perspective,’ and 
seek to describe and explain how a variety of environmental factors affect what humans 
choose to do (“undertakings”) and how those plans turn out (“outcomes”). They 
introduce a distinction between the ‘milieu’ and the ‘psycho-milieu,’ with the former 
being “the whole spectrum of environing factors; human as well as nonhuman, intangible 
as well as tangible” and the latter the image or idea of the milieu maintained by 
individual humans.47 Both the milieu and the psycho-milieu affect behavior and 
outcomes. The Sprouts forward theories of environmental possibilism and probabilism. In 
possibilist doctrine, the milieu does not compel or direct human behavior, but provides a 
set of opportunities and limitations for it.48 The milieu affects “operational results” of 
various undertakings, whether or not particular actors are aware of the effect.49 In 
contrast, probabilism is a model of behavior that considers the influence of the psycho-
milieu on “psychological states (values, preferences, moods, attitudes, perception, 
                                                 
45 Deudney, Bounding Power. 
46 Margaret Sprout and Harold Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), 6. 
47 Ibid., 27. 
48 Ibid., 83. 
49 Ibid., 95. 
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cognition, recognition) and actions (choices, decisions, undertakings).”50 This second 
focus on psychological phenomena is a major difference between this project and the 
Sprouts’ ecological perspective; I do not wade into the realm of psychology and 
individual decision-making. However, there are several important similarities. I also 
focus on ecology, in addition to geography and technology. The Sprouts’ description of 
their possibilism thesis is a paradigmatic example of structural causation; they conceive 
environmental factors as a “matrix, or encompassing channel…which limits the 
execution of undertakings” regardless of perceptual or psychological factors.51 Finally, 
The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs and this project both ultimately prescribe 
the systematic collection of “a very wide range of precise and up-to-date information” 
about the material context, as a key condition of “successful international statecraft.”52 
In recent years, the theoretical presence of geopolitics in IR theory has been 
associated with the work of Daniel Deudney. His refurbishment and theoretical 
development of ideas found in a nascent or implicit form in earlier geopolitics has 
provided framework and theoretical propositions that bring geopolitical theorizing into 
the contemporary planetary era. 
 In addition to reviving the geopolitical school in IR, Deudney also recasts its 
history in his 2008 book Bounding Power. Bounding Power reframes the intellectual 
history of materialist geopolitics to reveal a marginalized, but originally very innovative 
and consequential, IR tradition that places the main claims of Liberalism and Realism as 
fragments of a larger, more complete, but more inchoate ‘republican security theory.’ 
‘Republican security theory’ concerns “the relations among security-from-violence, 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 99–100. 
51 Ibid., 11. 
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material contexts, and types of government.”53 This historical project demonstrates that 
the political agenda of global governance to moderate and exit interstate anarchy is not an 
idealist or utopian enterprise, but is rather the necessary next step in adjusting political 
arrangements to the imperatives of a material context marked by planetary-scale violence 
interdependence at intense levels. This historical exegesis demonstrates that early 
naturalist, global geopolitical thinking and contemporary international institution building 
to replace anarchy, are all intelligible as responses to security imperatives created by 
shifting scales of intense violence interdependence. Deudney argues that contemporary 
political theory is characterized by a “gross under appreciation or misappreciation of the 
importance of material-contextual factors, of nature, geography, ecology, and 
technology.”54 Although he does mention the importance of ecology, Deudney’s 
argument about security-viable political forms focuses on geography and technology, and 
he frames materialist geopolitics as “an argument about material contexts composed of 
geography and technology as restraining and empowering forces. [emphasis original]”55  
This project is, in important ways, inspired by and consistent with the grand 
historical political theorizing contained in Bounding Power. It draws upon the history of 
material-contextual arguments surveyed and unpacked by Deudney, and seeks to 
contribute to the revival of materialist geopolitical thinking. It employs a ‘limitations and 
opportunities’ view of structural causation, similar to Deudney’s focus on restraints and 
empowerments. However, this project differs from Deudney’s argument in its emphasis 
on global commons regimes, ecology, and collective action problems arising in efforts to 
govern fluid non-terrestrial planetary spaces. It also differs in that it is not primarily 
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focused on security from violence, but instead analyzes ecological and economic aspects 
of the interplay between material context and international regimes. 
This project’s effort to develop a materialist geopolitical theory of regimes for 
non-terrestrial spaces employs the overall framework of geopolitics. It is part of an 
emerging body of theory that can be understood as “neoclassical geopolitics,” which 
attempts to make more theoretically explicit what was nascent and underdeveloped in 
earlier geopolitical theories.56 The geopolitical legacy connects with the present project 
primarily through the argument that changing material conditions influence the form and 
character of functional institutions. It differs with many geopolitical theories, however, in 
replacing the state with the regime as the primary political and institutional unit of 
interest.  
Planetary Geopolitics 
The approach taken here is part of an emerging body of neo-geopolitical theory 
best described as ‘planetary geopolitics.’ Deudney first coined this term in his 1983 
monograph, Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace. Deudney was primarily 
concerned about the conditions of international security given the existence of planetary-
scale weapons. He notes that states attempting to achieve national security have focused 
on developing the “ability to garrison the planet’s commons,” and that military 
competition now takes place in the “vast, fluid and otherwise uninhabited realms of 
water, air, ice, and space.”57 Deudney’s central point, which he describes as the “lesson 
of planetary geopolitics,” is that security has now become indivisible, and therefore can 
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only be achieved cooperatively.58 Although his focus in Whole Earth Security is on the 
requirements of international security, Deudney’s more general point applies to the 
project at hand. He suggests that the fate of the ocean, atmosphere, and outer space is of 
“life or death concern for all peoples.”59 While in 1983 Deudney confined this conclusion 
to the issue of security from nuclear weapons, the sentiment rings true for the 
contemporary magnitude of environmental problems in non-terrestrial domains. And in 
later works, Deudney states the value of a planetary geopolitics approach more generally, 
as a theoretical response to the “planetary-scale material and social reality” created by 
globalization.60 Planetary geopolitics, as described by Deudney, can therefore be 
understood as a more general “contextual-material geographic understanding of the 
contemporary global situation.”61 Its central theme is the importance of planetary-scale 
material context for achieving desired outcomes in international politics.  
Geopolitics is an imperfect term for the insights that it is here being employed to 
represent, because it emphasizes the ‘geo-’ but also encompasses the ‘techno-’ and ‘eco-’ 
aspects of the material context.  The addition of ‘planetary’ aims to capture and 
emphasize the latter features, because it calls to mind the technological and ecological 
interconnections and interdependencies that weave the planet together into a single 
dynamic entity. By foregrounding the material features of planetary processes, ecosystem 
structures, and global technological systems, this theory identifies unique influences, 
limitations, and opportunities in planetary-scale non-terrestrial domains. The basic 
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assumptions of planetary geopolitics, and how it is applied to the study of global 
commons regimes, will be surveyed and supported in detail in the following chapter. But 
to establish the need for an additional treatment, this type of theory can be usefully 
compared and contrasted with two existing studies of global commons regimes. John 
Vogler and Frank Biermann take tentative steps towards an environment-centered regime 
theory, but stop short of claiming a new type of approach, or linkages with geopolitical 
theory.  
 Vogler has several major publications on the topic of global commons regimes, in 
which he explains both their content and effectiveness. Vogler describes the ‘global 
commons’ as a social construct, an idea that emerged in the late 1980s as a result of 
“shifts in human knowledge, capability and perceptions of scarcity” and overuse.62 
Although Vogler does not refer to the milieu and psycho-milieu, or the material context, 
his variables of interest fall squarely within the geopolitical tradition. Vogler is primarily 
concerned with scientific knowledge and technological capability, and how they shape 
and portray an issue area or domain. In terms of regime effectiveness, Vogler focuses on 
the importance of adaptiveness and flexibility of institutions. In particular, he argues that 
global commons regimes must adopt the function of generating and incorporating new 
knowledge about the domain at hand.63 Judging whether a regime design needs to adapt 
in order to be effective requires the establishment of “independent reference points, 
reflective of whatever scientific consensus may exist.”64 Because issue areas change over 
time, and often have fluid boundaries, institutional inertia and inflexibility is a major 
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cause of ineffectiveness.65 For Vogler, institutional effectiveness is significantly 
determined by how regimes account for “the complexity, difficulty and extent of the 
problem” as it exists in the real world.66  
This project shares much with Vogler’s account of global commons regimes, in 
terms of explicanda and explicans. But it both updates and surpasses Vogler’s account of 
the relationship between global commons regimes and the material context of non-
terrestrial domains. First, Vogler treats “shared scientific understandings” as a regime 
principle (‘beliefs of fact and causation’), which implies automatic regime change in light 
of new information.67 In contrast, I treat scientific understandings of non-terrestrial places 
as an exogenous variable, which may or may not be incorporated into regimes and 
prompt regime change. Second, Vogler argues that treating the “mismatch between the 
scope of a regime and the dimensions of the underlying problem, perceived ecologically” 
as a source of ineffectiveness is impractical.68 He argues that effectiveness does not 
require that the scale of the solution match the scale of the problem.69 In contrast, I 
suggest that mismatch between the scope and scale of the issue area and the regime is an 
importance source of ineffectiveness, and one that must be remedied. Finally, whereas 
Vogler is optimistic that regimes have been getting more effective “with respect to 
curbing environmentally damaging behavior,” the cases examined in this project suggest 
the opposite – things are getting worse, and existing regimes are likely to fail to achieve 
their objectives.70 
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A more recent treatment of international regimes for the environment comes from 
Frank Biermann’s Earth System Governance. The Earth System Governance project is 
both a single book, and a “large multinational project” instigated by Biermann himself, 
and bringing together hundreds of researchers.71 The book and project represent a “clear 
and standard reference point” for projects like this one, because of the depth and breadth 
of Biermann’s treatment of global governance.72 Biermann defines Earth system 
governance broadly, to include “the sum of the formal and informal rule systems and 
actor networks at all levels of human society that are set up to steer societies toward 
preventing, mitigating, and adapting to environmental change and earth system 
transformation.”73 He is concerned with the governance “architecture,” which is the 
“overall institutional arrangement within an issue area” and therefore encompasses issue-
specific regimes.74 Unlike Vogler, Biermann is motivated by a concern for the 
“prevailing lack of effectiveness” evident in existing governance architectures designed 
to confront global environmental problems.75 Although his explanation for 
ineffectiveness is complex, Biermann notes that “there remains a serious mismatch 
between the research and recommendations of earth system analysts and the actions of 
political decision makers.”76 This project centers the mismatch between scientific advice 
and institutional design, and argues that a ‘match’ is appropriately understood as a 
condition of regime effectiveness. In this way, it adds to Biermann’s list of five features 
of effective governance architecture. Another similarity is Biermann’s overall aim: Earth 
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System Governance is analytical, in that it seeks to explain ineffectiveness, but also 
normative in its critique of existing governance systems.  
 Like the regime analysis offered by Vogler and Biermann, a planetary geopolitics 
approach highlights the role of science and technology in the creation of effective and 
functional regimes. These concepts will be defined and explored in detail in the next 
chapter, but their theoretical import is discussed below. 
Global Technology 
Global technological systems are firmly in the background of human political 
affairs, resulting in a kind of technological somnambulism, where we “willingly 
sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence.”77 
This project centers the features and evolution of global technological systems, as a 
shaper of practices, creator of interests and problems, and opportunity for particular 
solution sets. More specifically, technological systems facilitate new types, quantities, 
and distributions of access and exploitation, but also new possibilities for verification and 
enforcement. In chapter two, technology is precisely defined, and the geopolitical 
approach to technology is contrasted with Science and Technology Studies, which entails 
a more constructivist, and less materialist, theoretical orientation. The geopolitical 
approach to technology has four basic features. First, it takes the composition and 
distribution of technology as key variables that change over time. Although the ‘level’ or 
‘degree’ of technological advancement is often discussed in a colloquial way, these types 
of descriptions only make sense with reference to the past, and tend to embed a 
teleological assumption. Composition and distribution offer a relatively neutral way to 
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grasp qualitative technological change. Second, geopolitical theory recognizes that 
technology is not an inert set of tools for human users, but is in a real sense in ‘control’ of 
driving activity and consequences in non-terrestrial spaces. This middle ground between 
instrumentalism and determinism was described above. Third, because global 
technological systems often represent both the primary source of problems and an 
opportunity for various solution sets, they are central to the question of effectiveness. 
Both Promethean moderns like Fuller and eco-pragmatists like Brand identify 
technological systems as a central opportunity to control and change our collective fate. 
The fourth feature of the geopolitical treatment of technology connects the theory 
with a larger body of work on political institutions. Geopolitical theory highlights the 
spatial features of stakeholder groups, such that formal membership is secondary to the 
group created by the scale and scope of consequences. The empirical changes associated 
with the industrial revolution helped prompt the notion that technological systems create 
increasingly extensive interdependence, and therefore ever-larger stakeholder groups. In 
The Public and Its Problems (1927), John Dewey discussed the requirements this 
situation created for effective political forms. Dewey argued that technological change 
was a “permanent revolution” that required flexibility and adjustment. As the material 
context changed, so did the “public” – or the group with interactions and spillovers that 
are lasting and significant.78 The communications and transportation technologies of the 
industrial revolution created a public much larger than in the past.  
The key question became how to revise and reform government so it could 
maintain its positive functions without becoming a hierarchy. Dewey favored an 
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administrative state capable of task accomplishment and regulatory interventions of a 
type that formerly occurred at lower levels of government. Dewey saw democracy as a 
necessary element of maintaining functionality, a kind of experimentalism that 
can/should constantly evaluate the nature and scope of “publics” to produce 
“communities” (self-aware publics). A major contrast between The Public and Its 
Problems and this project is the scale of government/governance considered. The main 
thrust of Dewey’s argument was that levels of interdependence and interaction previously 
only experienced at the local level were now being experienced at the scale of 
continental-size nation-states. As Deudney points out, the increase in scale is a function 
of geography and technology; “material contexts will determine the scope of publics.”79 
In the contemporary period, a central guiding assumption of materialist geopolitics is that 
high levels of interaction and unintended consequence – and thus publics – now exist at 
the planetary scale. The geopolitical approach draws on the notion of publics and 
communities – publics are groups of common fate, and communities are self-aware 
publics. But “not all publics give rise to communities,” and many publics created by 
interactions in the ocean and outer space remain unrecognized, unacknowledged, and/or 
unaccounted for by regimes.80 
Earth System Science  
Earth system science has an important role in planetary geopolitics, because it 
defines the domain and issues to be managed, through increasingly precise and accurate 
maps and causal models. In the language of the Sprouts, Earth system science represents 
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an important source of information and ideas in the construction of the psycho-milieu. 
The assumptions associated with scientific knowledge production are unpacked in the 
next chapter, but its theoretical role in planetary geopolitics is briefly reviewed here. 
Existing accounts of the impact of regime design on effectiveness stress endogenous 
institutional variables like decision-making procedures, membership, access to the 
resource, and formal compliance.81 But the scientific enterprise offers a standard of 
comparison for regime design, a source of guidance and information that is often 
overlooked or under-emphasized. Scientists discover and characterize ecological systems, 
and trace and define geographic dimensions like location, distance, and distribution. The 
mental maps and models they produce represent an understanding of the natural world 
that is indispensable – and profoundly influential – for policy making. 
As described above, this project makes a normative claim about the benefits and 
virtues of scientific knowledge production. Governance challenges in the global 
commons are best understood through the lens of Earth system science, instead of the 
alternative and hegemonic national-state-territorial perspective. While the former seeks a 
maximally informed and increasingly precise image of non-terrestrial domains, the latter 
distorts and cherry-picks information for its own (often misperceived) benefit. The state-
centric perspective is highly durable, because the state was and is the primary locus of 
interest formation in negotiations over the shared use of the global commons. In 1975, 
regimes were understood to be “transition systems” from the territorial state system to a 
kind of global governance architecture. 82  But far from being the beginning of a 
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movement away from the state, regimes actually re-inscribed the political geography of 
the state system. The political geography of global commons regimes is primarily 
international, which is to say dominated and defined by state-to-state relationships. Earth 
system science, in contrast, produces geographical information that is planetary in scale 
and scope, including complex and dynamic processes that create non-territorial 
communities of mutual interest and shared vulnerability. In this way, it generates an 
essentially non-state-centric map of the domain and issues to be managed. This 
alternative image plays a theoretical role by offering a standard of comparison and 
evaluation for existing regimes. 
State-centric approaches to management of the global commons have been largely 
ineffective; states have historically subsidized and protected technological exploitation of 
the commons, primarily funding scientific research that justified or enhanced use 
activities. This combination of funding technological access and willfully ignoring 
scientific understanding results in over-exploitation of the global commons, and poor 
understanding of the negative consequences of doing so. For example, state-supported 
oceanography during the Cold War was dominated by geophysical research – to the 
detriment of ecological research – in order to pursue security-imperatives related to 
submarine technology.83 Economic-imperatives similarly disincentivized ecological 
research. The state and the fishing industry were more interested in catching fish than 
counting them. As a result, the ‘industrial revolution of the sea’ was unaccompanied by a 
thorough account or real understanding of the contours and limits of marine 
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ecosystems.84 The global character of the marine ecosphere was treated as irrelevant to 
the formation and satisfaction of state-based interests. Even ostensibly global orientations 
like the ‘common heritage’ concept were actually about equalizing states’ rights to access 
resources. What has been missing is a focus on truly global shared resources, such as 
renewable food sources, clean air, uncluttered orbits, and ecosystem services. The engine 
of knowledge production about shared global resources and interests – Earth system 
sciences – has been truncated, coopted, and misdirected by the imperatives of modern 
states. This willful ignorance is an important source of regime ineffectiveness. 
Conclusion 
 This project introduces a geopolitical theory of global commons regimes that 
supplements and complements existing explanations of their ineffectiveness. This 
involves making a coherent and salient critique that is overlooked by the existing 
literature, as well as adumbrating several conditions of regime effectiveness in non-
terrestrial domains. Planetary geopolitics identifies structural constraints and 
opportunities for regime functioning, which are unique to the non-terrestrial domain at 
hand. There are multiple ‘structures’ examined in this project: the structure of material 
reality, the structure of scientific knowledge accumulation, and the structure of 
technological change. Unlike many conventional structural theories, planetary geopolitics 
can (and does) admit that regimes shape outcomes and behavior, and are not mere 
epiphenomena.85 This project aspires to schematize the impact on regimes that is 
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expected in the context of different types of scientific and technological change, modified 
by the particular features of non-terrestrial domains.   
Analytically, the dependent variables of this project are patterns of practice, 
formation of interests, and definition of problems. These represent what state and non-
state actors actually do in the global commons, and what state negotiators want out of 
regimes. Practices, interests, and problems are not fully determinative of regime 
effectiveness, but they have important relationships with most standards of effectiveness. 
Change in practices can indicate whether regimes need to modify, and have modified, 
actor behavior. Change in interests can indicate how and whether regimes serve or satisfy 
national and international interests. Change in problem definition represents shifting 
requirements for regime effectiveness. It is posited, and assumed, that GCRs are 
ineffective, and this project seeks to better explain why.  
 Normatively, this project attempts to throw off the blinders of the state system, 
and focus instead on the interaction between technological, geophysical, and ecological 
systems on a planetary scale. A macro-scale materialist history of global commons 
regimes situates these institutions between the unfolding and amplification of 
technologies of observation and access, and the geophysical and ecological ‘resources’ 
that drive humans into the non-terrestrial realms. Although the primary contribution of 
my argument is a geopolitical theory that complements existing regime theories, it also 
encompasses several implicit and explicit critiques of existing governance institutions. 
The basic prescription to international diplomats hoping to achieve collective goals and 
avoid shared vulnerabilities is this: pay closer attention to the patterns of change in 
science and technology, because they have important implications for opportunities, 
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obstacles, problems, and solutions in global commons domains. There is urgency to the 
theory building undertaken here, because technological change is accelerating, the human 
population is growing, and policymakers continue to disregard and deny scientific 
consensus on environmental issues. The planetary geopolitics perspective contains 
insights for effective treaty design, and contributes to the construction of a ‘planetary 
consciousness’ that may help overcome the domestic political obstacles to new 









Philosophical Foundations: Scientific Epistemology, Mixed Ontology 
 
This project pushes against recent trends in International Relations (IR) 
scholarship, and seeks to revive a theoretical approach that has been largely set aside by 
IR scholars. The study of global commons regimes undertaken here is incompatible with, 
and unintelligible to, post-modernism, critical theory, strong social constructivism, and 
interpretivist political theory. This chapter explains the divergence between planetary 
geopolitics and these bodies of theory at the level of philosophical foundations. More 
specifically, it unpacks and defends the commitment to a partial materialist ontology and 
scientific epistemology, or the idea that there is exists an objective material world, which 
scientists can describe and explain with special authority. This chapter describes 
geopolitical theory in broad outlines, setting the stage for a more specific description of 
planetary geopolitics, as applied to global commons regimes, in the following chapter.  
The first section will clarify the theoretical contribution made by this project, 
which can be described as a geopolitical theory of global commons regimes (GCRs). The 
second section surveys on-going debates about the status, role, and function of science. I 
argue that scientific knowledge production is a communal activity that produces inter-
subjective beliefs with increasing congruence to an objective material reality. The third 
section defines and describes the importance of technology to the overall project, and 
characterizes two different types of technological change. The conclusion introduces the 
connections between the philosophical foundations of the project, and the approach taken 
to analyze GCRs in the case chapters. 
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Geopolitical Theory  
 This project aims to generate a more sophisticated theory of global commons 
regimes (GCRs) by applying a strand of largely neglected materialist arguments in 
classical geopolitical theory. Reformulations of ‘old materialism’ have already proven 
fruitful in the security realm, and in this project I hope to extend geopolitical theory to the 
analysis of collective action problems, and attempts to deal with them, in the Earth’s non-
terrestrial realms.86 Geopolitical theory has virtually disappeared as a distinct theoretical 
position in IR, so its absence from theories of global commons regimes is unsurprising. 
Those who do call for a re-emergence of geopolitics often focus on the security side, 
including issues like resource scarcity and environmental security.87 But environmental 
problems in non-terrestrial spaces are also a fruitful avenue for employing the insights of 
geopolitical theory. In this section, I describe what a geopolitical theory entails. In 
subsequent sections, I examine what a geopolitical theory assumes about the world, and 
argue that it provides distinct benefits as a theory of global commons regimes. 
 Geopolitical theories focus on the features of the material context of human 
activity – specifically geography, ecology, and technology – as determinants of the basic 
opportunities and constraints for actors and activity in international politics. Geopolitical 
analysis implies a structural theory of change, insofar as change in the material context 
channels or influences the type of activities undertaken in the global commons.88  
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 A contribution of this argument to the larger project of resurrecting and 
reformulating geopolitical theory is its treatment of Earth system science. The material 
context as revealed by science is typically treated as an assumed pre-condition for 
political action, but this project engages it as a real set of variables. ‘Geography’ and 
‘ecology’ constitute much of the material context, in that they refer to the actual material 
reality of non-terrestrial domains, but they also represent ideas about the material 
context. This distinction employs the Sprouts’ concepts of ‘milieu’ and ‘psycho-milieu.’ 
A geopolitical theory of GCRs therefore operates on two levels – it considers how the 
material context structures human activity, and how scientific knowledge about the 
material context shapes ideas about interests and problems. When technology, geography, 
and ecology change in the real world, so do the possibilities for human activity. For 
example, new hull technology makes deep-sea submersion possible, the melting Arctic 
ice cap makes new transportation routes possible, and the extinction of a fish species 
makes fishing it impossible. Such activities are what GCRs seek to manage. Earth system 
science stimulates the development of new technologies, but its main contribution to 
geopolitical theory is the way that scientific knowledge accumulation changes ideas 
about geography, ecology, and technology. Earth system science informs the content of 
interests and reveals the structure of environmental problems. It reveals when existing 
technologies have harmful side effects, when non-terrestrial ecologies are fragile, and 
when geographies are more or less permanent. These ideas fill out important concepts 
like ‘shared vulnerability’ and ‘sustainable use,’ and may either support or undermine 
existing political authorities. In other words, Earth system science, through its 
characterization of the features of geography and ecology, and the consequences of 
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technology, helps set the agenda for GCRs. Whether or not scientific information is used 
to shape the formation of regimes is an important determinant of their effectiveness. 
 This kind of materialist geopolitical theory provides approaches to global 
environmental governance that confront three basic challenges: moving targets, 
complexity, and incomplete information.89 It also unpacks these concepts and addresses a 
significant part of their effect on regimes. ‘Targets’ for governance often move because 
of new technologies, or new insights about the geographical distribution of consequences. 
‘Complexity’ is a feature of the geography and ecology of non-terrestrial realms, whose 
multiple interacting and overlapping processes are difficult to disaggregate and/or 
partition. Incomplete information is slowly reduced by the efforts of Earth system 
scientists, who collect data, generate explanations, and disseminate important information 
about activities and consequences in the global commons (important examples include 
the International Geophysical Year and World Ocean Census). The geopolitical theory of 
GCRs cannot account for the full range of target movements, problem complexities, and 
gaps in information, but it does analyze them as important features of change driven by 
material-contextual variables. 
 The geopolitical theory developed here adds important insights to the analysis of 
GCRs, but it is not capable of standing alone. The material context affects GCR outcomes 
by shaping the conditions of possibility for access and exploitation, but geopolitical 
variables also matter because of their influence on intervening variables like power, 
interests, and ideas. In this way, geopolitical theory complements existing theories of 
GCRs by highlighting the way that new insights about the natural world (science) and 
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new possibilities for use-activities (technology) influence non-material variables. The 
relationship between a geopolitical theory and existing theories of GCRs will be 
examined in the following chapter, but first the basic commitments and distinct 
advantages of geopolitical theory will be reviewed. The next section examines the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the project. 
Modern Natural Science 
 Geopolitical theory offers several advantages compared to regime theories that 
emphasize power, interests, and ideas. Geopolitics is a “meta- or master framework that, 
without predetermining policy choice, suggests long-term factors and trends” in 
international politics.90 Understanding how changes in material contexts affect regime 
formation and effectiveness over time is underpinned by a more general understanding of 
scientific realism. This section will unpack the notion that science and technology 
undergo change conditioned by the features of material reality. Materialist geopolitical 
theory’s commitment to a philosophy of scientific realism and a soft version of 
technological determinism distinguishes it from some existing approaches to the study of 
international politics. Science and technology directly impact the formation of interests 
and understanding of problems that motivate regime building. Breaking down the 
meaning of science and technology for governance in non-terrestrial spaces is therefore 
an important component of geopolitical theory building. 
 The basic ontological and epistemological commitments of geopolitical theory 
differ in major ways with strong social constructivist and post-modernist approaches. The 
philosophy of ‘scientific realism’ is the conceptual foundation of geopolitics, and it 
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distinguishes this theory from several other social science approaches. This section will 
survey opposing theoretical approaches to international politics, and unpack the partial 
materialist ontology and scientific epistemology that characterizes geopolitics. 
Geopolitical theory rests upon a mixed ontological foundation: the independent variable 
of interest is the material context, but the dependent variable is regimes, which are social 
and political constructions. A key assumption is that the scientific method and scientific 
community represent a privileged and relatively authoritative form of knowledge 
production. The geopolitical approach assumes a basic relationship between the objective 
features of the material context and the ideas about that material context produced by 
Earth system scientists. This commitment is also compatible with pragmatist conceptual 
foundations, but there are advantages to scientific realism which will be surveyed at the 
end of this section. 
The S ie e Wars  
Materialist geopolitics is positioned on one side of a “perennial philosophical 
dispute” between forms of philosophical realism and anti-realism.91 In the mid-1990s, 
renewed tensions between proponents of scientific realism and their antagonists in social 
constructionism and post-modernism boiled over into the so-called ‘science wars.’92 Both 
ontology and epistemology were once again theaters of heated philosophical dispute. 
Anti-realists argued that the world is socially constructed, and targeted the special 
epistemic status of scientific knowledge. Scientific realists defended their belief in an 
objective material world, authoritatively described and understood by science. They 
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suggested that this view was commonsense in the modern world.93 This debate about 
epistemology – what knowledge the scientific method can produce – is important because 
of its implications for the reliability of science as a guide to practical action. These issues 
are addressed by the philosophy of science, which seeks to “disentangle the part of 
scientific theories that is up to us and the part that is up to the world.”94 The scientific 
image of the world is used to define global environmental and collective action problems, 
so its trustworthiness is a matter of paramount political concern.  
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
The most recent iteration of the debate about the status of scientific knowledge 
started with a historical perspective on the development of science. Thomas Kuhn’s 
landmark 1969 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions described change in 
scientific knowledge as occurring through episodic “paradigm shifts” instead of 
incremental data accumulation.95 Each paradigm shift creates a “revolutionary divide” 
between the old “normal science” and the new “normal science,” which are 
“incommensurable” with one another. These shifts subvert or undermine the idea of 
linear and incremental scientific progress, because the new “normal science” is not 
understood as “epistemically superior” to the previous.96 For Kuhn, the impossibility of 
neutral observation meant that sociological factors played an important role in driving 
shifts in scientific concept and theory. Scientific paradigms are therefore socially 
determined, and “create the reality of scientific phenomena” instead of describing 
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features of a world independent of minds.97 Other scholars quickly expanded the idea that 
scientific consensus was driven by social factors instead of better observations and 
explanations of the natural material world. Kuhn’s book has been described as “the single 
most important influence on the development of social constructivism,” but the author 
himself later questioned the constructivist understanding of science.98 By that time, 
however, even more radical and elaborately developed versions of social constructivism 
had emerged. 
Scientific realism contrasts with and opposes the ‘Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge’ (SSK) program developed by members of the ‘Edinburgh school,’ which 
includes work by Barry Barnes, David Bloor, Randall Collins, Steven Shapin, Simon 
Schaffer, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Bruno Latour, among others. The SSK program was an 
outgrowth of anti-naturalism from the 1950s and 1960s, which “refused to take science as 
an authority on epistemic matters.”99 A core commitment of the SSK approach, described 
by Bloor, is “symmetry in explanation,” the idea that beliefs that are ‘false’ and beliefs 
understood to be ‘true’ are epistemically equivalent.100 Bloor argues that the success of 
scientific knowledge must be explained just as much as the success of any other idea.  
This argument against scientific authority includes a rejection of materialist 
ontology. A central assumption of SSK is that scientific knowledge is “not constrained by 
nature,” but socially constructed. SSK scholars insist that “intellectual content is always 
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and altogether amenable to sociological explanation.”101 Construction of a particular 
concept may result from social interactions within the scientific community, or from the 
pressure of broad social and economic interests that determine the “content of scientific 
ideas.”102 Because they believe the injection of social norms and interests is inevitable, 
SSK scholars often propose an alternative ‘democratic epistemology,’ which dilutes the 
bias of a particular standpoint by explicitly injecting a diversity of gender, class, race, or 
other marginalized perspectives.103 In short, they ‘doubled down’ on the social 
determination of scientific knowledge. 
 A particularly influential voice in SSK and Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) is actually an anthropologist, Bruno Latour. In Laboratory Life (with Steve 
Wooldgar, 1979), Science in Action (1987), and We Have Never Been Modern (1993), 
Latour lays out a social constructivist view of science. For Latour, a scientific fact, 
concept, or theory achieves consensus by being “propagated” as a “network of 
standardized practices” that is “extended and stabilized.”104 Although he ultimately 
agrees with Shapin and Schaffer that “the facts are fabricated,” Latour offers a corrective 
to the overly-sociological Edinburgh school.105 He argues that facts must be crafted and 
called into existence, because the material world does not describe itself, but that they are 
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not purely socially constructed, “not made out of thin air, not of social relations, not of 
human categories.”106 For Latour, facts have a dual nature. 
Instead of understanding the world as purely social or purely material, Latour 
introduces the idea of “hybrids,” which are “mixtures of nature and culture.”107 He argues 
that an ontology that separates the objective/natural from the subjective/social takes an 
“epistemological wrong turn.”108 As the “official dogma of modernity,” the 
objective/subjective and natural/social distinction infects both scientific realism and the 
SSK literature. Scientific realism seeks to provide objective material explanations of 
scientific facts, whereas SSK pursues “purely social explanations.”109 Both positions reify 
the modern dualist ontology, and therefore both are subject to Latour’s critique. For 
Latour, nothing is purely social or purely material, and everything is exactly both. But 
while Latour’s position can be understood as part of the SSK literature more broadly, he 
is explicitly opposed to scientific realism. Indeed, one of Latour’s basic goals is to strip 
the natural sciences of their authority and legitimacy as sources of knowledge.110 
 The idea of hybrids is, however, too obscure and vague to have utility for the 
present project. Latour’s hybrids are understood to be part nature and part culture, but he 
provides no guidance for gauging, understanding, or wrestling with different proportions 
between the two. Hybrids appear as “consistently balanced entities” that are half material, 
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half social, and therefore always require the same type of explanation.111 This hybrid 
ontology creates epistemological difficulties; Latour cannot fully explain “why certain 
objects become stabilized and others do not.”112 In contrast to Latour’s ontology, which 
suggests that every thing in the world is material and social, the mixed ontology of 
geopolitical theory accepts that while reality is a mixture of material and social, some 
things are almost entirely material, while other things are almost entirely social. And 
even in the case of hybrids, the social or material aspect of an object or fact may be more 
interesting, illuminating, or explanatory.113 Under this view, a scientific fact or theory is 
stabilized as consensus over time because of its congruence with material reality. A 
socially entrenched position can be unseated by a “mass of evidence” acquired through 
scientific activity, because that evidence is indicative of some feature of material 
reality.114 This allows historians and philosophers of science to explain why some 
scientific views stabilize while others are unsettled. 
Science and Technology Studies 
 Another body of scholarship inspired by Kuhn, and also in sharp contrast with 
geopolitical theory, is Science and Technology Studies (STS). This body of theory is 
guided by three propositions: scientific knowledge is determined by the social and 
political context, its value is negotiated socially, and it is “co-produced” with political 
order.115 STS especially focuses on the role of science in shaping regimes under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty, but does not problematize decision making in the 
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absence of scientific consensus. STS scholars understand science as “intertwined” with 
policy, and argue that science is important exactly because it is “messy, impure, and 
political.”116 As a result, the STS view embraces the politicization of science, rejecting 
the ideas that scientific practice should be separate from politics, and that scientific 
consensus should precede policy formation. Scientific knowledge and social interests 
“adapt to one another in a process of mutual development,” instead of science providing 
authoritative information for politics and society.117 Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist 
describe the process of “stage management,” through which science is “strategically 
presented” as an authoritative knowledge source.118 They argue that scientific knowledge 
succeeds when it resonates with “settled forms of public knowledge-making,” including 
“shared normative and cultural understandings of the world.”119 Scientific consensus, 
therefore, has no special status, and is best understood as a compromise between social 
actors. Scientific credibility is earned by “the persuasive power of the individuals and 
institutions that speak for science, rather than the strength of internal consensus.120 
 This project offers a direct contrast to STS prescriptions for governance. I argue 
that decision-making under uncertainty is likely to lead to the creation of ineffective 
regimes, especially when uncertainty is overlooked or willfully ignored. Science also 
produces more useful information for regime architects when it is less politicized, by 
being relatively isolated from political pressures. Good science is therefore not a result of 
democratic inclusion of all viewpoints, but comes from the rigorous application of the 
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scientific method. These points will be addressed and supported in the following 
chapters. 
Social Constructivism 
 The mixed ontology and scientific epistemology of this project also contrasts with 
social constructivism as an approach to studying politics (its specific application to global 
governance will be considered in the following chapter). Whereas scientific realism 
believes that the world is found (by science), social constructivists believe that the world 
is made through social relations (including within the scientific community). Because 
constructivists are committed to the idea that all or most of reality is socially constructed, 
they focus on the explanatory power of ideas, norms, and identities. In regards to 
scientific knowledge, they argue that the substantive content of any consensus theory or 
concept is a poor indictor of its significance or influence.121 This is because the scientific 
“norm of disinterestedness” is a fantasy, and scientists subconsciously build theories that 
reflect and reinforce interests and power in society.122 Because the process of observing is 
already laden with theoretical expectations and projections, it cannot be understood as a 
neutral form of evidence. Social constructivists therefore focus on the specific external 
ideas that shape observation and theory building, such as individualism, 
anthropocentricism, and neo-liberalism.  
 While some strong forms of social constructivism reject the existence or 
relevance of an observer-independent material world, many are at least compatible with a 
mixed material/social ontology. And arguably social constructivism requires a material 
world; “A socially constructed reality presupposes a reality independent of all social 
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constructions, because there has to be something for the construction to be constructed 
out of.”123 But in general, the strong form of social constructivism rejects the idea that 
scientific theories “can be understood as furnishing knowledge of a mind-independent 
world.”124 A middle position understands scientific knowledge as “both found and 
made,” a combination of construction and discovery (which varies depending on the 
subject).125 Social factors may determine the choice, professional reward, and funding of 
particular research.126 But material reality has a “refractory nature,” such that it tends to 
shape the results of observation and measurement.127 Even if social scientific activity 
drives the formation of a consensus, the material context inevitably shapes the content of 
that consensus. 
Science Defined 
The meaning and coherence of ‘science’ has been the subject of debate for several 
centuries, and especially the last several decades. Early modern scientists such as Galileo 
Galilei and Isaac Newton followed a basic method: “conduct experiments to test your 
hypothesis and allocate your confidence in proportion to the strength of your 
evidence.”128 But the details, practices, and standards of the scientific method have been 
the subject of contrasting and evolving opinions. Most observers have concluded that 
“science is too diverse, too protean, to be captured in full by a definition.”129 When 
definitions are provided, they are broad and general. Astronomer Neil deGrasse Tyson 
defines the scientific method as: “Do whatever it takes to avoid fooling yourself into 
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thinking something is true that is not, or that something is not true that is.”130Although 
science “does not have an essence waiting to be discovered,” this should not be taken as 
an invalidation of the concept.131  
While there are many local variations on the scientific endeavor, a “global model 
of science” exists that attaches social authority to particular categories, standards, and 
outputs.132 ‘Science’ is understood here as a systematic research and theorizing activity 
that involves the accumulation and interpretation of information about the material world. 
It is a special mode of knowledge production, which generates an image of the natural 
world through disciplined and professionalized inquiry and analysis. It offers 
representations and explanations of phenomena, and often constructs experiments to 
isolate particular causal relationships.133 Employing theories, hypotheses, and principles, 
scientists attempt to progressively uncover causal connections and mechanisms, and laws 
of nature.134 The goal of science is to produce coherent and broadly accepted inter-
subjective understandings, among scientists, of “how and why things are as they are.”135 
Although a single definition of ‘science’ is elusive, the various scientific 
disciplines share a common object of study: nature itself.136 Scientific epistemology – the 
idea that the scientific method can reveal truths about the natural world – is based on the 
philosophy of external realism, also called ‘scientific realism.’ Scientific realism entails 
an ontological commitment to a world that exists independent of human minds, which is 
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patterned by general and fundamental principles and has a “hidden-to-the-senses causal-
explanatory structure.”137 The background assumption that an objective material world 
exists contains no particular content, because its “details and properties” are “precisely 
the kind of issue scientific research aims to elucidate.”138 In terms of epistemology, 
scientific realism understands scientific theories and concepts as descriptions of that 
world, which constitute knowledge. Scientific statements are ‘true’ to the degree that they 
are accurate descriptions of the objective material world. Although scientists can produce 
mistaken or flawed conclusions, scientific realism adopts a “positive epistemic attitude 
towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in…aspects of 
the world described by the sciences.”139 This orientation is embedded in the paradigms, 
norms, and culture of academic science.140 Scientific realism combines beliefs about the 
world with an understanding of scientific practice; “science discovers objective truths.”141 
 Scientific realists generally ignore the “global skeptical challenge” represented by 
strong versions of SSK and post-modernism.142 Although they recognize that science is a 
social institution, and that scientific practices have sociological aspects, scientific realists 
argue that these features do not necessarily undermine the process of rational inquiry.143 
Scientific realism has two basic defenses against strong social constructivism. First, the 
existence of an objective material world leaves room for social construction of 
knowledge, but guarantees that all knowledge is not socially constructed. The belief that 
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the world contains “brute facts” and therefore “reality is not logically constituted by 
representations” is fundamentally compatible with the idea of social construction.144 
Social constructions exist and matter, but in science, they are constrained and influenced 
by the natural material world.145 The existence of brute material facts explains why 
scientific theories ‘work’ despite social, cultural, and political difference and changes, 
and why the existence of scientific objects is often corroborated by multiple modes of 
detection and measurement.146 Second, scientific realists argue that scientific norms for 
accepting a knowledge claim minimize the influence of sociological influences. Insofar 
as warrant and evidence are the standards for acceptance of a scientific theory, the room 
for social explanations is minimized.147 In sum, scientific epistemology is designed to 
minimize the risk that scientific theories merely reflect social, political, and economic 
interests and ideas. 
Although philosophers of science disagree about the precise methods for 
generating scientific knowledge – such as falsification, verification, or anomaly testing – 
scientific realists agree that the general methods of structured observation and repeated 
experimentation produce a special form of knowledge. Bracketing the debate among 
scientists about methods, the general term ‘scientific epistemology’ describes all such 
ways of coming to know and understand the world. Scientific knowledge has a special, 
authoritative status because of the norms and practices associated with scientific methods 
of inquiry and analysis. 
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The production of scientific knowledge is a communal endeavor; observations 
and theories are not considered scientific ‘facts’ until they have been vetted by repeated 
and transparent research activity, including several forms of peer review. The process by 
which a scientific finding becomes scientific consensus is an important feature of 
scientific knowledge production, because it explains how an inter-subjective belief comes 
to be understood as an objective fact; ‘consensus-building’ connects scientific 
epistemology to its realist ontology. “The demand for justification renders science an 
inter-subjective enterprise; the demand for external grounding renders it an objective 
enterprise.”148 Scientific norms of communalism, universality, disinterestedness, 
originality, and organized skepticism produce an “agonistic arena” where “the particular 
bias of each individual is neutralized in the collective outcome.”149 This arena is social, 
but designed to bracket social influences. For example, the competition for personal 
scientific prestige increases the rigor of peer review. The desire to ‘make a name’ for 
oneself encourages the collection of new data, or creative fashioning of new experiments. 
The “intellectual virtues” that guide scientific knowledge production are embedded in the 
institutions and norms of the scientific community, as opposed to relying on the virtue of 
individual scientists.150 
 Despite concerns about the integrity of scientists and the reliability of scientific 
findings, actual data fraud, or lying about procedures, is exceedingly rare, and tends to 
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cluster in the biomedical sciences.151 Scientific knowledge is “self-correcting” in that 
falsehoods “will eventually be discovered and rejected.”152 The key to this progressive 
aspect is the close connection between warrants and acceptance – without a sufficient 
quality and quantity of evidence, a scientific dictum will not be considered true or close-
to-true.153 A large, dynamic, and de-centralized scientific community questions whether 
the given evidence provides sufficient warrant for accepting a scientific explanation. The 
process of inquiry and analysis involves cooperation and competition across borders and 
generations.154 When a scientific finding persists in stable form through the gamut of peer 
review, repeated testing, and new data collection it becomes a “practical, working 
consensus” upon which scientists base new theories and techniques.155 In other words, 
scientific consensus is a provisional declaration of congruence between objective material 
reality and the inter-subjective understandings of scientists. The stability of a scientific 
object or theory in the community can therefore be taken as a “reasonable indicator of its 
objectivity.”156 
A common counter-argument to these claims about the value of scientific 
epistemology is that states and other powerful actors control scientific knowledge 
accumulation in a way that biases its outcomes. While it is certainly true that interested 
and powerful actors support and restrict scientific activity, it is not the case that such 
actors control the direction of scientific consensus, especially in the medium-to-long 
term. An illustrative example is British and American attempts to justify the dumping of 
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nuclear waste in the ocean. At first, ‘health physicists’ sanctioned nuclear dumping as 
safe for humans, exactly as their government sponsors wanted. But quelling public fears 
required the involvement of oceanographers, because of their special knowledge of 
diffusion and uptake in the marine environment. The oceanographers – with funding from 
the American and British governments – came to different conclusions about the safety of 
dumping nuclear waste in the ocean. In short, government sponsorship did not influence 
the ultimate and durable scientific consensus.157 Examples abound of situations where 
governments wanted one thing, and scientists found another. 
The Nature of Scientific Progress 
Scientific knowledge production occurs in two phases. The observational phase 
collects data for the purpose of exploring and mapping natural systems. The explanatory 
phase involves theory development, through practices of experimentation and hypothesis 
testing, and processes of analysis and interpretation. Arguably there is a third phase, 
which entails the creation of dynamic models. The first phase discovers, the second phase 
explains, and the third phase predicts. This section will focus on the first two phases, 
unpacking their components with a focus on the role and limitations of social 
construction. In short, the room for politicized interpretation grows as a scientific idea 
moves from phase one through phase three. 
The main activities in the observation phase are measurement, documentation, 
and mapping, in order to progressively characterize material phenomena by refining and 
adding detail to scientific maps. This phase is especially important in Earth system 
sciences because humans have limited direct access to the vast reaches of non-terrestrial 
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planetary domains. We could tell very little about outer space by just looking up, and 
about the ocean by looking out from the shore. The observational phase is often taken for 
granted when we think of ‘science,’ but it is critical for defining what exists in the 
domain of investigation.158 The philosopher of science Otavio Bueno provides a useful 
account of the relationship between observation, instrumentation, and scientific 
knowledge (as understood by the scientific realists). Although pre-existing concepts 
influence how we understand the world, “it is not up to us what we will observe when we 
open our eyes.”159 SSK theorists sometimes argue that the use of instruments like 
telescopes, microscopes, and submersibles embeds theory into observation, such that 
what we see will be determined by how we are looking and what we are looking for. But 
instruments are “relatively theory-neutral” because only a few basic theories are needed 
to identify and process observational data.160 Bueno argues that when working correctly, 
modern instrumentation provides “strong epistemic access” and generates “robust data,” 
which can be used to evaluate scientific theories.161 Empirically, observational practices 
and the majority of observational data do not change when scientific theories or 
paradigms change, even when paradigms are incommensurable.162 The results of 
scientific observation therefore “provide stable, theory-neutral grounds for theory 
assessment.”163  
Only when physical patterns have been accurately mapped can scientists begin the 
second phase of investigation, using hypothesis testing and experimentation to theorize 
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about the origins and causal mechanisms of natural systems. In this phase, politics and 
personality are a more substantial influence because of the central role of interpretation 
and extrapolation, which creates room for external ideas and ideologies. This second 
phase involves the articulation of new theories and the erosion of old ones. A distinction 
can be made between core knowledge, which is widely accepted as true, and the 
“research frontier,” where new knowledge is being produced and there is a lack of 
consensus among scientists.164 Although interpretation on the research frontier is more 
open to social, cultural, and political influences, continued data collection, hypothesis 
testing, and peer-review eventually invalidate or delegitimize interpretations which do 
not comport with material reality. In sum, scientific progress moves towards more 
accurate and less political understandings over time. 
The basic distinction between the observation and theory-building phases of 
scientific knowledge production is not essentially sociological, because the former is a 
logical pre-requisite to the latter. A scientist cannot make an argument about ‘why’ until 
the ‘what,’ ‘where,’ and ‘how’ are sufficiently established. This does not imply that the 
two phases of scientific investigation are entirely sequential – new observational data can 
bolster or undermine existing theories that were built on more limited data sets. In other 
words, both phases can and do occur simultaneously, but the theory-building phase relies 
upon the products of the observational phase.165  
This distinction between phases explains why linear scientific progress can occur 
despite political, cultural, and sociological influences. Many aspects of science – such as 
its disciplinary organization, its immediate purposes, and its standards of evidence – are 
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subject to these influences. But what science discovers through observation is not socially 
constructed; even sensing apparatuses that are directed towards particular purposes can 
only discover what is actually there. In other words, “science is a genuine amalgam of 
‘construction’ and ‘discovery’…it marries intention with contingency.”166 The part of 
science that includes the progressive uncovering of the features of the material world, and 
unraveling of its structures and processes, explains the existence of scientific progress in 
a social world. 
Although scientists recognize that the objective physical world is never fully 
accessible, the goal of science is to produce inter-subjective understandings with maximal 
congruence to it. This is the basic relationship posited between the material context and 
ideas about it; over time, scientific theories change in a way that converges on the 
truth.167 The shared commitment to the existence of an objective material world explains 
why both non-linear shifts in theory and concept, as described by Kuhn, and linear 
accretions of data and knowledge can occur. The notion of advancement has a long 
history in the scientific community; Francis Bacon first proposed the ideal of scientific 
progress as a collective goal for scientists.168 Isaac Newton captured the notion of a 
collectively constructed edifice of knowledge that persists throughout generations in his 
famous statement: “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” 
The notion of progress does not imply that all scientists have a shared goal, although 
practical problem solving has been a consistent driver of scientific activity.169 Progress 
also does not imply the accretion of exact truth; while data and observations accumulate 
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in a linear way, interpretation is a more hectic and variable process of convergence. The 
“moving frontier” of pre-consensus research can “land all over the place until 
experiments converge in one direction or another.”170 Scientific theories often progress 
by coming closer to the truth, even if they do not always reach it.171  
More than just an ideal, scientific progress and knowledge accumulation is 
evident in world history. The phenomenon of ‘multiple independent discovery’ lends 
support to the idea that observational data reflects the existence of objective material 
phenomena, as opposed to being specific to a particular social and political context.172 
The phenomenon of accidental scientific discoveries also indicates that the purposes of 
scientific investigation are separable from the knowledge it produces.173 Scientific 
knowledge, in general and over time, has moved in a particular direction – congruence 
with objective material reality.  
An historical example illustrates how the accumulation of scientific knowledge 
relates to the distinction between the observational and interpretive phases of scientific 
investigation. Humans used to believe the ocean floor was smooth, but observational data 
revealed the mid-Atlantic ridge. Enough observations produced an inter-subjective 
consensus about the crevasses, seamounts, and slopes at the bottom of the sea. This 
scientific knowledge about how the ocean floor is shaped could be undermined by new 
and contrary observational data, but we do not expect to find such data because the inter-
subjective consensus is understood to have a basic congruence with objective material 
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reality. Even the strongest social, political, or cultural influences could not re-construct 
the ocean floor. In contrast, theories about why the ocean floor has a variegated 
topography are subject to interpretation, and indeed Soviet and American scientists 
offered competing explanations. Disputes about the causes of lithosphere textures were 
significantly conditioned by Cold War rivalry, the organization of professional 
disciplines, and standards of evidence.174 The eventual non-linear shift from Soviet-origin 
platform tectonic theory to plate tectonics occurred in response to linear accumulations of 
data that recommended one theory over another. Today, plate tectonics is taught to 
children as established scientific fact.  
The special knowledge of non-terrestrial domains produced by the consensus of 
Earth system scientists has increasingly approximated the features of the actual material 
context. Sometimes vested interests challenge scientific findings in political arenas and 
media outlets, but over time the conclusions of the scientific community tend to win 
out.175 The overall success of scientific theories developed over several centuries suggests 
that current scientific understandings of the ocean and outer space are “substantially 
trustworthy.”176 But it is likely that much remains to be known about the chemical, 
biological, ecological, geographical, and geophysical features of non-terrestrial domains. 
Uncertainty persists in particular areas, including patterns of cause and consequence in 
global environmental problems. Specific areas of uncertainty will be reviewed in the case 
chapters. The achievement of reasonable certainty and consensus is inevitable, but the 
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rate at which it emerges is substantially a result of society and politics. Today, the 
primary obstacle to progress in scientific knowledge about planetary systems is funding 
for research posts and projects.177  
Pragmatism  
Because this project is based upon the ontology and epistemology of scientific 
realism, it is also fundamentally compatible with American pragmatist philosophy. The 
existence of scientific consensus is an empirical question, but the meaning of its content 
is an epistemological one. Scientific knowledge accumulation can be understood as 
progress towards a full picture of the objective material world, or advancement in the 
efficacy or utility of science for achieving human goals and purposes. The former view is 
scientific realism, and the latter is a type of pragmatism. For pragmatists, something is 
‘true’ when it ‘works’ or is useful for satisfying human needs and desires.178 This 
practical epistemology is often attached to an experience-based ontology. But it is 
possible to hold both views; “the centrality and significance [American pragmatists] 
ascribe to understanding the role that such ideas or beliefs play in guiding our practical 
interactions with the world does not compete with the possibility that those same ideas 
and beliefs might ‘correspond to’ or ‘agree with’ reality.”179 In this project, the scientific 
realist view holds that scientific knowledge is both instrumentally powerful and ‘true’ in 
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the sense of approximately congruent with objective material reality.180 For scientific 
realists, problem solving and utility result from the discovery of truths.181 
For SSK and social constructivists, the object of scientific consensus is a social 
product. For scientific realists, it is a window into the real world. For pragmatists, it is a 
tool to be utilized and deployed in the pursuit of human ends. In evaluating the influence 
of existing and emerging scientific consensus on international regimes, this project rejects 
the social constructivist view, and embraces the pragmatist and especially the scientific 
realist approach and perspective. 
Scientific Realism: Popular Reception and Environmental Thought 
 Although scientific realism is typically embraced out of a belief that it best 
reflects actual reality, there are two basic advantages to adopting scientific realism in this 
project. First, scientific realism represents the ‘common sense’ or default assumption of 
most policymakers, which ensures that the project can communicate with those who 
make critical decisions about global commons management. Indeed, a partial materialist 
ontology underlies the vast majority of human thoughts and utterances, and is therefore a 
necessary condition for the intelligibility of the project to the general public.182 Scientific 
realism is the “normal understanding” of those outside philosophy and political theory.183 
Adopting this assumption therefore sidesteps any foundational philosophical debates that 
would prevent the largest and most important audience from engaging with the core 
argument of this project. 
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 The second advantage of scientific realism is its compatibility with 
environmentalist thought. This understanding of the role of science is the “most solid and 
durable element” in the “intellectual foundation” of environmentalism.184 The ontological 
aspect of scientific realism is the “basic template from which environmental problems are 
defined.”185 This shared template and foundation contributes to the globalization and 
consolidation of the environmental movement, which is a crucial part of its influence in 
international policy making.186 Scientific knowledge is critical in defining the causal 
relationships behind global environmental problems.187 It also implies particular types of 
solutions around which the environmental movement can coalesce.188 A shared 
philosophical foundation allows this project to respond to and resonate with major themes 
in contemporary environmentalism, including urgency, the need for a consciousness shift, 
environmental justice, modified capitalism, sustainable development, and others. 
Compatibility with the environmental movement increases the possible impact of the 
project, because environmentalism is a powerful force for re-orienting the destructive 
tendencies of modern scientific-technological civilization.189 
 In contrast, wholesale criticisms of scientific realism produced in the social 
sciences and humanities risk empowering the forces of predatory capitalism. Scientific 
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illiteracy and anti-scientific thinking increasingly pervade American society.190 Special 
interests hostile to environmental regulations take advantage of this eroding confidence in 
science, sometimes explicitly wielding strong social constructivism.191 This “demotion of 
science to a mere cognitive style” even infects the scientific classroom, where instructors 
increasingly hesitate to use terms like ‘fact’ and ‘misconception.’192 The adoption of a 
purely social ontology therefore has a practical political disadvantage, in that it 
undermines the authority of scientific knowledge production, and therefore impedes the 
transition away from thoughtless destruction, pollution, and unsustainable exploitation.    
Technology  
‘Technology’ is a particularly loose and unsettled concept that tends to conflate 
several distinct phenomena.193 It encompasses material apparatuses or ‘technics’ (more 
commonly, ‘devices,’ ‘artifacts,’ or ‘machines’) but also includes knowledge of how to 
create and manipulate things (like engineering). This latter meaning of technology bleeds 
into the concept of science because it includes the intellectual and ideational resources 
used to design, create, and animate technics, like knowledge, techniques, and skills. The 
basic idea is that “technology is science in application.”194 Theorists of technology, while 
admitting the difficulty of precise definition, agree that technology has several basic and 
essential features. First, technology is designed and deployed to achieve pragmatic 
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human purposes.195 Second, technology harnesses natural phenomena, such as the laws of 
physics and the availability of raw materials.196 Third, technology expands the ways 
humans can access the material world, especially through instruments of observation, 
measurement, and manipulation.197 Fourth, technology changes, and with it human 
abilities to see, do, and control various things. These features define the essence of 
technology as a variable in human affairs. 
While the whole of ‘technology’ has important implications for the management 
and use of non-terrestrial spaces, this project will focus on ‘technics’ – the material 
apparatuses created by scientists and engineers, which allow humans to identify and 
access resources.198 The use of the term ‘technology’ throughout is not meant to 
encompass the ‘know how’ of scientists and engineers, but rather signifies that the natural 
phenomena exploited by technics are characterized by scientists, who often design and 
construct instrumentation technology for their own purposes, including observation, 
measurement, and experimentation. It is technics, however, that directly create new 
capabilities for humans. The type of capability they support can be used to characterize 
different technologies: precise observation, harvesting of physical resources, or 
exploitation of spatial extension resources, among others. Humans invest in particular 
types of technology depending on their purposes and goals; scientists desiring more 
precise measurement invest in observation technology, oil companies desiring access to 
offshore deposits invest in drilling technology, and countries desiring to exploit the 
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vantage point of orbital space invest in satellite launch technology. Thus, the growth of 
technological capability is driven in large part by the desires and investments of human 
actors. 
Current technological capabilities are vast, and future technologies promise even 
more, but technological possibilities are not infinite. Which technologies are possible is 
inherently limited. No scientists or engineer can invent a machine that eliminates gravity 
or creates matter. Scientists, who develop theories like ‘Newton’s law of universal 
gravity’ and ‘the law of conservation of mass,’ characterize these limitations. The history 
of defunct and discredited scientific theories suggests that the basic material features of 
the universe is still coming into focus, and that we cannot say with certainty which 
limitations on human activity will be durable in the face of scientific advance and 
technological innovation. But some physical barriers seem more permanent than others. 
For example, while human vehicles have broken the speed of sound, they are not likely to 
Figure 1 – Universe of 
Possibility – Science drives 
technological advancement 
and characterizes the bounds 
of physical possibility (which 
are not fully known) 
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match the speed of light. Other examples of physical reality that currently constrain 
human activities in non-terrestrial domains include: the pressure of the deep sea, the 
vacuum of outer space, the attributes of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and the low 
density of air molecules in the upper atmosphere. Technology may or may not be able to 
surmount these limitations, but science remains critical to defining and understanding 
them.  
Technological Progress 
 This basic insight about the constraints on technological capability suggests that 
technological change, taken as a whole and over long periods of time, moves in a 
particular direction. Technological change can be conceptualized as pushing towards and 
tracing the boundaries of physical possibility. There are two basic types of technological 
change: improvement and innovation. Improvements are incremental augmentations of an 
existing capability, making it more efficient or more effective. Examples include 
increases in travel speed and the miniaturization of computer chips. Innovations generate 
new capabilities, and therefore represent more punctuated change. A prototypical 
example is the creation of nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Other examples include 
the submarine, heavier-than-air aircraft, and space vehicles. Technological change drives 
politics in non-terrestrial spaces because of the way it improves existing uses or innovates 
to create new uses or new forms of access. But technology does not always expand the 
total amount of access or exploitation; another way to categorize technological change is 
based on the effect it has on overall capabilities in a given domain. Improvements may 
amplify existing uses, and innovations may multiply the number of uses. But either might 
also generate an overall restriction on or reduction in existing uses, especially if the new 
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technological capability improves surveillance and interdiction, which are tools of 
verification and enforcement. 
 These general patterns in technological change are often overlooked because the 
immediate pace and direction of technological advancement is directly determined by the 
investments of interested parties in research and development of particular technological 
capabilities. There are many possible technologies that could exist, but do not because no 
one has an interest in their development. But the physical conditions of possibility are the 
ultimate determinants of what can be invented, even though the interests and resources of 
human actors determine what will be invented. For example, investments in maritime 
sonar will eventually experience diminishing returns as they bump up against the physical 
reality that acoustic waves attenuate in the ocean. And no matter how much money the 
military invests in creating a radar-like sensing apparatus for the oceans, it cannot make 
the water less opaque to electro-magnetic radiation. The basic point is that patterns of 
technological change can be understood as fundamentally shaped and channeled by non-







Although my basic argument assigns an important causal weight to technological 
change, this theory does not entail ‘hard’ technological determinism. The most basic 
reason is that it also ascribes causal force to environmental and geographic influences. 
Geography, ecology, and technology operate as bounds or constraints on what it is 
possible to discover and do. The material context determines what can be done, but not 
what will be done. The set of possible actions contains the set of actual actions. This kind 
of spatial understanding of causation has precedent: scholars often describe ‘proximate’ 
causes, and causal ‘over-determination’ (read: overlap). Consider an issue-area like deep-
seabed mining. Whether it is possible is a technological and geographic question, and 
concern about its negative impact on seamounts is based on ecological and topographical 
Figure 2  – Determinants of Technological Change – States channel science and technology 
based on their interests, and this differential investment results in uneven advancement in 
knowledge and capability. 
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characteristics of the seafloor. Many political, economic, and legal factors will play an 
important role in determining whether deep-seabed mining is pursued. But if the water is 
too deep and the technology is insufficient, even the most powerful actors will be unable 
to mine the sea floor. Similarly, if scientists discover that nearby seamounts contain 
biological and genetic resources critical to medical sciences, this may be used to block 
seabed mining. The extremophiles that live near hydrothermal vents are especially 
valuable genetically, but their unique properties were not constructed by society or 
industry. Other aspects of outcomes that cannot be accounted for by ideas, interests, or 
power include: the composition and distribution of seabed mineral deposits, the ocean 
currents that connect hypothetical mining sites with seamounts, and the crushing pressure 
of the deep ocean. These examples indicate why  geopolitical theory assigns important 
causal weight to scientific knowledge of geography and ecology, and technological 
capability, as limits on what is possible, but allows room for social and political factors to 
determine the ultimate regime outcomes. In other words, material factors both enable and 
constrain the operation of social and political influences. 
Technology in Geopolitical Theory 
A geopolitical approach to global commons regimes contributes to the analysis of 
Large Technical Systems (LTS) in IR.199 LTS are networked structures that can stabilize, 
coordinate, or disrupt social relations. They include submarine telecommunications 
cables, satellite networks, transnational shipping routes, trawl fisheries, and other patterns 
of activity in non-terrestrial spaces. These systems are “critical infrastructures in the 
skeleton of global governance,” because they pattern the geographies of practices, 
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interests, and consequences.200 They also happen to “present a clear object of study” for 
theorizing about international politics, because they are “a practical, graspable 
and…pressing presence right at the heart of global governance dynamics.”201 After 
extoling the explanatory and methodological virtues of an LTS-centric analysis, 
Maximilian Mayer and Michele Acuto describe an additional benefit: LTS as objects of 
study represent a fruitful opportunity for the transfer of concepts and theories from 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) to IR.  
The STS approach is not, however, the most useful way to engage LTS. The STS 
approach understands LTS as complex socio-technological systems, but the social 
phenomena take precedence over material variables in STS explanations. For example, 
“STS-informed understandings…emphasize the context-dependent, non-universal and 
inherently uncertain status of knowledge.”202 As a result, knowledge of material 
structures is ascribed no special epistemological status, and cannot be taken as ‘accurate’ 
or non-socially-constructed. The LTS is reduced to its social definition, and plays no 
special role in explanations. Mayer and Acuto rightly call for a technological turn in IR, 
but their proposed direction is tentative and inadequate. The problem is an aversion to 
understanding technology as a structural cause, which is associated with ritual 
denunciations of environmental and technological determinism (a decades-old 
bogeyman).203  
Technology entails an ever-evolving set of available capabilities in non-terrestrial 
domains, including access, exploitation, and surveillance. The features of technological 
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systems define the structural parameters for uses of the ocean and outer space, and 
influence both what regimes need to do, and what they can do, to be effective. Three 
features are of particular interest: the level, composition, and distribution of technologies. 
These characteristics of global technological systems – like submarine cables or satellite 
networks – shape the content of interests, the consequences of problems, and the set of 
possible solutions. This project focuses on the character of technologies of access, 
surveillance, and exploitation, which are highly specific to their associated domains. The 
pace of technological advancement matters for international politics, partially because it 
is so difficult to predict in advance. This project focuses on complex technological 
systems as an evolving structural factor for access and management in non-terrestrial 
spaces, and therefore an important influence on regime effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has described the fundamental philosophical assumptions of 
geopolitical theory, for two basic reasons. First, the commitment to a mixed ontology and 
scientific epistemology makes planetary geopolitics incompatible with, and unintelligible 
to, large portions of existing scholarship in the social sciences. Second, the nature of 
scientific and technological change, as described here, demonstrates some advantages to 
a geopolitical approach. Because the project shares intuitive philosophical assumptions 
and resonates with environmentalism, it is accessible to a broad audience. But more 
importantly, geopolitical theory acquires significant analytical traction from the 
recognition that science and technology move in particular directions, which are defined 
by the physical features of the material world. The next chapter addresses how the 
philosophical assumptions of geopolitical theory inform the methodology of geopolitics, 
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Despite decades of international diplomacy and regime building, global 
environmental problems continue to increase in number, scale, scope, and consequence. 
This project begins from the premise that existing approaches to global governance in 
non-terrestrial spaces have not produced functional regime designs. With the emergence 
of new and dangerous problems like space debris and ocean acidification, the situation is 
increasingly urgent. This project pursues a materialist geopolitical approach to explaining 
regime failure, which in this chapter is delineated and differentiated from the existing 
literature, and defined in broad outlines.  
 The first section begins by addressing the concept of a ‘global commons,’ and 
how it relates to the non-terrestrial domains that are the subject of this project. It then 
reviews existing theories of regimes from the realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, and 
constructivist schools of thought in International Relations (IR). This section 
demonstrates the inadequacies of existing theories, while noting the ways that they 
implicitly, and in an ad hoc way, rely on material contextual variables (geography, 
ecology, technology). The next section describes the methodology of planetary 
geopolitics, and unpacks the role of temporal and spatial structures in the overall critique 
of existing regime design. The third section addresses the thing to be explained: the 
ineffectiveness of existing global commons regimes. This includes the meaning of 
‘effectiveness,’ the conditions that are usually understood to support effectiveness, and 
the conditions of effectiveness from the perspective of planetary geopolitics. The 
concluding section identifies three ‘regime pathologies,’ or features of regime design that 
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contribute to ineffectiveness over time. This chapter sets the stage for the more targeted 
evaluation and analysis of the case chapters. 
Regime Theories 
The study of global environmental governance has been prominent in 
International Relations (IR) and related fields since the 1980s, and is noted for its special 
focus on the effectiveness of regimes. Material contextual variables (geography, ecology, 
technology) are present in many existing accounts of global commons regimes (GCRs), 
but their structural significance has been largely overlooked. Changes in scientific 
knowledge and technological capability tend to be treated in an ad hoc, unsystematic way 
that fails to register insights about their influential role for management in non-terrestrial 
spaces. This chapter draws out the implicit material contextual variables from existing 
theories, and weaves them together into a coherent geopolitical theory of GCRs. After a 
note on the term ‘global commons,’ this section reviews the dominant strands of regime 
theory applied to the non-terrestrial domains in order to point out (a) their general 
deficiencies, and (b) their ad hoc reliance on material-contextual variables. The next 
section describes the methodology for extracting, augmenting, and systematizing these 
variables into a novel and complementary theory of GCRs. 
Glo al Co o s  
The ocean and outer space are commonly referred to as ‘global commons,’ but are 
more accurately characterized as ‘non-terrestrial domains.’ ‘Global commons’ is a 
political geography constructed by humans, which overlays and interprets ‘brute’ 
physical facts.204 Most perspectives on GCRs take as a given, or an assumption, that non-
terrestrial spaces are global commons. Yet many authors define the global commons in a 
                                                 
204 John Vogler, “Global Commons Revisited,” Global Policy 3, no. 1 (February 2012): 61. 
 
 78 
contingent way, as areas that are not under national, sovereign, or singular jurisdiction.205 
The term is often used to contrast these areas with the political geography of the 
territorial state system. It may be true that governance regimes construct the ocean or 
outer space as a global commons, but that does not mean there are not other ways to 
understand non-terrestrial planetary spaces. Defining a space by its political geography, 
instead of its natural and technological material geography, begs the question of regime 
theory by conflating a socially-constructed political arrangement with an intrinsic 
attribute of what is to be governed. 
 The main schools of thought in IR with which scholars approach the topic of 
GCRs are Realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Each has a separate 
understanding of the ‘global commons’ as an object of management. For Realists, ‘global 
commons’ are operational environments for both military competition and economic 
exchange. For Realism, ‘global commons’ must be dominated to ensure smooth flows of 
power and production.206 For neo-liberal institutionalists, the ‘commons’ are places that 
contain ‘common pool resources’ (CPRs). In analyzing CPRs, neo-liberal institutionalists 
consider whether resource are ‘rival’ or ‘subtractable’ (they can be depleted) and their 
users are ‘non-excludable,’ so they pose distinct types of management challenges.207 The 
‘global commons’ are places where CPRs can be accessed by anyone in the international 
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community. But the existence of CPRs implies a particular property regime, one where 
resources can be accessed and exploited, but not owned. But property regimes are 
created, not discovered, by humans. The constructivist school understands the global 
commons as constructed international spaces, and they hold that Realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism, as well as materialist approaches, err in naturalizing what are in fact 
socially constructed entities.208 In general, most constructivists reject the idea that there is 
a separate, prior, and natural material context that represents an inherent and influential 
aspect of these spaces. 
 Whether the objects of governance are non-terrestrial planetary spaces or global 
commons matters for the literature on regimes. Scholars of global environmental 
governance frequently refer to the nature or structure of the “problem,” the “resource,” 
the “issue-area,” the “realm” or the “situation.”209 Problem structure motivates regime 
design and has implications for regime effectiveness, by determining what needs to be 
done and what can be done in a certain area. But there is no consensus about how to 
define problem structure. Reducing structure to ‘global commons’ oversimplifies the 
geographies of access, exploitation, and management in non-terrestrial spaces. For 
example, Realists overlook the spatial features of ecosystems, and neo-liberal 
institutionalists conflate the unique challenges of common pool vs. common sink 
resources.210 The geopolitical approach provides a more complete understanding of the 
influences of material contexts on the global governance of the ocean and outer space. 
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While the designation of a ‘problem’ is a human construct, the structure of a problem like 
ocean acidification or space debris is significantly shaped by the material context. This 
includes the geography of global technological systems, which contains “mundane 
heterogeneity” as well as important “clusters of technically stabilized (and evolving) 
relations at a multitude of scales.”211 The geopolitical approach thereby more accurately 
describes the complexity of non-terrestrial spaces, “sketching out a deeper and more 
complex, but still manageable, landscape for IR.”212 Just as existing theories miss the full 
story about the object of global governance, their accounts of regime formation and 
operation overlook and under-emphasize the planetary material context.  
 Most of the literature on GCRs focuses on the distribution of power (Realist), 
interests (neo-liberal), and ideas (constructivist) as explanations for political outcomes. 
These schools of thought are so distinct and powerful that – 25 years after penning the 
consensus view of regimes – Stephen Krasner revised his initial definition to account for 
three separate ways of defining them.213 The Realist view eliminates ‘rules’ from the 
content of regimes and argues that their principles, norms, and decision-making 
procedures merely reflect the interests of the most powerful actors. The neo-liberal 
institutionalist view keeps rules, and describes regimes as solutions to ‘market failures,’ 
understood as situations where the market fails to provide a good for which there is a 
demand. The constructivist view of regimes simply sees them as clusters of international 
norms. Each of these understandings of what a regime is places them in the context of a 
larger international order, whether it is the balance of power, the global economy, or 
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pervasive ideas and ideologies. These power-structural, institutional, and normative-
ideational contexts are critical for explaining many aspects of GCR emergence and 
operation, but they do not explicitly incorporate the material context on, over, and 
through which all of international politics occurs – the planet Earth. 
Realist International Relations Theory 
The Realist school of IR is highly skeptical of the independent influence of 
institutions on state behavior. Realists describe regimes as weak, ephemeral, or 
unenforceable, and thus have actually paid little attention to the politics of regimes for 
non-terrestrial spaces.214 Realists believe that states pursue relative gains, and are 
unwilling or uninterested in cooperating for the sake of absolute gains. Regimes are 
simply another forum in which to exercise power, and can either reaffirm or shift existing 
power relations.215 For example, Realists would tend to describe the ‘common heritage’ 
principle as an attempt by developing states to shift the economic benefits of resource 
extraction in their favor. But in general, Realists emphasize that many of the norms and 
rules governing the global commons started out as American preferences, practices, or 
policies.216 GCRs institutionally reinforce a preferential balance of power, including 
strategic and economic benefits for powerful actors. Realists understand violations of 
regime dictates – such as China’s rampant flouting of international fishing regulations – 
as evidence of rising and revisionist powers asserting their own national interests. In such 
cases, regime ineffectiveness is a product of a shifting balance of power. Realists do 
admit that power can be wielded in the service of the common good and collective 
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interests, but only in cases where doing so would establish a valuable leadership role that 
reaffirms a state’s power.217  
Scholars in the sub-field of global environmental politics generally view Realism 
as having little to contribute, because it is skeptical of the possibility of meaningful 
international cooperation to mitigate shared vulnerability and achieve collective 
interests.218 But Realism does offer important insights about the role of material variables 
in shaping the patterns and content of interests and practices. However, these insights are 
all framed in terms of relative power and national interests. For Realists, the most 
important question about material factors is who has more or less of them. Thus Realists 
view power as significantly a function of geography. They analyze factors like resource 
distribution, coastal topography, and location at the equator, which provide states with 
domain-specific forms of power. But Realists overlook the ways that geography creates 
stakeholder groups, such as those most vulnerable to sea-level rise, those with oil and gas 
in their continental shelves, and those with favorable siting for space launches. These 
groups may create novel coalitions for regime building and enforcement, because of their 
particular shared interests. 
Realists also view technology as a means to power. Access to non-terrestrial 
resources is technology dependent, and technology represents power within a given 
domain.219 Because technology can be costly and complex, the burdens of research, 
development, manufacture, and deployment create asymmetrical forms of access. 
Container ships, deep-sea trawlers, submarines, satellites, space vehicles, and other 
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access technologies require significant expenditure and advanced enabler technologies 
(such as engineering software). Realists focus on the distribution of technology, and 
especially the unequal power potentials inherent in advanced technology. But they 
overlook technological composition as a key variable, which directly influences patterns 
of practices in the ocean and outer space.220 New technological uses create vested 
interests in maintaining those practices. For Realists, technology is a tool of power. But 
states cannot simply pick the technological practices they prefer or object to – 
technological development independently conditions what practices can be pursued, and 
technological momentum makes it difficult to prohibit the use or dissemination of 
unfavorable technologies.  
Realists tend to be skeptical about the verification and enforcement aspects of 
international treaties, but this is also a technology-dependent question. Domain-specific 
forms of power can be used to monitor, verify, and control. New information technology 
may radically alter the prospects for surveillance in some use-activities (examples include 
Automatic Identification Systems for container ships, aerial and submarine drones, and 
chemical tracing). In some cases the ready visibility of some technological uses makes 
verification easier, such as in the case of ship design requirements for minimizing marine 
pollution.221 Realists characterize technological advances as an increase in state capacity 
and power. But this outcome is not the only possible result because technological 
capabilities may also contribute to constraining state power. 
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Realists recognize the importance of scientific knowledge production for state 
power. During the Cold War, great power competition drove data accumulation and 
theory development in an effort to improve the performance of militaries in their 
operational environments. In order to monitor the movements and capabilities of 
weapons, states employed oceanographic, atmospheric, and geophysical sciences.222 
Scientific findings also constitute a kind of authoritative knowledge that can be wielded 
in favor of preferred outcomes. For example, new scientific knowledge about the 
negative effects of high levels of radioactivity on the environment helped the Soviet 
Union effectively criticize the West for dumping nuclear waste into the ocean (despite 
continuing the practice themselves).223 Yet Realists overlook the ways that scientific 
knowledge production can reshape the content and boundaries of ‘national interests.’ In 
particular, scientific knowledge can re-frame issues by suggesting a different temporal or 
spatial scale, thereby generating new types of interests. For example, unrestricted carbon 
emissions seem in the short-term interest of specific sectors of the US economy. But from 
a broader and longer-term perspective, scientific findings show that unrestricted carbon 
emissions, causing sea-level rise and more severe storms, are not in the interests of the 
United States. 
Realism is not well-suited to analyzing the failures of global commons regimes in 
the governance of non-terrestrial spaces. It defines ‘effectiveness’ in an overly narrow 
way, to encompass only the interests of the dominant powers. This means that Realists 
provide a simplistic explanation of ineffectiveness as solely the result of a shifting 
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balance of power. But power shifts alone cannot explain the dysfunction of GCRs. Major 
changes in relative power, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, and 
the emergence of threatening non-state actors, have had no particular impact on the 
problem of ocean acidification, for example. Although Realists recognize that national 
interests are modified by geography and technology, they treat interests as relatively 
static and nation-centered. But interests are dynamic and often collective; stakeholder 
groups emerge over time from scientific knowledge production and technological 
advance. Planetary geopolitical theory shares with Realism the belief that material reality 
has explanatory power for explaining what states can do, and want to do, but offers to do 
so in a much fuller and more serious way. First, the project considers the importance of 
the material context for practices, interests, and problems as a whole, as opposed to being 
concerned solely with the geopolitical determinants of state power. Second, the planetary 
geopolitics approach incorporates the important material variable of ecology, which is 
almost entirely overlooked by Realists. 
Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
The prevailing mainstream approach to regimes among IR theorists is neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Members of this school are optimistic about the potential of GCRs to 
facilitate meaningful cooperation.224 Although the term ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ is 
criticized as mere “scholarly branding,” it captures the idea that states can achieve 
collective gains through institutionalized cooperation.225 Under this view, states create 
international institutions out of self-interest, to coordinate and collaborate with one 
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another in order to achieve individual and collective gains. Unlike Realists, neo-liberal 
institutionalists believe that “states are interested in absolute gains for the entire 
community,” and will seek out new ways to achieve collective benefit.226 Global 
governance, then, is “essentially a matter of administration.”227 But different 
constellations of interests require different institutional forms, and therefore neo-liberal 
institutionalists are concerned with the question of institutional design.  
Institutionalists categorize goods based on the rivalry of consumption and the 
excludability of users, and argue that the anarchic state system fails to provide certain 
kinds of collective goods. The solution to this is a treaty design that restructures 
incentives to stimulate efficient and/or sustainable use activities.228 Commons regimes, 
for the neo-liberal institutionalist, are rationally designed institutions that serve mutual 
interests by overcoming collective action problems. These interests are usually economic 
but sometimes related to sovereignty. Collective action problems are difficult to resolve 
because they “pit individual against collective rationality.”229 The ‘market failures’ 
regimes typically seek to overcome are production externalities and the provision of 
public (non-rival and non-excludable) goods.230 Because the international system is 
anarchic, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that success requires both inducements and 
verification. In addition to minimizing transaction costs, regimes are responsible for 
monitoring compliance, increasing transparency, and adopting other mechanisms that 
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reduce cheating.231 Effectiveness, then, is a matter of getting the incentives right. Even if 
GCRs are not successful at constraining harmful activities, institutionalists argue that 
they may create a convergence of interests through increased transparency, and by 
serving as a forum for consensus building.  
The rational pursuit of interests drives regime formation and operation. But in 
general, the question of interest content is a difficult one for neo-liberal institutionalists. 
Domestic-level interests are aggregated into diplomatic positions (state preferences) 
through different systems of decision-making and opinion-aggregation. Idiosyncratic 
domestic contexts, such as the powers and preferences of different industries or particular 
bureaucrats, or cultural attachments to particular activities, make it extraordinarily 
difficult to generalize about the content of interests on the state-to-state level. 
Institutionalists posit the existence of mutual, collective, and harmonious interests, but set 
aside questions about why such interests exist, when and how they emerge, and whom 
they include. 
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Geopolitical theory helps explain interest formation. Regimes are about what 
actors may do, in the sense of permission, legitimacy, and social acceptability. The 
material context defines what actors can do, in the sense of physical possibility. A third 
category of activities is those actors want to do, because they have a specific, conscious 
interest in doing them. The concept of interests sits at the heart of both neo-liberalism and 
geopolitical theory, because both presuppose that human agents are pragmatic, self-
interested, and rational in their pursuit of basic ends (like security, welfare, and 
prosperity), and in the face of fundamental and recurring problems of distribution and 
management.232 Domain-specific interests are formed when basic human desires interact 
with the physical possibilities of a particular planetary space. Because it would be 
irrational to have an interest in a logically or physically impossible activity, the 
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Figure 3 – Interest Formation 
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constraints of the material context shape the content of actor interests. What is possible, 
or what seems possible, limits the category of desirable activities. Regimes also attempt 
to shape actor interests, by legitimating particular activities and prohibiting others. 
Whether they are successful is a question of regime effectiveness, the subject of a later 
section. The key point here is that interest formation is a site of productive engagement 
between neo-liberal and geopolitical IR theory. 
 The material context shapes the content and distribution of interests in non-
terrestrial spaces. Neo-liberal institutionalists recognize that most institutional 
cooperation in the ocean and outer space is based on the awareness of mutual 
vulnerability to problems like over-fishing, piracy, space weapons, and environmental 
degradation. These vulnerabilities did not always exist, but they were in significant 
measure created by technological developments, and identified and characterized by 
scientific activity.233 All vulnerabilities are not created equal, however, and scientific 
knowledge serves as the basis for risk assessments and cost-benefit calculations at 
different time scales. Aside from mutual vulnerability, the other major driver of GCRs is 
the potential for collective benefit. In non-terrestrial domains, technology and 
technological capability mediate access to resources and enable new use-activities, 
thereby creating specific and definable interests. Although these types of access often 
create individual interests in extractive or other activities, the material context shapes 
collectivities of interest. For example, diplomatic coalitions often form along 
technological or geographical lines: the first space-farers, landlocked vs. coastal vs. 
maritime states, and the partnership of Arctic indigenous groups and small island 
developing states as the first victims of sea-level rise. Geopolitical variables shape the 
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timing, content, and distribution of interests in a patterned, observable way. Yet neo-
liberal institutionalism simply takes such interests as background. 
 Geopolitical theory also employs a distinction between actual-interests and 
perceived-interests. As mentioned, neo-liberal institutionalists recognize that shared 
vulnerability drives regime formation, and is often identified and characterized by 
science. But sometimes, the scientific community identifies an interest that the political 
community has ignored. In the case of climate change, for example, humans have an 
interest in decreasing carbon emissions even if they do not recognize or acknowledge it. 
But there are also cases where scientists are slow in recognizing a shared vulnerability. 
For example, asteroid collision was not considered a threat by anyone until the second 
half of the 20th century. I hypothesize that regime ineffectiveness occurs when a 
perceived interest is not satisfied because of regime design, or when an actual interest is 
not perceived because of regime design.  
This project partially relies on the tools of institutionalism to explain the 
persistence of a mismatch or misfit between scientific knowledge, technological 
capability, and the specific content of GCRs. When the material context changes, but 
institutions do not adjust, the reason is often a kind of institutional inertia or ‘lock-in’ 
effect. When institutions do adjust to account for new understandings or capabilities, this 
shift can be understood as a ‘critical juncture,’ where the inadequacy of an existing 
regime becomes obvious and acute. These are cases where an interest is perceived, but 
either is or is not responded to and accounted for by the regime.   
Commons Management 
 Commons management is a subset of institutionalist literature that focuses on the 
challenges of establishing coherent and enforceable property regimes in a shared resource 
 
 91 
system.  Property can be understood as a bundle of rights, including access, extraction, 
exclusion, and transfer.234 Creating and enforcing property regimes, which define 
ownership of resources, requires addressing “issues of allocation, measurement, 
boundaries, and enforcement.”235 Because non-terrestrial domains have different logics 
and patterns than terrestrial spaces, their cooperative management in a condition of inter-
state anarchy is a special problem for the state system. Theories of commons 
management are typically based on a liberal political economy, insofar as they are 
concerned with how different property and use regimes fare in a world of individualistic 
and self-interested actors.  
The ‘commons’ concept is applicable to all scales, and it is often the case that 
discussion of global commons merely increases the scale of concepts and ideas associated 
with the local commons.236 Eleanor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990) is the 
seminal work on small-scale commons management, and its insights about the conditions 
for effective cooperative governance have been applied in a limited way to the global 
commons. There are good reasons to believe, however, that the unique challenges and 
opportunities of global commons management severely limit comparisons with local 
institutions.237 Ostrom’s book, while illuminating, often reads like a discussion between 
anthropologists and economists about what makes individuals cooperate. These local 
commons depend on ‘vernacular knowledge’ whereas global commons regimes are more 
appropriately “science driven.”238 On the planetary scale, the personality of state and 
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corporate actors, the context of anarchy, the diversity of populations, and the sheer 
distance between actors requires additional insights from IR to generate useful 
prescriptions for cooperative management.  
 
 
Figure 4  – Differences between local and global commons; From Paul C. Stern, “Design Principles for Global 
Commons: Natural Resources and Emerging Technologies.” International Journal of the Commons 5, no. 2 
(August 2011): 216. 
Constructivism and Epistemic Communities 
The challenge to scientific epistemology in the 1970s and 1980s, from post-
modernism and social constructivism, set the stage for the emergence of a new school of 
IR theory, known as constructivism.239 In the 1990s, a new body of theory emerged to 
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challenge the Realist and liberal paradigms.240 Constructivist (sometimes referred to as 
‘cognitivist’ or ‘idealist’) theories of international politics display less unity in their 
assumptions and assessments of international institutions, but they are united in 
emphasizing the role of non-material ideational variables and in adopting a sociological 
meta-theoretical orientation.241 As such, constructivism is a clear foil for a geopolitical 
approach, because it “emphasizes the meanings that are assigned to material objects, 
rather than the mere existence of the objects themselves.”242 Although some 
constructivists admit to the existence of an objective material world, the “irreducible 
core” of constructivism is the view that all of accessible reality is socially constructed. 
Social meaning making constitutes any and all patterns, even causal relationships, and 
material objects do not directly affect outcomes. This constructivist approach is now 
“broadly accepted,” and the single largest school of IR theory, according to some 
reckonings. 243 
A constructivist approach to GCRs highlights the wider context of “persuasive 
ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities.”244 Ideas about regime goals and 
values, for example, might be explained by the application of ideologies from the larger 
international context to specific issue areas. Regimes might themselves generate ideas 
about the domains they seek to manage, and socialize users and members into particular 
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roles, preferences, and identities.245 Whether ideas are exogenous influences on regime 
formation and operation, or they are produced and disseminated by regime dictates and 
activities, ideational variables rely on the fact that inter-subjective concepts, or “shared 
meanings,” are (re)produced by the circulation of discourses. The focus on discourse, 
ideas, and norms means that constructivists do not privilege the state, but instead argue 
that other actors are influential and relevant.246 Any actor that promotes and disseminates 
new ideas can be a key actor.247 
 Constructivists also advance a general explanation for what leads states to 
cooperate. Unlike the neo-liberal institutionalist story about solving collective action 
problems, or the Realist competition for relative gains, constructivists see a world of 
actors pursuing social ends. Norms, values, ideas, and identities impact the formation of 
regime goals. For constructivists, interest formation occurs through socialization and 
internalization of ideas, and interests are often defined by the pursuit of recognition, 
prestige, legitimacy, or communal membership.248 For example, the common goals of 
sustainability and equity can both be understood as assertions about fairness and justice 
in the international community, present and future. Because non-terrestrial planetary 
spaces provide important resources – including food, fresh air, and a stable climate – to 
billions of people, the trade-offs involved in their exploitation represent a choice about 
the distribution of basic goods; “virtually all environmental decisions raise ethical 
dilemmas.”249 The developing world, through the Group of 77 (G77) coalition and the 
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‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO) movement, has injected ideas about 
historical injustice and contemporary reparations into the formation of GCRs. Examples 
include the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle, the inclusion of 
technology transfer provisions, and designations of ‘common heritage.’ Obligations to 
future generations, and to the planet itself, also animate discussions about how and why 
activities in the ocean and outer space should be regulated; the timeframe, spatial scale, 
and membership of the relevant community is constantly being debated and negotiated. 
But these evolving norms and values do not control or fully determine the content of 
interests and goals in non-terrestrial domains. 
 Constructivism suggests that ideas only affect international regimes when or after 
they have been transferred to policymakers in some way.250 The ‘epistemic communities’ 
approach, first introduced by Peter Haas in the 1990s, explains the role of scientists in 
concentrating, fleshing out, legitimating, communicating, and advocating for particular 
ideas (described as “consensus”). An epistemic community is defined as “a knowledge-
based transnational network of professionals holding political power by cognitive 
authority.”251 Epistemic communities are bound together by shared normative beliefs, 
causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise.252 These transnational 
networks of scientific experts use their authoritative position to shape the content of 
regimes. Although an ‘epistemic community’ is ultimately a theory deployed by 
constructivists (and not a paradigm in its own right), its visibility in IR and relationship to 
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the project suggests the need for a separate discussion. The epistemic communities 
approach is currently the “most influential model of the role of expert knowledge.”253 
 Epistemic communities are important for GCRs because the consensual 
knowledge they produce defines problems and shapes interests. More specifically, 
scientific groups identify causal relationships and interconnections between issues.254 
Epistemic communities are the “principal channel” through which understandings about 
cause are applied to international regimes.255 Causal relationships – like that between 
carbon emissions and climate change – define collective problems and create specific 
interests. This perspective is largely congruent with the geopolitical approach described 
above, because it explains how scientific knowledge comes to impact regimes. But the 
epistemic communities approach thus far has focused almost exclusively on the social 
factors involved in the dissemination of scientific knowledge. Scientific ideas are 
“chosen” from a “consensual knowledge base” depending on the number of available 
ideas, their simplicity, potential for political coalitions or political gain, and alignment 
with pre-existing beliefs.256 When ideas are successfully diffused, it is not because of 
their content, but because specific political, social, and economic channels were available 
and accessed by authoritative experts. The epistemic communities approach rejects the 
rationalist or policy-analytic claim that major problems exist independently of 
researchers, are discovered by them, and that this discovery automatically creates 
incentives for problem resolution. Scientific knowledge becomes a guide for action 
because it is wielded and disseminated by expert authorities. 
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Haas and co-author Casey Stevens explicitly acknowledge that in order to really 
be influential, scientific consensus must be developed independently of political 
processes, and be insulated from political pressures. For example, they argue that 
scientific bodies should control their own agenda, and be composed of experts chosen 
because of their scientific qualifications, not their national identity.257 Keeping the 
development of scientific knowledge as a distinct, separate, and prior phase (before 
policymaking) produces “usable” knowledge that is “likely to be adopted by decision 
makers.”258 Knowledge is usable insofar as it is credible, legitimate, and salient. All three 
of these features are social characteristics. Credibility requires consensus among 
scientists.259 Salient information is “timely and is organized on a politically meaningful 
timescale.”260 In other words, the production of scientific knowledge must be separated 
from politics not to ensure that it is true, but to guarantee that it is believable. This is the 
normative element of the epistemic communities approach: scientific communities 
provide better advice to policymakers, because of their expert status and minimal 
political bias.261 
In focusing on the social aspects of expertise and influence, the epistemic 
communities literature “brackets the production of knowledge itself.”262 Materialist 
geopolitical theory challenges the wide room for maneuver implied by the constructivist 
notion of “shared meanings” or “shared understandings,” instead suggesting that the 
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contours of material reality, as revealed by science and accessed by technology, represent 
a set of severe and important bounds or constraints on meaning-making. These 
constraints operate in two ways. First, the bounds of the material context channel our 
experience of the planetary domains in which we operate. For example, most humans can 
only see the deep ocean through the video streams of robotic submersible vehicles. 
Second, scientific knowledge production is keyed to the contours of the material context, 
and science enjoys a special status as authoritative fodder for meaning making. In both 
cases, our shared understandings of the ocean and outer space are channeled and shaped 
by the material context. Geopolitical theory puts the material core of inter-subjective 
understandings at the center of analysis, and highlights the mechanisms through which 
the material context shapes and constrains the trajectory of ideational variables.  
The geopolitical approach takes two stances that differentiate it from 
constructivism and the epistemic communities approach. First, the material context is a 
structural influence on interests and ideas. The key weakness of the constructivist 
approach is its difficultly explaining the structures and conditions that cause change in 
ideas, norms, and values.263 While this project could not possibly identify all relevant 
causes of ideational change, the geopolitical approach does offer some important insight 
about the nature of scientific knowledge production. Second, the structural influence of 
the material context explains why scientific knowledge has a special epistemic status, and 
is therefore a powerful influence on and source of interests and ideas. Most theorists 
agree that new ideas can change the calculation of interests, but the source of new ideas is 
disputed.264 Constructivists generally deny that scientific knowledge production can 
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independently shape the social and discursive world; “Sharers in a common scientific 
worldview are more likely to perpetuate than deeply challenge the political structures to 
which they are tied.”265 Yet scientific communities are still an important site of meaning 
making and source of ideas. Haas argues that scientific communities have special 
influence under conditions of uncertainty, and when a crisis is recognized, they are the 
ones tasked with providing key information about interests, consequences, and 
solutions.266 But sometimes, the information causes the crisis. The epistemic 
communities approach assigns scientists too much leeway in defining the meaning of 
scientific findings; Emanuel Adler and Haas describe the role of scientists in the 
“selection” of shared goals and dissemination of “their preferred world vision.”267 This 
implies that scientists choose their consensus for its fit with the needs of policymakers in 
a crisis. But the emergence of problems like the ozone hole, ocean acidification, and 
space debris, which serve no obvious political interests and challenge existing ideas, 
suggest that this model may be overlooking something fundamental. 
Two examples illustrate how ideas and interests are shaped by the material 
context. The NIEO movement and its associated ideas should be an easy case for 
constructivism, but in fact its influence on global commons regimes can be significantly 
explained in terms of geography, science, and technology. Most obviously, the G77’s 
strong bargaining position was significantly a result of high prices for globally traded 
commodities, which eventually collapsed. This situation resulted from the distribution of 
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natural resources and the development of new extraction technology.268 The successes the 
G77 did achieve resulted in regime rules that mandated technology transfer, which 
“eliminates the advantage of states technically able to recover a resource.”269 The 
complexity and expense of relevant technology ensured its limited and asymmetrical 
distribution, thereby necessitating transfer for the achievement of NIEO goals. The 
overall historical wealth inequality that motivated the NIEO movement was also 
significantly a result of uneven technological access to non-terrestrial domains. 
Membership in the G77, their leverage in negotiations, the content of NIEO values, and 
their translation into regime mandates all illustrate the influence of geography and 
technology on GCRs. 
 Another important example is the ecological paradigm of management, which 
challenges “traditional policies for managing discrete activities or physical resource 
spaces.”270 Haas notes the existence of “holistic ecological beliefs,” which emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s and progressively influenced the construction of global environmental 
agreements.271 The idea of universal ecological principles has been challenged for its 
supposed denial of the relevance and validity of local knowledge. This position implies 
that any scale of knowledge production or content is relevant, so long as it contains 
practices and ideas related to the environment. If the proposed solution is local, then the 
framing of the problem should be local.272 These positions fail to register the important 
fact that ecosystems have a real, material existence that determines the relevant scale for 
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understanding causal relationships, defining problems, and formulating solutions. Coral 
bleaching occurs locally, but ocean warming may be regional and temperature rise is 
global. The problem may be experienced locally, but that does not mean a local definition 
is accurate or a local solution will be effective. Ecological principles emerged as guides 
for GCRs because scientists created and disseminated ideas, but scientists advanced these 
ideas because they had progressively uncovered the interconnections and dynamics of 
real material ecosystems. 
 The epistemic communities idea is compatible with materialist geopolitics, and 
together they tell a more complete story than either accounts for alone. Epistemic 
communities serve as a kind of intervening variable or translation mechanism between 
the material context and regimes, because they are the carriers of scientific knowledge. 
Such knowledge is impactful and important because it is scientific, not simply because it 






 If international politics is conceived as a never-ending play with a complex plot, 
an analyst or critic could focus on the actors, the script, the set, or the meaning ascribed 
to the play by the audience. Planetary geopolitics considers the importance of the stage, 
and the constraints and possibilities it presents for the play of human activity.273 
Foregrounding the physical setting for human activity – the material context – illuminates 
basic structural influences on the practices, interests, and problems that motivate policy- 
and treaty-making.  This section begins to unpack how those structural influences are 
identified and characterized in this project. After describing the general methodology for 
analyzing GCRs and their relationship to the physical environment, this section outlines 
two key propositions made by planetary geopolitics: regimes are often constructed 
without reference to major structural features of the material context, and regimes do not 
adjust well to changes in the material context. After defending these propositions, these 
ideas are connected to the idea of regime effectiveness in the subsequent section. 
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 Figure 5  – Relationship between geopolitical theory and epistemic communities 
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Comparative Historical Analysis 
The methodology of Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) is applied to 
international management in two non-terrestrial spaces: the ocean and outer space.274 
Each case deals with complex outcomes on a very large scale, which can be best 
understood in light of several temporal processes, including the coalescence of scientific 
knowledge, the progression of technological capabilities, and the negotiation and 
implementation stages of global governance. The CHA methodology focuses on the 
generation of new theories that account for the structural features of international politics, 
in this case the structuration that results from institutions and individuals operating within 
the bounds of geographical, ecological, and technological possibility through time. The 
project addresses this set of variables as a coherent causal package – the ‘material 
context’ – that creates significant opportunities, challenges, and possibilities for 
international governance institutions with a given set of goals or purposes. Using two 
cases, provisional generalizations can be made about the causes of a particular outcome: 
the failure of GCRs to achieve their goals. Because each domain – the ocean and outer 
space – is examined across time, planetary-scale space, and multiple issue areas, 
comparative analysis can take place both within and across cases. The theory this project 
aims to extract and build from the empirical cases is complementary to existing theories, 
acknowledging the causal complexity surrounding global commons regimes. 
The temporal orientation of CHA is well-suited to this effort to explain the 
dysfunctions, failures, and ineffectiveness of GCRs over time. Relative time frames for 
scientific knowledge accumulation, technological change, and regime building and 
implementation matter for the chances of effectiveness. The formation of scientific 
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knowledge about coral bleaching, for example, will impact the ocean governance regime 
differently depending on whether scientific consensus formed before or after the core 
regime was negotiated. Tracing changes in the material context over time, and their 
influence on collective management institutions, draws on the existing literature about 
path dependence, feedbacks, critical junctures, and other patterns of institutional 
change.275 The pace, trajectory, and timing of alterations in global commons regimes is 
shaped by in the pace, trajectory, and timing of scientific and technological change. 
Disentangling and synthesizing these connections help create a coherent theory of the 
effectiveness of global commons regimes in non-terrestrial planetary spaces. 
Regime Pathology 
 GCRs are often pathological, in that their design inhibits their effectiveness over 
time. Regimes, or their components, are ineffective when their assumptions about the 
world diverge from what we actually know, and/or what is actually true. An inflexible 
regime is prone to be pathological because it will have decreasing congruence with 
scientific knowledge. When built on outdated science, and designed for old technology, 
inflexible regimes are unable to address contemporary sources and understandings of 
global environmental problems. 
 There are many reasons why regimes do not respond and adjust to new scientific 
knowledge about non-terrestrial spaces, and the origins of these inflexibilities are not 
explicitly explained by shifting material contexts and understandings of them. Planetary 
geopolitics focuses on the ways and reasons that non-adjustment dooms GCRs to 
ineffectiveness. The concepts of ‘critical junctures’ and ‘path dependence’ imply that 
there are specific moments when institutional adjustment is possible, but that institutions 
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are generally resistant to change. Critical junctures might include new scientific 
information or new technological capability in a non-terrestrial domain, which 
significantly alters understandings of possibilities and consequences. Relatively sudden 
discoveries or innovations can prompt a critical juncture, a period where actors’ choices 
have an increased probability of influencing regime effectiveness.276 When a choice is 
made – typically to ignore or downplay the significance of the new (or newly understood) 
material context – the phenomenon of ‘path dependence’ suggests that it becomes 
increasingly difficult to reverse. Each step in a particular direction institutionally makes it 
harder to turn back.277 This phenomenon, whereby existing arrangements shape the pace 
and direction of institutional change, is especially likely in regime complexes, where 
multiple overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions characterize a single regime.278 
The resulting institutional lock-in makes regimes inflexible, inefficient, and ineffective. 
Political Geography 
 Accounting for scientific knowledge and technological capability requires 
attentiveness to political geography, which is another potential source of dysfunction for 
GCRs. John Agnew and Luca Muscarà define political geography as “a set of scholarly 
and political ideas about the relationship of geography to politics,” with roots in 
geography, political science, sociology, anthropology, and IR. Theories and descriptions 
in political geography all include geography and politics as the key variables, but which 
is the cause and and which the effect has shifted over time. Political geography as an area 
of inquiry originally focused on how geography influences politics, but contemporary 
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theorists are more interested in the ways that politics influences geography.279 Agnew and 
Muscarà suggest in Making Political Geography that it is important to pursue a middle 
position, by theoretically balancing between determinism and social constructionism. 
This is reminiscent of Latour’s ‘hybrid objects,’ part-ideational and part-material with no 
particular proportion or core. Instead of seeking a neutral balance, it is better to push 
farther in the direction of materialism, by illustrating the continued utility of research on 
how material geography (broadly construed) affects and influences international politics.  
Agnew and Muscarà describe the approach of political geography as thinking in 
terms of the maps inherent in a political story. Maps are “the 'technology' or methodology 
most specific to geographical thinking.”280 They are a “graphic representation of the 
milieu,” and a “form of symbolization with special utility for encoding and transmitting 
human knowledge of the environment.”281 Maps thus are summary descriptions of 
material contexts. Examples include spatial representations of coastlines, the seafloor, 
orbital pathways, atmospheric currents, and other natural material planetary dynamics 
and processes. As material observations are systematized, vernacularized, and diffused 
they place basic constraints on our mental images of what a domain is, what is happening 
there, and what is possible there. Maps create political places, because they represent 
“natural locations that have acquired a social and psychological significance insofar as 
they ground political outlooks and projects.”282 The ‘global commons’ designation is a 
kind of mental map, because it entails a global geographic frame and international 
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membership. Agnew and Muscarà argue “geographical scale is imposed on the world and 
not inherent to it,” but the material dynamics of the ocean and outer space entail patterns 
and interconnections that have an intrinsic scale.283 For example, ocean circulation is 
dominated by meso-scale eddies, a feature that was discovered, not constructed.284 A 
geopolitical approach that focuses on the geography of the material context is not 
completely consistent with all of Agnew and Muscarà’s premises and prescriptions, but it 
does pursue a research agenda that they promote: the planetary commons, global politics 
of the physical environment, and political geography of the environment.285 Maps of the 
physical environment (including global technological systems) illustrate spatial patterns, 
and they help create and define political places like the planetary commons. These 
interactions and places are the objects of global governance. 
Although it has a long historical legacy, planetary geopolitics can be understood 
as something new. Prompted by the dire realities of climate change, scholars are paying 
increasing attention to the central importance of scale for conceptualizing problems and 
organizing solutions. New tools of geospatial analysis, like geographic information 
systems (GIS), enable the visualization and analysis of multiscalar phenomena.286 New 
problems and new technologies have prompted a (re)turn to the material context as a 
source of constraints, conditions, and opportunities for international politics. The next 
section outlines the relationship between the planetary material context and the successes 
and failures of global commons regimes. 
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Regime Effectiveness  
Defining and evaluating effectiveness is a difficult task, because each regime 
faces a different problem structure, utilizes different mechanisms to influence behavior, 
and confronts uncertainties about the causes and consequences of human activity. In 
other words, regimes differ in terms of what they confront, what they know, and what 
tools they are using. The lack of clear counter-factual scenarios means that analysis 
requires systematic inferences and the application of theoretical perspectives in order to 
judge regime effectiveness.287 Nevertheless, a simple definition of regime effectiveness is 
possible: an effective regime achieves its goals and purposes by influencing actors to 
change their behavior in a way that solves problems and satisfies interests, especially 
shared problems and collective interests. This section surveys the literature on regime 
effectiveness, considering how it is defined and evaluated, and the conditions under 
which effectiveness is achieved. 
Effectiveness Defined 
 Regime effectiveness requires causing changes in the behavior of relevant actors, 
especially those whose behavior causes collective problems.288 What type of behavior is 
required, however, is a subject of contention among scholars. Oran Young identifies six 
dimensions of effectiveness, which can exist in multiple possible combinations: problem 
solving, goal attainment, behavioral change, process effectiveness (which includes 
compliance), constitutive effectiveness (effort), and evaluative effectiveness 
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(performance).289 Although each is slightly different, these standards can be grouped into 
two basic definitions of effectiveness: either regimes are effective when actor behavior 
conforms to regime dictates (behavior, process, constitutive, and evaluative), or they are 
effective when actor behavior achieves the substantive goals of a regime (behavior, 
problem solving, goal attainment). This section will assess and reject the former 
understanding of effectiveness, in favor of a notion of effectiveness that is more difficult 
to define and evaluate, but also more meaningful for determining whether a regime is 
‘working.’ 
Compliance is a straightforward measure of effectiveness, as the criteria for 
evaluation are directly implied by the rules and norms of the regime, which sometimes 
include institutions for assessing whether a given actor is in compliance. Compliance is 
therefore a regime-specific standard, in that it compares the actual behavior of relevant 
actors with the specific dictates and injunctions of the regime. Compliance includes 
Young’s notion of process effectiveness, which requires members to incorporate regime 
provisions into their domestic legal and political systems.290 It also captures constitutive 
effectiveness, which entails the expenditure of time, energy, and resources, and 
evaluative effectiveness, which is a measure of performance rather than consequences of 
a regime.291 Compliance basically entails that members change their behavior in response 
to a regime, in order to fulfill its specific obligations. 
The compliance standard can be understood as the relic of a bygone era in 
political science. In early debates within institutionalism, compliance was used to 
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demonstrate that international institutions had an appreciable effect on state behavior. 
Indeed, the behavioral approach to conceptualizing regimes relies on a minimum 
threshold of compliance to prove that a regime even exists. By conflating existence and 
effectiveness, these regime theories are incapable of conceiving an institution that exists 
but that actors do not comply with, a condition that intuitively holds for many historical 
regimes. States rarely negotiate and ratify treaties that would be difficult to comply with, 
or where their non-compliance would be visible, or trigger punitive measures. As a result, 
perfect compliance is often insufficient for solving collective problems, because regime 
provisions were never adequate in the first place.292 Compliance is therefore a poor 
standard for evaluating whether existing regimes ‘work.’ 
 Another way to evaluate the effectiveness of regimes is to consider whether they 
have achieved their own (typically external) goals and purposes; has the regime solved 
the problem it was meant to solve, or achieved the collective benefit it was meant to 
achieve?293 These goals may or may not be embedded within the regime as principles, 
which include “beliefs of…rectitude.”294 Whether or not they form part of the explicit 
content of GCRs, external goals and purposes motivate the negotiation and ratification of 
international treaties to manage non-terrestrial spaces. Although regime formation tends 
to be motivated by problem solving, actors typically frame this as the achievement of 
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more general goals or values.295 These more general values, such as ‘sustainability’ or 
‘equity,’ represent important criteria of regime effectiveness, insofar as they reflect the 
reason a given regime is implemented and maintained.296 If over-fishing continues to 
accelerate despite the global fisheries regime, we must describe the regime as ineffective 
even if all its specific injunctions were being satisfied. The exact character of these goals, 
and the assessments of whether or not they are being achieved, are (or should be) subject 
to revision and re-articulation in the face of scientific and technological advance. For 
example, the definitions of two commons regime goals – ‘sustainability’ and ‘equity’ – 
change with the material context. Whether these changes are accounted for by GCRs is 
critical for their effectiveness. 
 The concept of ‘sustainability’ implies balance between system maintenance and 
reproduction and the disruptions of external actors who exploit the system for various 
purposes. In this way, sustainability has no content without reference to a particular 
system. The system that needs to be sustained might be thought of as an economic 
system, whose level of resource extraction must be sustainable.297 Or the system to be 
sustained may be thought of as an ecological one, subject to internal and external sources 
of disruption and flux.298 In the case of the ocean, ecological and economic systems are 
intertwined by the concept of ‘resources.’ A sustainable regime, allows “as many of the 
highest priority uses as can be accommodated without harm to the resources 
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themselves.”299 This limit on sustainable use is defined materially and given precision by 
scientists. The limit of the atmosphere’s ‘global sink’ resource is a function of its 
physical and chemical properties, which shift, attenuate, and concentrate toxins in 
different ways and to different degrees than, say, the ocean as a global sink. The goal of 
‘sustainable fishing’ requires scientific knowledge of reproduction patterns, growth rates, 
and total numbers, evident in the notion of a ‘maximum sustainable yield,’ which is 
embedded within fisheries management institutions. Because the knowledge necessary to 
make assertions about sustainable use is often lacking, some regimes adopt a 
‘precautionary principle’ designed to deal with scientific uncertainty.300 The basic 
question of sustainability is: how much use is too much use, such that it decreases 
possible future use? The answer is different depending on the resource, so ‘sustainability’ 
as a regime principle does not function as a criterion for effectiveness without domain 
specific scientific knowledge.  
 The concept of ‘equity’ is entangled with science and technology. The principle 
of equity entails equality of access, benefit, or consequences. It often includes an 
historical element, insofar as many of the G77 countries argue that the imperialist 
predations of the past few centuries are responsible for their comparative lack of 
technological access to non-terrestrial domains. The ‘common heritage’ concept, first 
articulated by Arvid Pardo in 1967, is an application of the principle of equity to 
commons resources.301 The principle has been applied to commons regimes in two basic 
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ways. Several regimes incorporate a mandate for transfer of technology from advanced to 
developing states in order to ‘level the playing field’ and rectify inequities in access, or 
share the means for alleviating a mutual vulnerability. Other regimes challenge pre-
existing ‘first come, first served’ norms with a principle of equal claim despite (current) 
unequal access. These types of arrangements are associated with resources that require 
advanced technology to access, such as deep seabed minerals or geo-stationary orbit. As 
technology advances, its composition and distribution change, and so too do the 
conditions required for achieving domain-specific equity. Equity comes into play in a 
slightly different way regarding globally shared vulnerability to events like climate 
change, sea-level rise, and ocean acidification. The failure of a regime to achieve its more 
immediate purpose of, for example, mitigating sea-level rise, is framed as an equity issue 
because of the distribution of consequences when global commons are poorly managed. 
For example, the small island developing states are significantly more vulnerable to 
rising sea levels than the industrialized countries whose emissions are the primary cause 
of global warming. Even when a regime targets a global issue, concern about its failure to 
mitigate shared problems often is manifested in an argument about lack of equity. 
Effectiveness Explained 
The primary literature on regime effectiveness comes from neo-liberal 
institutionalism, which tends to elevate the importance of regime design. Theorists have 
identified a large number of obstacles to and conditions of regime effectiveness, which 
Young categorizes using two metrics. First is decision variables versus structural 
variables; decision variables are “subject to conscious control or manipulation” by regime 
designers and negotiators, whereas structural variables are “features of the larger 
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physical, biological, or social environment” that are not subject to conscious control.302 
An additional metric concerns the location of the variable: is it endogenous, exogenous, 
or is there a linkage between the two? Endogenous variables come from regime design, 
whereas exogenous variables include a broad array of external conditions, especially 
associated with power, interests, and knowledge. Linkage variables consider “the fit 
between the institutional character of a governance system and the environment in which 
it is expected to function.”303  
The relationship between regimes and the material context spans all of these 
categories. It impacts decision-making and endogenous variables insofar as it is 
concerned with flexibility in regime design. Geopolitical variables – geography, ecology, 
and technology – can be understood as exogenous and structural. But the main focus is 
linkage: what is the relationship between regime design and the material context, and 
how does that relationship contribute to ineffectiveness? Because neo-liberal 
institutionalism is my main theoretical interlocutor, I will first review two endogenous 
explanations for effectiveness from this body of theory. Institutionalists tend to focus on 
the constellation of interests – how they are configured, and whether institutional 
arrangements can reconfigure them in a way that solves collective action problems.304 For 
this reason, they are especially concerned with regime design. 
 Neo-liberal institutionalists focus on the structure of incentives as a key 
determinant of effectiveness. Cooperation is achieved not by changing the content of 
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actors’ interests, but by adjusting the incentives that drive their behavior.305 There are 
many possible mechanisms for changing incentives, including monitoring and its 
reputational effects, capacity building and transfer, increasing levels of concern by 
raising awareness, and treaty-based inducements and punishments.306 Because treaty 
design shapes actors’ incentives, institutionalists often focus on achieving the best 
possible design. The ideal regime alters incentives in a way that makes its rules and 
norms “self-enforcing,” because compliance is individually rational, collectively rational, 
and perceived as legitimate.307 Restructuring incentives only works in cases where 
common interests or mutual benefit are achievable through cooperation, because these 
situations contain an alternative incentive structure that motivates collective action.308 
 In the case of regulatory regimes, enforcement is often understood as a critical 
means of re-aligning incentive structures, because members have incentives to cheat.309 
Levels of enforcement depend on the capacity (time, energy, and resources) available and 
devoted to enforcing the rules and norms of a given regime. Capacity is understood as a 
necessary condition for effectiveness.310 Enforcement requires identification of rule-
breakers (monitoring and verification), and may include formal adjudication and 
punishment. Effectiveness is therefore partially a function of “the strength of the key 
control provisions…but also the provisions on reporting, monitoring, regime 
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strengthening, noncompliance, and financial and technical assistance.”311 Typically a 
focus on enforcement is associated with the compliance view of effectiveness.312 Because 
capacity problems are widespread, lack of enforcement provides an easy explanation for 
ineffectiveness.313 Compliance can be enhanced by building up domestic and secretariat 
capacity, increasing assistance to other members, improving monitoring and reporting, 
and considering sanctions, among other things. 
Geopolitical Conditions of Effectiveness 
 The conditions of effectiveness identified by neo-liberal institutionalists tend to 
assume that interests and problems are well formed and well understood, and can 
therefore be pursued straightforwardly by altering incentives for behavior. But the 
geopolitical approach argues that this situation, which serves as a pre-requisite for 
successful regime design, cannot be assumed. When interests and problems are obscure, 
inchoate, or poorly understood by regime designers, the resulting institutional forms are 
unlikely to alter behaviors in a way that achieves desired outcomes.   
The basic argument of the geopolitical theory of GCRs is that regimes are 
effective insofar as they demonstrate a fit or match with the material context. The idea of 
‘isomorphism’ represents the ideal or perfect match. But because the material context 
itself, and our scientific image of it, changes over time, maintaining institutional 
isomorphism with the structure of the environment (both natural and technological) is a 
challenging set of tasks. The ideal regime is functional, meaning that it is directed at 
achieving a specific external outcome, which it does in fact achieve. The material context 
constrains which regime designs will be functional, but the choice of regime design is a 
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social and political question.314 For regimes to function, they must consistently obtain and 
rely upon the best possible understanding of the material situation, which in the case of 
non-terrestrial domains happens to be provided by Earth system sciences. Institutionalists 
already recognize the value of consensus; Young says “a regime is likely to be 
effective…when it rests on a common conception of the problem to be solved and some 
degree of consensus regarding what is needed to fashion a solution.”315 The geopolitical 
approach adds another condition: the consensus on which regimes are built must be 
scientifically valid and credible. Most institutionalists suggest that effectiveness requires 
regimes to account for the “nature of the underlying problem” or “characteristics of the 
issue area,” such as biophysical properties, spatial and temporal scales, and the 
availability of scientific knowledge to characterize them.316 In order for a GCR to be 
effective, it must be attentive to the resolution and detail of the non-terrestrial material 
domain it seeks to govern, especially as it changes over time.  
The geopolitical theory of GCRs outlines two conditions of effectiveness: the 
acquisition of necessary scientific knowledge of the material context, and the institutional 
flexibility to respond and adapt to new information about interests and problems. These 
conditions are briefly surveyed here, examined throughout the case chapters, and 
revisited in the conclusion. 
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Acquisition of necessary information 
 The role of science in creating effective environmental regimes is both contested 
and underdeveloped.317 But scientific knowledge is critical to regime effectiveness, 
because it reveals interests and characterizes problems, although these are not always 
recognized, acknowledged, or acted upon. The goals and purposes of regimes – what 
makes them functional – are comprised of interests to be satisfied and problems to be 
solved. But defining the precise ‘functions,’ and designing institutions to fulfill them, 
requires careful planning and analysis. Scientific knowledge about relationships of cause 
and consequence informs risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and stakeholder 
identification.318 An institution ‘fits’ with the material context when it reflects 
contemporary scientific consensus about planetary systems. According to Young, 
ecosystem properties relevant to institutional fit include structures (complexity, 
homogeneity, interdependence), processes (productivity, growth, stabilization, change), 
and linkages (boundary conditions, transboundary interactions).319 Geography and 
technology are also part of the material background with which regimes ought to fit. 
Knowledge about shared consequences is especially influential for regime formation, and 
substantially explains which problems are addressed and when.320 A “shared perception 
of mutual vulnerability” presents a clear and collective interest, which can be pursued 
through institutional cooperation.321 But building a functional regime is not easy or 
inevitable, because scientific study of complex planetary systems remains plagued by 
data deficiency and uncertainty. Lack of scientific guidance presents risks for 
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effectiveness, because “causes, impacts, consequences, and solutions are often 
interconnected in surprising ways.”322 If a regime is built without knowing the 
relationship between means and ends, it is unlikely to achieve its particular ends.  
 Because perfect information – in the form of universal, comprehensive scientific 
knowledge – is illusory, effective regimes must have a functional relationship with 
uncertainty. In other words, regimes should be designed in a way that acknowledges what 
negotiators and bureaucrats (informed by scientists) do not know, and what they need to 
know. Young cautions that “simple ignorance about the behavior of biotic and abiotic 
systems” is a real and important source of poorly designed regimes.323 Complex problems 
like ocean acidification and space debris require significant scientific investment, in order 
to identify their scale, intensity, and time frame. Uncertainty can cause public goods to be 
under-valued relative to parochial interests. Long-term consequences are virtually 
ignored if threats are poorly defined, and as a result public concern is very low.324 
Because environmental experts do not themselves create regimes, uncertainty is easily 
overlooked. A dysfunctional relationship with uncertainty will be described in the section 
on specific regime pathologies. 
 
Institutional flexibility 
 Regimes are “articulated at particular points in time,” so there is a risk that they 
will “codify existing knowledge in rules that are difficult to change.”325 Because the 
material context changes over time, in both reality and image, Young argues that 
effective regimes must periodically “review the relationship between ecosystem 
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boundaries and regime boundaries.”326 This same process must also occur with 
geographical and technological geographies; as maps of dynamic planetary systems and 
changing human activities change, so too must the regime. Biophysical systems in 
particular “are characterized by processes of evolution that tend to be nonlinear, subject 
to abrupt changes, and irreversible.”327 The more rapidly and profoundly scientific 
understanding changes, typically from uncertainty to certainty, the more important the 
need for institutional flexibility becomes.328 In this situation, the effectiveness of a 
“brittle” regime, or one firmly constructed on outdated and inaccurate premises, will be 
short lived.329 This is because material contextual change typically means an alteration in 
the problem itself, and scientific knowledge accumulation updates and refines our 
understanding of shared problems.330 A primary condition of regime effectiveness over 
time is therefore the built-in capacity for a regime to adjust and adapt to new material 
situations, referred to as ‘regime flexibility.’331  
Regime Pathologies 
The methodology of Comparative Historical Analysis distinguishes causal 
associations from incidental correlations by identifying particular mechanisms – or 
vectors of influence – through which a set of variables affects or influences outcomes. 
This project posits the existence of three types of regime pathology, and then investigates 
whether they exist in the case of the ocean and outer space, and how they affect the 
outcome of regime ineffectiveness. Regime pathologies are institutional design features 
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that reinforce mismatches and misalignments between the material context and the 
regime. They are self-subverting features of regime design. Such regimes are guaranteed 
to be dysfunctional, and therefore ineffective, to the degree that they embody these 
pathologies. Although there are other causes of GCR ineffectiveness, the identification of 
three new mechanisms represents a contribution to theory development, specifically a 
geopolitical theory of regimes in non-terrestrial spaces. These pathologies will be 
outlined below, fleshed out in the case chapters, and re-visited in the conclusion. 
Territorialization 
 In non-terrestrial planetary spaces, achieving regime goals and purposes requires 
getting the scale right: decision-making communities must include all those affected, and 
accountability mechanisms must apply to all those who are part of the cause.332 In other 
words, institutional mechanisms must align with the geographies of cause and 
consequence. This insight about the appropriate scale of governance is over 40 years old: 
Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian noted in 1975 that in non-terrestrial realms, access and 
exploitation have “increasingly universal impacts, thereby widening the arena of 
necessary mutual accountability to include more and more of the human community, and 
thereby enlarging the necessity for correspondingly inclusive decision structures.”333 Yet 
the ocean and outer space regimes have, to a significant degree, inscribed a political 
geography of territorialization. Carving out territorial ownership and jurisdiction– 
whether they are attached to a geographical location (zones) or technology of access 
(flags) – conflicts with the material geography of non-terrestrial spaces. But because 
territorialization and nationalization entail rights and claims over valuable resources, this 
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political geography becomes rapidly and deeply embedded into our shared conception of 
these domains. The territorialization strategy for collective management has been 
extremely prevalent, but is “basically retrogressive” in terms of creating a functional 
relationship between “the evolving material world and the traditional international 
political system.”334 Territorial political geography creates a durable mismatch between 
regimes and the geography of practices, problems, and interests. 
 
Naturalization of Technology 
 Technology significantly determines which practices of access and exploitation 
are exercised in the ocean and outer space, and thereby plays a central role in defining the 
interests and creating the problems that motivate regime formation. Technology is also an 
important source of solutions, in that it can increase use efficiency (and decrease negative 
externalities), provide opportunities for monitoring and verification, and improve equity 
through its transfer and diffusion. Regimes therefore tend to contain specific injunctions 
regarding technology, especially its deployment (prohibition or mandate) and regulation 
(how, when, and by who it can be used by). But because technology changes over time 
through improvement and innovation, the problems and interests it creates, and the 
solution sets it provides, also change. A static or stagnant regime with regard to 
technology misses new requirements for effectiveness, and opportunities for its 
achievement through the control and use of technology. If regimes do not take account of 
the frontiers of technological research and development, a significant and dangerous lag 
will emerge between the assumptions about technology made by the regime, and its 
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actual impact on non-terrestrial spaces.335 Regime dictates regarding specific technology 
naturalize a level of capability, and ensure a future mismatch between regimes and 
domain-specific practices, problems, and interests. 
Frozen Ontology 
 Scientific knowledge has a “pervasive influence” on governmental decision-
making and policy formation, because it is used for risk assessment and to calculate costs 
and benefits.336 The perceptions of policymakers and negotiators “closely reflect the state 
of existing scientific knowledge.”337 This knowledge is used to define the nature of 
shared problems, which informs the construction of regime goals and the specific 
behavioral changes required to achieve them.338 It is also used “to define the interests that 
political actors articulate and defend,” whether parochial or collective.339 In situations of 
scientific uncertainty, value judgments and interpretive contests often fill the gap.340 But 
of course, the level of scientific uncertainty changes, scientific knowledge accumulates 
over time, scientific theories change, and scientific uncertainty decreases. The result is an 
identification of new problems and interests, and better understanding of the nature of 
cause, consequence, and solutions for previously recognized problems and interests. The 
threats of asteroid collision, cascading space debris, and ocean acidification were all 
discovered after the solidification of their associated governance regime, as well as new 
interests like marine genetic resources and asteroid mining. Scientific knowledge 
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accumulation has also “enlarged the depth of environmental problems by creating lengthy 
chains of environmental causality.”341 It has identified new global public goods, like 
ecosystem services, and redefined the terms of sustainable exploitation. But regimes tend 
to embed a particular understanding of the domain to be managed, which prevents 
adjustment to new conceptions of interests and problems. 
 Regimes are pathological when they are constructed in a way that ignores or 
under-emphasizes existing scientific uncertainty and inevitable scientific knowledge 
accumulation. This occurs as a kind of freezing the image of the governance domain, 
embedding within institutions the assumption that current maps and theories are already 
accurate, and will not change. This feature of regime design is understood as a virtue at 
least one STS scholar. Steve Rayner argues that ignorance is a “necessary social 
achievement” as opposed to a dysfunction, because it is “essential to maintain the 
organizational arrangements of societies.”342 New knowledge may be “uncomfortable” 
insofar as it reveals disagreements about facts or values, and risks causing “delicate 
institutional arrangements to fracture.”343 Rayner therefore recommends “information 
management strategies” that deny, dismiss, divert, or displace new information if it 
threatens the stability of existing institutional architectures. This form of ‘leaning in’ to 
ignorance assumes that regime durability, not effectiveness, is the ultimate goal. Rayner’s 
proposal is a plan for regime pathology. If pursued, it would guarantee a growing 
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mismatch between the regime and material realities, thus guaranteeing steadily growing 
ineffectiveness. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has situated the project in the larger theoretical literatures that 
address science, regimes, and global environmental governance. In the next several 
chapters, the methodology of Comparative Historical Analysis will be applied to the 
historical cases of ocean and outer space governance, in order to evaluate the conditions 
of effectiveness and regime pathologies described above. The conclusion will return to 
these hypothesized mechanisms and features of (hypothetical) effective regimes for 
managing non-terrestrial spaces. The intention is to provide a constructive contribution to 
regime theory in IR, and also prescriptions for practitioners (diplomats and policymakers) 







World Ocean: Maritime Expansion, Cartography, and Order Building 
 
 The Earth is an ocean planet, although it is more frequently understood as a 
terrestrial planet with multiple oceans. A contiguous body of salt water, the ocean covers 
71 percent of the Earth’s surface and surrounds the continental crusts that contain most of 
human civilization. The volume of oceanic space is staggering, accounting for 97 percent 
of the Earth’s water and with an average depth over 2 miles. All this watery space 
comprises 99 percent of the Earth’s biosphere, and contains variegated and complex 
ecosystems. Through energy and molecule exchange, the ocean and atmosphere are 
connected along the permeable border that is the sea surface. Through this connection, 
the ocean affects both weather and climate. The ‘global ocean conveyor belt’ circulates 
massive amounts of water on the timescale of millennia, and is a central component of 
nutrient and carbon dioxide cycles. But very little of what is now known about the ocean 
was known before the 20th century. Despite the grand scale of the ocean and its processes, 
the hydrosphere has occupied a central role in human history only in the last several 
centuries.344 
For most of human history, direct access to the expansive ocean was extremely 
limited by its vast size and unfathomed depths. Coastal areas were first used regularly for 
food. Archaeologists believe that early humans survived climate fluctuations by 
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clustering in high protein coastal zones.345 As boat technology advanced, local and 
regional scale maritime communities emerged. These seafaring societies and networks 
were globally disconnected for many centuries, and each ocean world was defined by the 
culture and custom of its regional users.346 Daniel Headrick identifies five great sea-
faring traditions (Polynesian, Indian, Chinese, Mediterranean, and Western European) 
that brought humans out onto the ocean.347 Through the activities of these groups and 
others, several major regional trading networks emerged and ebbed over the centuries.348 
When these networks became interconnected and globalized in the ‘Age of Expansion’ 
(15th to 17th century), the resulting density of actors and interests produced new norms 
and principles of international ocean law.   
This chapter begins by comparing historical maritime activity in Polynesia, the 
Indian Ocean, and European waters, in order to demonstrate the diversity of possible 
ways of relating to the ocean and organizing seafaring activity. Because it was the 
European maritime states that collectively formed the foundations of the modern ocean 
governance regime (although not always consciously or cooperatively), their history will 
be unpacked in greater detail to set the stage for analysis. The second section describes 
the directed process of discovering the ocean undertaken by European maritime states, 
through which they collected, synthesized, and selectively disseminated geographic 
information. Although initially motivated by the quest for political and economic 
                                                 
345 Curtis W. Marean, “When the Sea Saved Humanity,” Scientific American, August 2010.; Jon M. 
Erlandson and Torben C. Rick, “Archaeology, Marine Ecology, and Human Impacts on Marine 
Environments,” in Human Impacts on Ancient Marine Ecosystems: A Global Perspective (University of 
California Press, 2008). 
346 Lincoln P. Paine, The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World, First Edition (New York: 
Knopf, 2013). 
347 Daniel R Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to 
the Present (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 11–20. 
348 Philip E Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
 
 128 
advantage, data collection eventually served the emerging disciplines of modern science. 
The third section examines three features of the ocean governance regime constructed 
during the early modern and modern eras, and considers their relationship with the 
evolving geophysical and technological realities of seafaring.   
Polynesia 
 The Austronesian people used open, double-hulled and outrigger canoes to 
colonize islands across a full one-third of the global ocean, from Madagascar to what is 
commonly described as Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Although the exact 
timeline of expansion is unknown, the last major wave of settlement in Oceania is 
Figure 6 - Near and Remote Oceania, From Finney, "The Other One-Third of the 
Globe," page 275 
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thought to have ended around 1000 CE.349 Austronesia navigation methods were 
advanced and ingenious, and relied on observations of the stars, sun, ocean swells, birds, 
and cloud formations.350  Although their “craft and skill was limited to the tropics,” they 
ranged widely on well-known ocean pathways, and out into unexplored parts of the 
ocean.351 The Austronesians lived in a world covered by water, in which there were many 
islands. This worldview, and other social and resource pressures, encouraged 
Austronesian seafarers to explore and colonize the islands of what is best described as 
Remote Oceania.352 In the hierarchal Polynesian societies, knowledge of routes was 
privatized and kept as a secret of navigator elites.353 These sea-faring societies remained 
largely isolated from other maritime trading networks until the European Age of 
Expansion. Although Europeans began traversing Remote Oceania in 1520, they initially 
had neither the technological capability nor the interest to explore and colonize the vast 
Pacific. But by the late 18th century, the British and French began sending regular 
scientific and strategic expeditions to the Pacific, enabled by “vastly improved ships, 
navigation methods, and provisioning.”354  During the 19th century, many Polynesian 
archipelagos were annexed and colonized by European powers. 
Indian Ocean 
The Indian Ocean trading network thrived between 500-1500 CE, and connected 
diverse societies from Africa, Arabia, India, and Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean 
offered a fortuitous geography for maritime trade, with high visibility, low currents, and 
regular alternation of winds. By the 13th century, navigation in the Indian Ocean was 
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assisted by the use of magnetic compasses, North Star navigation, and sailing manuals. 
Although Indian Ocean ports were bustling entrepôts during this period, the ocean itself 
was understood as “a special space of trade, external to society.”355 Inland agriculture 
was a key source of wealth for rulers on the sub-continent, and coastal societies “did not 
seek to claim or organize the sea as a means for generating economic wealth.”356 There 
were few attempts to project maritime power, monopolize trade or routes, or colonize 
distant lands in the Indian Ocean. The maritime Melaka Code, formulated around the late 
13th century and codified in the late 15th century, was the “prevailing maritime legal 
tradition for Southeast Asia.”357 The code was a series of laws for ships and shipping, as 
opposed to a law of the sea itself. The ship was the locus of jurisdiction in the code, and 
treated as a “territorial annex of its home state…a state-like territory.”358 Analogies 
within the Code compare the ship to a kind of “floating state.” Although the Melaka Code 
did not persist and expand to cover global ocean activities, later international law reflects 
this basic approach to maritime governance. 
China was, for a time, a powerful player in this trading network. China had been a 
relative latecomer Indian Ocean trade, but by the 14th century boasted “by far the largest 
navy and merchant marine in the world.”359 In the 15th century, China sent seven fleets 
across the Indian Ocean, concluding treaties of tribute and trade, and sometimes over-
throwing local leaders. At this time, Chinese navigation was far ahead of the rest of the 
world, and Chinese captains could have sailed to America and around the world. But a 
confluence of domestic factors caused them to relinquish oceanic and regional sea faring 
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in the 15th century.360 Chinese withdrawal from regional trading networks created an 
opportunity for new entrants to the Indian Ocean trading networks. The decline of 
Chinese regional sea power coincided with the arrival of European ships in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Europe 
 The history of European seafaring in the early modern period would have lasting 
and international import, because it was the European tradition of maritime norms and 
laws that became globalized in the modern period. The rise of European maritime 
powers, and their jockeying for strategic and economic advantage, produced new 
motivations for establishing shared understandings about rights and duties in the world 
ocean. Mercantilist maritime states sought to accumulate wealth by controlling trade 
routes, and achieving preferential trade balances. The international law of the sea they 
produced and exported was not the result of cooperative planning, but the outcome of 
practical problem-solving, geopolitical tension, and merging maritime traditions. 
European seafaring was divided into two separate spheres – the southern and 
northern – until the middle of the 13th century. In the Mediterranean, relatively simple 
coastal navigation facilitated regular maritime trade since the time of the Romans. In the 
North and Baltic Seas, fog and storms made navigation more difficult, but the colder seas 
contained especially productive fisheries. 361 European maritime powers waxed and 
waned, and a large number of polities shaped the prevailing systems of trade and power 
projection. These included the Hanseatic League, Scandinavia, the Dutch Republic, 
Venice, Genoa, the Ottoman Empire, England, France, Portugal, and Spain, among 
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others. In the medieval period there were no common supra-territorial maritime laws, but 
codes of conduct developed between groups involved in shipping. In northern Europe, 
maritime regulations were often forged and enforced on the scale of towns. Several 
polities made claims to dominion over proximate seas, including the Venetians in the 
Adriatic Sea, the Genoese in the Ligurian Sea, and various Scandinavian countries in the 
Baltic Sea.362 Northern and southern trading networks began establishing links in the 14th 
century, through both coastal and riparian navigation. In the 15th century, the emergence 
of mercantilism fueled competition between northern and southern European powers for 
control over increasingly global maritime trade routes.363 
 During the ‘Age of Expansion’ in the 15th through 17th centuries, the Portuguese 
and Spanish, and then the English and Dutch, successfully expanded trading networks 
and established colonies throughout the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.364 Two technological 
advances facilitated the European globalization of maritime trading networks: southern 
Europeans excelled at map-making, and northern Europeans developed sophisticated 
navigation techniques. These advances combined with improvements in shipbuilding and 
innovations in ship financing, administration, and armament.365 The newfound 
technological capability of global seafaring created a wealth of economic and political 
opportunities, and increasingly detailed and accurate maps facilitated the expansion of 
trading networks, colonies, and naval bases. The following sections will outline the 
history of European maritime activities in the ‘Age of Expansion,’ focusing on the 
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importance of cartographic information. The history of formal and customary 
international maritime law during this period will be examined in the second half of the 
chapter. 
Portuguese 
The northern and southern European nautical traditions first merged in Portugal, 
whose geographic location sits “at the intersection of the Mediterranean and North 
Atlantic seafaring systems.”366 The Portuguese caravel, which “opened the oceans to 
exploration,” was a “hybrid, combining the best features of both the Mediterranean and 
North Atlantic ships.”367 In the early 15th century, the son of the Portuguese king, Dom 
Henrique ‘the Navigator,’ funded oceanic exploration from his villa on the southwestern 
point of the Iberian Peninsula. While some accounts suggest that Henrique founded a 
school for the study and teaching of navigation, historians have concluded that the famed 
center in Sagres never existed.368 But Henrique did sponsor a series of expeditions down 
the western coast of Africa, motivated by both a missionary zeal and search for 
commercial advantage. He gave careful instructions to his captains about the systematic 
collection of data pertaining to coastal geography, navigation, trade goods and prices, and 
local languages.369 The accumulated information was treated as a state secret, and housed 
in a ‘hydrographical repository’ tasked with issuing maps and collecting them upon 
return. The penalty for pilots giving or selling charts to foreigners was death. Non-
Portuguese who did acquire Portuguese maps during this period often suspected 
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deliberate falsification of information.370 Eventually the Portuguese rounded the tip of 
Africa and entered the Indian Ocean trade, where they established fortified outposts. 
Portuguese merchants dominated Indo-European maritime trade for a century, in large 
part “because the Portuguese controlled the maps.”371  
 
Spanish 
 Portugal and Spain dominated exploration and long-distance trade during the 
same period, the first century of the Age of Expansion. Spanish exploration focused on 
westward movement across the Atlantic, starting with the sponsorship of the Genoese 
Christopher Columbus’s expedition. Although Columbus was searching for a westward 
route to Asia, he massively miscalculated the distance to China and Japan. This 
miscalculation resulted from an underestimation of the size of the Earth, in addition to 
bad information about the location of Japan. Unlike ‘Terra Australis,’ the hypothesized 
southern continent that ‘balanced’ Eurasia, “the possibility of an intervening continent 
was not even considered.”372 Ten years after Columbus returned from the Americas, 
Spain established the Casa de la Contratación in order to coordinate resource extraction 
and colonization of the newly discovered continent. One function of the Casa was to 
maintain a ‘master chart’ with up-to-date geographical information, and issue it only to 
those authorized by the Spanish crown. In 1524, Spain created the Council of the Indies 
to centralize administration of the growing Spanish empire. Spain initially maintained 
control of new territories through close control of navigational and geographic 
information. Domestically, the topic of who could sell which maps to whom was a 
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subject of legal contention, and publications with geographic information were regularly 
censored. Over time, enough information was stolen or collected by explorers from other 
countries, and “the Spanish were reduced to defending their territorial claims by force of 





When the Dutch Republic replaced Portugal as the dominant European power in 
the Indian Ocean, it was also with the aid of carefully guarded cartographic information. 
In preparation for establishing a vast Indian Ocean trading network, the Dutch East India 
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Company compiled a ‘Secret Atlas’ from 180 navigational charts, which had “the status 
of a state secret.”374 The Secret Atlas also contained “topographic views, maps and 
descriptions of Asian towns and coastlines.”375 It was compiled and distributed through 
the company’s Hydrographic Office in Amsterdam, which paralleled Spain’s Casa de la 
Contratación.376 
Conflict with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean began in the early 1600s.377 The 
Dutch East India Company, established in 1602, ejected the Portuguese from the lucrative 
Spice Islands in 1605. After setting up an administrative headquarters in Batavia (modern 
Jakarta) in 1618, the Dutch quickly began creating new trading opportunities for 
themselves. In 1624 they built Zeelandia castle on Taiwan, which served as an entrepôt 
for trade with China, Japan, and the Philippines for several decades. Their success in 
replacing the Portuguese is partially explained by the Dutch adoption of a more modest 
and humble approach to relations with local rulers. After the Portuguese were banned 
from Japan in 1639, the Dutch East India Company secured exclusive access to trade in 
Japan, including precious Japanese silver, gold, and copper.378 After their position in the 
Indian Ocean was assured, the Dutch turned their attention to the Coromandel Coast of 
India, where they set up lucrative textile factories. A separate Hydrographic Office was 
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established in Batavia sometime during the 17th century, in order to compile, control, and 
disseminate local navigational information.379 
 
English 
 In the early 1500s, England “consciously chose to become a sea power.”380 
Although its navy during this period “was not yet an effective instrument of state power,” 
Queen Elizabeth I (reigned 1558-1603) regularly lent English ships to private commercial 
ventures.381 Most notably, Queen Elizabeth sent Francis Drake on a covert mission to 
circumnavigate the globe, which he completed in 1580. The charts and maps Drake 
compiled on the journey were made state secrets immediately after.382 News of Drake’s 
route, which passed through the Straits of Magellan and up the coast of South America, 
caused Spain to protest the unauthorized trespass of its claimed sea territory (discussed 
below). Soon thereafter, other issues caused simmering tensions between Spain and 
England to boil over into maritime conflict. Although the English victory over the 
Spanish Armada in 1588 was largely the result of poor planning and administration on 
the part of the Spanish, the victory gave the English newfound confidence in their 
expansion into Spanish spheres of influence.383  
 England quickly became a typical mercantilist maritime power, and began 
expanding trade networks and projecting power across the global ocean. English 
merchants had established the joint stock Muscovy Company (1555) and Levant 
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Company (1581) to exploit trading opportunities with Russia and the eastern 
Mediterranean, and this same model was used to create the East India Company in 1600. 
The English East India Company had fewer resources and less sophistication than the 
Dutch East India Company, but it profited from a high volume of trade in low value 
goods.384 In 1612, the East India Company won a naval battle with the Portuguese outside 
Surat, Gujarat, which became the company’s first headquarters of trade in India. The 
English eventually achieved dominance in Asian markets, establishing a colony in India, 
starting several wars with China, and generally using coercion to ensure preferential trade 
relationships.  
 The English state was actively involved in supporting and protecting English 
trade. A series of Navigation Acts in the mid-17th century declared that English trade 
must be in English vessels, with crews that were at least three-quarters English. All goods 
from English colonies had to be shipped to England, and all goods going to the colonies 
had to be shipped through England. The English perceived the Dutch to be their main 
trade competitor, and the Navigation Acts were essentially designed to exclude all trade 
with the Dutch. Overall, the Navigation Acts were followed and obeyed, although the 
English could not prevent some smuggling, especially to and from its colonies in North 
America. By the 19th century, the scope of the British Empire and hegemony of the Royal 
Navy were unrivaled among European maritime powers. 
Mapping the World Ocean 
Voyages of exploration in the 15th and 16th centuries “necessitated a radically new 
vision of the world and its oceanic reaches.”385 The task of collecting and systematizing 
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geographic information initially fell to cosmography, a broad field concerned with the 
nature of the physical universe.386 But because maps were so economically and politically 
valuable, the production of cartographic knowledge became “controlled, selected, 
organized, and redistributed according to definite procedures”387 The creation, use, and 
dissemination of maps made exploration an iterative process: a voyage would bring back 
new charts, which the next voyage would use to navigate to the edge of the unknown. 
That voyage would then bring back new data for the next voyage. Much of the 
knowledge acquired was drawn from indigenes and settler communities, in addition to 
direct observation and, eventually, systematic surveying.388 Maps and charts encoded the 
most important information acquired on these early voyages. They facilitated the 
expansion of trade networks and colonies and increased the safety and efficiency of 
navigation. Because geographic and cartographic information was so valuable, its 
collection, synthesis, and distribution was controlled by mercantilist states in the early 
modern period. 
This section describes how and why the model of centralized and controlled 
geographic knowledge broke down. Although there were multiple motivations for 
collecting geographical data at any given time, in general the incentives shifted from 
strategic and economic advantage, to practical utility, to scientific knowledge production. 
Regardless of motivation, the resolution and precision of maps progressively improved 
throughout this period. 
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During the 16th century, the European maritime powers exerted substantial effort 
to restrict access to the growing body of knowledge concerning geography, cartography, 
and navigation.389 Because mercantilist states were jockeying for trade advantage, “a 
nation’s knowledge of safe and efficient routes comprised a jealously guarded body of 
trade secrets.”390 Even states without centralized repositories of cartographic information, 
like England, controlled the dissemination of charts in an ad hoc way. Maps were 
concealed and censored, and sometimes falsified.391 
The model of state secrecy over maps began to break down in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Multi-national crews made it difficult to hide navigational information, and the 
dissemination of the printing press made it easier to circulate geographic information.392 
State and private actors invested in their own information-gathering expeditions, but also 
resorted to espionage and theft.393 Pirates gained geographic information by capturing 
ships, stealing their documents, and interrogating their pilots. As time passed and more 
ships ventured to more places, secrecy became difficult or impossible to maintain. 
But there were also economic and political reasons to make maps available. The 
growing number of users meant that to achieve the full benefit of maritime trade, maps 
needed to be available to merchants. Navigational charts not only revealed the location of 
routes, but were also an important means of reducing the vulnerability and fragility of 
ships in the sometimes-harsh maritime environment, by encoding information about 
shoals and other hazards. Maps and charts, when made public, could help legitimize 
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territorial claims. Maps were a “visual language communicating proprietorial or 
territorial rights in both practical and symbolic senses.”394 State actors were therefore 
attentive to whether new maps represented demarcation lines in ways that might 
disadvantage them.395 An “unstated compromise” emerged where maps that contained 
useful diplomatic information, such as latitude, longitude, and boundary lines, could be 
publicized while more detailed navigational charts maintained the status of trade 
secrets.396 
To these two reasons for the decline of secrecy – loss of control and practical 
benefit – can be added a third: the emergence of scientific incentives, practices, and 
norms for data collection. Although ‘oceanography’ (not yet a distinct science) barely 
existed during this period, the exploration and cartography described above can be 
understood as the first phase of scientific investigation: observation and documentation. 
By the 18th century, cartography “was transformed from a description of the world into a 
scientific discipline expressed in mathematical terms.”397 The “gradual growth of the 
practice of making oceanographical observations at sea” must be understood in the larger 
context of the emergence of modern science.398  
Filling in the World Map 
Because it was Europeans who “filled in the map of the world,” the maps they 
produced tended to be Eurocentric.399 Many features of contemporary world maps, 
including the hierarchy of ocean divisions, the major constituent parts of the ocean, and 
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specific names, are all “rooted in a specifically European worldview.”400 The British 
played a particularly central role in naming and describing new places, parts, and features 
of the world ocean. Three examples of British map-making over the 18th to 19th century 
demonstrate this shift from state-centric secrecy for economic and political advantage to 
scientific investigation for the sake of understanding the ocean. 
The effort to understand ocean processes extended to the American colonies, 
where Benjamin Franklin published a series of charts in 1768, 1782, and 1786 that 
literally put the Gulf Stream on the map. This “landmark contribution to maritime 
cartography” served practical needs and satisfied scientific curiosity.401 Franklin was 
interested in why the westward trip across the Atlantic took an average of 83 days, 
whereas the eastward trip only took 49 days (in the 1720s). He collected information 
from mariners, and especially whalers, who had better knowledge of the Gulf Stream 
because their occupation led them to explore its edges.402 Until this time, seafarers’ 
knowledge was poorly circulated on land, either because of lack of interest, or because of 
the “corporate ethic” of secrecy.403 With the rise of the British Navy, the state declared 
“new authority over…maritime knowledge,” including the publication of maps, to assist 
with the expansion of the British Empire.404 While Franklin’s charts of the Gulf Stream 
were initially published in the service of this empire, his later releases expressed a pro-
independence political orientation. Indeed, during the Revolutionary War Franklin 
“intended for copies to be given to all French ships supplying arms to the Americans.”405 
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While maps of the Gulf Stream were initially intended to assist the British Empire, they 





 The three voyages of Captain James Cook (1768-79) represented a shift in the 
grand project of exploration. For the first time, “scientific work in general became an 
important feature of voyages of discovery from Britain.”406 The objective of Cook’s first 
voyage was to observe the transit of Venus from Tahiti, an idea introduced by Edmond 
Halley several decades before. The primary purpose was therefore to contribute to the 
science of astronomy, which was an important aid to navigation. A secondary purpose 
was “the search for Terra Australis,” a hypothetical southern continent that was believed 
to exist as a balance to the northern hemisphere.407 This search motivated Cook’s second 
voyage, which reached both the icy edges of Antarctica and Easter Island in the remote 
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southern Pacific. Cook’s third expedition set out to find a Northwest Passage, for which 
Parliament had offered a substantial prize. He did not find a Passage, but his ships 
reached both the Bering Strait and the Hawaiian islands (where he was killed in a 
skirmish with locals). The voyages of Captain Cook were extremely successful, in part 
because his “strict regimen for cleaning and airing the ship” improved the health and 
resilience of his crews.408 Cook charted numerous oceanic islands, “laying the 
groundwork for the first accurate map of the Pacific.”409 Many of the places Cook 
discovered are named after him, including the Cook Strait (between the big islands of 
New Zealand), the Cook Inlet (in Alaska), and the Cook Islands (in the south Pacific). 
After his three expeditions, only a small number of Polynesian islands remained 
unmapped.410 
 In the 1800s the British Navy increased its investment in the collection of 
scientific data, most notably in the voyage of the H.M.S. Challenger (1872-6). This large-
scale expedition was proposed by the British Royal Society, which hoped to “combine 
the various lines of inquiry that were coming to define the discipline of oceanography.”411 
In a trip of over 1000 days and 68,000 miles, six civilian scientists recorded depth and 
temperature data, measured currents and took water samples, and dredged the seabed. In 
addition to discovering over 4000 new species, the Challenger expedition made a 
substantial contribution to the development of marine geology. Its scientists discovered 
the existence of manganese nodules strewn across the seafloor, and located the deepest 
point in the ocean, named ‘Challenger Deep.’ The expedition’s Challenger Reports were 
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published between 1880 and 1895, and included 50 volumes with 29,000 pages. Among 
other things, they contained data that “established the existence of density circulation 
beyond all reasonable doubt.”412 One lasting legacy of the Challenger expedition was its 
creation of a network of researchers with a common focus: understanding the ocean. 
What the Maps Missed 
The maps created during the early Age of Expansion can be described as 
‘distorted portraits’ for many reasons, but in particular, the diversity of maritime fauna 
“remained virtually unknown.”413 The process of discovery and documentation included 
no real investigation of ecology, because seafarers were more concerned with trade 
routes, wind patterns, and coastal geography. When early mapmakers depicted 
unexplored regions, they often populated them with sea monsters as a warning to 
seafarers. These creatures were actually based on a small number of unscientific 
observations, including the accounts of sailors and decaying carcasses washed up on 
beaches.414 Ecosystems were known only through folk knowledge from fishers, sealers, 
and whalers for many centuries. Targeted scientific inquiry into fisheries only arose when 
academic zoologists began to specialize in marine life in the late 1800s, and some 
western governments sponsored coastal research sites. While over-exploitation occurred 
in some coastal fisheries, the problem was not significant, recognized, or acted upon until 
the modern era.  
Limitations in data collection – because of imposing marine geography, 
rudimentary technology, and lack of scientific professionalization – inhibited the 
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formulation of detailed, durable, and useful scientific theories during this period. This 
relatively limited scientific understanding meant ignorance of the full suite of ocean 
resources, and also made the concept of human damage to the ocean environment 
virtually unthinkable. Although geographic knowledge expanded rapidly during this 
period, maps of islands and coastlines in the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans still 
lacked detail and precision. Limitations on geographic knowledge, the near total absence 
of ecological knowledge, and the growing technological capabilities of European ships, 
created a specific context for the formation of international law of the sea.  
Regime Formation 
 The concept of an ‘ocean governance regime’ is anachronistic for the early part of 
this period. Before the 19th century, rules of ocean use were rarely developed explicitly 
and collectively, or codified in documents understood as international law. But social and 
political institutions did form from repeated practices and juristic theorizing, described as 
‘customary international law.’415 Particular actors – European maritime entrepreneurs and 
sea powers – exercised a ‘practical authority’ in the creation of normative maritime 
practices.416 This section considers two historical trends in the development of the 
modern ocean governance regime: the extension and retraction of territorial claims, and 
the shift from support to prohibition of piracy and privateering. Although conflict over 
fisheries did play a role in shaping maritime political geography in the early modern 
period, conflict over trade routes and security from predation loomed larger. 
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A common theme during the Age of Expansion was close commercial and state 
partnerships in the effort to monopolize lucrative routes to the Indian Ocean and the 
Americas. In terms of the exercise of power, these relationships make it difficult to 
distinguish the actions and intentions of private and public actors. States often authorized 
private actors to use violence against non-nationals, as in the letters of marque system 
that legitimized privateering. At other times, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
application of naval power would serve the economic interests of co-national merchants 
and traders. European mercantilist states – especially the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and 
English – all had the individual goal of controlling trade routes, and therefore “put a high 
premium on exercising social power at sea.”417 Maritime states desired the protection of 
their own ships, and the predation of others (although the shared benefit of anti-piracy 
protection was a common justification for claims). The earliest contributions to the 
modern ocean governance regime were forged in this crucible of competing European 
interests. 
The Europeans introduced the idea of dividing the ocean into parts, for the 
exercise of national political control over a space analogous to territory on land.418 The 
early modern period includes two notable attempts to territorialize broad swaths of the 
global ocean. In the early Age of Expansion, the Portuguese and Spanish made vast 
territorial claims in the ocean. The Treaty of Tordesillas, discussed below, divided the 
world ocean in half before Vasco da Gama had rounded the tip of Africa (1498) and 
Ferdinand Magellan’s expedition had circumnavigated the globe (1520). As Iberian 
maritime power waned, emerging competition between the English and Dutch sparked an 
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international legal debate about the status of the oceans, and in particular whether or not 
they could be territorialized. This debate, which pitted English and Iberian territorial 
claims against a Dutch concept of free seas, took place before the Pacific was mapped 
and longitude could reliably be determined. This section surveys the relevant history, 
with special attention to the relationship between cartography, geography, and 
international law of the sea. 
Territorialization  
After the “shared experience in the discovery and exploitation of the Atlantic 
archipelagos,” Spain and Portugal embarked on separate imperial projects.419  The 1479 
Treaty of Alcáçovas divided the Atlantic archipelagos between the two Iberian powers, 
giving the Canary Islands to Spanish Castile, and allowing Portugal to retain ownership 
over Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands. The Treaty also gave the 
Portuguese “free rein in the exploration of the Atlantic.”420 The Portuguese continued the 
work of Henrique the Navigator, exploring the Gulf of Guinea, which a Papal Bull of 
1455 had declared their legitimate possession. In contrast, the Spanish sponsored voyages 
to the north and west in the Atlantic, from the launching point of the Canary Islands. 
After the successful voyage of Columbus to a landmass he thought was Asia, the 
Portuguese King João claimed that the Spanish had violated the terms of the Treaty of 
Alcáçovas.421 Columbus argued that the islands he had discovered were actually an 
extension of the Canary Islands archipelago, “when patently they were not.”422 Both 
Spain and Portugal wanted clarification, so the Spanish lobbied the Pope to recognize 
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their claim. A series of four Papal Bulls caused more confusion about the division of 
claims, so the Iberian powers negotiated the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which clarified 
the demarcation line with reference to the Canary Islands. 
The Treaty of Tordesillas assigned the southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans to 
Portugal, and the northern Atlantic to Spain. But it was quickly discovered that the line 
created by Tordesillas transects the easternmost tip of South America, thereby 
legitimating Portuguese colonization of Brazil. This unintended result occurred because 
of incomplete and imprecise maps at the time the Treaty was negotiated. In the 1520s, 
Magellan and de Elcano’s successful circumnavigation of the Earth (sponsored by the 
Spanish) created another issue for the Treaty of Tordesillas. Because the Earth is 
spherical, figuring out where one Iberian state’s domain ended and the other’s began 
required drawing another line. The specific location of the dispute was the Spice Islands 
(Maluku Islands), which Portugal had reached in 1511, and from which could be 
procured valuable spices such as nutmeg, cloves, and mace. The 1529 Treaty of 
Saragossa merely drew another longitudinal line in the Pacific, such that the whole world 
was divided into unequal halves, with all ocean space claimed by one or the other Iberian 





Figure 9 - Treaties of Tordesillas and Saragossa, From Wikipedia, licensed under Creative Commons 
 
Many scholars argue that the Treaties of Tordesillas and Saragossa were 
straightforward territorialization; “the historical moment in which the appropriation of 
land was no longer something distinct from the appropriation of the sea.”423 But Philip 
Steinberg rejects this comparison in The Social Construction of the Ocean, suggesting 
instead that the treaties are better understood as “an allocation of routes for movement 
and spheres for exploration rather than an allocation of boundable, claimable territory.”424 
Steinberg is interested in how the Papal Bulls and Treaties reflect and reinforce the “logic 
of mercantilism.”425 But his detailed investigation of primary and secondary texts actually 
reveals centuries of heated disagreement about what the Treaties exactly meant, and how 
actors at the time understood and interpreted them. 
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There is a more fundamental reason why Tordesillas did not create ocean territory 
that is equivalent to land territory: the ocean is fluid, and therefore cannot be easily 
partitioned. If the Papal Bulls and Iberian treaties did intend to create traditional 
territorial borders, this would be a “the imposition of legal fiction onto geographical 
fact.”426 Unlike land territory, ocean territory could not be permanently marked or 
defended by the construction of walls and other border infrastructure. But Steinberg’s 
suggestion that this difference means the Treaties could not be an act of territorialization 
implies that Europeans had a pre-formed cognitive and political model of ‘territory’ that 
they could draw upon, but chose not to. In fact, international politics during the Age of 
Expansion actively shaped an inchoate and malleable concept of territory: “the New 
World proved to be a laboratory where ideas were tried out, concepts forged, and 
techniques tested and perfected.”427 In other words, the Treaty of Tordesillas can be 
understood as an act of territorialization, even if it did not create the equivalent of modern 
land territory.  
Stuart Elden argues in The Birth of Territory that Tordesillas represents a model 
of territoriality “that the actual techniques only later caught up with.”428 Because 
longitude could not be reliably determined at this time, cartographers found it challenging 
plot the demarcation line relative to known coastlines. The way the Treaties of 
Tordesillas and Saragossa divided territory between Portugal and Spain was 
fundamentally new, because it used a calculative and deductive measure to divide land 
and ocean space that had yet to be discovered, documented, or occupied. As opposed to 
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being different than territorialization, this act can be understood as an innovation on 
territorialization. In embracing an abstract and calculated border, the Iberian powers were 
rejecting the idea that “simple occupation led to possession.”429  
A little over a century after the Treaty of Tordesillas, England’s naval capacities 
had advanced considerably, and the English crown resurrected territorial claims over the 
British Seas made in prior centuries. These claims had a starting point – the English 
coastline – but no clear boundary marking their extent. In 1609, King James I asserted 
exclusive rights to coastal fisheries in an attempt to obstruct Dutch fishing. King Charles 
I (reigned 1625-49) expanded the claim of absolute sovereignty to exclude all foreign 
military vessels, and to require foreign commercial ships to ‘strike the flag’ in a sign of 
deference upon meeting the English fleet. These claims were clarified and defended by 
John Selden’s Of the Dominion, or, Ownership of the Sea (also known as Mare 
Clausum), published in 1635. Selden’s description of the extent of British seas, despite 
being “absurdly expansive” and including all of the North Atlantic, was generally 
adopted in the following decades.430  
 These two territorialization projects were driven by the hegemonic desire for a 
monopoly over trade and commerce, and were part of a larger process of early modern 
European state building. Territorialization was, however, very ineffective at shaping 
patterns of practice. Borders could be neither precisely defined nor effectively defended, 
because of limitations in geographical knowledge and technological capabilities. Earlier 
claims to dominion or possession, such as by Venice in the Adriatic Sea or Scandinavian 
states in the Baltic Sea, utilized obvious and well-known natural boundaries (primarily 
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coastlines). In contrast, the declarations made by Portugal, Spain, and England claimed 
vast areas in the open ocean. The inability to ascertain longitude (until the invention of 
the marine chronometer in 1761) meant that the precise location of islands and distant 
coastlines could not be determined with much accuracy, and cartographic representations 
of space were particularly malleable.431 In other words, these official borders meant 
practically nothing to users of the global ocean. Its vastness made consistent surveillance 
and interdiction of violators impossible, so the territorial claims had little deterrent effect 
on foreign merchants, navies, and pirates. 
 Like the Iberian claims, the broad declaration of ‘British Seas’ also had major 
issues with delimitation and enforcement. But in this case, the malleability of the British 
territorial claim actually allowed the political borders to sync up with geographical and 
technological realities. Until the 17th century, the “Sea of England” was merely a 
“political expression” with no formal demarcation.432 In 1610, one year after King James’ 
declaration of exclusive fishing rights, a Dutch delegation to England broached the idea 
that “the maritime dominion of a state ended where its power of asserting continuous 
possession ended.”433 This “principle of compulsion” appears in Hugo Grotius’s 1625 
Law of War and Peace, but was generally ignored as a principle of international law until 
1702 when another Dutchman, Cornelius van Bijnkershoek, proposed that the distance of 
a cannon shot from shore define the territorial sea.434 This proposal to use functional 
control from the shore as a delimitation principle resonated with a strong early incentive 
for ocean governance: the maintenance of order and suppression of piracy. This “decisive 
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property of compulsion and dominion” would be “transferred in theory to all parts of a 
coast.”435 The principle of compulsion, and more specifically the 3-mile ‘cannon shot’ 
norm, did not command immediate assent, but by the end of the 18th century the 3-mile 
territorial sea was widely accepted. The United States was the first to officially declare a 
3-mile territorial sea in 1793, when it needed to define a neutral zone in the recently 
sparked war between France and Great Britain.436  
Freedom of the Seas 
 This narrowing from territorialization of huge swaths of ocean to a 3-mile 
territorial sea is part of a more general takeover of customary international law by the 
‘freedom of the seas’ doctrine. Classical Roman jurisprudence regarded the ocean as 
“property of all people,” common and freely accessed, not subject to appropriation.437 
But in the medieval period, European maritime powers had begun claiming dominion 
over regional seas, and in the 15th century the Iberian powers made expansive territorial 
claims. The increasing density of maritime trade, improvements in cartographic 
representation, and conflicts over routes and entrepôts set the stage for the formation of 
new international law – customary or formal – for managing global ocean space. In the 
early 17th century, jurists from the Dutch Republic, England, and Portugal had an 
extended debate about the legal and political status of the Earth’s ocean.  
The proximate cause for the so-called ‘Battle of the Books’ was a multi-year 
conflict between Dutch and Portuguese ships in Southeast Asia. In 1600, two Dutch ships 
sailed to “investigate the possibility of establishing a Dutch presence in China.”438 The 
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first ship landed at Macau in 1601, and sent a delegation to the Portuguese, who had been 
effectively renting Macau from the Ming Dynasty since 1557.439 The Portuguese, fearing 
encroachment on their lucrative China trade, slaughtered most of the delegation. The 
other Dutch ship, which had been investigating trading opportunities elsewhere, found 
out after it seized a Portuguese ship and discovered letters detailing what had happened at 
Macau. Encouraged by a local ruler, the captain of the second Dutch ship decided to wait 
in the Singapore Strait to ambush a Portuguese ship traveling from Macau to Melaka. In 
1603, the Dutch bombarded and captured the Santa Catarina. The booty from this prize 
was auctioned in Amsterdam, where it earned “enough to build fifty or sixty merchants’ 
houses.”440  
Portugal challenged the legality of the capture, and Dutch East India Company 
shareholders questioned its wisdom and morality.441 The Dutch captain van Heemskerck 
had no official letter of marque, but before the ambush he drafted a document of legal 
justifications, which he had his officers sign. A Dutch court declared the prize valid, but 
the Dutch East India Company asked Hugo Grotius to draft a justification of the ruling. 
The Dutch East India Company was “both a trading entity and an instrument of the 
state…invested with powers to wage war, contract treaties, establish forts, administer the 
law, and in most respects act as an arm of the Dutch government.”442 Grotius was 
therefore defending the Dutch interpretation of customary international law of the sea. 
Although the proximate conflict was between the Dutch and Portuguese, Grotius 
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formulated general arguments designed to rebuff Iberian and English sovereignty claims. 
His arguments relied heavily on “classical antecedents,” but their re-articulation was 
necessary in light of growing imperial competition and broad territorial claims.443 
Out of Grotius’s larger work The Law of Prize and Booty, one chapter was 
published anonymously in 1609. In Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), Grotius marshaled a 
diversity of arguments against the Portuguese claim to sovereignty in the Indian Ocean. 
He argued that Portugal had no right to sovereignty or exclusive possession, whether 
based on discovery, papal donation, war, occupation, prescription, or custom. More 
generally, Grotius argued that the ocean was fundamentally unlike the land: it was bigger, 
you could not occupy it, and its primary resources (navigation and fishing) were 
inexhaustible.444 For these reasons, the arguments used to justify sovereignty and 
property over land did not easily apply to the ocean.445 Grotius declared that these 
fundamental differences with land-space meant that the ocean was part of the realm of 
natural law, and no part of it could be claimed as the exclusive domain of a state. In other 
words, the concept of territorial sovereignty did not extend into ocean-space. This 
exclusion of the sea reversed the implicit assertion of Tordesillas that territorialization 
could be applied to ocean space, and reaffirmed the connection between territory and 
terrestrial space, which could be “bounded and organized into discrete spaces.”446  
Ocean-space was “expressly defined as outside of state territory,” but for Grotius 
this did not make the sea res nullius.447 Far from waiting to be discovered, the ocean had 
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been used to human advantage for all of human history. Grotius saw the ocean as a space 
where the international community exists and international interactions take place. This 
conception of an abstract arena reflected the primary use of the ocean during the early 
modern and modern period: as a transportation surface, a plane of circulation. At this 
time, renewable resources like fish seemed inexhaustible, and non-renewable and 
stationary resources like oil and minerals were unknown. The focus on trade routes and 
power projection on the surface constructed ocean-space as an abstract zone of channeled 
circulation to be managed, as opposed to a set of variegated places to be claimed. Grotius 
proposed a principle of res extra commercium, in which the ocean was understood as a 
communal zone of free exploitation.448 This open arena created an international 
community of users, but Grotius rejected the notion of communal ownership. Users were 
required to conserve ocean resources, but had no obligation to share their maritime 
profits.449 In other words, Grotius rejected the principle of res nullius in favor of a form 
of res communis, but did not go as far as to establish or imply a res publica regime. 
 Two responses to Mare Liberium represented the views of competing maritime 
powers.450 The English response – John Selden’s Mare Clausum – was written at the 
request of the English crown in 1618, but not published until 1635. Selden made no 
arguments about the open ocean, but forcefully asserted that possession was possible 
where the sea could be controlled. Seraphim de Freitas wrote the semi-official Portuguese 
response, and argued that sovereigns could legitimately claim authority over navigation 
and trade routes. But instead of proposing possession of ocean space, Freitas favored 
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“exclusive usufruct rights” over specific long-distance routes.451 Despite these counter-
arguments against the strong ‘freedom of the seas’ doctrine, the principle espoused by 
Grotius and the Dutch eventually became the foundation of modern customary 
international law. The English came to support the free seas doctrine relatively quickly, 
as their merchant marine and naval forces grew in numbers and strength. Rather than 
acquiescence to the Dutch proposal, the English embrace of ‘freedom of the seas’ could 
be understood as a return to the original doctrine of Queen Elizabeth I (reigned 1558-
1603), the predecessor of James I.  
 The ‘freedom of the seas’ doctrine became customary international law instead of 
territorialization and sovereign possession, for two basic reasons. First – territorial 
borders in the ocean were impractical in implementation. The difficulty of locating exact 
borders on imprecise maps was compounded by the inability to surveil and enforce 
exclusion across broad swaths of the ocean. Indeed, the much-reduced 3-mile territorial 
sea was proposed and adopted precisely because the border could be easily apprehended 
and enforced. In short, broad territorialization was not feasible because of the geophysics 
of the ocean and the technology of early modern maritime states. If territorialization had 
proven feasible, an alternative European tradition – of dominion in the Baltic, Adriatic, 
and Ligurian Seas – may have been globalized. Second – increasingly powerful actors 
had an interest in free navigation. The English and Dutch would not have been able to 
establish global trading networks if ocean space was partitioned. During this period, 
European maritime states were more focused on imperial expansion than fighting on 
European shorelines. The freedom of the seas doctrine “encouraged broader participation 
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in intercontinental trade.”452 These two reasons – the inability to partition and the 
preference for free commerce – demonstrate that the res communis regime established by 
Grotius came about by both default and design. 
Piracy and Privateering 
 Predation by pirates has existed as long as maritime commerce, and during the 
medieval period piracy plagued both the northern and southern European maritime 
communities. Early territorial claims in the Mediterranean and North Sea were often 
justified by the need to provide safety for maritime commerce.453 Indeed, a state’s 
responsibility for redressing piracy along its coastline was the first “practically derived 
norm” in anti-piracy customary international law.454 As European maritime communities 
began to merge and interconnect in the early modern period, piracy remained a major 
problem. Merchants’ associations, and later sovereign authorities, organized to “maintain 
by force the security of navigation in the common interest.”455 But the problem got more 
difficult to solve as trading networks ventured farther from home territories, into the 
Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. European merchants encountered new sources of 
piracy, such as the “active antagonism” from Oman, but also brought European piracy to 
new places.456 And eventually, pirate enclaves emerged in locations like Madagascar and 
the Caribbean, either in quasi-states or with the blessing of local rulers. In the 17th 
                                                 
452 Paine, The Sea and Civilization, 440. 
453 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, 30; Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean, 62. 
454 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence 
in Early Modern Europe, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 116. 
455 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, 6. 
456 Paine, The Sea and Civilization, 454. 
 
 160 
century, a new scale and scope of organized piracy, in addition to privateering sanctioned 
by rivalrous states, threatened the safety of long-distance trading ships.457 
 Although the European maritime states were the primary victims of predation 
during this period, their own actions amplified the problem of non-state violence at sea. 
Counter-intuitively, predation got worse as a result of European efforts to solve the 
problem of security at sea in the absence of powerful navies. Two separate practices 
developed. First, states issued ‘letters of marque’ in peacetime, which “allowed 
individuals to seek redress for depredations they suffered at the hands of foreigners on the 
high seas.”458 Commonly used since the 14th century, letters of marque were a practical 
way for governments to resolve private international disputes without having to mobilize 
military resources. The second practice, privateering, was used by states in wartime to 
supplement their naval capacity. Privateers were officially authorized to attack enemy 
commerce, and allowed to keep a portion of their spoils. Many states initially regulated 
the practice closely, requiring privateers to obtain prior consent for attacks, post bond to 
ensure compliance with instructions, and/or submit their spoils to inspection.  Until the 
19th century, privateering was used as “both a substitute and a foundation for state naval 
power.”459 These two systems – letters of marque and privateering – became confused 
and conflated, as states relied more and more on private ships to commit useful violence 
in the interests of the home country. When private ships were called in and out of the 
military service of the state, their crews developed the skills and the taste for maritime 
predation. When former privateers become pirates, European states would make a 
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nominal effort at suppression, until offering them pardons in exchange for privateering in 
the next war.460 In short, “privateering generated organized piracy.”461 
 European maritime states had many reasons to accept and even support piracy by 
co-nationals. Piracy weakened the competition and could break rival trade monopolies, 
bringing “scarce goods at affordable prices” to European markets.462 The Portuguese 
engaged in piracy in the Indian Ocean, and English colonial governors endorsed English 
piracy in the Caribbean.463 In the American colonies, piracy offered an investment 
opportunity for the wealthy and created a “thriving business” for provisioning ships.464  
England manipulated the legal status of piracy to serve its own interests; in the 15th 
century, Parliament passed strict anti-piracy laws but made no effort to suppress English 
piracy.465 Indeed, England gained naval superiority over Spain in part through the actions 
of the 16th century Elizabethan ‘Sea Dogs,’ who “engaged in all kinds of violent activities 
against Spain in the New World.”466 Many of these English pirates were later rewarded 
with knighthood or a position in the Royal Navy.467 Like the letters of marque system and 
privateering, piracy and privateering became difficult to distinguish, and in the 17th and 
18th century the widespread presence of both started to be seen as a problem.   
 More specifically, piracy and privateering became less useful to the increasingly 
powerful England, which became Great Britain in 1707. In the 17th century, two forms of 
innovative financing laid the foundations of British naval hegemony: Charles I’s writs for 
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‘ship money,’ a kind of taxation that went directly to the Navy, and the establishment of 
the Bank of England, which created new opportunities for financing.468 By the early 18th 
century, Great Britain had the most powerful navy in the world, in large part because of 
its bureaucratic and systematic administration, and sophisticated convoy and blockade 
strategies.469 In the 19th century, multiple technological innovations in shipbuilding, ship 
repair, and communications would work to Britain’s advantage, solidifying and 
expanding its naval hegemony. The British built a “global network of naval bases and 
commercial harbors,” outfitted with dry dock repair capability, and connected via 
submarine telegraph cable.470  
The emergence of British naval hegemony provided both motive and means to 
end non-state violence at sea. As a result of its growing naval capacities, Britain no 
longer needed to rely on undisciplined privateers. Privateering became a weapon of 
weaker states; the Americans used it against Britain during the Revolutionary War and 
the War of 1812.471 Great Britain regarded privateering as “the only real threat to its 
naval supremacy,” and therefore defined it as a problem.472 Piracy also plagued the 
emerging British Empire more generally. The British East India Company first pressured 
the British government to address the problem of piracy based in Madagascar. Because 
the pirates were English-speaking, rulers in India suspected the company of collusion and 
exacted retribution against English merchants for the actions of English pirates.473 
Although these specific events prompted British action against piracy, it was also 
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generally understood to hurt trade revenues, by reducing the number of ships that reached 
their destination, increasing insurance rates, and requiring outlays and cargo space for 
guns and men to shoot them. 474 
The British targeted piracy first, with some success. Even with organized and 
targeted effort, anti-piracy policing is very difficult, because the vast expanses of the 
ocean inhibit the easy identification and pursuit of pirates. The British strategy involved 
expanding the reach of both jurisdiction and enforcement. In 1699 Parliament established 
a system of vice-admiralty courts across the empire, to expedite the trial and punishment 
of captured pirates.475 The Royal Navy destroyed pirate strongholds in the Caribbean, and 
patrolled Madagascar to deter the establishment of new ones. In 1721, Parliament passed 
a law that “made trafficking with pirates and furnishing them with supplies crimes of 
piracy.”476 By 1730 the British had succeeded in suppressing the ‘Golden Age of Piracy,’ 
due to these and other laws and activities.477 The power concentration of British naval 
hegemony, and its dispersion across a globally interconnected network of bases, 
contributed greatly to the effectiveness of anti-piracy measures. British anti-piracy efforts 
demonstrate “how successful a singular, coextensive geographic and jurisdictional 
approach to piracy can be.”478 But British efforts were not entirely successful, in part 
because privateering continued; even British privateers were attacking British 
commerce.479 Despite a century of anti-piracy efforts, the early 19th century was “the 
most violent and lawless period of maritime warfare in modern history” because of the 
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predation of privateers and ‘quasi-privateers.’480 Because the line between piracy and 
privateering was so fuzzy, and because privateering had ceased to be closely regulated by 
governments, the same actions simply continued under a different guise; “Piracy could 
not be defined, much less suppressed, until privateering was abolished.”481  
 States began placing restrictions on privateering in the late 18th century, but the 
practice was not abolished until the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The Treaty formally ended the 
Crimean War, and established new rules of wartime commerce. This formal international 
agreement, in which seven major powers simultaneously gave up the right to authorize 
privateering, was a reversal of centuries of customary international practice.482 It was 
Great Britain that pushed for the prohibition of privateering, and the other powers agreed 
in exchange for ending “the British practice of interdicting neutral ships in search of 
contraband.”483 Although the Treaty of Paris was not complied with right away – the 
Confederacy commissioned privateers in the US Civil War – the practice had ended by 
the late 19th century, and no privateers were used during the 1898 Spanish-American 
war.484 Outlawing privateering helped solve the problem of predation at sea more 
generally, because it facilitated the universalization of international norms against 
piracy.485  
Although ending privateering was necessary to define and outlaw piracy, it also 
created a system that could not solve piracy in the long term. The prohibition on 
privateering ended the responsibility of the state over its violent nationals. Privateers had 
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committed violence “under the authority of a state that accepts or is charged with 
responsibility for [their] acts.”486 In the 1856 Treaty of Paris, states gave up their ability 
to authorize and take responsibility for the violent actions of private nationals. After the 
Treaty of Paris, only sovereign violence from national militaries was sanctioned on the 
ocean. This severed the connection between sovereign power and sovereign jurisdiction: 
national ships were floating pieces of territory under sovereign jurisdiction, but not 
themselves legitimate agents of the state. A three-tier system was created: state military 
ships that could commit sovereign violence, ‘flagged’ national ships that were under 
sovereign jurisdiction, and non-flagged, non-national ships. This severance of nationality 
and sovereignty meant that the prohibition on piracy had a problem: if a state was not 
responsible for the violence of its nationals, then who was responsible for stamping out 
piracy on the high seas?487  
 The territorialization strategy, whereby any ship without a foreign flag was 
considered a pirate, could have solved this problem by extending the norm about anti-
piracy efforts in the territorial sea to broader swaths of the ocean. Under this strategy, 
Spain would be able to code any non-Spanish ships in the North Atlantic as pirates, and 
Spain would be responsible for quashing them. But, as we have seen, the territorialization 
strategy failed for a geographic and technological reason: such territories were very 
difficult to patrol and enforce. 
Another possible approach was maintaining a stronger connection between nationality 
and sovereign jurisdiction, so that “the national origin of the pirate should determine 
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which state was responsible for his acts.”488 One obstacle to this approach was that many 
pirates disavowed any nationality, or even claimed allegiance to a pirate commonwealth. 
But in cases where nationality could be at least ascribed to a pirate, because of language 
perhaps, states refused to accept responsibility. Janice Thomson suggests that the norm of 
state responsibility for nationals on the high seas did not catch on because “sovereignty 
and nationality could be entirely divorced.”489 Her argument for what caused the divorce 
was multi-national crews flying under a sovereign flag. To that I add another argument: 
when the ban on privateering disconnected nationality from the right to sovereign 
violence, it also disconnected nationality with sovereign jurisdiction on the high seas. 
What mattered for enforcement purposes was whether one’s ship was a piece of floating 
territory, not whether its crew had national affiliation. Nationality was replaced with 
territory for the purpose of creating a community subject to state jurisdiction. 
 The anti-piracy norm that did become internationalized does not compel or 
encourage enforcement: “no state is responsible for the acts of pirates, and therefore no 
state can be held accountable for them.”490 Because piracy is outlawed across the ocean 
(eventually British laws became international law), states have the right to enforce anti-
piracy law. But because the connection between nationality and sovereignty was severed, 
states do so with discretion, because they have no duty to capture and prosecute 
pirates.491 Piracy was now easy to identify – any ship without a flag was a pirate – but 
without a flag, there was no ‘flag state’ specifically tasked with capture and prosecution. 
The anti-piracy regime solved the distinctiveness issue, whereby piracy and privateering 
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could not be easily distinguished or differentiated, by making the flag the mark of 
sovereign jurisdiction.   
This system was relatively effective during the Pax Britannica, the era of British 
naval supremacy, exactly because of that supremacy. But even when a maritime hegemon 
does have reason to act on the right to capture and prosecute pirates, the vast geography 
of the ocean makes this a very difficult task. Almost everywhere in the open ocean is a 
decent place to hide. Without a powerful and motivated enforcer, the anti-piracy regime 
is ineffective at solving the problem of piracy. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter illustrates several geographic and technological influences on the 
formation of the early modern ocean governance regime. It was superior ship and 
navigation technology that propelled Europeans across the global ocean before other 
seafaring traditions. Geographic information had tremendous importance for actors 
seeking advantage through navigation across the ocean, so maps were carefully 
controlled. Secrecy eventually broke down, and maps became more accurate and 
available, in part because the ocean is accessible from all coastlines. And the vastness of 
the ocean made it difficult for any actor to control where ships could and could not go. 
Despite this size and fluidity, the Portuguese, Spanish, and English attempted territorial 
partition in the ocean. Territorialization in the open ocean failed, and the territorial sea 
was reduced to the 3 miles from the coastline that could be controlled with weapons. In 
the open ocean, territory was replaced with the ‘freedom of the seas’ principle and the 
notion that legitimate ships are sovereign territory. These norms and principles were 
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globalized during the period of European expansion and imperialism, and were widely 










 Between 1850 and 1950, the nature of naval power changed fundamentally. This 
period witnessed unprecedented growth in the number of military ships on the ocean, in 
addition to revolutionary change in ship technology, armaments, doctrine, strategy, and 
tactics.492 As strategic and military use of the ocean expanded, customary international 
law and formal arms control agreements sought to shape military activities, in order to 
achieve the goal of peace (or at least reduce the risk of conflict). The 1856 Treaty of 
Paris, for example, established protections against seizure of neutral goods, or goods 
under neutral flags, in wartime. It also established that a “binding” blockade must be 
“effective” at preventing access to an enemy coast.493 In the 1920s and 1930s, three 
multilateral naval arms limitation conferences sought to prevent a naval arms race by 
restricting the tonnage of particular types of ships in a ratio that maintained US and 
British naval hegemony.494 These treaties failed to shape the nature and intensity of naval 
arms races and naval warfare, in large part because of their inability to account for 
technological change. The submarine and aircraft carrier became dominant naval warfare 
instruments in the first half of the twentieth century, undermining the assumptions of 
previous arms control treaties about the determinants of power on and under the ocean. 
 Naval arms control, like the ocean governance regime more generally, must 
contend with the particular geography, geophysics, and technology of the ocean. A 
particularly consequential and recent case study illustrates how the interaction between 
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the geophysical ocean and naval technologies plays a pivotal role in shaping one of the 
paramount world order arrangements in the post-World War II era. The regime of interest 
in this chapter is the world nuclear order, established after the advent of nuclear weapons 
to confront the obsolescence of territorial states as security providers. Because of the 
ever-present risk of nuclear destruction, the goal of the world nuclear order is peace 
through strategic stability. The choice of deterrence theory and strategy as a means to 
achieve strategic stability – described below – required the careful and coordinated 
management of naval forces on the part of the Cold War superpowers. The ocean itself, 
and its physical properties, interacts with technological capability to create a specific set 
of possibilities for regime success. 
 This chapter describes the relationship between strategic nuclear submarines, the 
world nuclear order, and the ocean governance regime. The first section unpacks the 
deterrence concept, and explains the choice of nuclear-armed submarines to bear the 
mantle of deterrence and thereby serve as the bulwark of strategic stability. The second 
section frames the Seabed Arms Control Treaty as an example of a particular approach to 
arms control, one that seeks to restrain technological systems and prevent the expansion 
of the nuclear arms race into new domains. The third section examines how the 
importance assigned to strategic nuclear submarines influenced the construction of the 
Law of the Sea Treaty. Each of these sections is a case of regime building, and this 
chapter demonstrates how in each case, the interaction between geography, geophysics, 
and technology shaped the content of the regime. The final section considers the 
effectiveness of the world nuclear order, given changes in technological capability and 





Strategic Nuclear Submarines 
The development and detonation of atomic weaponry at the end of World War II 
so shocked established political and military thought that it can be accurately described as 
a ‘Nuclear Revolution.’ The expectation that nuclear weapons would continue to be used 
in conflict, and the emerging bipolar tension, stoked premonitions of eminent 
international disaster. Aversion to their continued use, combined with fear of giving them 
up, produced a period of contradiction and adjustment in the missions and strategies of 
the armed forces. A nuclear strategy was needed to reconcile the extreme strength and 
extreme vulnerability attendant to the Nuclear Revolution, and to find a use for 
apparently un-useable weapons. ‘Deterrence theory’ was meant to provide a practicable 
stopgap while more radical political solutions were formulated, but it was eventually 
fully incorporated into military doctrine, strategy, and force structure.495 Deterrence 
theory relies on the idea that the threat of nuclear retaliation will prevent an enemy from 
starting a nuclear conflict. For deterrence to function, however, requires assurance that 
the victim of a ‘first strike’ will be able to respond after an initial attack. Thus, deterrence 
hinges on the maintenance of a ‘secure second strike’ capability that cannot be reliably 
eliminated in a disabling first strike. 496  
As land-based delivery vehicles became more targetable, military strategists 
sought ways to guarantee the ability to retaliate against a first strike. Although other 
means were pursued, such as hardened and mobile ballistic missiles and ‘launch on 
warning’ postures, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (SSBNs) were 
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understood to be the most survivable, and therefore most reliable, secure second strike 
capability. In assuming the mantle of deterrence, they became a “keystone of global 
military strategy.”497 The ability of SSBNs and their ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to remain 
invulnerable to a nuclear first-strike is a function of their ability to hide beneath the 
surface of the ocean, which is opaque to most forms of surveillance.  
 The opacity of the ocean is a product of its unique features, which tend to thwart 
traditional surveillance technologies. Opacity varies over time, however, evolving with 
new scientific understandings of the operational environment and innovation in sensing 
and hiding technologies. Scientific study of the undersea environment helps illuminate 
where and how the ‘signatures’ of SSBNs can be detected. Advances in information 
technologies such as radar, sonar, and satellites allow users to locate and track objects of 
interest with increasing degrees of precision. Improvements in oceanographic modeling 
and computer processing assist in separating smaller and smaller signals from 
background noise. All of these innovations contribute to transparency. But science and 
technology have also produced increasingly sophisticated ‘hiding’ techniques and 
‘cloaking’ technologies, which attempt to evade detection by reducing submarine 
signatures or enhancing background noise. These are means of rebuilding opacity. As 
science adds detail and precision to our understanding of the operational environment, 
and as technological innovations add to our capabilities to ‘hide and seek,’ ocean opacity 
may be subject to incremental erosions and/or sudden collapse as submarines become 
visible, and therefore targetable. Because the opacity of the submarine environment is 
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foundational for submarine-based strategic nuclear deterrence, its degradation entails 
serious potential volatility. This possibility is considered in detail in the final section. 
 The significance of ocean opacity for strategic nuclear stability implies that the 
basic condition of nuclear peace is a material one. Because scientific advancement and 
technological change continuously alter the relationship between transparency and 
opacity in the operational environment of nuclear forces, this basic condition cannot be 
understood as permanent. Transparency is a continuous variable that creates conditions of 
possibility for nuclear strategy. Transparency is typically understood to have benefits for 
political, economic, and social life.498 In the security realm, transparency about intentions 
and capabilities discourages irrational wars and facilitates negotiated settlements.499 
Transparency in the location of nuclear forces, however, is more likely to be destabilizing 
insofar as it alters the incentives and vulnerabilities assumed by contemporary nuclear 
force structures. Most concerning for theories of nuclear deterrence are the conditions 
under which the ‘secure second strike’ remains secure, because invulnerability of some 
nuclear forces is thought to dis-incentivize a counter-force first strike. Indeed, many 
proponents of offense/defense theory suggest that secure second strike weapons, and in 
particular SLBMs, are functionally defensive and therefore help stabilize and pacify 
international politics.500 The fabric of the international system in the nuclear era rests in 
large part on a particular premise about the interaction between technology and 
geography, which favors deterrence. Because of these high stakes, the conditions of 
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invulnerability, or survivability, remain an essential focus for theorists of nuclear peace, 
but are incomplete without careful examination of their fluid material foundations. The 
story begins in the early Cold War. 
The 1960s were a significant decade for the maturation of the Cold War conflict. 
In the United States, calculations of qualitative and quantitative advance in Soviet nuclear 
forces, though often misguided, helped drive massive new expenditures on strategic 
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The strategic nuclear ‘triad’ force structure 
emerged quickly, but was subject to upgrades and modifications throughout the Cold 
War. The 1960 deployment of Polaris-armed SSBNs by the United States represented a 
significant investment in invulnerable strike forces whose primary job was to maintain a 
credible threat of nuclear retaliation.501 In 1961, the Polaris-armed SSBN was completely 
invulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW). But the Soviet Union responded to 
Polaris with major new ASW programs, and although their success was limited, Navy 
and Department of Defense officials were seriously concerned about the potential of an 
ASW ‘breakthrough.’502 As the Cold War marched on, advances in weaponry and 
targeting made land-based nuclear delivery systems increasingly vulnerable to a counter-
force first strike, which amplified the strategic importance of invulnerable SLBMs.503 
The strategic studies literature has recognized the role of inter-service rivalry, 
perceptions of Soviet force structure, and the relationship between the Navy and 
oceanographers as partial explanations of why and how the US military shifted the 
mantle of ‘mutually assured destruction’ towards SSBNs. Because changes in the 
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strategic balance, and perceptions of the strategic balance, are the result of numerous 
interconnected and overlapping factors, very few accounts capture the full detail of 
relevant Cold War history. Social and institutional explanations are incomplete insofar as 
they overlook the crucial relationship between the geophysical properties of a particular 
operational environment (ocean, atmosphere, or space) and the technology designed to 
operate there. The interaction between evolving technologies of sensing, hiding, and 
destroying and the growing knowledge of the ocean environment drove Cold War 
defense expenditures towards a submarine-centric strategic nuclear deterrent. 
Shifting the Mantle of Deterrence 
 The most important feature of nuclear submarines was not that they could carry 
nuclear-tipped weaponry, but that they could do so without being located, targeted, and 
destroyed. The fact that SSBNs had this ‘opacity advantage’ over other nuclear forces 
was not determined by strategists, but was the outcome of rapid growth in the capabilities 
of surveillance technology. This revolution in transparency was driven by advances in 
existing sensing technologies (radar and sonar) and computer processing, and the 
development of new sensing platforms: surveillance aircraft and reconnaissance 
satellites.504 It radically increased the vulnerability of land-based weapons systems and 
command and control centers to a disabling first strike. Although advances in 
transparency and targeting have been on going throughout military history, the shock of 
direct visual surveillance from air and space was highly concentrated during the early 
Cold War period. Transparency has major implications for force structure because it 
changes the value of existing weapons systems, such that the number and size of weapons 
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is no longer a reliable indicator of strength.505 Even thousands of nuclear bombs and 
missiles cannot achieve credible retaliation if they can all be simultaneously located and 
destroyed. The increase in transparency during the early Cold War was so acute as to 
raise the specter of a debilitating or decapitating first strike whereby the enemy could 
prevent nuclear damage to itself, representing a serious challenge to deterrence-based 
strategy. 
 Transparency increases vulnerability by enabling better targeting. Specifically, the 
United States feared growing Soviet capabilities in ballistic missile accuracy and anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) technology. These twin developments were seen as eroding the 
secure second strike from two sides, in that they made a first strike maximally 
destructive, and provided some defense against any second strike capabilities that might 
remain.506 Although US nuclear-armed submarines could effectively hide from Soviet 
ASW during the early 1960s, strategists anticipated that this might change. Polaris-armed 
submarines were aging, and both Polaris and Poseidon missile systems had relatively 
limited ranges that constrained the size and location of patrol areas. The Americans 
believed that the incentives for a Soviet strike were growing, because the credibility of 
‘mutually assured destruction’ was waning, and therefore in 1966 Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara commissioned the ‘STRAT-X’ study. The purpose of STRAT-X was 
to undertake a comprehensive analysis of nuclear force structure, in order to figure out 
how to maximize survivability in the event of a first strike scenario.507 McNamara wanted 
specific investment proposals; executives from major defense contractors were involved, 
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and each of the 124 projects surveyed had to be unique relative to existing platforms. The 
proposed projects “ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous,” and included putting 
ICBMs in hardened subterranean silos, on trucks or railcars to make them mobile on land, 
on barges to make them mobile on existing or constructed waterways, on surface ships at 
sea, and on seabed platforms.508 Many of the proposals came from an Air Force that 
knew its monopoly on the nuclear arsenal was threatened. Since 1960, the Air Force had 
considered multiple ‘shell game’ missile arrangements, the purpose of which was “to 
achieve invulnerability and deception by shifting the missiles among multiple silos.”509 
Despite the fact that only two of the 124 proposals were sea-based, the final 
recommendations from the STRAT-X study included two land-based and two sea-based 
schemes. This balanced conclusion simply reflected inter-service politics, however, and 
the Navy’s underwater long-range missile system (ULMS) was the only proposal 
eventually developed into the Trident missile system.510 By the early 1970s, ULMS 
would become the agreed upon basis of mutual deterrence between the superpowers.511    
Expectations of Opacity 
The Navy’s ULMS proposal was pursued for multiple reasons, but the most basic 
is the character of the maritime operational environment. The Navy was well prepared to 
argue in favor of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), because of its pre-
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existing, mutually beneficial, and productive relationship with oceanographers.512 
Proving that the SSBN concept was the most efficient and effective way to maintain 
credible retaliation throughout the period for which the STRAT-X study was 
commissioned (1975-85) required assessing the likelihood that the ocean would remain 
basically opaque in the face of technological innovation. The Navy had two decades of 
experience conducting research into the nature of the maritime operational environment, 
as part of the broad post-World War II effort to identify new strategic missions for the 
military services. Defining what naval forces, especially submarines, were capable of 
required basic oceanographic research. The characterization of the maritime environment 
received a major boost during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), an 
international cooperative scientific effort “aimed to extend synoptic data collection over 
the entire Earth” and with a large number of projects focused on ocean properties.513 The 
IGY was supposed to ease Cold War tensions, but one of the Soviet projects, the Sputnik 
satellite, signaled the potential for a major advancement in surveillance capabilities and 
catalyzed the search for new foundations of strategic deterrence. 
 The basic reason for the persistence of ocean opacity is a geophysical fact: only 
sound travels through ocean water in a way that is useful for long-range sensing 
technologies. Electro-magnetic radiation, and therefore radar, does not penetrate the 
ocean’s surface well.514 In other words, the atmosphere is transparent in a way that the 
ocean is not. Oceanographic labs and institutions working with the Navy characterized in 
detail what this geophysical reality meant for the possibilities of ‘hiding’ and ‘seeking’ in 
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the ocean. In the late 1940s, oceanographers discovered natural sound channels that 
trapped and focused low frequency sound, suggesting the viability of passive acoustic 
sensing via arrays of sonar hydrophones.515 In the course of investigating the acoustic 
environment in the North Atlantic and around important sea lines of communication, the 
significance of thermal layering, depth, and seafloor terrain for obstructing and distorting 
sound propagation became clearer.516 Oceanographers also described and characterized 
the sources and nature of ocean background ‘noise,’ a critical step in defining the signal-
to-noise ratio that ultimately determines the acoustic visibility of submarines. Because 
these geographical and geophysical features of the ocean determined the possibilities and 
obstacles for acoustic sensing, oceanographic data, especially bathymetric charts and 
bathythermograph data, were subject to security classification; “oceanographic data 
presented a case in which basic science itself was a commodity of extreme importance to 
the Navy's operations.”517 This accumulated knowledge about the oceanic operational 
environment led military strategists to conclude that the advantage of SSBNs over ASW 
would persist in the face of technological innovation. The acoustic sensing technologies 
best suited to the hydrosphere had limited range and could be easily thwarted with 
defensive technology.  
Investments in Transparency 
Submarines became the foundation of nuclear deterrence because passive acoustic 
sensing could not make the ocean fully transparent, but the superpowers still invested in 
detection technologies. The Soviet Union deployed its first nuclear-armed submarines in 
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1968, and despite a pre-existing “tremendous acoustic advantage” the United States 
wanted to maximize the chances of tracking them.518 The first major projects were 
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passive sonar arrays, linked by radio or submarine cable to centralized computer 
processing centers that would separate the ‘signal’ from the ‘noise.’ Referred to as 
‘SOSUS’ (Sound Surveillance System), these hydrophones placed along undersea cables 
were extensive enough to detect very low frequency signals, which propagate farther than 
high frequencies. By 1958, the United States had SOSUS systems along the entire eastern 
seaboard, in Hawaii, and along parts of the Pacific seaboard. By 1965, a network of 
passive acoustic hydrophones spanned the ‘GIUK’ gap, which served as a primary means 
of egress for Soviet submarines entering open ocean patrol areas. By the 1970s there 
were over 20 SOSUS installations at global strategic locations, including important 
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chokepoints such as the Straits of Gibraltar. This regional acoustic detection strategy was 
combined with a ‘coordinated ASW’ response that included surface ships and 
surveillance aircraft utilizing active sonar and radar on the surface of the ocean. Although 
active sonar is more effective at localization, it has a shorter range and reveals the 
presence of a seeker, and was generally eschewed by US submarines during the Cold 
War, in favor of passive acoustic sensing.519 
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The Soviet Union also invested in passive sonar arrays, although they were 
inferior to SOSUS.520 Upon realizing their vulnerability to detection in the open ocean, in 
the mid-1970s Soviet SSBNs adopted a ‘bastion’ strategy whereby they remained in the 
“marginal ice seas of the Soviet Arctic littoral,” avoiding traversal of the SOSUS arrays 
but keeping SLBMs within strike range of the United States.521 This hiding strategy was 
possible because of the long range of SLBMs, and because any attack on Russian SSBNs 
was expected to come from US attack submarines.522 The bastion strategy partially 
redressed Soviet submarine vulnerability by creating a zone of “active defense” in which 
detection was possible, but localization required risky transit into the heavily defended 
and Soviet-controlled Barents Sea.523  
Internal Arms Racing 
 It is easy to overlook the essential stability of ocean opacity throughout the Cold 
War. Investments in both hiding and detection produced incremental advances in both 
capabilities for decades. This technological arms race was driven by more than just 
competition between the hiding Soviet Union and the seeking United States; it continued 
largely because of the institutional structures in which it was embedded. The US military 
regularly produced reports detailing expected innovations in Soviet technology, and 
therefore improvements in Soviet capability. A lack of reliable intelligence led the 
Americans to imagine ‘worst case scenarios’ that drove reactive investments. Because the 
tasks of detection and concealment were contracted out to different labs and research 
institutions, internal competition increased the budgets for both. Improvements in passive 
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acoustic sensing technology, especially SOSUS, pushed American submarine designers 
to build quieter submarines. This “technical competition between listeners and hiders,” 
all occurring within US research institutions, drove American submarine and ASW 
technology forward in what was perceived as a race with the Soviets, but is more 
accurately understood as an internal race.524 Yearly ASW exercises in the 1960s 
generated performance analyses that were used to justify defense expenditures to fill 
‘gaps’ in capabilities. Despite this dynamism in technological capability, nuclear 
deterrence remained stable because of the opportunities for hiding provided by the ocean 
environment. 
Cold War Opacity 
 Because passive sonar relied on submarines making noise, both sides pursued 
quieting in vessel design and operation. Nuclear power was the first major design 
innovation for the purposes of concealment, because it decreased the need to surface 
regularly. The previous classes of diesel-electric submarines had to surface or snorkel 
periodically to recharge their batteries, making them vulnerable to multiple modes of 
detection. But the first generation of nuclear submarines was also constantly noisy, as 
opposed to the intermittent loudness of diesel electric submarines.525 Even a stopped 
nuclear submarine generates noise from its power plant, whereas a submarine running on 
only electric power is very quiet.526 Despite this, US nuclear submarines maintained 
opacity throughout the Cold War through hiding techniques that reduced acoustic 
signatures or created decoy signals. The United States developed nuclear-powered 
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submarines first, and designed their internal parts to be quieter; the Polaris-armed 
submarines deployed in the 1960s “were superior in all respects to contemporary Soviet 
ballistic missile submarines.”527 The shape of submarine hulls was contoured to reduce 
the active sonar signature, and operators used hiding techniques like slow speeds, limited 
communications, and travel below the thermocline. Both superpowers invested in decoys 
and noisemakers, which could multiply the number of apparently valid targets, or even 
eliminate the possibility of acoustic detection altogether.528 During the Cold War, 
maintenance of ocean opacity was assured by continued innovations in concealment 
technologies.  
 The United States maintained a “unique and enduring advantage” in passive 
acoustics throughout the Cold War, but even the most optimistic assessments of its 
‘seeking’ capabilities do not conclude that Soviet SSBNs could be located and targeted 
with enough certainty to incentivize a US first strike.529 And eventually Soviet 
submarines began to get quieter. Investment in ‘hiding’ technologies may have been 
accelerated by intelligence about SOSUS sold to the Soviets by U.S. Navy Chief Warrant 
Officer John A. Walker, who leaked naval secrets from 1967-85.530 The maturation of 
Soviet quieting technologies in the early 1980s appeared as bipolar convergence on an 
‘opacity advantage,’ leading one US Admiral to predict that “at some point, nobody will 
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be able to find a submarine with anything.”531 Official Navy reports expressed confidence 
in the persistent advantage of ‘hiding’ over ‘seeking’ technologies (which were really 
mostly ‘listening’), and took for granted the resilience of strategic invulnerability in the 
face of technological innovation.532 When a Russian official conveyed his confidence in 
1992 that space-based radar and optical detection systems were five to ten years away 
from achieving strategic transparency, US scientists expressed strong skepticism.533 
Despite this confidence in opacity, the US Air Force continued proposing alternative 
basing schemes, including in deep space, in an effort to reclaim part of the mantle of 
‘mutually assured destruction.’534 Instead of pursuing alternative schemes for opacity, the 
US military augmented the SOSUS system in the mid-1980s, adding surveillance ships 
towing sonar arrays hundreds of meters long. Information from SOSUS and towed arrays 
were processed together, and became known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance 
System. Despite these minor improvements in sensing technology, ‘hiding’ had the 
advantage on both sides when the Cold War ended, and the secure second strike was 
therefore assured. 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty 
 The invulnerability of SSBNs during the Cold War created an opportunity for 
arms control in the ocean: the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (or ‘Seabed Treaty’). In the 
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mid-1960s, commercial and scientific groups began exploring and contemplating the 
seabed with increased focus and vigor. A variety of ambitious plans for using the deep 
sea and seabed were proposed.535 Reports began circulating about military plans for the 
deep ocean, prompting concerns about the possibility of a new phase of the nuclear arms 
race.536 Both superpowers had indeed contemplated basing weapons on the seafloor, 
including nuclear-tipped ICBMs, nuclear-armed ‘crawlers,’ and nuclear-armed mines.537 
These schemes would take advantage of the ocean opacity that made nuclear forces 
harder to locate, and “even if their exact location were known they would be more 
difficult to neutralize.”538 Although basing nuclear weapons on the sea floor was 
genuinely contemplated, the superpowers instead decided to pledge mutual restraint.  
Restraining Technology 
 The Seabed Treaty, which entered into force in 1972, committed its members “not 
to emplant or emplace on the seabed…any nuclear weapons or any other types of 
weapons of mass destruction.” The origins of the Seabed Treaty can be found in a 1967 
speech given by Arvid Pardo, the Maltese representative to the United Nations, which 
declared that the seabed was the “common heritage of mankind.”539 In addition to this 
general idea about reserving the seabed for peaceful uses, the superpowers had their own 
reasons for outlawing the basing of nuclear weapons on or under the seabed. The United 
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States and Soviet Union recognized that the Cold War rivalry had a kind of technological 
momentum, whereby advances in technology were producing violence capabilities 
unrelated to actual political and strategic goals. The “momentum of technology” was 
understood as potentially very dangerous, and tremendously expensive.540 The Seabed 
Treaty provided a bulwark against new and frivolous weapons systems, by giving both 
governments “a legal excuse for saying no to [their] military-industrial lobbyists.”541  
 Despite this superpower consensus, there was some negotiation over the terms of 
the Seabed Treaty. The Soviet Union proposed to fully ‘de-militarize’ the seabed, which 
would prohibit the emplacement of SOSUS hydrophones, among other things. The 
United States wanted the nuclear-free zone to end 3 miles from the coastline, whereas the 
Soviets preferred allowing emplacement within a 12-mile zone. After exchanging draft 
treaties, both states compromised rather quickly. The final Treaty only prohibits weapons 
of mass destruction, a concession to the United States, and does so only up to 12 miles 
from the coastline, a concession to the Soviet Union.542 The biggest challenge to reaching 
agreement was actually the problem of verification.543 Most countries wanted some form 
of internationalized verification, while the superpowers were content without designating 
a special procedure or new authority.544 Article III of the Seabed Treaty represents a 
compromise on the question of verification, by giving each state the right to verify on its 
own, but also providing the opportunity to refer the issue to the United Nations Security 
Council. 
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The Seabed Treaty and SOSUS 
 The Seabed Treaty might be understood as a missed opportunity for ensuring the 
invulnerability of US and Soviet SSBNs, and therefore strengthening the foundations of 
deterrence. During the 1960s and 1970s, US submarine detection primarily relied on 
hydrophones placed on the seabed. If that ASW capability became too effective and made 
detection and localization possible, the likely result would be strategic instability. For this 
reason, the Soviet proposal to de-militarize the seabed may have been “stabilizing in the 
long run, since it would have brought the survivability of the Soviet ballistic missile 
submarine force to a level equal to that of our POLARIS force, thus giving both sides an 
assured destruction capability.”545 There are four basic reasons the de-militarization 
approach was rejected in favor of de-nuclearization. 
 First – de-militarization would have been a major shift in strategic advantage from 
the United States to the Soviet Union. At the time of negotiation, western ASW 
technology was more advanced than similar Soviet systems. The United States and its 
allies also had a durable geographic advantage in ASW, given their control of important 
chokepoints like the GIUK gap, and the favorable acoustic environment of the Barents 
Sea. And without ASW capabilities, geography would make US allies more vulnerable, 
because they were “far more dependent on the sea for bringing in reinforcements in a 
crisis,” compared to the Soviet Union.546 So the United States opposed de-militarization 
because it would provide the Soviet Union “an important military advantage with little or 
nothing in exchange.”547  
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 Second – the Soviet Union had its own interest in maintaining the possibility of 
conventional militarization of the seabed. Restricting the Seabed Treaty to de-
nuclearization ensured that the ocean floor was “preserved as an extensive area of 
military potential.” 548 The Soviet Union, United States, and other countries recognized 
the future potential of the deep ocean and seabed as a test range for underwater weapons. 
They also envisioned underwater bases for submarine repair, command and control, or 
protection of commercial endeavors. Although expectations of nuclear basing on the sea 
floor provoked trepidation, the idea of conventional militarization was “exciting” for 
many states.549 With a de-nuclearization approach, the superpowers could preserve the 
seabed, and potentially arm it too.  
 Third – the ASW capabilities that made Soviet SSBNs vulnerable to detection had 
utility for other “general-purpose naval missions.”550 So while banning ASW systems on 
the seafloor might protect the second strike capability of SSBNs (particularly Soviet 
SSBNs), it would also have a detrimental effect on other maritime capabilities. The most 
significant loss would have been the ability to detect conventional attack submarines, 
which threaten surface vessels and also provide a means of attack against SSBNs.551 
 Fourth – as US Ambassador Gerard Smith regularly pointed out, complete de-
militarization would be a significant, potentially insurmountable, challenge for 
verification. Placing a weapon of mass destruction on the seafloor would be fairly 
noticeable, given the massive infrastructure requirements. In contrast, many objects with 
utility to the military are small and easy to place clandestinely. And because many seabed 
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technologies are dual use, complete de-militarization would necessitate the complex and 
burdensome task of “deciding whether each object or installation emplaced on the sea-
bed was of a military nature.”552 
Spatial Arms Control 
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty is an example of a particular type of arms 
control developed during the Cold War, and applied to non-terrestrial spaces. Before and 
after negotiations, the United States drew an explicit comparison to the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967.553 US negotiators noted that the Outer Space Treaty specifically bans 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, instead of broad de-militarization.554 
In both treaties, an emerging new area of human activity was closed off to the possibility 
of nuclear weapons basing, before that basing was actually pursued. As additions to the 
world nuclear order, the Outer Space and Seabed Treaties are examples of restraint, 
instead of relinquishment. And that restraint is based on spatial areas, not specific 
technologies. Instead of banning or regulating the number and size of weapons systems, 
as in the failed interwar naval arms limitation agreements, these treaties prevent nuclear 
rivalry and arms racing from expanding into new domains. According to the United 
States federal government, the idea was to “prevent an arms race before it had the chance 
to start,” and to “preserve this new seabed environment for the benefit of mankind.”555 
 Negotiation of the Seabed Treaty was relatively easy because of the reliability and 
invulnerability of SSBNs, and specifically because of their superiority to seabed-based 
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nuclear weapons systems. SSBNs were more likely to avoid detection because of their 
mobility.556 Although the proposed nuclear ‘crawlers’ would have been mobile, even in 
the best-case scenario they would be slow, and obstructed by topographic obstacles on 
the sea floor. And SSBNs were an established technology, with decades of research and 
development. Over the course of the 1960s, optimism was replaced with the idea that 
seabed based weapons were a “technological blind alley.” 557 Because the cost of seabed-
based nuclear weapons systems would be exorbitant, and because SSBNs already 
provided assurance of nuclear retaliation in the event of a first strike, the attitude of the 
superpowers to placing nuclear weapons on the seafloor was simple and straightforward: 
“why bother?”558 
Law of International Straits 
 In the 1970s, the ability of SSBNs to remain undetected became of subject of 
political and legal contention. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) convened in 1973, with the goal of negotiating a ‘Constitution for the 
Oceans’ that covered multiple ocean uses. While UNCLOS specifically set aside military 
matters like arms control, laws relating to transit had the potential to affect military 
activities. In regards to SSBNs, determinations about the width of the territorial sea and 
the status of international straits had the potential to inhibit submarine navigation. In the 
two decades before UNCLOS, the norm of the 3-mile territorial sea had been undermined 
and challenged by a series of unilateral claims to a 12-mile territorial sea. If the 12-mile 
territorial sea became enshrined in international law, 116 international straits (those used 
widely and regularly by the international community) would be composed entirely of 
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territorial waters. A previous international agreement, the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, had established that transit through 
territorial waters is subject to ‘innocent passage,’ and therefore requires submarines to 
“navigate on the surface and to show their flag” (Article 14). But at the time of this 
agreement, the 3-mile territorial sea was still the norm, and therefore most international 
straits contained a ‘high seas corridor’ through which submarines could pass 
submerged.559 
 In the early years of the UNCLOS negotiations (1973-1982), a coalition of ‘straits 
states’ (Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Morocco, Spain, and Yemen) proposed that 
submarines be required to give prior notice, receive prior authorization, and travel 
through straits on the surface and showing their flag.560 The US Navy strongly opposed 
this blueprint for the international straits regime, because the requirements “would make 
it easier for an antagonist to locate and, thereby, threaten the submarines.”561 The result 
would undermine strategic stability, because of the increased vulnerability of SSBNs 
when they surface, and because neither superpower could trust that the other was fully 
complying with the surfacing requirement. A secondary concern related to navigational 
safety. SSBNs are designed to travel submerged, and when traveling on the surface they 
have a dangerously low profile and are less maneuverable. In a chokepoint of global 
shipping traffic, traveling on the surface would greatly increase the risk of collision. 562 
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 The US Navy won its preferred outcome in the final treaty, in part because the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain supported the US position. The United States also 
eventually made concessions related to the territorial sea and seabed mining, in order to 
win support for its free passage agenda. Article 39 of UNCLOS defines ‘transit passage’ 
through international straits, which allows ships and submarines to maintain their 
“normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit.” Although the United States never 
ratified UNCLOS, the norm of submerged transit through international straits has 
achieved the status of customary international law.563 
 Interestingly, none of this may have mattered for the security of SSBNs. A 1974 
study by Robert E. Osgood reviewed all the world’s international straits to determine how 
the US Navy’s capabilities would change under the ‘innocent passage’ regime proposed 
by the straits states.564 Out of only 16 straits that might be important for SSBN passage, 
all except three have convenient alternative routes. And friendly governments controlled 
the three straits that must be transited – Ombai-Wetar and Lombok in Indonesia, and 
Gibraltar at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Apart from these three straits, “passage 
through straits is not vital for the United States Navy.”565 But the supreme importance 
attached to SSBN invulnerability, combined with the risk that friendly governments 
might become unfriendly, meant that the US Navy was unwilling to budge on its 
preferred regime for international straits.566 Technologically and legally, the 
invulnerability of SSBNs was assured throughout the Cold War. 
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Erosion of Opacity 
Confidence in the persistent advantage of SSBNs over ASW has, since the end of 
the Cold War, co-existed with warnings about the specter of ocean transparency. But 
technological advances have only recently made the expectation of transparency truly 
compelling.567 The momentum of a broad-based and well-funded effort to discover and 
document the oceans has produced new scientific understanding and technology, and 
overcome key barriers to Cold War ocean sensing like limited platform penetration and 
slow data processing.568 In particular, new maps of the operational environmental help 
separate the signal from the noise. New motivations have engaged industry in the process 
of developing enabling technologies. And continued improvements in acoustic sensing 
are joined by innovations in non-acoustic sensing. Oceanographers speak breathlessly of 
being “poised on the brink of a series of improvements” from “transformational 
technologies” that will facilitate “truly synoptic observations of ocean regions and 
processes.”569 The accelerating pace of technological change carries risks, however, and 
may nullify the utility of SSBNs for strategic nuclear deterrence as new sensors and 
platforms make the ocean increasingly transparent.570 This section assesses and supports 
the claim that technological innovations will spread across the ocean in the next few 
decades and achieve an unprecedented degree of transparency.571 Before examining how 
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transparency might be achieved, it is important to understand why crossing this threshold 
is increasingly likely.   
New Motivations  
 The end of the Cold War marked the decline of a major driver of investment in 
submarine hiding and seeking technologies. In the last two decades, a powerful new 
motivation for understanding and monitoring the ocean has materialized: climate change. 
The urgency and shared vulnerability of this planetary problem demands tremendous 
investment in redressing gaps in our knowledge of atmosphere-ocean interactions. 
Especially relevant are the details of carbon and heat storage, the dynamics of 
thermohaline circulation, and the effects of ocean acidification on marine ecosystems. 
Much of this data is dual use; for example, measuring changes in stratification and 
mixing in the water column informs scientists about the effects of global warming on 
ocean circulation, and submariners about the likely pathways for sound propagation. 
Increasingly precise measurements of sea surface height help characterize regional 
variation in sea level rise, but could also potentially be capable of detecting the wakes of 
passing submarines.  
Because oceanography is an ‘observational science,’ marine scientists prioritize 
increasing, diversifying, and achieving a higher resolution for the data flows coming from 
the ocean.572 This entails the establishment of coordinated observation programs that 
address the need for data at larger and longer scales by deploying floating, steered, and in 
situ sensing platforms.573 Autonomous drones on and under the surface are being tested 
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and deployed to gather scientific data throughout the ocean.574 Operators of these sensory 
arrays describe what they are doing as “essentially providing an extension of the internet 
over the oceans.”575 A participant in the National Research Council’s workshop 
Oceanography in 2025 described the discipline’s essential aim: “our goal is to make the 
ocean as transparent as possible.”576  
The breadth and depth of scientific effort makes civilian and government 
oceanographers an independent strategic force in the technological balance between 
opacity and transparency, a new constituency with strong motivations to discover, detail, 
and document ocean processes. Their open access model for data sharing helps redress 
funding shortfalls and geographic limitations, and represents a reversal of the Cold War 
practice of classifying oceanographic data. This effort contributes to the detection of 
SSBNs because sensing technology is dual use, but also because the improved scientific 
understanding of the ocean makes it easier for sensors to distinguish the signal from the 
noise. 
New Maps 
 As the ocean becomes increasingly “sensor rich,” new types and quantities of data 
are producing a more detailed picture of the ocean.577 Cold War era maps and models 
were so rife with assumptions and elisions that they are best understood as “works of 
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extrapolation, interpolation and inspiration, not mere measurement.”578 Oceanographers 
are now deploying advanced sensory networks to refine these maps by providing more of 
the necessary information to create accurate representations. In particular, advances have 
been made in mapping the topography and composition of the sea floor. The integration 
of GPS satellites has improved the precision of acoustic data collection, and new 
understandings of the ‘deep scattering layer’ minimize inaccurate soundings. But the 
requirement of using surface vessels still limits the range of sonar bathymetry. Since the 
1990s, satellite radar altimetry has been used to produce wider area measurements of 
several sea surface properties, from which oceanographers can glean information about 
the seabed.579 In 2014, the first new map of the ocean floor in twenty years was produced 
from satellite altimetry data, and it was twice as accurate as the last one.580 This map is 
open access, available on Google Earth. The refinement of such maps matters for 
submarine detection because the contours of the seabed strongly condition and obstruct 
sound propagation, so that better maps improve acoustic detection techniques. This kind 
of basic knowledge about the physical ocean is “the foundation of all ASW 
objectives.”581 
Enabling Technologies 
 The complexity and variability of the ocean environment vastly increases the 
computational requirements of separating the signal from the noise.582 Since the Cold 
War, advances in digital processing, solid state memory, and lithium batteries have 
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increased computational power while decreasing computer size.583 These technologies 
enable small sensing platforms to process information in situ, and communicate and 
coordinate across multiple platforms, allowing them to operate as a ‘swarm.’ Scientists 
are currently testing the use of artificial intelligence software to increase the autonomy 
and integration of the swarm.584 Operation as a network will enhance the potency of 
sensors, especially when they are mobile and can automatically optimize their behavior 
or position.585 But exploitation of these possibilities requires a new generation of 
platforms, because Cold War vehicles are too large and expensive to effectively operate 
in a large and mobile network. Aerial, surface, and submarine drone technology satisfies 
the need for this capability. 
A major obstacle to ocean transparency during the Cold War was the persistent 
gap between detection of a submarine and the localization required for effective 
targeting. The relative ease of detection using static acoustic platforms preceded the more 
difficult task of localization using mobile platforms. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles 
(AUVs) or ‘drones’ can collapse the spatial and temporal distances between detection and 
localization. When contemporary AUVs are widely distributed, equipped with effective 
short-range sensors, and networked together, “detection and localization will be 
simultaneous.”586 With large numbers of drones, the location of an SSBN is 
‘compromised’ all at once – the idea is that detection by one AUV automatically triggers 
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the others to swarm together in pursuit, calculating the target’s trajectory in real time.587 
These drones can carry any type of sensor including towed passive arrays, and operate in 
risky maritime environments (because they are relatively cheap and unmanned).588 They 
could also potentially operate as weapons delivery platforms, or kamikazes, although the 
primary ASW missions envisioned for AUVs do not include weapons engagement.589 
Enabling drones to track targets automatically complicates countermeasures like evasive 
maneuvering, deep diving, and the use of decoys. If the full suite of small, autonomous 
sensing platforms is developed as planned, the outcome is likely to be “highly disruptive” 
for the existing balance between hiding and seeking.590 The degree of transparency this 
scenario represents would be unprecedented, and is currently within the realm of 
technological possibility. 
AUVs are still an emerging technology, but the commercial, scientific, and 
military sectors are all investing in research and development. Networked underwater 
drones represent a superior, and potentially cheaper, means of mapping and monitoring 
the ocean environment. Because AUVs are seen as a major growth market, companies 
that design sensors, communications, power sources, and vessels are increasingly 
involved in developing specialized versions of these technologies.591 In the commercial 
sector, AUVs produce detailed maps of the seafloor in order to identify the best locations 
for offshore drilling, deep seabed mining, and the position of submarine 
telecommunications cables. Once operations are underway, AUVs can inspect and 
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monitor technological systems and assist in making repairs. For oceanographers, AUVs 
are an important new tool for exploring hydrothermal vents, toxic cold seeps, and other 
benthic marine habitats. Some underwater drones can already operate to a depth of 6000 
meters and adapt to unexpected conditions, but advancements in their endurance and 
flexibility are still anticipated.592 In particular, marine scientists are developing 
underwater gliders that rely on buoyancy engines, “a slow but frugal form of travel with a 
tiny power requirement.”593 These gliders can travel long distances over months, and 
oceanographers use them to collect large-scale data on chemical and geophysical 
properties of the ocean. Gliders have also been used to measure radiation levels, inspect 
icebergs and submarine volcanoes, and follow whales. They have significant dual use 
potential, especially because gliders are extremely quiet, which makes the acoustic 
sensors they carry more effective. The Chinese in particular are developing the 
“academic base” for this technology, although US defense contractors lead in the 
production of diverse prototypes.594 
The United States military has invested in several different types of drone 
programs. The P-8 Poseidon surveillance plane is currently equipped to release Coyote 
drones from the same tubes used to deploy sonar buoys. Although their mission time is 
limited to 90 minutes, these aerial drones can be recovered and reused.595 The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) ‘Upward Falling Payload’ program 
envisions pre-positioned nodes concealed on the vast seabed, which can be activated and 
deployed immediately. The current design releases payloads that float to the surface and 
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deploy aerial drones.596 In terms of underwater drones, the Navy has for some time used 
small, remotely operated vehicles for search and rescue and minesweeping operations.597 
A new autonomous drone, the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, 
represents a significant advance. Designed for intelligence and surveillance, this small 
system will be “stowed, launched and recovered by multiple-host platforms,” including 
ships, attack submarines, and SSBNs.598 Finally, DARPA’s autonomous surface vessel – 
the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel – is currently in the sea 
trial phase. Designed to detect and automatically track submerged vessels, this 130-foot 
unmanned vessel can operate autonomously for 70 days, and carry diverse non-
conventional sensor technologies.599 These drone programs each erode the opacity of the 
ocean in their own way, and are intended to operate in a network with aircraft or 
submarines that may pursue actual engagement with enemy vessels. The overall goal is to 
connect multiple types of mobile, deployable, and in situ sensors into a network that 
autonomously and automatically reacts to maintain the precise location of a potential 
target.  
One persistent challenge for hypothetical networks of swarming AUVs is the need 
to communicate between vehicles. Individual mobility and group coordination requires 
wireless communication. Underwater acoustic communications are low bandwidth and 
must occur at close range, such that coverage of a wide area requires a large number of 
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AUVs with sophisticated on board ‘reasoning.’600 Surface radio communications have a 
longer range, but require making the AUV vulnerable by surfacing and raising 
antennas.601 While networked underwater communication is the subject of on-going 
research, one simple solution would be the deployment of a large number of densely 
packed AUVs. Another option is networking with other platforms, such as ‘gateway 
buoys,’ whose primary purpose is the facilitation of networked communication. These 
strategies carry their own costs and vulnerabilities. 
Improvements in Acoustic Detection 
Despite some technological advances, the balance between acoustic methods of 
hiding and seeking remains about where it was at the end of the Cold War. Acoustic 
systems locating submarines have been both downgraded and enhanced. Several of the 
SOSUS networks operated by the US military have been shut down or repurposed for 
non-military ends.602 A small set of regional sonar arrays, however, has been augmented 
and updated in three ways: by adding new kinds of mobile sensors, improving 
communication between sensors, and networking with the hydrophone arrays of allies.603 
The development and deployment of multistatic sonar entails technical performance 
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improvements, and facilitates operation in a larger network.604 The Integrated Undersea 
Surveillance System includes SOSUS arrays, the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor 
System, and other fixed and mobile acoustic systems. The operational concept envisions 
a global network of submarine ‘seekers,’ including deployable sensors that connect 
readily with other platforms and the hydrophones of allies, “like an underwater 
internet.”605 This vision has only been partially realized in the ‘sector location’ tactic that 
coordinates P-8 Poseidon surveillance planes, satellites, passive hydrophones, and surface 
ships towing arrays. One basic obstacle is the slow communication speeds through water, 
which were described by one authority as “roughly where the Internet was 30 years 
ago.”606 The acoustic environment of the East Asian littoral seas, where the concept has 
primarily been tested, is especially challenging for passive sonar.  
The challenging littoral environment, combined with improvements in submarine 
quieting in the late Cold War, prompted western navies to increase their investment in 
active sonar technology.607 Mid-frequency active sonar was already a standard tactical 
tool for surface ships, but lower frequencies promised superior detection ranges. Low-
frequency active (LFA) sonar was developed in the late 1980s and deployed in the 1990s 
on towed arrays, which could be placed below the warm surface layer.608 Variable depth 
LFA sonar quickly became the ‘sensor of choice’ among western navies, although it still 
operates among a wider network of mobile and fixed passive arrays. Active sonar faces 
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many of the same challenges as passive sonar in the littoral environment, including high 
ambient noise, reverberation, and coastal mixing that disrupts temperature and density-
based ocean layers.609 Active sonar also entails a high risk of detection and counter-
attack, and is politically unpopular because of the harm it causes to charismatic mega 
fauna like dolphins and whales.610 While this has led the Navy to restrict the total usage 
of LFA sonar, DARPA currently has a prototype program to equip an AUV with active 
sonar.611  
Investments in acoustic detection also take place within fisheries management, 
where the technique of Ocean Acoustic Waveguide Remote Sensing represents a 
significant advancement in the ability to monitor fish populations. This low frequency 
technique, which uses the continental shelf to guide horizontal sound waves, can generate 
“instantaneous wide-area sensing of marine life over thousands of square kilometers.”612 
The passive sonar version of waveguide remote sensing has been able to detect individual 
marine mammals from their vocalizations.613 The scientists working to innovate this 
technique suggest that it is applicable to the detection and localization of individual 
submarines.614 The active sonar version has been described as “game-changing,” and 
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although it has not yet been deployed by militaries, its utility for ASW is rapidly being 
recognized.615  
Evasive and defensive strategies remain generally effective against acoustic 
sensing. These include slow travel and hiding in ‘shadow zones’ to reduce submarine 
signatures.616 Even when they are widely distributed and finely tuned, passive acoustic 
arrays are easily destroyed or confused by defensive technology. This is a basic acoustic 
advantage for opacity: “The provision of hundreds or thousands of such noisemakers 
could well eliminate the possibility of detecting submarines in the first place.”617 Total 
acoustic transparency may be unlikely, but sensor improvements still degrade the opacity 
of the ocean. When deployed on new platforms, and networked with other types of 
sensors, passive and active sonar still play an important role in the detection of SSBNs. 
Innovations in Non-Acoustic Detection 
 At the end of the Cold War, non-acoustic detection methods were more 
theoretical than operational, and all were vulnerable to the same basic countermeasure: 
traveling deep.618 The primary difficulties were technical: separating the signal from the 
noise, and accounting for environmental variability. Platform options were limited to 
aircraft and satellites, and each provided insufficient coverage.619 But in the last two 
decades, technological advances in both sensors and platforms have created new 
possibilities for non-acoustic detection. The full development and integration of these 
sensing methods into operational platforms may entail major transparency gains. 
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 Many types of sensors have extended their ranges while reducing their size and 
cost, which makes placing a large quantity on small platforms both attractive and 
feasible.620 When these platforms are mobile like AUVs, they can follow an SSBN as it 
travels into the deep. Progress has even been made against the problem of ‘biofouling,’ 
which degrades sensors and reduces their service life.621 New types of sensors are 
emerging, and marine scientists have a strong interest in the development and 
deployment of non-acoustic sensors. The signatures that can be observed by non-acoustic 
detection methods depend on the properties of the submarine itself, and its interactions 
with the ocean environment. These can include electromagnetic effects, biological 
disturbances, internal and surface waves, temperature change, optical reflectivity or 
absorption, and chemical or radioactive tracers.622 A survey of the most promising non-
acoustic detection methods suggests that their contribution to ocean transparency may be 
significant. Four types of non-acoustic detection will be considered.  
LIDAR measures distance using the reflections of lasers, and the method has been 
successfully used in seafloor mapping and mine detection.623 Although LIDAR has been 
the subject of optimism regarding submarine detection, it is unlikely to overcome the 
problem of ‘backscatter’ from the clouds and sea surface, which reduces the signal 
strength.624 This method of non-acoustic detection is ultimately thwarted by ocean 
geophysics; “there is no possibility of strategically significant blue-green laser ASW 
because even the optimum laser color does not penetrate (in a round-trip) to the 
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comfortable operating depth of existing submarines.”625 LIDAR might be useful for 
short-range localization of shallow submarines, but it is ineffective for wide-area 
surveillance.626 These barriers are unlikely to be overcome by technology. 
Another non-acoustic signature that could theoretically be detected is the effect of 
submarine transit on marine microorganisms, especially those with bioluminescent 
reactions.627 Because oceanography had an early and persistent focus on geophysical 
systems – encouraged by the Office of Naval Research – detection and modeling of 
chemical and biological systems is especially immature.628 But marine scientists 
increasingly understand these conceptually distinct systems as a single integrated 
biogeochemical system, such that it is theoretically possible to measure biological effects 
as proxies for the physical effects of submarines. Some biological effects are being 
actively monitored; ocean color remote sensing from satellites is used to derive 
productivity baselines from algal blooms.629 And the relevance of micro- and 
nanotechnology for plankton research is increasingly recognized.630 But these biological 
sensor systems remain fundamentally immature, and this detection method is easily 
evaded by diving deep, where less prevalent bioluminescence is too deep to shine up to 
the surface anyway.631  
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A more promising technique, Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) seeks out 
disturbances in the Earth’s magnetic field caused by the transit of a submarine. MAD is a 
mature technology that is deployed by patrol aircraft, but it has a limited range that makes 
it incapable of wide area surveillance.632 Plans to deploy MAD on aerial drones launched 
from patrol aircraft (specifically the P-8 Poseidon) could expand its range, but a more 
significant breakthrough exists on the horizon. The application of ‘Superconducting 
Quantum Interference Devices’ (SQUID) to MAD promises major advances in sensitivity 
and range. SQUID magnetometers have been used in oil exploration, mapping tectonic 
faults, and biomedical imaging.633 The emergence of micro-cryogenic cooler technology 
enables the application of SQUID to military surveillance.634 Increasingly detailed maps 
and models of the Earth’s magnetic field complement the increased sensitivity of SQUID 
sensors, and decrease false alarm rates. “The full potential of MAD techniques remains to 
be exploited in operational systems,” but the availability of drone platforms and the 
improvement in sensor range makes this detection technology promising.635  
Another promising technique looks for disturbances in the circulation of ocean 
water. The passage of a submarine creates internal waves in the vertical layers of the 
ocean, and two types of surface waves that trail behind it. Earth system scientists 
regularly use satellite-based remote sensing to measure properties of the sea surface such 
as its height, temperature, salinity, color, and surface currents. Yet surface waves remain 
difficult to detect because of “the enormous variability of ocean surface conditions.”636 
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The resolution and coverage of sea-surface measurements is insufficient to detect these 
patterns with consistency and precision. Internal waves below the surface may actually be 
more promising for detection. Oceanographers of all types could benefit from more 
informed maps and models of ocean layering and turnover, and such knowledge is also 
critical for understanding the challenge of climate change.637 This sought-after 
knowledge provides important information about environmental variation that could be 
useful for separating a signal from noise. Internal waves caused by the transit of a 
submarine propagate a long distance along density layers, so the signal is not miniscule. 
Satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar is capable of identifying the main features of 
internal waves from the modulations they cause at the sea surface.638 Advances in 
scientific knowledge about ocean layering will improve the precision of this detection 
technique. 
Technological developments in the last few decades have overcome major 
technical hurdles to detection that ensured the persistence of opacity throughout the Cold 
War. AUVs solve two problems for surveillance: they make it impossible to hide in the 
deep, and they reduce noise by getting sensors closer to the signal. Acoustic sensing is 
still limited by the problem of noise, but augmented through the deployment of multiple 
networked platforms. At least two non-acoustic signatures – magnetic anomalies and 
internal waves – are increasingly detectable. The “robotization of the oceans” is 
beginning, and the number and variety of stationary and mobile sensors is projected to 
increase drastically in pursuit of military and non-military objectives.639 Even if sensors 
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themselves are limited, greater transparency may be achieved through sheer technological 
presence. The multiple drivers of these technologies, and the investment of militaries in 
both hiding and seeking, mean that no single actor is in control of this situation. 
 
Conclusion 
If ocean transparency made nuclear strategic submarines more detectable, 
locatable, and targetable, the military and political implications would be significant. Yet 
the topic of SSBN vulnerability is “virtually taboo” in the US Navy’s public 
documents.640 A culture of complacency has set in regarding the role and missions of 
SSBNs, such that submariners are poorly equipped to adjust to potentially novel 
operational realities.641 And other countries are walking the same path: the planned 
development of SSBNs by India and Pakistan is driven by a judgment about their 
superior and durable survivability.642 This chapter challenges the assumption that 
extrapolations from the past can serve as reliable guides for the future, especially as 
regards the foundation of the world nuclear order. Specifically, the security of second-
strike capabilities, and therefore the assurance of mutual destruction, rests on fluid 
material foundations. Whether the potential obsolescence of ‘hiding’ technologies occurs 
as a slow erosion of usefulness, or an avalanche of illumination, could have serious 
implications for nuclear strategic stability.  
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The possibility of, and reactions to, ocean transparency present a challenge for the 
prevailing arms control regime. The force structures created and shaped by existing arms 
control treaties assume the superior survivability of SSBNs as the foundation of nuclear 
deterrence. If transparency were to arrive as a “technological surprise,” this feature of the 
regime sets the stage for instability.643 Without invulnerability, nuclear states may pursue 
a ‘safety in numbers’ approach to achieving a secure second strike, which would require 
a substantial buildup in weaponry. The pursuit of ‘launch on warning’ postures conflicts 
with the arms control agenda of “lengthening the fuse.”644 And if ‘mutually assured 
destruction’ were abandoned wholesale, the possible return to a ‘war strategism’ 
approach that sees nuclear weapons as usable would be especially detrimental to the arms 
control agenda. An arms control regime that accounts for the possible erosion of 
transparency might replicate the Treaty on Open Skies, which regulates the frequency 
and resolution of aircraft surveillance.645 This strategy would entail rebuilding opacity by 
treaty where it may be undermined by technology. 
It is unlikely that the ocean will become transparent everywhere, all at once. 
While predicting exactly how and where transparency will be achieved is impossible, this 
analysis suggests where to look in order to see transparency coming. Broad and precise 
ocean sensing requires advanced technology, which is restricted to technically proficient 
actors with substantial funds. But new motivations and open-access oceanography imply 
that such innovations may not be limited to the US military. The variegated terrains of the 
vast ocean create different sets of opportunities and challenges for hiding and seeking in 
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the sea, so that transparency is likely to be a regional phenomenon before it is a global 
one. Who is investing, and what regions matter, is substantially a function of 
contemporary international politics. The ocean operational environment has historically 
been a good place to secure a second strike capability, but increased understanding and 
advancing technology may soon undermine the opacity that strategic submarines have 




Global Ocean: The Modern Ocean Governance Regime 
 
After World War II, significant advances in science and technology related to the 
ocean created a new set of opportunities and challenges for ocean governance.646 Remote 
fisheries and fossil fuel resources were increasingly accessible, but the problems of 
depletion and marine pollution seemed to be worsening. Many countries began making 
unilateral claims over the continental shelves and water columns abutting their coastlines. 
Yet the idea of a single global ocean was also taking shape, and taking hold among the 
international community.647 Governments saw an increasing need to come to agreement 
about how ocean space and ocean resources should be shared and managed. A series of 
three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (1956-58, 1960, and 1973-82) 
attempted to generate agreement about principles, rules, and norms for the ocean, and to 
construct a new formal regime for ocean governance. The final conference succeeded in 
creating a ‘Constitution for the Oceans,’ which most of the international community has 
now ratified, and which has come to be understood as having the status of customary 
international law.648 
A massive diplomatic effort went into the negotiation of the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, which entailed nine years of conferences, multiple and shifting 
coalitions, bargaining, concessions, the exchange and reconciliation of drafts, and dealing 
with the full suite of non-military ocean uses. The 1970s were a high water mark in 
international regime building, especially regarding the collective management of 
                                                 
646 John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance, 2nd ed (Chichester, 
West Sussex, England ; New York: Wiley, 2000), 44. 
647 Alan Villiers, Oceans of the World: Man’s Conquest of the Sea (Museum Press, 1963). 13 
648 Tommy T.B. Koh, “A Constitution for the Oceans,” n.d.  
 
 216 
international spaces.649 The Cold War superpowers had strategic and economic interests 
in building predictable rules and norms for global spaces, and could gain prestige by 
taking on leadership roles in international negotiations. But while the prevailing gusto for 
regime building may explain part of the motivation behind UNCLOS, it does not explain 
the specific content of the regime, and cannot fully explain its many failures. This chapter 
considers how the content and effectiveness of the UNCLOS-centered ocean governance 
regime is influenced by scientific knowledge of, and technological capability in, the 
global ocean.  
The basic argument of this chapter is that the modern ocean governance regime 
was bound to fail. The salience of technological practices, combined with uncertainty 
about collective interests and the structure of collective problems, produced barriers to 
effectiveness that are ‘baked in’ to the ocean governance regime. The central focus of 
critique will be on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), because of its 
breadth of topics and membership, and the novel political geography it created. The first 
section reviews the changes in human understanding and use of the global ocean that 
occurred in the decades leading up to the negotiation of UNCLOS. The second section 
describes the main features of UNCLOS, and how the formation of the regime was 
influenced by geographic, ecological, and technological factors. The third section 
considers the question of effectiveness, focusing especially on whaling, fishing, and 
marine pollution. Many of the issues with UNCLOS will be explored in the next chapter, 
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which covers the period in the late 20th and early 21st century, during which UNCLOS 
was augmented and reformed.  
The Globalized Ocean  
 Although maritime circumnavigation first occurred in the early modern period, it 
was not until the 20th century that most ocean activities took on a truly global scale, and 
the ocean began to be systematically contemplated and understood in its entirety. This 
expanded scale of experience and exploitation set a new stage for international politics, 
and served as the foundation for the formation of a broader and more formalized ocean 
governance regime. This section describes the contours and patterns of the modern global 
ocean. 
Technological Exploitation 
The period between World War II and the opening of the third UNCLOS 
negotiations encompassed a marked industrialization of ocean uses.650 Fishing became 
even more mechanized through the use of new technologies, including fish-finding sonar, 
on-board refrigeration, lighter and stronger nets, and trawling.651 In the 1950s, pelagic 
fishing became the majority of the total catch, driven in part by state-sponsored Japanese 
and Soviet long-distance fishers. Latin American fishing also grew dramatically.652 By 
the 1960s, fisheries were by far the most valuable economic resource in the ocean, and by 
the 1970s half of all fish caught were traded internationally.653  
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Long-distance fishers preferred a norm of open access, while coastal states 
preferred ownership and control of local resources. For example, long-distance tuna 
fishers from the United States wanted access to the waters off South America. In contrast, 
US salmon fishers off the coast of Alaska preferred the prohibition of foreign fishing. 
Despite, or perhaps because, of these conflicting interests, no strong regime was 
established or enforced in the immediate post-war years. Many fish populations collapsed 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most notably Bluefin tuna.654 The possibility of over-
fishing as a regional, or even global problem first arose during this period. 
Global whaling collapsed earlier and harder than global fisheries. In the mid-18th 
century, new on-board processing technology enabled whalers to stay at sea for months 
or years at a time. During this period, whale oil was in demand for lighting, lubricants, 
soaps, perfumes, and margarine, and pliant whale baleen was used for corsets, umbrellas, 
and industrial brushes.655 The Pacific sperm whale population collapsed in the 1850s, and 
the Atlantic Great Northern whale population collapsed in the 1880s.656 Mechanization 
greatly improved whalers’ ability to hunt, kill, and process whales. In 1946, the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) was created “to manage hunting for the sake 
of the industry, not that of the whales.”657 But it failed to stem exploitation enough to 
allow populations to rebound, and as a whole, global whaling peaked in the 1950s and 
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1960s.658 Many populations were totally extirpated, and some species were reduced to 
tiny fractions of their pre-whaling numbers. This failure of the IWC to stem the tide of 
over-exploitation will be considered in the third section. 
In addition to the intensification of existing uses of the ocean, new technologies in 
the post-war era generated new types of practices in the ocean. Naval warfare had been 
progressively revolutionized through the introduction of steam power, torpedoes, larger 
and faster ships, and submarines. After World War II, military ships, coast guards, and 
submarines plied the global ocean in large numbers. The advent of nuclear weaponry 
introduced a new sink source, in that nuclear waste began to be dumped regularly into the 
ocean.659 Offshore oil drilling expanded dramatically in the 1960s, due to advances in the 
technology of stationary drilling structures, which were able to handle greater depths and 
more severe weather conditions.660 Trans-national shipping was revolutionized in the late 
1960s and 1970s with the advent of container shipping, intensifying global economic 
interdependence.661 The 1960s were full of optimism, and “observers anticipated the 
inevitable and speedy inauguration of new modes of travel, recreation, work and life 
undersea.”662 Most users and beneficiaries of the ocean environment were interested in 
more. 
 
                                                 
658 Smith, “The Industrialisation of the World Ocean,” 20.;Rocha, Jr., Clapham, and Ivashchenko, 
“Emptying the Oceans.” 
659 Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the 
Nuclear Age (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008). 
660 Helen M. Rozwadowski, “Engineering, Imagination, and Industry: Scripps Island and Dreams for Ocean 
Science in the 1960s,” in The Machine in Neptune’s Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and 
the Marine Environment (Sagamore Beach, Mass: Science History Publications/USA, 2004), 315–54; 
Smith, “The Industrialisation of the World Ocean,” 18. 
661 Smith, “The Industrialisation of the World Ocean”; Marc Levinson, The Box How the Shipping 
Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2008),. 
662 Rozwadowski, “Engineering, Imagination, and Industry: Scripps Island and Dreams for Ocean Science 






Oceanography became professionalized in the early 20th century, including the 
creation of major national research institutions, inter-governmental organizations, and the 
first comprehensive textbook.663 Two US institutions quickly became known for ‘cutting 
edge’ oceanography: the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego, and the 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. After World War II, the center 
of oceanographic activity “shifted decisively” to the United States, especially due to the 
ample funding provided by the Office of Naval Research, established in 1946.664 Due in 
large part to this military patronage, the primary research focus of oceanography 
remained geophysical, including data-collection and theory building surrounding ocean 
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circulation, seafloor topography, and sound propagation.665 The oceanography-military 
connection was mutually beneficial in several ways. To take just one example, nuclear 
testing created an opportunity for use of radioactive tracers to study ocean mixing and 
circulation.666  
International cooperation in oceanography occurred frequently during the middle 
decades of the Cold War. After World War II, the US Department of State used marine 
sciences as a foreign policy tool to forge positive relations with Japan, and as a 
humanitarian means to assist developing countries in establishing modern fisheries. The 
first Pacific Science Congress after the war was held in Manila in 1953, with the purpose 
of encouraging cooperation in scientific research among Pacific states.667 The US Navy 
sponsored cooperative data collection in the Pacific during the 1950s, bringing together 
researchers from the United States, Canada, and Japan.668 The most significant 
international scientific endeavor during this period was the 1957 International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) – a massive, collaborative global data-gathering event that 
“aimed to extend synoptic data collection over the entire Earth.”669 
The IGY was a remarkable endeavor, “the largest set of coordinated experiments 
and field expeditions to be undertaken during the cold war.”670 It involved tens of 
thousands of scientists from 67 countries, collecting data in a planned and coordinated 
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way in order to provide evidence for testing nascent theories about planetary domains.671 
Although IGY planning initially focused on the poles, the atmosphere, and outer space, 
oceanographers saw an opportunity for “global studies involving simultaneous multiple 
observations,” and therefore took the lead in creating a research agenda.672 The IGY 
program for oceanography investigated many different problems and questions, including 
deep ocean circulation and the nature of variations in biotic productivity. It was hoped 
that new knowledge about ocean properties would “make it possible to harvest the seas 
methodically, instead of haphazardly.”673 Although the IGY produced important 
discoveries about ocean circulation and deep-sea life, it failed to live up these high 
expectations. The Soviet-led data collection program was “uninspired” and not keyed to 
specific problems, and even the US projects are described as only “observational 
expeditions” or “descriptive exploration.”674 Indeed, the most important legacy of the 
IGY may be renewed scientific competition between the United States and Soviet 
Union.675 
The IGY was the major exception to a more general trend of scientific secrecy 
during the Cold War. The Central Intelligence Agency kept close tabs on IGY activities, 
because domain-specific knowledge could provide important military advantages.676 
After the IGY, oceanographers became divided politically and scientifically, such that 
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isolated pockets of scientific knowledge emerged.677 Scientists may have contributed to 
this trend by vacillating between two justifications for their research: benefit for 
humanity as a whole, and support of specific national interests. When appealing to 
government and military sources for funding, oceanographers often emphasized the 
national security relevance of their research. The problem of restrictions on science 
worsened in the late 1960s, when many states concerned about the protection of coastal 
resources began restricting access in areas “most vital to marine research.”678 Coastal 
developing states argued “even where research was not of a commercial or military 
nature, it would benefit the developed researching state more” and therefore should be 
controlled in order to avoid worsening the growing gap between developed and 
developing countries.679 The rights of marine scientific researchers would become an 
important topic during the UNCLOS negotiations. 
 Despite significant advancement in physical oceanography and seafloor geology 
during this period, much about the ocean remained unknown. The development of a 
comprehensive theory of ocean circulation was a major advancement, but rife with errors 
due to its assumption of a flat seafloor and inability to account for vertical mixing.680 
Marine scientists believed the deep ocean was stagnant until IGY research produced 
evidence of deep ocean circulation. Debates about the theory of plate tectonics could not 
be resolved without data collection from the seafloor, which began in earnest in the 
1960s.681 When UNCLOS III began, negotiators lacked a synoptic map of the seabed. 
                                                 
677 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War, 52. 
678 Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, 180. 
679 Ibid., 277. 
680 Eric L Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet: How the Study of Ocean Currents Became a Science, 
2011. 
681 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War. 
 
 224 
They finally got one in 1977 – Marie Tharp’s World Ocean Floor Panorama, which 
included the mid-Atlantic ridge and rift valley for the first time. Despite major gains in 
data and research support, physical oceanography was just at the beginning of major 
theory development about the dominant scales of ocean circulation, the causes of 
upwelling and nutrient flow, and molecular exchange with the atmosphere.  
 Rapid growth in knowledge of ocean ecology occurred during this period. Despite 
obvious depletion in some fisheries, both scientists and the general public still assumed 
that the ocean was abundant with life. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of extreme 
optimism about the bounty of the global ocean, which was perceived as an expansive 
sink, a “great neutralizer, with virtually unlimited ability to absorb noxious 
substances.”682 Both academic and popular books heralded the abundance of its resources 
in titles like The Inexhaustible Sea (1954), The Bountiful Sea (1964), and Riches of the 
Sea (1968). Problems associated with pollution and over-exploitation did not concern 
most researchers. The ocean seemed even more full of life than previously thought. In the 
1960s, the use of deep-sea submersibles established the presence of deep ocean 
ecosystems, and in the 1970s a whole new kingdom of life (Archaea) was found.683 
Hydrothermal vents and their unique ecosystems were discovered in 1977.  
These discoveries belied the fact that knowledge of the most exploited ecosystems 
was extremely limited. Direct sampling of oceanic organisms faced major obstacles; 
tagging of animals was rudimentary and unable to collect detailed data. Lack of baseline 
data about many marine processes prevented detection of trends and disruptions. Yet the 
effects of over-exploitation were becoming hard to deny, and emerging concern about 
                                                 
682 Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature, 99. 
683 Jon Bowermaster, ed., Oceans: The Threats to Our Seas and What You Can Do to Turn the Tide: A 
Participant Media Guide, 1st ed (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010). 
 
 225 
over-fishing prompted the development of mathematical models of population growth. In 
the context of these concerns, the idea of ‘rational fishing’ emerged. Fish population 
models, intended to identify the optimal rate of harvest, were based on the philosophy of 
German scientific forestry, and rooted in a metaphor of terrestrial agriculture.684 
American fisheries scientists were especially confident about their ability to rationally 
manage a fishery, and their concept of a ‘maximum sustainable yield’ was embedded in 
fisheries policy by 1958. In the following decade, spending on fisheries research 
represented less than one-tenth of total funding for the Federal Marine Sciences Program 
in the United States.685  
 These perceptions of a resource-rich ocean subject to rational exploitation began 
to unravel in the 1960s, with books like The Frail Ocean (1967) spreading awareness of 
actual and potential ecological degradations and resource conflicts.686 The Frail Ocean 
begins by acknowledging the change in perception, warning readers “it may be difficult 
to accept the fact that our progress can mean death to the ocean.”687 This new 
understanding that the “technological penetration of the ocean is…potentially disastrous” 
was bolstered by the rapid growth of oceanographic work.688A boom in oceanography 
continued through the 1970s, a decade during which the number of oceanographers 
doubled every four years.689 Marine science increasingly incorporated the ‘framework 
science’ of ecology, broadening the factors deemed relevant for fisheries.690 But scientific 
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consensus about diffuse threats to ocean ecology was undeveloped and/or invisible, from 
the perspective of international negotiators at UNCLOS III. More visible and salient were 
vested interests in continued and expanded resource exploitation. 
Ocean Governance Regime 
The ocean governance regime is composed of several distinct institutions, all of 
which were created after World War II. Two sector specific organizations are the 
International Whaling Commission (1946) and the International Maritime Organization 
(1959), which deals with shipping regulations. Two treaties cover maritime pollution, 
OILPOL (1954) and MARPOL (1973/78). But the focal point of the global ocean 
governance regime is the UNCLOS treaty, which came out of the third UNCLOS 
conference. The first two conferences in 1958 and 1960 had failed to resolve major 
disagreements about the territorial sea and other jurisdiction zones. The third conference 
took place from 1973 until 1982, when representatives of over 150 states convened 
eleven times to discuss the terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty (called ‘UNCLOS’). In the 
words of the president of the UNCLOS III conference, Tommy Koh of Singapore, the 
fundamental objective of these negotiations was the creation of a “comprehensive 
constitution for the oceans which will stand the test of time.”691 The basic purpose of the 
‘ocean constitution’ was to ensure sustainable and equitable use of ocean resources. 
UNCLOS was intended to serve as an umbrella for existing governance institutions, and 
for any treaties to follow. This section will first consider the creation of the watershed 
UNCLOS agreement, which serves as a framework for the rest.  
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The catalyst for regime building was a wave of unilateral declarations of 
ownership over ocean resources, triggered by two ‘proclamations’ made by the Truman 
administration in 1945. The Truman Proclamations asserted jurisdiction over natural 
resources on and above the entire contiguous continental shelf. In the next five years, ten 
Latin American governments made similar, but diverse, declarations. The need for 
international justification led Chile, Peru, and Ecuador to coordinate the content and 
defense of their claims, which expanded to include full sovereignty 200 miles from their 
coastlines. The choice of 200 miles was made for different reasons, which were 
“obscured by the development of sophisticated legal rationales to buttress a claim which, 
at the outset, served a very limited range of economic interests and found little support in 
the then prevailing international law of the sea.”692 UNCLOS I and II had limited 
agendas, and extremely limited success in adjudicating between these competing claims. 
Developing states in Africa latched onto the concept of seaward extension of jurisdiction 
in the 1970s, and in 1972 Kenya presented a working paper entitled “Exclusive Economic 
Zone Concept” to an Asian-African Legislative Consultative Committee.693 It was this 
group – developing coastal states with a strong interest in keeping developed maritime 
states away from their resources – that brought the idea to UNCLOS III. 694 The territorial 
and jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS are a central feature of its legacy. 
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  When UNCLOS III began in 1973, “the law of the sea was in a state of disorder 
bordering on chaos.”695 Conflicts existed over several topics, and there were three main 
committees to deal with substantive issues. Committee I covered seabed mining beyond 
national jurisdiction and Committee II handled “issues pertaining to national jurisdiction 
such as the economic or resource zone, the continental shelf, fishing, the territorial sea, 
and straits.”696 Committee III dealt with the “residual issues” of the marine environment 
and scientific research.697 
The UNCLOS III negotiations were extremely complex, for three reasons. First, 
negotiators had a broad mandate to address “all matters relating to the law of the sea,” but 
aimed to formulate a single treaty.698  This “formidable negotiating task” entailed 
accounting for the interests of participants that were geographically, economically, and 
politically diverse, and dealing with all known collective action problems in the ocean. 699 
Second, the length of negotiations entailed substantial turnover within state delegations, 
fluctuations in the power and needs of domestic interest groups, and a changing 
international context. The negotiations spanned a period that included the OPEC oil 
embargo, the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
independence of over twenty new sovereign states. Third, negotiations could not begin 
with a blank slate, but had to build on the palimpsest of hundreds of years of customary 
international law in addition to the relatively new suite of unilateral claims. As a result of 
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these three obstacles, diplomatic coalitions fluctuated between issues and over time.700 
Some general trends and patterns emerged, many of which demonstrate the significant 
influence of the material context. 
 The contours of the ocean itself are reflected in the formation of interest groups; 
negotiation coalitions based on geography, ecology, and technology did exist and were 
influential. The nature of coalitions was not primarily East vs. West or North vs. South, 
which would represent ideological, political, and economic divisions.701 From the very 
beginning of the conference, at the agenda-setting phase, negotiation blocs formed 
around geographic differences and commonalities.702 ‘Geographically disadvantaged’ and 
land-locked states had a negotiating agenda that favored revenue sharing, limited 
nationalization (only 12 mile territorial sea), and open access.703 Unsurprisingly, this 
group “did not exert significant influence” during negotiations.704 Archipelagic states like 
Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, Malaysia and the Philippines joined together in favor of 
straight baselines from which to generate jurisdictional zones. Archipelagic states 
sometimes sided with the “straits states,” such as Cyprus, Greece, Morocco, Spain, and 
Yemen, but sometimes their interests conflicted.705 Other groups included states with 
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semi-enclosed seas and the “margineers,” or states with broad continental shelves.706 
Coastal states were of course a significant category, but groupings were even more fine-
grained; for example, Japan, Norway, and Iceland shared a strong interest in commercial 
whaling.  
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Figure 12 - UNCLOS negotiating coalitions, From Galdorisi, George, and Alan G. Kaufman. 
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 The geography of fisheries also shaped coalitions of interest. Conflicts between 
long-distance and coastal fishers were patterned by features of population ecology, 
including migration, growth rates, predator/prey relationships, and reproduction.  The 
initial wave of territorial claims made by Latin American states were an effort to keep US 
fishers from depleting bait fisheries off the coasts of Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and 
Ecuador. US fishers captured baitfish to use in fishing for pelagic tuna in the Southeast 
Pacific. Eventually three states with productive tuna fisheries – Peru, Ecuador, and Chile 
– formed a coalition to strengthen and justify these claims.707 Coalitions also formed 
between states whose coastlines represented a waypoint for highly migratory or 
anadromous fish species (most notably, tuna and salmon).708 
The composition and distribution of technology also shaped interests in the 
emerging regime. ‘Maritime states’ with powerful navies or long-distance fishing fleets 
(especially the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and Great Britain) preferred to 
maintain freedom of navigation and exploitation.709 The technology of seabed mining 
was also influential in creating strong interests that preceded actual practice. Indeed, in 
the last six years of negotiations, seabed mining was “the only significant unresolved 
issue.”710 The contentious negotiations were pervaded by optimism about the impending 
affordability of deep-sea mining. The “Pioneer Seabed Miners” were a distinguishable, if 
not explicit, group of advanced states.711 The location of seabed minerals in the center of 
ocean basins suggested an open-access regime, since no country could exclude the others, 
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but the geographical variation between sites suggested exclusive mining rights because of 
the need for custom extraction platforms and the expense of mining technology.712 
Because of the enormous initial investment, venture capital mining corporations preferred 
the legal predictability of a nationalization scheme.713 Developing countries who could 
not expect to afford deep-sea mining preferred a revenue sharing arrangement. States that 
exported minerals – such as Canada and Australia – had their own interests in limiting 
marine seabed mining.714 The specific features of the International Seabed Authority that 
was eventually agreed upon will be reviewed in the next section. 
In contrast to these strong common interests in exploitation, ideas about shared 
risk and vulnerability were under-developed and did not prompt the formation of 
coalitions. Problems associated with over-exploitation and pollution were too unknown 
or misunderstood to influence negotiations, as evidenced by the scant emphasis on over-
exploitation and marine pollution. The proximate goals of the UNCLOS III negotiations 
related to the maintenance and advancement of existing use practices, more so than their 
control and regulation. The material context also limited what the regime could do in 
terms of enforcement, such that any strong regulatory regime would require the 
application of substantial effort and resources. 
The final treaty was both ambitious and ambiguous. Most importantly, UNCLOS 
created a system of ownership and jurisdiction zones that specified who could 
legitimately access which resources. The political geography of UNCLOS includes zones 
with both horizontal and vertical dimensions. There are two vertical categories: the 
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seafloor and the water column. The horizontal seafloor is divided into two types of area. 
The resources of the continental shelf (up to 350 miles) belong to the nearest coastal 
state, and everything else is controlled by the International Seabed Authority, a public 
organization with a distributional mandate. The resources of the water column are 
divided into four types of zones: territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), and high seas (also called the ‘Area Beyond National Jurisdiction,’ or 
ABNJ). The closer to the coastline, the more control a state has. The EEZ gives states 
exclusive control over water column resources, conditioned by the principle of free 
navigation for those who follow usage regulations mandated by the coastal state. These 
jurisdiction zones represent a “totally unprecedented array of boundary-making 
requirements,” but did they effectively resolve all conflicts of interest and collective 
action problems?715 In terms of reducing boundary conflicts, there is some support for a 
positive effect.716 But, as discussed below, these zones have been less successful at 
resolving problems associated with pollution and over-exploitation.  
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Figure 13 - Exclusive Economic Zones, From Gjerde et al. “Ocean in Peril: Reforming the Management of 
Global Ocean Living Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction.” Marine Pollution Bulletin 74, no. 2 
(September 30, 2 
International Seabed Authority 
Negotiations over the Seabed Authority were some of the “most controversial and 
divisive” of the Third UNCLOS conference.717 In 1967, Maltese representative Arvid 
Pardo gave a speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declaring the 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction the “common heritage of mankind,” a principle 
which was formally affirmed in UNGA Resolution 2749, adopted in 1970. The specific 
rules and norms that would fulfill this principle were an extremely contentious issue, and 
from 1977-1982 the terms of seabed mining were the “only significant unresolved issue” 
in the UNCLOS negotiations.718 While developed countries preferred a ‘first come, first 
served’ regime, the Group of 77 (G77) developing countries preferred a model where 
exploitation occurred collectively, and benefits were shared. After the success of the 1973 
OPEC embargo, the G77 coalition was “exhilarated, cohesive, and uncompromising” on 
                                                 
717 Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Global Environmental Institutions, Global Institutions Series (London ; New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 81. 
718 Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, 287. 
 
 236 
issues related to the creation of a more just and equitable international economic order.719 
These countries took the lead in formulating a blueprint for an international organization 
to manage seabed mining. The results in the final treaty represent “a creative 
compromise” between the G77 and developed country positions.720 
Part XI of the final UNCLOS agreement covers activities in “The Area,” the 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Section 4 creates a new international organization, 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to serve as the agent of UNCLOS treaty 
obligations. Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, the ISA became fully operational in 
1996. It has several decision-making bodies, and the 36-member Council has an 
interesting means of ensuring representation of relevant parties. The members of the 
Council must be elected from within five different categories: the largest consumers of 
minerals (4 members), the largest investors in seabed mining (4 members), the largest 
exporters of minerals (4 members), developing countries with “special interests” such as 
large populations or land-locked status (6 members), and whatever countries need to be 
placed on the Council in order to achieve geographical representation (18 members). 
Geography and the distribution of technology therefore play an important role in 
determining the composition of the Council. 
 One of the most controversial aspects of the ISA is the ‘Enterprise,’ which is 
supposed to undertake actual exploitation of seabed minerals. The idea is that whenever 
an ISA member applies to explore or exploit seabed resources, it must choose two areas. 
The ISA then awards one of those areas to the applicant, and one to either the Enterprise 
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or a developing country.721 In part because of the delayed technological feasibility of 
seabed mining, the Enterprise has yet to be constituted. 
 The United States has failed to ratify UNCLOS, in large part because of its 
objections to the ISA. This may have come as a surprise to other UNCLOS members, 
because in 1976 Henry Kissinger, on behalf of the United States, made three explicit 
concessions on seabed mining. Kissinger claimed that the US would support the creation 
of the Enterprise, the principle of production control, and mandates for technology 
transfer.722 The United States gave these concessions in order to “secure consensus on a 
treaty that protected certain navigation rights.”723 The United States got what it wanted, 
and the free passage norms of UNCLOS have become customary international law. In 
1994, an implementation agreement to UNCLOS weakened the provisions for technology 
transfer and taxation and redistribution of mining profits, and strengthened the potential 
voting position of the United States within the Council.724 Despite this acquiescence to 
US concerns about the ISA, the United States has still failed to ratify UNCLOS, and 
therefore does not participate in the ISA.  
Regime Effectiveness 
 The complexity of the UNCLOS III negotiations, described above, makes it very 
difficult to provide an adequate and thorough explanation of why the international 
community settled on this particular regime. It is even challenging to explain the 
preferences of any single state throughout the conference period. The United States, for 
example, formulated its preferences through an inter-agency task force that represented 
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20 government agencies.725 And domestic groups concerned with influencing the US 
position included “some 40 federal executive bureaus and agencies, some 33 
congressional subcommittees, 3 states, and a wide range of commercial interests 
including fishing, oil and gas, and the merchant marine.”726 Because the United States is 
a large state with multiple crosscutting interests, its position “shifted from a heavily 
maritime orientation to one that attempted to balance coastal with maritime interests.”727  
The above section illustrated the role of geography, technology, and ecology in shaping 
the negotiation coalitions. This remainder of the chapter considers two problems that the 
UNCLOS-centered regime has failed to solve: over-exploitation and marine pollution. 
Figuring out why ocean management has been unable to achieve most of its core 
objectives is difficult, because human politics in the hydrosphere are characterized by a 
multitude of interests and parochial goals, including strategic, economic, and cultural 
imperatives. Ann Hollick concludes that the “international and domestic environment 
was not propitious for the negotiation of a balanced, comprehensive law of the sea 
regime.”728 Part of the explanation is surely a lack of political will and enforcement 
capacity. A deeper, structural cause of ineffectiveness relates to the shifting foundations 
for governance: the ocean regime is, and has always been, based on incomplete, evolving, 
and often misguided understandings of what the ocean is, and what drives the expansion 
of ocean uses. This section outlines reasons for UNCLOS ineffectiveness that are based 
on geography, ecology, and technology. The ocean’s resources and networks exist on 
local, regional, and global scales. The magnitude of the management task presents many 
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challenges, which governance schemes overcome imperfectly. This section will first 
focus on whaling and fishing, as “one of the most glaring and high-profile examples of 
the mismanagement of the planet.”729 
Whaling 
 The attempt to achieve sustainable whale harvests is a unique case in the history 
of ocean governance, because of how early efforts began, and because of how 
spectacularly they failed. In 1946, the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling established the International Whaling Commission (IWC), in recognition that “it 
is essential to protect all species of whales from further over-fishing.” But the ultimate 
goal of the IWC was “orderly development of the whaling industry.”730 Despite overlap 
with the mandates of other international environmental agreements, the IWC remains 
“the central institution in the cetacean issue-area.”731 UNCLOS Article 65 merely 
reaffirms the obligation to cooperate for conservation of marine mammals, and in the 
case of whales to “work through the appropriate international organization for their 
conservation, management, and study,” namely, the IWC.732 The establishment of the 
EEZ did complicate IWC efforts, in that a larger number of coastal states began to assert 
unilateral rights to control coastal whale stocks.733 But in general, the IWC is responsible 
for international whaling.  
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 Whales are a global resource, in that most whale species have a global range. 
Baleen whales, for example, migrate long distances between feeding and reproduction 
sites. Some whales have no particular migration path, but travel long distances 
“according to environmental conditions.”734 Most commercially fished whales have 
ranges that span the waters of multiple coastal states.735 Whales are also a particularly 
vulnerable resource, in that their site-specific feeding and reproduction, and their frequent 
surfacing for air, make them easy targets for whaling ships. Slow reproduction rates, and 
the importance of healthy sub-populations for overall genetic diversity, mean that whales 
have low resilience to over-exploitation. The IWC has a unique advantage because it is 
“the only geographically global fishery commission.”736 Despite the global extent of IWC 
jurisdiction, it has a history of ineffective regulation.  
 Until the late 1960s, the IWC was basically a “whalers club.”737 There was a 
“relatively low sense of urgency” during this period, because the evidence of over-
exploitation was not dispositive, and there was little public interest in whaling.738 The UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization even encouraged the resumption and expansion of 
whaling after World War II, as “the quickest way to meet a severe global shortage of 
edible fats and oils.”739 Until the 1970s, quotas were determined with reference to the 
‘Blue Whale Unit,’ or the amount of oil that could be produced by an adult blue whale. 
This pro-whaling orientation combined with a lack of clear scientific evidence regarding 
over-exploitation to create an ineffective control regime.  
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The IWC set a single global quota, undivided into individual state quotas, which 
encouraged competition and “reckless investment in larger and more efficient fleets,” 
leading to the “overcapitalization of the pelagic whaling industry as a whole.”740 
Information about whether the quota had been met came from whalers themselves, who 
had a disincentive to provide accurate data. In 1965, legal catches of baleen whales had to 
be over 38 feet long, yet “90 percent of the baleen whales caught were reported to be 
between thirty-eight and thirty-nine feet long, a statistical impossibility.”741 During the 
1950s and 1960s, there was substantial reason to believe that quotas were too high, and 
that cheating was rampant.742 But cetologists had neither the data nor the agreed-upon 
models required to make authoritative and persuasive statements about the status of 
whale stocks and the appropriate quota. Even if the data had been comprehensive and 
reliable, IWC members regularly assumed that fish-based population models were 
appropriate for managing whale populations.743 
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Figure 14 - History of global whale catch, From Cressey, Daniel. “World’s Whaling Slaughter Tallied.” Nature, 
March 11, 2015. 
 
 In the IWC, membership matters, in part because it is voluntary. Not all whaling 
states favored international regulation. Three of the biggest whaling countries – Japan, 
Norway, and the Soviet Union – joined the IWC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Iceland joined, left in 1992, and rejoined in 2002. Latin American countries attempted to 
regulate commercial whaling for their own benefit. Chile made the first unilateral 200-
mile claim in 1947 in part to protect its fledging whaling industry from post-war 
European competition.744 When Chile, Ecuador, and Peru harmonized their 200-mile 
claims in 1952, they “banned all foreign fishing for baleen whales” and strictly regulated 
fishing for toothed whales.745 By the 1960s and 1970s, the “large Japanese market for 
whale meat was supplied by Brazilian, Chilean, Icelandic, South Korean, Soviet, and 
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Taiwanese as well as Japanese firms.”746 Japanese customers bought whale meat from 
IWC members (Japan and Soviet Union), non-members (South Korea and Taiwan), and 
countries that would become members in the 1970s (Brazil and Chile). In the United 
States, a member since 1948, commercial whaling had basically ended before the 20th 
century.747 
 In the 1970s, major shifts in the membership and institutional structure of the 
IWC changed its approach to the management of whaling. In 1972, the Stockholm 
Conference adopted Resolution 33, calling for a ten-year moratorium on commercial 
whaling. The United States presented this idea to the IWC, where it was rejected.748 
Instead, in 1974 new procedures in the IWC Scientific Committee mandated the 
collection of more data and refinement of better models, in order to “raise the level of 
scientific argumentation that went into decision-making.”749 The ‘Blue Whale Unit’ was 
replaced with species-specific assessment and management.750A successful campaign by 
environmentalists and anti-whaling governments increased IWC membership during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Although many of these states joined for domestic reasons, 
their presence tipped IWC decision-making in favor of non-whaling states.751 By 1982, 
28 of 39 IWC members had no involvement in whaling.752 In 1982, the IWC voted to 
introduce a moratorium on commercial whaling starting in 1986. 
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 The moratorium on commercial whaling persists today, but its success has been 
incomplete because of several ways to avoid compliance. Japan and the Soviet Union 
continued commercial hunts into the late 1980s, and Norway and Iceland still hunt 
whales commercially. The IWC cannot force states to become or stay members, and 
Iceland left in 1992. When it re-joined in 2002, Iceland made an official reservation 
against the commercial moratorium. The IWC rules allow violations of policy in the case 
of formal objections, which Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union filed immediately 
after the declaration of a commercial moratorium.753 The Soviet Union, now Russia, has 
ceased commercial whaling, but former Soviet scientists revealed that “official state level 
catch statistics were intentionally incorrect during the Soviet era so that Soviet whalers 
could cover up non-compliance,” including kills of protected species.754 Another 
loophole is the exception for scientific whaling, which Japan, Iceland, and Norway have 
all claimed. Japan continues to cull hundreds of minke whales under scientific permits, 
but because the IWC requires that the carcasses be utilized, the whale meat is eventually 
sold. Because of the dubious scientific value of these whale kills, many observers have 
concluded that Japanese whaling “is clearly commercial whaling in the guise of scientific 
whaling.”755 Another exception is aboriginal subsistence whaling, which takes place in 
Greenland, Russia, the United States, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Proponents 
argue that aboriginal whaling is important to “retain cultural integrity,” but the 
persistence of any kind of whaling may undermine the legitimacy of the IWC.756 
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 The IWC had some success despite its weak enforcement structure. During the 
span of the Cold War, the IWC transitioned from a “whalers’ club” to a pro-whale 
organization, and enacted a multi-decadal commercial moratorium. Although population 
data is extremely lacking across species, some whale populations and species have 
undoubtedly rebounded. The explanation for this change in regime norms and rules, and 
the resulting increased effectiveness of whale conservation, is related to the ecology of 
whales themselves. However, as M.J. Peterson argues in detail, cetologists did not 
operate as a persuasive, coherent, or authoritative influence on IWC policy during the 
period of change from 1974-1982; “the field was wide open for highly political and often 
Figure 15 - Contemporary global whale catch,  From Broder, John M. “U.S. 




highly public contention.”757 Although data collection had increased since the 1940s, 
disagreement persisted about the data requirements for new ecosystem-based modeling. 
The result was that the scientific group most knowledgeable about whales was unable to 
provide the IWC with “consensus expert advice.”758 Environmentalists filled the 
leadership void. 
 Environmental consciousness reached a new peak in the 1970s, and whales 
became “a metonym for the environment as a whole.”759 It was easy to portray whaling as 
intolerably cruel, because of their beauty, size, and hypothesized intelligence, and 
because “whaling kills whales slowly.”760 Environmentalists managed to strongly 
influence US policy in the IWC, and the United States took two sets of actions that 
secured victory for the commercial moratorium: it induced additional non-whaling states 
to join the IWC, and it threatened to impose trade sanctions on those who did not abide 
by the moratorium.761 But anti-whaling environmentalists themselves helped generate a 
“normative snowball,” by capturing publicity, lobbying through non-governmental 
organizations, and “[attracting] large numbers of highly educated individuals who 
legitimated their cause.”762 
 The strength of the environmentalist argument is evident today, as “a return to 
large-scale whaling is almost unthinkable” and “remains unpalatable to world 
opinion.”763 After the 1986 commercial moratorium, preservationist arguments about the 
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immorality of whaling pervaded international meetings and media.764 It is notable that 
environmentalist justifications persist despite belief in the early 1990s that “many marine 
mammal stocks appear to be both healthy and abundant.”765 Previously, extremely 
depressed whale population numbers brought conservationist and preservationist 
perspectives together. There is some evidence that some whale populations have 
rebounded, and yet anti-whaling generally persists. In earlier eras of the IWC, scientific 
uncertainty presented an opportunity for the whaling industry to assert its interpretations 
and interests. That uncertainty remains, and even the IWC is “reticent about recording the 
state of whale populations given the scientific uncertainty over numbers.”766 The anti-
commercial whaling moratorium seems effective in part because humans have decided 
that killing whales is morally wrong; in other words, a normative value has been attached 
to a particular part of the ocean ecosystem. The rise in whale-watching tourism offers an 
economic alternative for coastal states, and its popularity reflects and reinforces an 
affective connection with whales.  
 If the IWC has become pro-whale instead of pro-whaling, in terms of its 
principles and institutional goals, then it has not been very effective. Whales now face a 
larger portfolio of risks than they did at the time of the IWC’s founding. While hunting 
and bycatch have decreased, growth in global shipping traffic, and the size and speed of 
ships, has increased the risk of ship strikes. The impact of ship strikes on whales is 
difficult to quantify, because of detection, attribution, and reporting issues. Whales also 
have to deal with chronic risks, including chemical pollution, noise pollution, and habitat 
loss, which affect the general fitness of whales and whale populations.  
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In terms of chemical pollution, industrial pesticides tend to bio-accumulate in 
cetaceans, weakening their immune systems and sometimes causing reproductive 
failure.767 In May 2017, a dead killer whale that washed up in Great Britain was found to 
be contaminated with PCBs 100 times the amount known to cause physiological damage 
to whales. This particular whale came from the last resident pod of killer whales in 
Britain, which had not produced a healthy calf in 23 years.768 Because whales are 
acoustic animals, noise pollution makes it difficult for them to navigate, communicate, 
locate prey, and (in the case of smaller whales) avoid predators.769 Primary sources of 
marine noise include active sonar, explosions for oil and gas surveying, and ship motors, 
specifically the cavitation caused by their high-speed rotation.770 The ambient noise 
causes chronic stress, and forces whales to compensate physiologically and behaviorally. 
Although these impacts are difficult to quantify, especially in terms of impact thresholds, 
the evidence is strongly suggestive. Immediately after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States, the precipitous drop in shipping traffic caused a significant 
decrease in stress hormones among North Atlantic Right Whales.771 
The IWC regulates the industry for the protection of the animal, but says or does 
nothing about the ocean environment. Its scientific data is insufficient for reliable 
population estimates in most cases, let alone an analysis of environmental stressors and 
ecosystem disruptions.  
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One of the basic purposes of UNCLOS was the achievement of sustainable use of 
renewable ocean resources, by preventing their despoliation or over-exploitation.772 
Coastal states in particular had a strong incentive to protect their local resources, and this 
imperative drove the emergence of the EEZ concept among developing states.  The 
creation of zones that gave “exclusive fishery management authority to states” was 
supposed to help combat over-fishing, by limiting entry, improving enforcement, and 
creating disincentives for over-capitalization.773 The EEZ system brought 90 percent of 
the global marine fish catch under state control.774 Yet by the 1990s, it was “abundantly 
apparent” that the regime for fishing had failed to prevent serial depletions, especially of 
high seas fisheries.775 And the decreasing supply did not deter fishers; even as global fish 
catch declined, the capacity of the global fishing fleet had doubled since 1970.776 
Currently, roughly 80 percent of global fish stocks “can withstand no increase and may 
not even be able to sustain the level of fishing currently experienced.”777 
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Over-fishing is recognized as the “biggest failure” of the UNCLOS-centered 
governance regime.778 In most cases, real efforts to restrain fishing are made only “after 
there is drastic and undeniable evidence of overexploitation.”779 The pro-fishing (as 
opposed to pro-fish) orientation should not be surprising, because fisheries interests drove 
the initial formation of the global fishing management regime.780 Although the United 
States and Soviet Union are large coastal states, their relative technological superiority 
led their interests to align with the long-distance fishers. The result is a regime that is 
ineffective at achieving its goals of equitable distribution and sustainable use. In terms of 
sustainability, fisheries depletion, over-exploitation, and collapse have increased since the 
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negotiation of UNCLOS. In terms of equity, the coastal fisheries of developing countries 
are often subject to over-exploitation by long-distance fishers.781 
Established explanations for this state of affairs include ‘industry capture’ of 
domestic and international policymaking, lack of political will and/or enforcement 
capacity in the high seas, and the hierarchical and complex structure of global fishing, the 
“ultimate industrial capitalist system.”782 Elizabeth DeSombre and Samuel Barkin 
suggest that the problem structure of the over-fishing problem is particularly challenging, 
because fisheries are subtractable, non-excludable, and ‘first come, first served.’ 
Effective policymaking is hindered by uncertainty about fish stocks, and “tensions 
between collective and individual incentives, and between long run and short run 
incentives.”783 These analyses are each insightful and collectively provide a thorough, but 
incomplete, explanation of the over-fishing problem.  
A foundational criticism of the ocean governance regime concerns the disjuncture 
between the natural geography of fisheries, the geography of global technological 
systems, and the territorialized political geography of UNCLOS. This section will focus 
on the political geography created by UNCLOS, and especially the assumptions it makes 
about the geography and ecology of fisheries. The system of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs) will be described and evaluated in the following 
chapter, because many RFMOs were organized in the decades after UNCLOS, and 
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because they adopt different management approaches compared to UNCLOS-based 
jurisdictions. 
The UNCLOS regime assigns fisheries management authority to coastal states 
within their EEZs. In Article 61, states are assigned the prerogative to “determine the 
allowable catch,” by “taking into account the best scientific evidence available.” Article 
61(c) clarifies that the goal is to maintain the “maximum sustainable yield,” but qualified 
by environmental and economic factors, and taking into account the “special 
requirements of developing states.” Article 62 requires the coastal state to make “the 
surplus of the available catch” accessible to foreign fishers, in order to achieve “optimum 
utilization” of EEZ fisheries. UNCLOS assumes and implies that setting quotas for the 
“allowable catch” is an effective management strategy.784  It also assumes that access to 
foreign fishers can be documented and controlled. These provisions for fisheries 
management have been criticized as “largely ambiguous, incredibly flexible, and virtually 
unenforceable.”785 
UNCLOS jurisdiction zones ostensibly represent compromise between the free 
passage and territorial models of ocean governance, where jurisdiction is granted to 
coastal states within the EEZ, but other states are allowed ‘innocent passage’ and 
exploitation of any resources that do not exceed the ‘maximum sustainable yield.’ But in 
practice, it remains a ‘freedom of the seas’ situation for developed maritime states that 
can evade the insufficient surveillance and enforcement capacities of developing coastal 
states.786 Long-distance foreign boats from Europe, Japan, China, and the United States 
quickly began encroaching on the EEZ fisheries of developing countries in Africa and 
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Latin America.787 This outcome was made more likely because of the global 
technological systems present in the ocean: technological capabilities of access and 
exploitation far exceeded those of surveillance and enforcement at the time of treaty 
negotiation, and that basic asymmetry persists today.  
Even costal states with the technical and financial capacity to effectively manage 
their coastal waters have failed; “proper management has been an 
afterthought…Exclusive national control has been the goal.”788 By nationalizing 
commercial fishing areas, UNCLOS created incentives to expand national fishing 
capacity. Most states, in declaring their EEZs, initially ejected foreign fishers from their 
national waters.789 Many of these distant-water fishers returned to fish in their national 
EEZs, but there was often a “mismatch between national fleets and national stocks,” such 
that national fleets were far too large for national fisheries.790 For states without full 
capacity, subsidizing fishing activity was pursued as an easy economic development 
strategy, since fish produce themselves and only need to be harvested. In both cases, 
EEZs were “virtually open access for national fishermen.”791 The concept of ‘allowable 
catch’ was malleable due to lack of data, and many states used their discretion to set 
catch levels high enough to justify current practices.792 In many EEZs, this increased 
fishing intensity merely “substituted a domestic tragedy of the commons for an 
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international one.”793 Although the EEZ was designed to enable exclusion from fisheries, 
it ended up supporting the overall expansion of global fishing capacity.  
A large part of the problem was the concept of ‘rational fishing,’ embodied in the 
notion of a ‘maximum sustainable yield’ (MSY). The MSY is the amount of fish that can 
be taken each year without decreasing the amount of fish available in future years, and it 
is used to determine the ‘allowable catch.’ Obviously, the MSY concept is an effort to 
translate the goal of sustainability into a rule or norm for fishing. MSY represents a 
theoretical catch limit, beyond which the reproductive rate of a given fishery declines and 
the catch becomes unsustainable. It is a fundamentally anthropocentric concept, because 
its primary concern is the value of the resource to human users, as opposed to a more 
general concern with ecological health.794 The United States pushed strongly for the 
inclusion of the MSY concept in UNCLOS, in order to “reduce fishing by foreign fleets 
in US waters and to continue expansion of US distant water fleets.”795 Including MSY in 
fisheries management “made the world safe for distant-water fishing,” by shifting the 
burden of scientific proof onto regulators.796 MSY is a scientific concept that must be 
filled in with scientific content, but the data required is often lacking.  
When MSY was enshrined in the UNCLOS regime, fisheries scientists were 
“enormously confident about their discipline.”797 The calculation of basic MSY requires 
information about population numbers and ages, lifespan, reproduction rates and breeding 
patterns. UNCLOS Article 61(3) also qualifies MSY based on “relevant 
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environmental…factors,” which might include predator-prey relationships, diffuse or 
indirect connections to ecosystem properties, and natural variability and change in each 
of these. Scientists often do not have the required information, which means that 
population models are rife with abstractions and assumptions. Because regulation 
typically only begins after a new species is exploited and then over-exploited, the 
relevant scientific data collection often lags the creation of the problem.798  And it may be 
that ecosystems are simply too complicated for MSY: “Population dynamics within 
species and ecological relationships among species are too complex and involve too 
many scientific unknowns to model with the accuracy necessary to manage fisheries 
through precise quotas and other species-specific management tools.”799 The basic 
problem is that the MSY concept requires detailed maps of fish populations that marine 
scientists cannot produce with sufficient detail. And UNCLOS does not mandate good 
science either: “states have great flexibility and virtually no international legal obligation 
to base management on objective scientific criteria.”800 The result is a situation where 
MSY-based fisheries models are highly susceptible to biased interpretation.801 The 
flexibility of MSY made it an effective tool for expanding industrial fishing.802  
Besides lack of scientific support, the MSY concept has not been effectively 
integrated into fisheries management decision-making. Although it represents a 
maximum, MSY has often been interpreted as a target instead of a ceiling. And 
management targets have often been created at levels far above the advice of scientists. 
When deciding upon the MSY, managers rarely consider the contribution of dependent 
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and associated species for the resilience of a target species. So even if the relevant 
scientific information were available, and MSY models could accurately determine 
quotas that ensure a future sustainable yield, national and international fisheries managers 
still may not set effective targets. 
The concept of MSY sits at the center of modern fisheries governance, but it has 
been criticized ever since the UNCLOS negotiations.803 Proponents of reform suggest the 
“inherent uncertainty of fisheries,” combined with the precautionary principle, means that 
the threshold of fishing must be lowered far below current calculations of MSY.804 The 
MSY threshold would be reframed as “the point at which effort reduction policies should 
be applied.”805 While this reformulation of MSY would resolve some problems, there is 
another feature of the UNCLOS regime that obstructs effective fisheries management. 
The static political geography of the EEZ conflicts with the fluid and dynamic geography 
and ecology of the ocean. Ecologically, target species rely on ecosystem features and 
functions that span national borders. One of the obstacles to multi-species calculations of 
MSY is the fact that the EEZ does not ‘fit’ the scope of an interconnected ecosystem.806 
Philip Steinberg argues that this disconnection is exactly what makes the maritime 
political geographies durable: “lines drawn in and around ocean regions often take on an 
outsized level of authority because they are so self-evidently divorced from the matter 
that is experienced by those who actually inhabit the environment.”807 The same 
mismatch exists with the complex global fishing industry. Technologically, the interests 
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and practices related to fishing are global: a tuna sells for just as much whether it was 
caught inside or outside the EEZ. Even at the time of the UNCLOS negotiations, 
industrial-fishing fleets had global reach; their practices were not confined to regional or 
coastal spaces. This basic mismatch between political, natural, and technological 
geographies is a structural explanation for the failure of UNCLOS to achieve sustainable 
use of fisheries. 
Marine Pollution  
 The vast ocean domain is plied by dirty industrial ships and bordered by industrial 
societies. It is easy to hide waste in the ocean, and for many decades ships discharged oil 
and dumped low-level nuclear waste without restriction. These practices were undertaken 
by two powerful vested interests: actors in the global oil market (extraction and shipping) 
and advanced militaries. The regulation of these harmful practices was weak and 
ineffective for many years. Only when the two international institutions for regulating 
marine pollution – MARPOL and the London Convention – changed their relationship to 
science and technology, did they achieve a degree of effectiveness with regard to 
reducing marine pollution. 
 
MARPOL 
The right to pollute was an “implicit freedom of the high seas” for many 
centuries, but in the 1920s marine pollution from industrialized and transnational 
shipping networks aroused international concern.808 Regulation of oil emissions in the 
open ocean began with the first OILPOL agreement in 1954, which created zones where 
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the discharge of oil was prohibited. But French and German scientists shortly developed a 
new consensus that, because of durability and harm of oil pollution at sea, such zones 
were insufficient.809 Marine chemical pollution is especially damaging and dangerous, 
because it cannot be easily contained, it often resists biodegradation, and toxins increase 
in concentration as they move up the food chain.810 The 1962 OILPOL amendments 
banned discharges from new tankers over 20,000 tons, but this rule “defined compliance 
in terms inconsistent with existing monitoring capabilities,” and did not support the 
necessary infrastructure for port reception of what would otherwise be discharged.811 The 
negotiation of MARPOL in the 1970s was a vast improvement over OILPOL, because it 
utilized new technology as part of the solution. Until MARPOL, other attempts to reduce 
marine pollution “had essentially no impact on improving the marine environment.”812  
MARPOL was negotiated under the aegis of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), which understands the treaty as “one of its most important 
accomplishments.”813 The first MARPOL agreement (1973), was opposed by “shipping 
interests in crucial maritime states,” and did not receive enough ratifications to enter into 
force.814 The United States created pressure for another meeting, during which MARPOL 
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was modified to assuage the concerns of opponents.815 The eventual agreement fused 
with the previous one to become MARPOL 73/78.816 
MARPOL 73/78 introduced design requirements for ships, including monitoring 
devices, separators (to reduce discharge), and segregated ballast tanks. The 1978 
amendments to MARPOL added a requirement for washing out tanks with crude oil 
itself, instead of water. These facilitated new, less polluting practices related to ballast 
exchange and tank cleaning. MARPOL also shifted responsibility from operators, who 
manage at-sea discharges, to owners, who purchase constructed ships. These innovative 
regulatory provisions focused on the technology itself, thus shifting from enforcement at 
sea to enforcement in port.817 Because MARPOL required ratification from enough states 
to account for more than one-half of global merchant shipping, by weight, it did not enter 
into force until 1983.818 In 1997 the MARPOL conference of parties adopted a new 
protocol also focused on ship technology, which limits emissions of air pollutants and the 
sulfur content of fuels819 
MARPOL is generally regarded as a success, despite continued challenges with 
implementation and enforcement in the developing world.820 The treaty currently covers 
nearly 98 percent of registered global shipping, by weight.821 More importantly than the 
scope of its membership, MARPOL “has fundamentally changed the way ships are built 
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and has dramatically decreased the extent of oil pollution.”822 Violations are virtually 
nonexistent.823  As carefully argued by Ronald Mitchell, the shift from performance 
standards to equipment standards significantly explains MARPOL’s success, because it 
“removed practical and legal barriers to effective detection and enforcement.”824 Port-
based enforcement was both empowered and made easier by MARPOL, which “radically 
changed the nature of the compliance problem.”825  
Mitchell and others argue that the evolution from OILPOL, to MARPOL, to 
MARPOL 73/78, is an example of regime learning.826 Mitchell says that the choice of 
equipment standards “was a response to the perceived failure of the existing performance 
standards.” A crucial element of this learning process was the shock of highly visible oil 
spills, and their effect on public opinion.827 The Torrey Canyon spill off Britain in 1967, 
and the Amico Cadiz spill off France in 1978, “dramatically highlighted the disastrous 
environmental effects of oil pollution on the marine life of the area, as well as on the 
fishing and tourist industries.”828 But the ultimate reason for MARPOL’s success in 
reducing marine oil pollution is the changes made to the global technological system of 
transnational oil shipping. The crude oil washing technique required by MARPOL 73/78 
“had been available since the late 1960s.” Due to the political momentum behind stricter 
equipment standard proposals, the oil industry “reevaluated its technological options” and 
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proposed crude oil washing. 829 This is a case of a regime targeting technological systems 
directly, and mandating the use of easily verified safety technology. 
The MARPOL regime is lauded for scope, which includes acute accidents and 
mundane discharges, and which has expanded to include atmospheric emissions.830 But 
the treaty does not cover land-based sources of pollution, which are more significant in 
terms of overall harm to the marine environment.831 MARPOL’s political geography is 
not shaped by the dimensions of the problem, but by the form of solution: because the 
IMO handles the issue, a coordinated approach to marine pollution that involves sea- and 
land-based sources is highly unlikely.832 
London Convention 
In the early Cold War, a new source of contamination began to weigh on the 
minds of policymakers, scientists, and eventually the general public: radioactivity. 
Precisely characterizing the risks involved took several decades. In 1961, the US 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that “very little is known about 
the effect on animals or humans of very low, but prolonged exposures” to radiation.833 
Throughout the early Cold War, the scientific debate about the dangers of nuclear 
‘fallout’ and radiation existed alongside a political debate about the ability of national 
militaries to release nuclear material into the environment through testing weapons and 
dumping waste. A subset of this international and domestic contention concerned the 
question of dumping nuclear waste at sea. 
                                                 
829 Mitchell, “Intentional Oil Pollution of the Oceans,” 214. 
830 Paine, The Sea and Civilization, 592. 
831 Vogler, The Global Commons, 56. 
832 Oran R Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 117. 
833 Aaron Nisenson, “The Great Fallout Controversy,” JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 181, no. 2 (July 14, 1962): 171. 
 
 262 
The United States was the first to dump nuclear waste in the ocean, in 1946. Great 
Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union soon followed in the 1950s.834 Throughout the Cold 
War, fourteen countries dumped radioactive waste into the ocean, with almost 90 percent 
coming from Great Britain and the Soviet Union.835 In addition to emitting nuclear waste 
into rivers that flow into the ocean, the Soviet Union dumped 18 spent nuclear reactors 
directly into the ocean.836 The United States also relied on sea disposal until the early 
1960s. This practice was justified by scientists in the United States and Great Britain, 
while the Soviet Union denied its own dumping. For the first few decades, the structure 
of the problem was uncertain and contested, and scientists from different disciplines each 
contributed ideas about the level of harm. The idea of a “threshold value” – a 
determinable limit beyond which dumping becomes harmful – prevailed throughout this 
period, and served as a “benchmark of safety” for disposal rates.837 Geneticists criticized 
threshold values as unscientific from the beginning, while other scientists forwarded the 
idea of a “tolerable dose” or “permissible dose” below which “no damage would 
occur.”838 Health physicists, especially in Great Britain, adopted a “critical pathways” 
approach to calculating permissible dose, which focused on the amount of radiation that 
humans might consume from marine products, and ignored other effects on the marine 
environment.839  
Oceanographers, initially stymied by “enormous uncertainty about the behavior of 
the sea,” supported and provided threshold values in the 1950s (and added the term 
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“acceptable dose,” undefined).840 Despite the irreversibility of sea disposal, 
oceanographers and other scientists did not challenge the prevailing view of the ocean as 
“a giant sewer with a specific capacity.”841 They lacked baselines for marine 
radioactivity, as ocean nuclear testing preceded data collection.842  
An anti-dumping consensus slowly formed as oceanographers accumulated 
knowledge, and effectively leveraged their position with the US government. Discoveries 
about ocean circulation during the 1957-58 IGY dispelled the notion of stagnant zones 
where radioactive waste could be isolated. A new collective action problem emerged, and 
the support for sea disposal weakened. The United States, facing internal and regional 
pressure, stopped sea disposal of nuclear waste in the early 1960s. The emergence of a 
global environmental movement, energized by Stockholm in 1972, rapidly ‘turned the 
tide’ of public opinion against sea disposal during the 1970s.843 Yet several countries 
continued to dispose of radioactive waste in the ocean until the early 1990s. Russia, in 
particular, continued dumping, in the stated belief that the practice is not harmful.844 
Military interest in maintaining the practice, instead of identifying the problem, 
impeded the accumulation of scientific knowledge crucial for avoiding dangerous levels 
of marine radioactivity. The government listened to scientists who lacked domain-
specific knowledge. Health physics requires broad knowledge in “physics, electronics, 
biophysics, chemistry, biochemistry, physiology, genetics, toxicology, and ecology,” but 
these scientists and “sanitary engineers” had no knowledge of ocean circulation and 
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bioaccumulation.845 And, the “critical pathways” approach artificially narrowed the 
domain of negative consequences by excluding broader environmental effects. Because 
of scientific uncertainty and misplaced scientific authority, the governments of nuclear 
powers could easily challenge opponents of dumping, and marshal proponents (or at least 
neutral scientists).  
The 1972 London Dumping Convention, negotiated under the auspices of the 
IMO, prohibited the dumping of high-level radioactive waste, among other controlled 
substances. In some senses, the London Convention was a success. It was the first 
agreement to empower coastal states to enforce provisions, although a weakness is that 
the London Convention does not empower the IMO or International Atomic Energy 
Agency to monitor or enforce its rules.846 Before the agreement, the dumping of 
“municipal and industrial waste” was very common, and after the London Convention, 
acceptance of waste dumping has “decreased dramatically.”847 
In terms of nuclear waste, the 1972 London Convention was only partially 
successful. It ignored the full extent of disposal practices, by treating radioactive disposal 
as an ocean-only problem. The London Convention prohibited the dumping of 
radioactive waste from ships, but most of Great Britain’s waste disposal happened 
through pipelines that emptied on to its coastline, and much of the Soviet discharge 
entered the Arctic Ocean through its north-flowing rivers.848 The London Convention 
also banned only “high-level waste,” which actually created “internationally accepted 
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threshold levels to legitimize dumping.”849 In 1983, the Convention initiated a ten-year 
moratorium on “depositing slightly or moderately radioactive substances in the sea,” and 
in 1993 this moratorium became a formal ban.850 Russia violated both the moratorium 
and the formal ban, and although it claims to have ceased dumping, there is disagreement 
about the veracity of that claim.851 
Conclusion 
 The collective problems and shared vulnerabilities surveyed in this chapter 
demonstrate that the ocean governance regime tends to be ineffective when it ignores the 
contours and patterns of the ocean environment and the technological systems that exploit 
it. In general, the scope of “regime arrangements are arbitrarily defined without reference 
to the boundaries of natural systems.”852 The political geography of UNCLOS is 
fragmented into seabed and water column, EEZ and ABNJ, which makes integrated 
management inherently difficult. When resources like whales and fish are far from shore, 
and the technology of access is cheap and de-centralized, regulating exploitation is more 
difficult. The strongest examples of success include regulation of technological systems 
and the targeted collection and dissemination of information about ecosystems. The 
environmental movement played an important role in both cases, by increasing the 
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Planetary Ocean: Geophysical, Ecological, and Technological Horizons  
 
The way humans use and understand the ocean changed significantly in the years 
following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By the late 
20th century, holistic conceptions of nature combined with increasingly global data sets to 
produce a new dominant paradigm for scientific study of the planet: Earth system 
science.853 The basic principle of Earth system science is the integration of models and 
theories of change, at all scales. The ocean is now understood as a highly complex, 
interdependent, and dynamic planetary environment with meaningful interactions across 
geophysical layers, including the ocean/atmosphere interface, and between ecological and 
geophysical systems. Through concerted and coordinated effort, several areas of 
oceanography are becoming data rich for the first time.854 New tools of sampling and 
remote sensing are diversifying the sources and types of information collected. Enabling 
technologies such as Geographic Information Systems support the production of better 
maps of the ocean. Collective endeavors like the World Ocean Census, Ocean 
Biogeographic Information System, and Global Ocean Observing System actively seek 
out new data and ensure its global dissemination. This influx of data and knowledge 
stokes much unbridled optimism; some scientists suggest that we are approaching 
“predictive capabilities” in terms of our understanding of ocean systems.855 But this 
conclusion seems premature, as “very little of the ocean has been scientifically 
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investigated.”856 This situation – major leaps in knowledge but with significant gaps 
remaining – sets the stage for ocean governance in the 21st century.  
This chapter begins by surveying the contemporary status of marine scientific 
knowledge and maritime technology. Although much remains unknown, data collection 
and theory building has revealed new environmental problems and created new economic 
interests. Advances in technological capability have amplified existing uses, especially 
global-scale fishing. The second section reviews augmentations of the ocean governance 
regime starting in the 1990s, which sought to improve and build upon the framework 
created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The third 
section describes several areas where the ocean governance regime fails to achieve its 
goals, and explains these instances of ineffectiveness by reference to a mismatch between 
the material context and the ocean governance regime. Because this chapter explores the 
contemporary period, the potential topics of consideration are numerous. But new 
technologies heralded as on the near-term horizon may not develop in the manner or with 
the speed that is predicted. And it is possible that the ocean governance regime will adjust 
to account for new uses. This chapter therefore confines the areas of analysis to those 
where the ocean governance regime has established a clear goal, such as reducing marine 
pollution or achieving sustainable fishing, which it fails to achieve. 
Oceanography 
In terms of geophysical knowledge, both the seafloor and water column remain 
starkly under-sampled. The most synoptic maps of the seafloor are low resolution, 
produced by satellites that measure sea surface height as a proxy for gravitational 
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variation. More detailed acoustic sensing still gathers information about the seafloor at 
bicycle-speed.857 The interaction between water circulation and seafloor composition is 
increasingly understood; processes of sediment suspension, transport, and deposition 
interact with the winds, waves, and tides.858 But the details of ocean circulation are 
relatively uncertain; the paradigm of macro-dominant ocean circulations was only 
replaced by a theory of meso-scale dynamics in the 1990s.859 Physical oceanographers 
are just beginning to understand the ways that marine ecology affects ocean 
circulation.860 Computer models produce seemingly synoptic dynamic maps, but often 
belie gaps in knowledge.  
Research on ocean ecology, under-emphasized in previous eras, received a boost 
from the environmental consciousness of the 1970s. 861 But a disproportionate amount of 
data still comes from ocean users; for example, fish population estimates often rely on 
self-reported catch numbers.862 Even with better data collection, inferences are limited; 
without a “zero year baseline” there is no way to accurately gauge the magnitude of the 
impact from human depredations.863 Still, marine scientists are attempting to establish 
contemporary baselines, so that the size, rate, and direction of change in ocean 
ecosystems can be measured from now on.864 The result has been a series of important 
discoveries, including both new species and new and distinctive ecosystems; marine 
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ecologists now recognize that “the ocean everywhere is alive.”865 Marine scientists in the 
2010 World Ocean Census found that “rare is common,” and discoveries were easy to 
come by.866 The diversity they characterize – of ecosystem types, species within an 
ecosystem, and organisms within a species – is understood to be critical to ecological 
resilience.  Marine scientists are also uncovering how basic physical conditions 
throughout the ocean “control the abundance, distribution and composition of biological 
life.”867 The interdisciplinary science of ‘marine landscape ecology,’ which emerged in 
the 1980s, focuses on the composition, configuration, and complexity of the ‘seascape’ 
and its impact on ecological processes at all scales.868 This connection between 
geophysical and ecological features of the planetary ocean represents the ideal integrative 
picture of Earth system science. 
Brave New Ocean 
Contemporary scientific knowledge of the marine environment has uncovered 
new collective action problems. Most visible are the uses and over-uses of the ocean as a 
sink for the outputs of global production processes: chemicals, plastics, carbon dioxide, 
and heat. Chemical fertilizers (phosphorous and nitrogen) run from farmland into rivers, 
and from rivers into oceans. The “synthetic disaster” of hundreds of ‘dead zones’ around 
the world is caused when these fertilizers cause algae blooms, and then massive die offs, 
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and then hypoxia.869 This problem is well understood, and the practices that cause it are 
land-based. Other forms of pollution enter the ocean after being blown there by the wind, 
or washed off the coastline. Farther out to sea, the “detritus of civilization” is driven by 
surface circulation and gathers in large gyres.870 Five of these “debris collection zones” 
have been identified, and 60 to 80 percent of the debris is plastic.871 This debris, and 
especially photo-degraded micro-plastics, concentrate toxins, block sunlight, and are 
consumed by fish. The complete structure of this problem remains opaque, because the 
full extent of the impact is uncertain. We do not fully know where debris goes, or how 
much there is. The prevailing notion of “basins of attraction” is insufficient for locating 
and understanding the dynamics of the great ocean ‘garbage patches’.872  
While these chemical and material inputs create obvious and visible problems, 
three more diffuse and significant threats are coming into focus. Physical oceanographers 
have broadened the concept of ‘climate change’ to include ocean warming, ocean 
acidification, and sea-level rise. As atmospheric temperatures rise, the ocean absorbs 
more heat. Ocean warming causes problems like coral bleaching and alterations in 
species distribution.873 As species’ ranges change in response to warming oceans, 
diseases spread to new places and populations. The ocean also absorbs excess 
atmospheric CO2 because of molecular exchange at the interface of ocean and air, which 
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acidifies the water and thereby reduces the saturation of calcium carbonate minerals, 
harming the construction of shells and skeletons for marine microorganisms. Sea-level 
rise is also a geophysical phenomenon caused by glacial melting and thermal expansion 
of seawater.874 The extent of the problem has been hard to ascertain, because baselines 
for understanding change are young: satellite altimetry measurements of sea level began 
in 1994, and adequate ice measurements only in 2004.875 Although scientists know that 
the ocean is the primary sink for both carbon dioxide and atmospheric heat, the dynamics 
of these processes are poorly understood.876  
Another emerging collective action problem relates to a newly understood interest 
in ‘ecosystem services.’ This concept emerged as scientists began to understand the ways 
that a stable and normal-functioning ecosphere contributes to habitable planetary 
conditions for humans: a strong collective interest, and potential shared vulnerability. But 
the specifics of this interest remain unclear: oceans drive all major Earth processes, but 
we do not entirely understand how.877 The ecosystem services concept requires the 
challenging task of defining diffuse causal relationship and attaching value to them. The 
integration of economics and ecology this implies faces many barriers, including 
insufficient information about the relationship between ecosystem structures and 
functions, and disagreements about valuation.878 
Despite the general paucity of baseline data, scientists do know that ocean 
ecosystems are changing in response to the intensity of human activities. These activities 
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are causing an unprecedented amount of disruption in the ocean ecosphere; today, 
“humans alter multiple abiotic and biotic environmental controls at rates, scales, and 
combinations fundamentally different from those at any other time in history.”879 The 
general consensus is that the planetary ocean is experiencing a radical ecological 
simplification as a result of the “synergistic effects of habitat destruction, overfishing, 
introduced species, warming, acidification, toxins, and massive runoff of nutrients.”880 
Existing ocean ecosystems are deemed on “the point of collapse.”881 Distinctive 
ecosystems in the deep ocean are especially vulnerable to permanent damage, because 
they are marked by slow growth, maturation, and reproduction.882 A sense of urgency 
exists among scientists who study places that are undergoing fundamental transformation, 
such as in the polar oceans.883 The “brave new ocean” is not ideal for human interests, but 
may be inevitable.884 Any possible solutions “need to be urgent, focused, innovative and 
global.”885 
New Resources 
Increased scientific understanding of the marine material context has identified 
new problems, but also generated new interests in exploitation. In particular, research on 
deep-sea ecosystems has revealed new resources. Unique communities of organisms 
endemic to seamounts, hydrothermal vents, and cold seeps represent genetic resources of 
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interest to medical research and pharmaceutical manufacturing.886 The new activity of 
‘bio-prospecting’ for marine genetic resources at these sites lacks any kind of regulatory 
regime. These same locations contain important minerals, which were already known to 
be present in seafloor manganese nodules, but appear in different concentrations and 
compositions around vents and seeps. The work of geologists studying the seafloor has 
revealed that manganese nodules, which had been known to contain nickel, copper, and 
cobalt, also contain increasingly valuable rare Earth elements.887 These additional 
incentives for deep-sea mining may finally be aligning with the technological capability 
to exploit them: exploratory licensing from the International Seabed Authority has 
experienced a boom in recent years (26 total issued, 18 since 2011).888 While neither type 
of deep-sea resource has yet to be really exploited, when and if interests in bio-
prospecting and deep-seabed mining evolve into practices, they may conflict. Slow-
growing and unique biotic communities are unlikely to recover quickly from the sediment 
plumes and toxic releases of seabed mining.889 
Fishing Technology 
 Fishing practices have continued to grow and create more severe versions of the 
same problems: over-exploitation and habitat destruction. Advanced technological 
capability drives these practices, and the problem they cause is disruption of productive 
ecosystems. The amount of fish caught worldwide peaked in 1996, and has declined ever 
                                                 
886 “In Deep Water,” The Economist, February 22, 2014; Salvatore Aricò, ed., Ocean Sustainability in the 
21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 203.;John Vogler, “Global Commons Revisited,” 
Global Policy 3, no. 1 (February 2012): 67. 
887 Maddie Stone, “The Future of Technology Is Hiding on the Ocean Floor,” Gizmodo, April 5, 2016. 
888 L. M. Wedding et al., “Managing Mining of the Deep Seabed,” Science 349, no. 6244 (July 10, 2015): 
144–45. 
889 Charles W. Schmidt, “Going Deep: Cautious Steps toward Seabed Mining,” Environmental Health 
Perspectives 123, no. 9 (September 1, 2015): A234–41; Thomas A. Schlacher et al., “Seamount Benthos in 
a Cobalt-Rich Crust Region of the Central Pacific: Conservation Challenges for Future Seabed Mining,” 
ed. David Richardson, Diversity and Distributions 20, no. 5 (May 2014): 491–502. 
 
 274 
since. This is not for lack of effort, which has increased significantly in the last 30 years, 
but because the majority of fisheries are over-exploited.890 It is difficult to rebuild 
depleted populations that contain fewer mature adults, because of their depressed 
reproduction rate. There has been a “dramatic expansion” in the types of fish caught.891 
This is all enabled by the scale and sophistication of contemporary fishing technology. 
40,000 industrial fishing boats use trawls and seine nets to scour farther out and deeper 
down than ever before.892 Old technologies (vessels, nets, long-lines) have been 
significantly improved, and new technologies deployed in the last three decades. Spotter 
airplanes locate schools of fish, and more than 50,000 ‘fish aggregation devices’ have 
been deployed in the Pacific Ocean alone.893 Not only do these methods facilitate the 
extraction of large numbers of fish, they often destroy benthic habitats wholesale. Deep-
sea fishing in particular has been described as a kind of “fish mining,” where a 
theoretically renewable resource is so heavily exploited that it becomes functionally non-
renewable.894  
 The global economy of fisheries practices is highly complex, and defined by the 
geography of technology and ecosystems. In one way, it is de-centralized. Fishing is 
practiced on a variety of scales, down to local subsistence fishing. Although large fishing 
companies exist, none is big enough to wield market power.895 In another way, fishing is 
highly centralized: just 23 countries catch 80 percent of the world’s fish.896 Regional 
dynamics are also important: Asian and American countries dominate global catch, and 
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3/5th of the global catch comes from the Pacific Ocean.897 China has increased its effort 
dramatically, and now accounts for 1/6th of global catch. 
The geography of extraction is national, regional, and de-centralized, but the 
geography of consumption is significantly international. Developed countries export and 
import large quantities of fish, so where a fish is caught, and who catches it, has little 
impact on who eats it. The United States imports 90 percent of the fish it consumes.898 
Although fisheries are generally over-exploited, uncertainty pervades the calculation of 
population numbers. The FAO collects global statistics on catches, but they have been 
criticized for focusing on industrial fishing and ignoring bycatch, illegal fishing, and 
subsistence fishing.899 The vast areas around small island developing states are highly 
targeted and insufficiently monitored, such that an accurate count is impossible.900 This 
makes it difficult to provide a detailed characterization of the problem of over-fishing. 
 
Contemporary Ocean Governance Regime 
UNCLOS remains the central institution of ocean governance, but it has been 
modified in two important ways. First, the July 1994 Implementation Agreement 
amended Part XI of UNCLOS, which deals with seabed mining, to weaken the provisions 
for distributional equity in an effort to appeal to non-party industrialized countries. 
UNCLOS entered into force in November 1994 after the sixtieth ratification. Second, the 
1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement attempted to fill in where UNCLOS was deficient 
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regarding the management of high seas and migratory fisheries.901 The Straddling Stocks 
Agreement mandates a precautionary approach and reaffirms the goals of conservation 
and optimum utilization, but the Agreement has no formal relationship with Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and has been ratified by half as many 
states as UNCLOS.902 These two agreements modified UNCLOS directly, but the ocean 
governance regime has advanced in other important ways.   
Advances in fisheries management aim to redress the insufficiency of RFMOs, 
which have grown slightly in number and membership, but remain widely criticized. 
Efforts have focused on making ships more traceable at sea, and more accountable in 
port. The 2009 Food and Agricultural Organization Port State Measures Agreement has 
the explicit goal of blocking the flow of IUU (Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated) fish into 
markets. It allows port states to deny entry to foreign boats suspected of illegal fishing, 
and to require detailed documentation and inspection to ensure the legality of the catch. 
This agreement aspires to overcome existing barriers to effective port state enforcement, 
including lack of information about IUU vessels, inadequate efforts on the part of ports, 
and the continued existence of alternative ‘ports of convenience.’903 In terms of at-sea 
monitoring, in 2000 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) made the use of 
Automatic Identification Systems mandatory for all ships of a certain size.904 Because 
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this requirement is easy to circumvent, through the use of smaller boats or simply turning 
off the transponder, NGOs are starting to use satellite monitoring to fill the gaps.905 
Another instrument for high seas governance, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), are 
increasing in number and size, and lauded as the “flagship tool” for protecting 
ecosystems.906 Despite the lack of an over-arching mandate for MPA creation, scientific 
observers regularly call for their expansion.907 
Regime Effectiveness 
These additions and augmentations have generally failed to produce an effective 
ocean governance regime. The basic goals remain sustainable use, equitable access, and 
economic benefit.908 The regime has been more reactive than proactive, such that 
development of practices in any given area precedes their regulation.909 The management 
ideal of integration (using complementary regimes to manage multiple uses) has not been 
achieved, although it still serves as a regime principle.910 Indeed, parochial interests and 
existing practices are firmly entrenched, such that regime formation is rarely driven or 
informed by the structure of collective problems. This section will review some of the 
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key failures of the regime, and explain them in relation to the changes in interests, 
practices, and problems described above. 
Marine Pollution 
Problems such as plastic detritus, dead zones, ocean warming and acidification 
cannot be solved by the existing ocean governance regime, because the regime has 
jurisdiction over the locations where a negative consequence is experienced, but not over 
the land-based economic activity that is the origin of the problems. These forms of 
marine pollution cause major disruptions to ocean ecosystems, which are already 
impacting coastal economies that depend on tourism and subsistence fishing, and which 
will eventually impact even global fishing in the open ocean. These challenges are “of a 
magnitude unforeseen in public international law,” because their geography extends to 
the land and atmosphere, and the political geography of UNCLOS does not.911 Because 
the chains of cause and consequence involved span the division between the ocean and 
other planetary domains, the ocean-specific governance cannot solve them. 
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Sea-level rise is a particularly vexing problem for ocean governance: its causes 
are atmospheric and international, its effects are planetary in scale, and policy responses 
so far have been primarily local or national. Sea-level rise does not really harm ocean 
ecosystems, but it will have major effects on coastal communities and low-lying states. 
634 million people live along global coastlines, many in highly urbanized cities with 
heavy material infrastructures.912 Although UNCLOS does not have a goal of protecting 
land-based populations and infrastructure, sea-level rise does affect the ability of the 
regime to resolve conflicts over maritime jurisdiction zones and territories. The political 
geography created by UNCLOS – the territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive 
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Economic Zone (EEZ), and continental shelf zone – is constructed on the assumption of a 
static coastline. The coastal ‘baseline’ serves as reference point for calculating 
jurisdictional extent. UNCLOS contains detailed provisions for drawing a baseline, which 
reference the natural coastline (Articles 5, 7, 14, and 47).  The assumption of a static 
coastline also underlies the very existence of national jurisdiction zones – while an 
‘island’ can generate EEZ and continental shelf claims, a ‘rock’ cannot (Article 121). The 
political geography of UNCLOS was built without the expectation of substantial coastal 
dynamism.913  
Coastlines have always been dynamic through processes of erosion and 
deposition, but they are increasingly dynamic in the contemporary era.914 In some cases, 
states undertake purposeful dredging to construct islands or expand coastlines for 
economic or political reasons.915 But on-going and impending sea-level rise promises to 
be the main source of coastal dynamism, as rising water levels submerge coastal areas, 
and as states increase the use of dredging to save coastal infrastructures and population 
centers. Urban areas are likely to be protected with ever-higher sea walls, but this strategy 
can actually accelerate erosion, and alters deposition patterns in a way that increases 
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dynamism farther down the coast.916 In many cases, maintaining existing coastlines will 
simply be too expensive or too challenging. Low-lying islands in particular are likely to 
become uninhabitable rocks. Citizens of Kiribati and the Maldives are already assuming 
they will lose their countries.917  
UNCLOS assumes that islands will stay islands, rocks will stay rocks, and 
coastlines will stay put. The treaty lacks legal clarity regarding whether its key 
jurisdictional categories will shift as the sea level rises. This situation is likely to intensify 
pre-existing disputes over maritime boundaries, and create new ones.918 The “vast 
majority” of overlapping EEZ claims have been resolved by reference to the equidistance 
principle.919 When the coastline of one party retreats, the other party is likely to demand 
that the equidistance line shift to compensate. Low-lying coastal states that experience 
major coastal retreat, such as Bangladesh, are likely to insist on maintaining their 
previous baselines. In some cases, sovereign island states may become entirely 
submerged and uninhabitable, and it is unclear whether this means their maritime 
jurisdiction zones disappear. If the UNCLOS baseline is allowed to be ‘ambulatory’ and 
shift with changes in the coastline, hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements will 
have to be re-negotiated. This option might legitimize China’s claims to newly created 
islands in the South China Sea, an outcome that the United States is likely to strongly 
reject. The other option, in which political baselines are treated as static even as the 
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coastline changes, would result in interesting situations where maritime zones grow in 
size, or exist without reference to any coastline at all (in the case of submerged islands). 
Because UNCLOS was designed without sea-level rise in mind, the treaty text offers no 
guidance regarding the shifting nature of coastlines. This situation is likely to stoke inter-
state conflict.920 
Fisheries 
The ocean governance regime continues to fail at resolving older and more 
understood problems like the unsustainable use of renewable biotic resources. Despite 
some success in management of coastal stocks, and a strong legal foundation for 
conservation of marine ecosystems, defaunation is rapidly increasing.921  RFMOs are 
widely understood to have failed at their primary task: maintaining the sustainability of 
fisheries.922 Most RFMOs rely on committees to generate estimates of MSY from 
whatever data is available.923Although UNCLOS and the Straddling Stocks Agreement 
improve upon MSY by requiring the adoption of a precautionary and ecosystem-based 
approach, RFMOs have “large governance deficits” and have made only “nominal 
progress” in adherence to these principles.924  
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Each RFMO is an autonomous agreement between a group of members that self-
regulate their exploitation of a particular species, or of all commercial species within a 
particular area.925 They are open membership, and only create legal obligations over their 
members. The geographies of membership and jurisdiction in RFMOs are significantly 
out of step with the geography of exploitation. The fundamental problem is that these 
regimes are controlled by vested interests seeking to justify existing practices.926 
Advanced technology easily enables long-distance fishing, and can obtain large catches 
from fish stocks on the brink of collapse.927 Many states do not become members, but 
fishers from member states can easily register their ships in non-member states.928 Little 
or no effort is made to keep non-member fishers out of an RFMO area. Even when fish 
stocks are regional, the technological production chain that catches, produces, and sells 
them is globally interlinked.929 The problem of RFMO management is put succinctly by 
Elizabeth DeSombre and Samuel Barkin: “a common pool resource cannot be 
successfully protected by a sub-group of users.”930  
The RFMO solution set ignores the structure of the over-fishing problem. RFMOs 
codify a regional political geography, based on an inaccurate agricultural metaphor that 
considers harvestable resources to be wedded to a plot of territory.931 Even when 
particular species have a limited range, fisheries are best understood as a global 
                                                 
925 Hance D Smith, Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero, and Tundi Agardy, Routledge Handbook of Ocean 
Resources and Management (Taylor and Francis, 2015), 39. 
926 Gjerde et al., “Ocean in Peril: Reforming the Management of Global Ocean Living Resources in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction.” 
927 Carmel Finley, All the Fish in the Sea: Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Failure of Fisheries 
Management (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 7. 
928 DeSombre and Barkin, Fish, 32. 
929 Gjerde et al., “Ocean in Peril: Reforming the Management of Global Ocean Living Resources in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction,” 544. 
930 DeSombre and Barkin, Fish, 9. 
931 Finley, All the Fish in the Sea, 7. 
 
 284 
system.932 The resilience of any individual fish stock depends on multiple 
interdependencies with various scales, such as nutrient flows, seawater composition, 
predator/prey relationships, disease patterns, and other ecosystem features.933 Many 
pelagic species are transient by nature, and therefore extremely difficult to manage within 
a fixed zonal regime.934 Indeed, fish are the quintessential fugitive resource, and 
relatively difficult to locate, track, and count. A governance approach that creates 
invisible, basically indefensible borders around mobile resources exploited by mobile 
users, was not likely to succeed. Another form of zonal management – Marine Protected 
Areas – is also deficient as a conservation strategy because it faces the same 
challenges.935 These mismatches between natural, technology, and political geography 
can be understood as “criminogenic asymmetries” that enable and incentivize IUU 
fishing.936 
Ecosystem Based Management 
 Another weakness of the ocean governance regime relates to ecological 
knowledge of the material context. The emergence of the Earth system science paradigm 
prompted the development of the “ecosystem based management” (EBM) approach. 
Although there is no consensus about the exact principles of EBM, and it lacks a 
“universal application framework,” the basic idea is managing ecosystems as a whole 
instead of individual species or uses.937 This approach now pervades the ocean 
governance regime, and is “broadly accepted” as a principle. The standards for EBM are 
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demanding.938 It requires managers to account for complex interactions and cumulative 
impacts at multiple scales, and to factor in the diffuse but significant benefit of 
‘ecosystem services.’939 Although the EBM concept is attractive, there exists no clear and 
feasible method for translating it into specific management practices.940 The term 
‘ecosystem’ has no consistent legal meaning, and scientists disagree about the appropriate 
scale for delineation and time horizon for management.941 Even if ecosystems were easy 
to differentiate, EBM requires a large quantity of fine-grained scientific knowledge, 
despite a severely under-sampled ocean. Indeed, marine scientists have only recently 
made key discoveries, such as crucial role of blue-green bacteria for producing 
atmospheric oxygen, and the role of whales as “ecosystem engineers” that are responsible 
for vertical nutrient flows.942 Additional discoveries are impending, including details 
about the ecosystem services of the deep-sea.943 Despite the general consensus that very 
little of the ocean has been explored and documented, EBM is taken seriously as a 
management principle. How is this possible? 
 The EBM approach addresses the lack of ecological knowledge in two ways. The 
first is using modeling to determine the possible consequences of different situations. 
These models, because they must function with incomplete information, rely on making 
assumptions about unknowns. Their attractiveness as a source of quantifiable results is a 
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dangerous temptation, and may trade off with problem-focused research.944 The second is 
an appeal to the ‘precautionary principle’ in the event of uncertainty. The strong version 
of this principle entails shifting the burden of proof from those who want to conserve to 
those who want to exploit. The principle is not a legal mandate, however, and its main 
relevance thus far has been as a “framework for discourse about the interpretation and 
application of legal obligations.”945 
 These two means of dealing with the scientific knowledge deficit – modeling and 
the precautionary approach – are insufficient because they do not overcome key 
challenges to conceptualizing the ecosystem and achieving holistic management. First, 
the most relevant characteristics of any given marine ecosystem are how it has changed 
and how it will respond to change in the future. Historical baselines are useful for “setting 
responsible goals based on healthy levels of abundance, distribution and biocomplexity in 
the past.”946 Yet oceanography lacks baseline data for many features of the ocean, 
especially those dealing with the abundance of particular ecosystems. The hazard is that 
current species distribution maps will be taken as, and conflated with, habitat suitability 
maps. There is no known “normal” that can be used to problematize the status quo. 
Second, there are no non-artificial borders on ocean ecosystems. Every part of the ocean 
is affected by thermohaline circulation, the interface with the atmosphere, and complex 
food chains. EBM requires valuation of the provision of ecosystem services, the 
calculation of which requires considering these types of planetary scale interconnections. 
Most RFMOs are designed to regulate a single species, and the broadest MPAs are only 
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regional.947 Implementing the ecosystem-based approach regionally requires planetary-
scale knowledge, but does not entail planetary-scale control. Even if the problems lie 
outside regional borders, the solution must occur within them. 
Technology 
 Growth in technological capabilities continues to support access and exploitation 
instead of surveillance and enforcement. Use practices are supported by strong incentives 
(profit), while enforcement practices are deterred by cost. A primary example is the 
complex and overly flexible geography of jurisdiction over maritime shipping. The 
problem of ‘flags of convenience’ exists because ships can be registered in any state, 
regardless of the nationality of the ship owner, captain, and crew, and regardless of where 
the ship transits or harvests. This system is “based on a legal fiction that a ship is a 
floating piece of national territory over which the flag State exerts control.”948 Flag states 
are required to enforce their laws over ships registered there, but owners often choose to 
register in countries with weak labor and environmental protections and/or negligible 
enforcement capacity. The result is near free-reign for “pirates, illegal fishers, polluters 
and various other criminal activities such as arms trafficking.”949 The basic problem is 
that the political geography remains tied to the territorial state system, while the 
technological geography of access is complex, fluid, and global. 
 Technology now penetrates and pervades the planetary ocean in ways that the 
existing regime is blind to: new practices have emerged, and institutions have not 
adjusted. The IMO has no provisions to cover drone ships and submersibles; it is not even 
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clear whether Autonomous Underwater Vehicles are included in the category of 
‘ships.’950 Humans can now deploy machines to reshape coastlines and build islands, yet 
UNCLOS says nothing about whether these can alter baselines and therefore expand 
territorial and EEZ claims. This is an increasingly important issue, as China turns reefs 
into habitable islands in the South China Sea, the trend of artificial island building 
progresses, and countries like Singapore literally expand their territory through massive 
dredging.951 The UNCLOS regime assumes that categories like “ship” and “coastline” are 
obvious and static, an assumption increasingly challenged by new technology. 
Technological capabilities now make possible more effective enforcement, yet 
surveillance and monitoring technologies are barely deployed by or through the ocean 
governance regime. RFMOs employ substantially less surveillance technology than they 
could, allowing illegal fishing to proliferate.952 Satellite-based receivers have 
supplemented the IMO’s mandatory Automatic Identification System since 2008, but 
these are still limited by the small number of total receivers.953 Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicles represent a “tremendous opportunity” to monitor ocean processes and ocean 
users, but management institutions are not investing in their deployment.954 The 
contemporary ocean governance regime contains no mandates for the use of surveillance 
technology, and no provisions for the transfer of these technologies. 
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Scholars and policymakers recognize many of the flaws in contemporary ocean 
governance described above. Proposals for regime augmentation tend to focus on 
incrementally adding new rules to deal with new uses, following the historical pattern of 
developments in the international law of the sea.955 More ambitious proposals include the 
creation of a new centralized authority for management of ocean uses, in recognition of 
the ‘public goods’ it provides to humanity as a whole. These institutional blueprints 
sometimes abolish the EEZ, but the most common element is a “comprehensive ocean 
authority” with a thicker legal foundation and regional mandates.956 This purview of this 
centralized authority would also extend to the high seas and deep ocean, in an effort to 
regulate high seas fisheries and ensure the provision of ecosystem services.957 Even those 
who do not favor a single governance authority still propose forms of centralization, such 
as Barkin and DeSombre’s global fisheries organization.958 At least one scholar argues 
that holistic ocean governance creates a “harmony” between political and natural 
geography, and thereby facilitates “the rationality and effectiveness of ocean 
governance.”959 
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These proposals repeat a critical error in recreating a political geography that 
starts and stops at the coastline. The insights of this chapter suggest that the ocean is not 
appropriately conceived as a separate and distinct domain for the purposes of 
management. The public good of an untainted ocean clashes with entrenched private 
interests in the terrestrial economy, including emissions from burning fossil fuels, 
agricultural externalities like pesticide and fertilizer runoff, and a consumption society 
that has deposited 5 trillion pieces of plastic into the ocean.960 Resolving ocean 
consequences like acidification, sea-level rise, and chemical/material pollution require 
regulating their land-based causes. These issues for effective design will be considered at 
length in the conclusion chapter. 
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Outer Space: Governance of Orbital Space and Celestial Bodies 
  
After centuries of anticipation, the Space Age began abruptly in the middle of the 
twentieth century. The movement into space was a major new development in 
humankind’s capabilities, and extremely novel in character. Different types of access to 
space, for different reasons, emerged over the decades after Sputnik ushered in the Space 
Age in 1957. A fairly comprehensive regime was put into place before humans had much 
actual experience with, or use of, orbital space. In political terms, the construction of the 
outer space regime was near instantaneous. Despite Cold War competition in science and 
technology, the superpowers converged on a common political framework. Anchored in 
the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the regime constructed a political geography of open 
access, with national registration and flagging but no national territories. It outlawed both 
sovereign appropriation and the basing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. 
The broad and skeletal outer space regime has persisted for many decades, but new 
problems have emerged in the space realm. This chapter answers a basic question: what 
explains the ineffectiveness of the outer space regime in some areas? I argue that the 
regime was built too quickly, and then augmented and reformed too slowly, such that it is 
unable to confront and redress contemporary problems in outer space. The regime has 
been unable to account for new technological capability and scientific understanding. 
This chapter focuses primarily on Earth orbital space (EOS), which includes most 
human activity in outer space (but excludes inter-planetary probes). Focusing on EOS fits 
the parameters of a planetary geopolitics approach, because orbital space has a particular 
and distinctive geography shaped by the gravitational pull of the Earth. This chapter 
compares the outer space regime with the material context of EOS, especially its 
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geophysical reality and technology-mediated human access. The first section surveys the 
basic elements of the outer space regime. The second section examines the assumptions 
about geophysical reality and technological capability made at the time of regime 
formation, and compares these ideas with what is known about space today. The third 
section acknowledges the successes and describes the failures of the outer space regime, 
in both broad outlines and with reference to four specific areas – militarization, space 
debris, commercialization, and asteroid deflection. The final section considers and 
evaluates proposals for augmenting the space regime, and draws tentative conclusions 
about the requirements for a functional and effective regime. 
Outer Space Regime 
In outer space, as in other non-terrestrial domains, geophysical facts and 
technological systems condition the types and distribution of practices, the content of 
interests, and the structure of problems. But because the geophysical features of space 
and the trajectory of space technology were relatively unknown – they lacked detail or 
certainty – at the time of negotiation, we should expect to see deficiencies in the outer 
space regime. When geography is poorly mapped and technology is in its infancy, this 
situation generates misconceptions about the practices that need to be regulated, the 
interests being pursued, and the problems that actors are attempting to solve. In this 
chapter, I argue that the outer space regime is ineffective in particular areas because of a 
dysfunctional relationship with scientific knowledge accumulation and technological 
change. This brief section reviews the major parts of the outer space regime, with a focus 
on the assumptions they embed and reinforce about the material context of activities in 
EOS. The next section will consider how negotiators, scholars, and diplomats dealt with 
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uncertainty and incomplete information during regime formation, and also survey 
contemporary knowledge of the outer space environment. 
The outer space regime is relatively young and skeletal, compared to other global 
commons regimes. Most of its elements, including an enduring framework agreement 
(OST), came into being quickly. The moment of arrival into space was singular, and 
space actors suddenly confronted the need to create principles, norms, and rules to 
regulate space activities. Evidence of a collective ‘coming to grips’ is found in the 
reliance of international legal scholars on other-domain analogies, and also in the 
preference of national militaries – the first entrants into space – to defer and delay in 
answering questions about rights and duties in space.961 This delay is at least partially 
explained by a desire be sure of one’s interests in space before committing to any formal 
agreements; discerning interests was “guesswork” full of ambiguities.962 But of course, 
norms and expectations about space access came into being as soon as status quo 
activities were accepted without contestation; international treaty making was not needed 
for the creation of customary principles of access. This gave a small group of space-
capable actors (initially a group of two) substantial leverage in interpreting their 
obligations to each other and the international community more generally.963 The 
principles for governing outer space were therefore mostly built as customary 
international law (starting in 1957), and only subsequently and intermittently codified in 
international law and treaties (starting in 1967).  
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Because of concerns about superpower conflict spilling into and escalating in 
outer space, the main goal of early diplomatic initiatives regarding space was “to confine 
the use of outer space to peaceful purposes.”964 The space powers were motivated by both 
individual and collective security; they wanted to avoid great power war in space, and 
also maintain safe access to orbit and beyond. By the early 1960s, the United States and 
Soviet Union began to sense a shared interest in reserving space for peaceful purposes, 
including civilian programs, military support functions, and scientific observation.965 The 
1962 Starfish Prime nuclear test demonstrated the possible magnitude of indiscriminate 
damage for both superpowers.966 The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) outlawed 
nuclear explosions in space, and a 1963 U.N. General Assembly Resolution called on 
states to refrain from putting weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. 
In view of the “common interest” in peaceful uses of outer space, the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty formalized the prohibition on WMD, and also outlawed territorial claims. The 
negotiation and entry into force of OST marks the beginning of a concentrated period of 
regime formation. 
The outer space regime is primarily composed of four treaties or conventions, all 
negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s: the Outer Space Treaty (1967),967 Agreement on 
Rescue and Return (1968),968 Registration Convention (1976),969 and Liability 
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Convention (1972).970 The Outer Space Treaty (OST) can be understood as both the core 
of and framework for the outer space regime. As the core, it is a “Treaty on Principles” 
that outlines the central commitments of signatories to non-appropriation, peaceful use, 
and shared benefits. As a framework, its somewhat-vague categories and concepts have 
been fleshed out by follow-on agreements and resolutions, but the OST itself has never 
been challenged, amended, or replaced; it “enjoys the broadest subscription and the 
highest regard.”971 Its durability does not necessarily indicate effectiveness, however, as 
there are many possible reasons OST has not been altered. The appetite for regime 
building was lost in the 1980s, primarily because renewed Cold War tension spilled over 
into disagreements at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS). 
The regime is a two-layer regulatory system, where international agreements bind 
states, which must then enforce treaty provisions on their domestic actors. According to 
Article 6 of OST, state members are responsible for “authorization and continuing 
supervision” over non-governmental actors. At the time of its negotiation, there were no 
independently capable private and/or commercial non-state space actors.  
Collectively, these agreements constructed space as an international commons 
“based on the principles of equal access and freedom of exploitation and use by all 
states.”972 Outer space could have been declared res nullius – making it a nascent part of 
the territorial state system – but instead it was declared res communis, an international 
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arena that could be used by all but appropriated by none.973 The OST describes outer 
space as the “province of all mankind,” which is not defined precisely, but generally 
understood as a weaker commitment than the “common heritage of mankind” designation 
given to the deep seabed. The decision to declare outer space the common ‘province,’ 
used only for peaceful purposes and without state appropriation, extended a political 
geography of the ‘commons’ already developed in the context of the high seas. This 
principle precludes sovereign territorial claims, but “leaves open the possibility of 
resource use.”974 Users are obliged to “take into consideration the interests of others” 
when using space.975 
An open access res communis regime was not the only option for creating 
political geography in space. The alternative scheme of partition was considered and 
rejected, because of the basic geophysical features of orbital space. The first and default 
choice of the territorial state system is typically the extension of the political geography 
of terra firma, by declaring newly discovered res nullius and incorporating it into state 
territory. The basic obstacle to doing so in EOS was that partition would make orbital 
space un-usable, because satellites by nature pass over large swaths of the Earth’s 
surface. This also significantly explains the durability of the core free passage provision, 
which is necessary to make space usable by satellites. In other words, a fundamental 
feature of geophysical reality, interacting with technological systems, conditioned the 
basic structure of the regime. In this, the interests of current and future space actors were 
abundantly clear. However, there was much that the architects of the outer space regime 
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did not know or could not foresee about the material context of EOS, and this lack of 
complete information would impact the regime’s future effectiveness in the decades to 
come. Notably, the Treaty does not define the realm of outer space, and only makes a 
single reference to it being distinct from air space. 
 
Figure 18 - Consideration of partition schemes, From Jessup, Philip C., and Howard J. Taubenfeld. Controls 





At the time negotiations over OST began, “most governments had little 
conception of space or space activity.”976 M.J. Peterson describes how actors first had to 
establish a “locational classification” for outer space in order to define the situation 
precisely. From this classification, actors could begin to glean their interests and relative 
identities, and only then pursue the creation of particular institutions to manage outer 
space. This idealized two-step process is reflected in the division of COPUOS into a 
Scientific and Technical subcommittee and a Legal subcommittee. Until the mid-1970s, 
COPUOS was the “single most important source of international law relating to space 
activities.”977 The Scientific and Technical subcommittee was charged with developing 
shared knowledge about space and the potentials of space activity, while the Legal 
subcommittee drafted multilateral agreements. But the Legal subcommittee got ahead of 
its counterpart. Peterson argues that lawyers – highly trained in analogical reasoning – 
had the largest influence on early regime formation out of COPUOS.978 The result was a 
reliance on “direct transfers of idea from similar types of earthly activity,” a process 
which Peterson describes but does not problematize.979 By the time COPUOS activity 
slowed down in the late 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of technical experts had 
decreased in favor of diplomatic generalists. The influence of international lawyers and 
diplomats, as opposed to space scientists and engineers, may partially explain why the 
regime was based on a fuzzy and imprecise understandings of the EOS material context. 
This section reviews two different accounts of the process of “locational classification” in 
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outer space during early regime formation, and then surveys contemporary scientific 
descriptions of outer space. 
Many scholars like Peterson have analyzed the role of other-domain analogies for 
the formation of the outer space regime.980 These are a kind of materialist argument, 
because they detail how actors came to understand the geography of the place where they 
were interacting. But these existing treatments, and especially the extensive reviews from 
Peterson, have three disadvantages: First, Peterson describes the switch from one analogy 
to another as a result of both superior political ‘fit’ with the purposes of dominant actors, 
and better ‘fit’ with the material realities of outer space. But she does not differentiate the 
character of these causes, and therefore overlooks the way that processes of scientific 
knowledge accumulation progressively reinforce the appropriateness of some analogies 
while undermining others. Indeed, Peterson repeatedly suggests that “purpose” and 
“perceived interests” explain the adoption of particular spatial understandings of the 
domain.981 Second, she provides no way to evaluate representations except from a 
particular perspective – do they serve the interests of particular actors? Third, Peterson’s 
approach fails to translate such insights into prescriptions for better policy-making in 
response to further problems. Will any of these analogies help us confront problems like 
space debris? Peterson does not answer this question. Although her work on the outer 
space regime is detailed and insightful, I will argue that there are advantages to taking a 
more strongly materialist approach. 
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Another approach to explaining “locational classification” comes from the 
constructivist school of International Relations, which focuses on the social construction 
of ideas and concepts. In his 2016 article “Unearthing global natures: outer space and 
scalar politics,” Jason Beery adopts a “production of nature approach” to understanding 
how outer space came to be understood as a “global commons.” This approach 
understands the global scale of outer space “as socially produced, as discursively 
deployed, and as a political tool.” Beery rejects the existence of a “fixed, pre-given, and 
separate” natural world, and insists that scientific “framings” of nature are inherently 
political.982 He argues that the prevailing construction of outer space as a ‘global 
commons,’ solidified in the OST, served the interests of dominant actors by reinforcing 
technological, economic, and political inequality. Although, like Peterson, Beery actually 
relies on the features of material reality in his explanation, these disappear in his 
concluding description of the construction of outer space. He argues that outer space is 
defined by non-appropriation, free access, and collective benefit. But these are political 
features of the regime, constructed on a foundation of understandings about the 
geophysical features of the space environment. In other words, Beery believes that outer 
space is defined by the political geography of the ‘global commons,’ instead of the 
planetary geography of a non-terrestrial domain of the Earth. Although Beery’s approach 
assumes that ‘nature’ is socially constructed, he relies on features of the actual material 
context to explain why territorial partition and spatial demarcation of outer space were 
not pursued.  
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Both of these sets of arguments about the outer space domain are inferior versions 
of a more strongly materialist approach, one premised on the existence of an objective 
material world that is progressively characterized by scientists. Peterson alludes to this 
premise, while Beery flatly rejects it. Peterson argues against a purely rationalist 
explanation of regime formation, and analyzes the influence of analogies on interest 
formation. She explains that both lawyers and scientists contributed to the “standards” for 
evaluating representations of outer space, 
but she greatly underplays the latter group. 
While international lawyers were orienting 
by reaching for analogies to frame their 
space law proposals, scientists were orienting by collecting, synthesizing, and 
interpreting data about the domain itself. The assumption that an objective, geophysical 
outer space exists is evident when Peterson surveys the pitfalls of analogic reasoning – 
she says that the “existence” of a domain feature may be over-looked, or inaccurately 
presumed, because of a reliance on an analogy.983 But ultimately Peterson, like Beery, 
concludes that the purposes and interests of dominant space actors determined which 
representation of the space environment was incorporated within and reproduced by the 
outer space regime. Their arguments imply that political actors can build the regime that 
suits their interests, regardless of the ‘raw material’ of the domain to be managed. A 
central argument of this chapter is that interest formation is inherently corrupted or 
skewed without direct reference to scientific knowledge of the material context.  
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Figure 19 - Established views on outer space regime 
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The influence of geophysical features of outer space is generally under-
appreciated in the literature analyzing the history of access to space.984 A strong 
materialist approach highlights the role of geography, geophysics, and technology in 
shaping the practices, interests, and problems that motivate the formation and operation 
of a regime. This approach has two major differences with the approaches of Peterson 
and Beery. First, it suggests that analogies are ill suited to drive regime formation, 
because they inevitably create misidentifications and mischaracterizations of interests and 
problems. Second, it focuses on a source of image construction outside the minds and 
practices of social actors – the actual material world, mapped and characterized by a 
diverse scientific community following a shared scientific method. This geopolitical 
approach posits a crucial distinction between international actors, a constructed global 
commons regime, and an actual material planetary-scale space. The actors and their 
constructed regime are not all that exists in EOS – the place itself conditions, constrains, 
and influences the actors’ interests, practices, and power and therefore shapes the regime, 
and whether it effectively realizes the interests that motivate its formation. 
Taking seriously the role of an objective material context – one that exists 
independently of human perception – has several advantages for understanding the 
construction and operation of the outer space regime. First – in explaining the evolving 
image of outer space, this approach separates political and material explanations. The 
distinction provides the analyst with a better idea about the durability of trends in space 
access. For example, fluctuating terrestrial mineral prices offer a contingent explanation 
for the pursuit of lunar or asteroidal mining. In contrast, the existence or absence of 
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particular minerals on other planets, moons, and asteroids provides a durable explanation 
for whether celestial mining is pursued. While this example is particularly simple, 
durable and predictable material trends also exist regarding launch requirements, orbital 
paths, human physiological limitations, remote sensing and communication physics, and 
other features of space activity. The key point, as Martin France et al. succinctly states, is 
that “some constraints…are not subject to negotiation.”985 Second – the geopolitical 
approach helps explain the formation of particular interests and purposes regarding space; 
what we want is shaped in part by what we can do, and what we can do is significantly 
determined by the interaction between current technology and geophysical realities. Third 
– the material approach easily engages with Realism, which dominates the approach of 
many space practitioners, scholars, and theorists.986 While many Realists focus on outer 
space as a realm of inter-state competition, realist theory takes seriously claims about 
technological innovation, terrain, and resource distribution. In particular, Realist 
geopolitics appreciates the existence of ‘spatial extension’ and location-based resources. 
But Realism has other flaws that make a distinct materialist geopolitical approach 
necessary. Realists tend to import strategic principles from terrestrial politics, and most 
see competition in space as inevitable.987 Finally – because the materialist approach 
employs a scientific standard for evaluating representations of outer space, it is more 
suited to guiding effective national and international action in space. Geopolitics suggests 
that interests are best pursued, and problems best avoided, when scientific practitioners 
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have thoroughly investigated the domain and objects of the outer space regime. Thorough 
investigation often results in consensus formation about the consequences of various 
practices in space, but it can also reveal areas of persistent uncertainty. Either set of 
information is useful for the design of effective regimes. 
Domain analogies 
The persistent use of analogies for describing, understanding, and ordering the 
outer space domain represents a collective ‘coming to grips’ with the geography of this 
new domain of human activity. Analogies make familiar the otherwise unfamiliar, and 
are therefore a source of guidance for confronting new situations. Analogies to the outer 
space domain are widely employed in the speeches of policymakers, arguments of 
diplomats, reports of analysts, and studies of scholars. Their prevalence implies a lack of 
confidence in descriptions of the outer space environment. This could in part be 
accounted for by the fact that few who discuss space will ever actually go there, but the 
same can be said for the domains that have been the source of such analogies: the ocean 
(high seas and deep seabed), air space, and Antarctica. Analogies with other geophysical 
domains serve as a vehicle for importing pre-existing legal principles, norms, and rules to 
help guide the creation of an outer space regime. The assumption has been that domains 
most similar to outer space – geographically, technologically, and politically – would 
provide the most useful legal concepts for managing outer space. The materialist 
geopolitical approach suggests that this is an inherently flawed strategy, because the 
material context of the ocean, air, and frozen continent are not the same as the orbital 
space environment. This section will review why such analogies were appealing, and 
what they captured and obscured about the space environment. Analogies are chosen for 
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their fit with material surface features, as well as their fit with the interests of powerful 
actors.  
 The analogy that most dominated the early and middle periods of space activity 
compared outer space to the ocean.988 There are several features of this analogy, which 
were emphasized at different times. The version with the most uptake in the international 
community is that space is like the high seas, and should therefore be treated as an open 
access area that can be used by everyone, but not appropriated by anyone. On the high 
seas, states are responsible for enforcing regulations on their own nationals. The view 
that outer space was like high seas helped define its political-geographical border with 
airspace, which could be understood as similar to the territorial seas.989 Some of the most 
transferrable precedent came from the comparison of obligations associated with ships 
and crews, such as those regarding rescue, piracy, navigational aids, liability, and 
registration.990  
The idea that outer space is like the high seas had intuitive appeal, because both 
are vast and fluid, and contain areas of solid material. It was also readily available as a 
result of the on-going negotiations over the law of the sea, which reinforced traditional 
customs regarding high seas access. Diverse groups still regularly employ the 
ocean/space analogy. Realists draw on Alfred Thayer Mahan’s arguments about sea 
power for insights about spacepower.991 Even oceanographers reinforce the comparison, 
in terms of the requirements of research and exploration: “complex technology, 
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innovative ways of getting to and from extreme environments, and, once there, the 
courage to investigate.”992 The high seas analogy also implied a parallel between islands 
in the ocean, and ‘islands in space.’993 While islands in the ocean were historically 
territorialized, international lawyers and diplomats did not want celestial bodies to be 
characterized as res nullius and be subject to state appropriation. Neither side of the 
‘space race’ knew who would get to such places first, so both preferred a principle of 
non-appropriation. The argument that moons and asteroids should not be understood as 
islands required an analogy shift. 
The analogy between outer space and Antarctica became salient towards the end 
of negotiations, and “supplied solutions to a number of practical problems.”994 In both 
Antarctica and space, diplomats were confronted with the question: is this area res 
nullius, or is it something else? The Antarctica Treaty System (ATS) came into being in 
1959, and was understood as a test for international cooperative forms that might be 
applied to space.995 Some observers elevate the role of the ATS to the analogical “base 
model” for the outer space regime.996 It provided a rationale for the setting aside of 
territorial claims in favor of designating a commons, the retention of control over national 
objects and people, and continued space activity without the risks of Cold War rivalry.997 
The ATS and OST also both enshrine the right of peaceful scientific research.  
 The analogy between airspace and outer space is supported by their shared 
ascendant position and the notion that vehicles in either are ‘flying.’ The term ‘aerospace’ 
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reflects the belief that space is a continuation of airspace, and some legal scholars at the 
beginning of the Space Age proposed that the legal regime for airspace was an important 
precedent for outer space. Problems associated with injury, damage, and loss from space 
vehicles have been described as “identically the same…in international air law.”998 This 
suggests a similarity in terms of rules about nationality, liability, and safety. But the 
airspace analogy fell out of favor quickly, and virtually no one forwarded it after 1961. 
Peterson argues that the strongest explanation – a materialist explanation – is the “poorer 
fit with what was known about space,” particularly the basic nature of orbital 
mechanics.999 The air analogy implied that outer space should be divided into national 
segments treated as sovereign territories, but “lawyers and governments alike had trouble 
conceiving how a country might claim sovereignty over a vacuum whose location was 
constantly shifting.”1000 Of course, it was not the vacuum itself with a shifting location. 
Objects in any orbital trajectory, even those that appear stationary relatively to a point on 
Earth, are constantly moving through different points in space. The airspace analogy was 
rejected for the same basic reason partitioning was abandoned: sovereign territory makes 
little sense in the orbital space environment. 
None of these analogies is useful or appropriate for fully defining the political 
situation in outer space, because each source domain lacks the basic structural features of 
the target domain. Most obviously, the space environment is practically and perhaps 
theoretically infinite, whereas the ocean, atmosphere, and land have “knowable finite 
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bounds.”1001 In this sense, each of the three analogies commits a fundamental category 
error. It might be argued that analogies, by definition, contain only partial identity with or 
similarity to the target domain, and that what they do capture about reality justifies their 
use. The problem is that analogies are used as an expedient to understand situations 
without much information, so users are poorly suited to identify which parts of a given 
analogy are revealing, and which are concealing. Indeed, when analogies are first 
employed, the user assumes that “the target domain is similar in all respects to the source 
domain.”1002 This entails a high probability of misreading, misperception, and mistakes in 
problem definition and interest formation. What is needed is a kind of ‘geography 
criticism,’ which evaluates the extent to which a given analogy includes or omits accurate 
information about the material context.1003 Ultimately, the whole enterprise of choosing 
between ocean, air, and Antarctic analogies is flawed, because each analogy obscures 
fundamental material features of outer space. There are three major features of the EOS 
environment that these analogies overlook or distort. 
First – unlike the ocean and Antarctica, outer space contains no ecology – no 
ecosystems, no endemic life whatsoever. The presence or absence of ecosystems matters 
for governance, because ecosystems contain properties of self-sustainability and renewal 
that can moderate and regulate the impacts of human activities. Animals reproduce, 
carbon can be sequestered, ice refreezes, toxins disperse, and even continental crust is 
renewed. Outer space does not contain ecological sources of renewal and stabilization; it 
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is fragile and has limited capacity to repair itself.1004 Lack of ecosystems also means that 
outer space does not contain harvestable, renewable, resources that can go extinct. The 
features of these types of resources give a particular meaning to ‘sustainable use.’ Indeed, 
almost no material resources – finite or renewable – have been harvested from space.1005 
The space resources currently used are spatial extension resources, like orbital paths and 
ballistic missile trajectories. Even these are unlike sea and air lanes, in that their traversal 
does not entail negative externalities for ecosystems. This creates significantly different 
conditions for achieving sustainable access and use. It also represents a unique context 
for treaty negotiations – in the ocean, valuable and readily accessible resources were at 
stake, whereas in outer space, resources were speculative or difficult to access, especially 
in the near term.1006 
Second – unlike the ocean and atmosphere, outer space is not a fluid domain in 
the sense of having ‘flows’ of liquid or gaseous particles.1007 These winds and currents – 
driven by density and pressure gradients, among other material properties – shape the 
patterns of ecosystem productivity, and also distribute external inputs like air and water 
pollution. In contrast, uncontrolled and ‘cast off’ objects in orbital space tend to spread 
out evenly in a shell around the Earth. Fluidity is also absent on the lower edges of orbital 
space; the border of EOS is uncertain, but it is not understood to be undergoing constant 
fluctuation. The only exception to this is when solar flares heat the Earth’s outer 
atmosphere, causing it to temporarily expand. But this dynamism is miniscule and 
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momentary compared to other domains. The borders of the atmosphere and ocean are 
shaped by molecular movements and exchanges in and between each domain, and are 
constantly in flux due to erosion, deposition, runoff, industrial emissions, and sea surface 
exchange. In addition to the obvious coastal border between land and sea, the problems of 
air and water pollution and ocean acidification represent a porous natural border. 
Problems that originate in one domain and have negative consequences in another 
demonstrate that, for the purposes of effective collective management, the borders 
between land/air/sea are largely artificial. In contrast, terrestrial, aerial, and maritime 
activities barely affect orbital space, with the exception of the thousands of machines that 
humans intentionally send there, which are closely tracked and monitored. These global-
scale technological systems create their own material patterns and processes in non-
terrestrial domains. 
Third – space technology, and the way it facilitates access and activity in space, is 
fundamentally different from aerial and maritime technologies. Take the example of 
vehicles. ‘Ships’ are designed for operation in all three non-terrestrial domains, but their 
common name is more analogy than equivalence.1008 Aircraft and boats – commercial, 
military, recreational – are durable and reusable. In the case of watercraft, the technology 
may be very basic, and is highly diffused across the planet. Although aircraft are more 
complicated and expensive, they are usually flown for several decades before being 
decommissioned. In contrast, space access technology is extremely expensive, complex, 
and fragile. Many space vehicles, such as rockets, are ‘single use,’ and even reusable 
vehicles require significant repair and refurbishment between trips. Although this is not 
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necessarily a permanent condition of space vehicle technology, the difference in 
operational environments increases the barriers and obstacles to robust and reusable 
spacecraft. Space vehicles also need different materials and manufacturing; they can be 
weaker in some ways, for example because they do not encounter terrestrial weather, but 
they need to be stronger in others, such as shielding from radiation. These technological 
differences are significant, because they result in different numbers, distributions, and 
types of users. The more distinctive and expensive a technology, the fewer actors have 
access to it. These patterns create particular conditions for regime formation where space 
users either have vastly more or less leverage, depending on the topic at hand. Features of 
technology also impact the prospects for particular regulatory strategies. For example, the 
question of how and whether to ‘flag’ a space vehicle via permanent markings was an 
important part of the negotiations over registration.1009 Flagging a boat and painting an 
aircraft proved far easier than marking a vehicle that travels through the atmosphere at 
extremely high speeds and temperatures. In the early 1970s, the COPUOS Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee concluded “there was no feasible way to put marks capable of 
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Table 2 - Analogies for outer space 
Analogy Version Captures about space MC Misses about space MC Presence in regime 
Ocean High seas Vast, fluid; 
Solid islands; 
Obstacles to deep access; 
Coastal area (airspace) 
Infinite; 
Effective distance (speed of 
vehicles); 
Delicate and expensive 
technology; 
Security issues; 




CIL principles instead of 
positive rules; 
Rescue obligations 
Ocean/Land Seabed Vast potential mineral 
wealth; 
Obstacles to access 
No ecological context; 
Separate mineral caches 
Moon Treaty (CHM) 
Land Antarctica Harsh environment; 
unknown resource extent;  
Distance; 
Uninhabited except few 
settlements 
Mostly unable to partition; 
Requirement of advanced 
technology 
International commons;  
National control over 
humans, vehicles, stations; 
functional coordination 
comes first; scientific 
cooperation 
Atmosphere Airspace Ascendance and ‘flying’;  
Vehicle safety issues;  
Vehicle registration needs 
Orbital mechanics; 
Obstacles to partition 
Liability rules 
 
Because the political geography of outer space was constructed from a series of 
air, ocean, and Antarctic legal precedents, there is a prima facie reason to expect a 
mismatch between the political and material geography of outer space.1011 In short, 
analogies mislead. Because non-terrestrial domains are fundamentally different from one 
other, it is not likely that regime features designed to govern one domain will be effective 
when applied to another. The distinctive features of the ocean, atmosphere, and outer 
space entail different constraints, opportunities, and motivations for regime building.1012 
This geographical mismatch, combined with a heavy reliance on analogies, results in 
corrupted, distorted, and myopic conceptions of possibilities for activities and thus of 
interests and preferences in outer space. Spatial disorientation makes for difficult 
steering. Functional regimes are designed to achieve specific social, political, and 
economic purposes in a domain. But because they ‘function’ by regulating technological 
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activities in the material space environment, a clear and precise representation of the 
domain is vital to the creation of an effective political geography. A central argument of 
this chapter is that the presence or absence of reliable and detailed information about 
particular features of the outer space environment has a strong influence on both regime 
design and effectiveness. When information is lacking and understandings are 
incomplete, interests are poorly formed and problems weakly defined. The standard by 
which a representation of outer space should be evaluated is not its satisfaction of the 
interests of states and other actors, because those interests cannot be taken as pre-defined 
and given.  
An example of scientific knowledge the regime builders did have is information 
about the vacuum of space and orbital dynamics. This geophysical reality constrained the 
options for regime design. Whether or not a domain becomes a ‘global commons’ or is 
carved into sovereign territorial states is often understood to as a political question. It has 
been argued that the superpowers both benefitted from and were cheated by the Outer 
Space Treaty’s declaration of space as a global commons.1013 Interests and power cannot 
fully explain why space was declared a commons instead of carved into territorial 
parcels. An ‘unknown’ domain becomes ‘known’ not simply through the construction of 
a political geography, but through increasing scientific knowledge about the contours of 
the space itself, and the capabilities and requirements of technological access. The 
processes of scientific knowledge production and technological advancement have 
continued for decades after the construction of the regime; our abilities in and 
understandings of the outer space environment are significantly advanced relative to the 
1960s.  
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The next two sections review the state of contemporary scientific knowledge and 
technological capability in the outer space environment. While these topics are addressed 
separately, this distinction is more heuristic than real. The advancement of science and 
technology are closely related in general, but this connection is especially pronounced in 
space, and clearly demonstrated by the early case of the telescope. The innovation and 
progressive development of telescopes revolutionized our understanding of the Earth and 
the universe, by providing access to new information and stimulating the emergence of 
new ideas about space. First, outward-pointing telescopes confirmed nascent theories 
about the heliocentric solar system, the movement of the Earth, and the nature of the 
stars. As telescopes got bigger and better, astronomers began to identify asteroids and 
other celestial phenomena. Then, telescopes were placed in space, beyond the obscuring 
filter of the atmosphere. In addition to learning about more distant space objects, and with 
more detail, telescopes were pointed inward at the Earth to gather information about this 
planet. This example powerfully demonstrates how both scientific study and 
technological advance contribute to the refinement of our representations of outer space 
as a place distinct from domains within the atmospheric envelope. 
Geography 
The geography of outer space is frequently misperceived. It appears to be a 
distinctive and separate place that is empty, abstract, and smooth. But in reality, outer 
space, and especially Earth orbital space (EOS), is highly textured. EOS is the part of 
space where the Earth’s gravitational attraction is overwhelmingly dominant. Although 
EOS is vastly larger than the atmosphere in total volume, the increase in speed made 
possible because of lack of friction means that distance is actually compressed. Outer 
space travel represents a decrease in “effective distance”: even very long distances can be 
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traversed quickly when traveling at very high speeds. 1014  Because of gravity and the 
increase in speed, EOS should be understood as the outer shell of the planet, as opposed 
to the anteroom of an infinite universe.  
The environment of outer space is overwhelmingly inhospitable to human life, 
and creates a set of obstacles for the operation and maintenance of human technology. 
Outer space is difficult to get to, be in, and return from. Because it is a vacuum, terrestrial 
organisms cannot live in outer space without the assistance of advanced technology. 
Space-based objects experience enormous variation in temperature, depending on their 
location relative to the sun. Outside of the protective filter of the atmosphere, radiation 
abounds. The ‘solar wind’ entails a continuous and high-velocity flow of charged 
particles from the sun, with occasional eruptions of intense high-energy radiation called 
‘solar flares.’ An additional source of radiation is ‘cosmic rays’ from outside the solar 
system. These high-energy particles travel an appreciable fraction of the speed of light, 
and can do massive damage to biological tissue. Such radiation flows through orbital 
space, but it is also concentrated there. The Van Allen belts are dense layers of charged 
particles held around the Earth by its magnetic field, which can also do damage to 
humans and human technology. This environment makes human spaceflight very difficult 
biologically, and requires that everything done in space (with or without humans) include 
elaborate shielding. We must do artificially what the atmosphere does naturally. This 
vastly increases the cost of doing things in space, and has encouraged a shift from human 
to robot-based activity. 
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All objects in the universe exert the attractive pull of gravity. Gravity is the 
dominant force shaping the material context in outer space, and especially the areas 
surrounding celestial objects. Gravity is decisive for space activities because one has to 
overcome it to go anywhere in outer space. Because gravitational attraction falls off in a 
non-linear relationship to distance, its patterns and contours are best understood through 
the conceptual model of a ‘gravity well.’ The basic idea is that a celestial object exists at 
the bottom of the well, and the bigger the object (mass), the deeper the well. The depth of 
the gravity well represents the difficulty of escaping the attractive pull of the object. The 
gravity well means that the bulk of the energy required to get somewhere in outer space is 
expelled in the effort to escape the Earth’s gravity.  
Gravity also creates particular places in outer space; the ‘Lagrange points’ are 
“points of unusual orbital stability,” where the gravitational attractions of celestial objects 
basically cancel each other out.1015 Although these points represent a stable location for 
building things in space, they are (so far) only known theoretically. Virtually everything 
humans have done in space is within the gravity well, which includes all of Earth orbital 
space. 
 Gravitational dynamics make it possible to place artificial satellites into orbit 
around the Earth. Achieving a stable orbit requires reaching orbital velocity, which 
depends on the mass of the object to be orbited. Orbital velocity for the Earth is at least 
17,500 miles per hour. At this velocity, an object can circumnavigate the planet in about 
90 minutes. But there are several different types of orbit, or paths that a satellite can take 
in its revolutions around the Earth. Orbital paths have three features: height, eccentricity 
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(near-circular or elliptical), and inclination (angle relative to equator). The choice of orbit 
depends on the particular use of the satellite. 
Most satellites are within 500 miles of the Earth’s surface, which is relatively near 
given the vast expanse of outer space. EOS is commonly divided into three zones. Low 
Earth orbit (LEO), which extends up to 750 miles from sea level, contains the 
International Space Station, most scientific satellites, many weather satellites, and some 
reconnaissance and communications satellites. One type of LEO, polar orbit, has the 
highest possible inclination and passes over both poles. Because a satellite in polar orbit 
is always rotating north-south while the Earth rotates east-west, it can scan most of the 
surface of the Earth. This makes polar orbits especially useful for reconnaissance and 
remote sensing.1016 A special type of polar orbit is called ‘sun-synchronous,’ because it 
always passes over the equator at the same local time. Although staying in sun-
synchronous orbit requires regular adjustments, it is extremely valuable for consistent 
observation. This is especially useful for scientists, because it allows them to better track 
change in other factors by keeping the angle and strength of sunlight relatively 
constant.1017 
Medium Earth orbit (MEO), from about 1,200 to 22,000 miles, contains most 
navigation satellites (like the US GPS and European Galileo), and some communications 
and space science satellites. Two MEOs are of particular interest. The semi-synchronous 
orbit has a 12-hour period, and has a high degree of consistency and predictability. This 
is the location of the GPS system satellites. The Molniya orbit, pioneered by the 
Russians, has a high inclination and high eccentricity, such that each 12-hour orbit 
                                                 
1016 Ibid. 
1017 Holli Biebeek, “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits,” Earth Observatory, September 4, 2009. 
 
 318 
includes a slow and high altitude portion that lingers over one hemisphere. Molniya orbit 
is useful for high latitude observation and communication, and currently contains Russian 
communications and Sirius radio satellites. 
 High Earth orbit also contains satellites for weather and communications, as well 
as scientific satellites that monitor solar activity. Perhaps the most important high Earth 
orbits are geo-synchronous, meaning that the “period of revolution of the satellite is equal 
to the period of rotation of the Earth.”1018 Although the eccentricity and inclination of a 
geo-synchronous satellite can vary, a unique type of geo-synchronous orbit is ‘geo-
stationary’ (GSO). GSO is 22,300 miles above the Earth’s surface, and has an 
eccentricity and inclination of zero; it is circular and rotates directly above the equator. 
Because GSO satellites are always above the same spot on the Earth’s surface, they are 
extremely useful for regional weather monitoring and especially for communications 
satellites. A network of three communications satellites placed in GSO can achieve total 
coverage of the Earth’s surface while remaining stationary over ground-based receivers. 
Without GSO, achieving continuous coverage over one location would require a large 
string of satellites. Individual slots in GSO are particularly valuable, but crowding can 
cause interference and undermine their value so the resource is finite.  
Celestial bodies are a large physical outer space resource, and visions of visiting, 
colonizing, and exploiting them have long pervaded the Space Age. In addition to the 
planets that orbit our sun and other stars, and the moons that orbit those planets, asteroids 
populate the space environment. Humans have only known about asteroids for around 
200 years, and initially they were a curiosity for astronomers. In the past three decades, 
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however, scientists have increasingly catalogued ‘near Earth objects’ (asteroids and 
comets) that may present a risk of collision with the Earth. In these same decades, 
scientists first learned “the basic physical properties of asteroids, such as rotation rate, 
size, shape, composition, and origin.”1019 This knowledge – made possible by innovations 
in electronics and computing – supported the conceptualization of asteroids as a resource 
to be mined by humans.1020 In comparison to other celestial bodies, asteroids are 
relatively accessible, have negligible gravity wells, and are therefore easy to move and 
easy to leave. Many of them are known to contain valuable minerals, and comets may 
contain useful materials like water, methane, and ammonia.  
 Space travel had been dreamed about since Johannes Kepler’s 1634 novel 
Somnium, so at the beginning of the Space Age there were lots of mature ideas about 
what resources existed in space. Speculation about minerals on the moon and other 
celestial bodies drove excitement about a solution to terrestrial resource scarcity.1021 So 
too did ideas about space-based solar power, which might be harnessed in space or 
beamed down to the planet.  
But ultimately, the vast majority of resources exploited in space so far have been 
“spatial extension resources,” or those whose value is a function of their geography.1022 
Satellites are useful because of their position ‘above’ and orbit around the planet. This 
position allows them to be used as tools of information collection and distribution, 
including navigation and mapping, point-to-point communication and broadcasting, 
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targeting and search and rescue, among other applications. Another feature of these 
actually-exploited and non-speculative resources is that their access and use depends on 
technology, such that the resource arguably did not exist before the technology existed to 
exploit it. Additional and speculative spatial extension resources – such as the Lagrange 
points, or shields to deflect electromagnetic radiation from the sun – also depend on the 
development and application of new technology. While this relationship between 
technology and resources also exists on the surface of the planet, it is especially 
pronounced in outer space. Unlike terra firma, outer space is solely accessible because of 
technology.1023  
Technology 
Space activities emerged very rapidly; in one lifetime, humans achieved heavier-
than-air flight (1903), launched the first rocket through space (1944), sent objects into 
orbit (1957), and put a human on the moon (1969). The suddenness of access to space can 
be understood as a singular historical moment, and a “real qualitative change in human 
existence.”1024 The swift progress of the early years of the Space Age encouraged 
observers and enthusiasts to imagine wondrous new futures in space activity. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, popular and government forecasting about technological 
possibility was extremely optimistic, because observers assumed that the steep rate of 
progress would continue unabated.1025 Although scholars noted that “it is difficult for the 
human mind to adjust” to the novelty of the situation, they were comfortable predicting a 
short time frame for reaching the moon and achieving inter-planetary travel.1026 It was 
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believed that launches would get much easier, and that space would be filled with 
workers and residents in only a few decades. In the spirit of Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, 
space enthusiasts made extrapolations of technology based on what seemed possible at 
the time, and proclaimed that humans were on the brink of a “new and greater age of 
discovery.”1027  
 
These anticipations greatly under-estimated the physiological barriers to living in 
space and the challenge of affordable escape from the Earth’s gravity well. They also 
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over-estimated the feasibility of resource extraction, and the willingness of actors to 
spend large amounts of money to pursue space possibilities. Militaries in the United 
States and Soviet Union were the first to make major investments in research and 
development of space access technologies, because they could achieve significant 
benefits without needing to send any people to space. Eventually, the Space Age entered 
a plateau of incremental developments and unexpected setbacks, during which time 
disappointed space enthusiasts were forced to temper their expectations for the near 
future. The US Space Shuttle program promised routine access to space, but only five 
were built, and two were lost in catastrophic accidents. Perennial commitments to build a 
moon base or send humans to Mars remain unfulfilled. Despite this history of dashed 
expectations, a coterie of ‘space expansionists’ continues to devise schemes and lobby for 
support for more space technology.1028  
Building a regime to effectively manage current and future space technologies 
requires having a functional relationship with the evolution of space technology. A 
regime can either be flexible (which the Outer Space Treaty is not), or just well-suited to 
emerging forms of technological use of space. Technologies create the basic conditions 
for all activities in EOS. In particular, the distribution and composition of space access 
technology influences the type of practices, content of interests, and structure of problems 
in outer space. Insofar as the outer space regime ignores, overlooks, or cannot see these 
patterns, it is unlikely to achieve its basic goals. 
The geophysical features of orbital space create obstacles to access, which must 
be overcome by technology. In effect, these features set a design agenda for space 
technologies: if technologies cannot do certain things, humans or their technological 
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proxies cannot get to and operate in orbital space. Escaping the Earth’s gravity requires 
tremendous velocities, and operating in space requires shielding from extreme 
temperatures. Because of the extreme environment and advanced technology required to 
access it, outer space activities have been very expensive. These high costs partially 
explain two general trends in space technology. First, the initial dominance of military 
activities over commercial applications is at least partially explained by the ability of the 
former to invest in high cost, high-risk ventures without guaranteed financial return. 
Second, the expense and distinctiveness of space technology impede its ready and easy 
diffusion among states and other actors, especially compared to access technology in 
other domains.  
 Space vehicle technology faces three major tasks: escaping gravity to reach 
orbital space, maintaining structural integrity while there, and in some cases, safely 
returning to Earth through the atmosphere. Each step entails significant design and 
materials requirements for space vehicles. Launching requires powerful rockets and large 
amounts of fuel, and high launch costs have persisted throughout the Space Age and 
obstructed the diffusion of access to space. The approximate cost of putting a pound in 
orbit is $10,000, and roughly 85 percent of a rocket’s weight at the launch pad is fuel.1029 
Because the pull of gravity is consistent, reducing launch costs can only be achieved by 
decreasing the weight of payloads to minimize the amount of fuel required, or through 
reusable vehicles. Operations in orbit require fuel and situational awareness, to maintain 
particular orbits or avoid dangerous space debris. Re-entry seems like the easy part, 
because vehicles are moving in the direction gravity pulls them. But moving from 
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frictionless space into a friction-filled atmosphere is actually quite arduous, because 
friction causes a great increase in temperature. Indeed, space vehicles become sheathed in 
plasma for part of re-entry. This requires materials that can withstand extreme heat and 
pressure. 
 The speed and ascendency of objects in orbital space makes this domain an 
attractive location for weapons, which may be based in orbital space or simply travel 
through it (like an ICBM). The perspective from space is also valuable: the information 
gathered by satellites operates as a ‘force multiplier’ for existing weapons technologies, 
providing targeting information and performing communication functions. It also 
supports a more general type of reconnaissance, which was especially valuable for the 
United States in the early Cold War. Although military interests and actors were the first 
to develop and use space technology, it has been estimated that ninety percent of this 
technology is “dual use,” meaning that the same capabilities can be used for non-military 
interests.1030 Two primary examples of dual use technology are rockets and satellites. 
 Satellites – objects placed in orbit around the Earth – currently have three major 
applications: remote sensing, communications, and navigation. All three types of 
satellites began orbiting in the 1960s, although navigation and remote sensing satellites 
were the exclusive province of national militaries during this period. ‘Remote sensing’ 
includes both looking ‘out’ and looking ‘in,’ and is useful for weather forecasting, 
reconnaissance, and astronomy. Communications and navigation are useful for 
coordinating military activities and targeting weapons, but also for international 
television broadcasts and finding one’s way in a new city. Indeed, the information 
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gathered and transmitted via satellite is utilized for a wide variety of purposes, and 
satisfies the interests of a large and diverse set of actors. To perform their commercial, 
military, and monitoring functions, satellites utilize delicate and expensive hardware, 
which opens them to risk of damage, and their owners to risk of major losses. In general, 
however, recent advances in computing, manufacturing, and corporate business models 
have radically increased access to satellites.1031 Launch costs remain high, but are less of 
a barrier as payloads get lighter and more sophisticated and investment increases. 
Space enthusiasts are currently heralding a ‘Second Space Age,’ which promises 
wide-scale exploitation and near-term colonization.1032 These predictions, as in the 1960s, 
tend to be saturated with optimism and imaginative thinking about technological 
innovation.1033 Space anticipations are also inspired by the significant development of 
private space activities, driven in large part by billionaire space enthusiasts. The prospect 
of space tourism is tied to continued development of aerospace vehicles. The idea of solar 
power collecting satellites is often floated as a solution to climate change. The biggest 
bottleneck for access to space has always been limitations in launch technology, which 
has not advanced significantly since the early Space Age.1034 But some still predict 
"orders of magnitude reduction of launch costs" before 2020.1035 There remains a 
persistent belief in the possibility of new launch technologies, given the right amount of 
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investment.1036 Space enthusiasts envision a breakthrough in access in the form of ‘space 
elevators,’ among other ideas, which will facilitate space-based industry and the 
colonization of space stations. The raw materials for these projects can be hypothetically 
gathered in space, including energy from solar collectors and raw materials from the 
mining of asteroids. Many scientists and engineers express skepticism about these plans, 
especially colonization, but some future technologies – such as asteroid mining – may be 
more realistic medium-term prospects.  
Ineffectiveness 
It is inherently difficult to evaluate the success of a governance regime compared 
to the counterfactuals, which include (1) no regime, (2) the same regime implemented 
sooner, and (3) a different regime altogether. This project evaluates the OST-centered 
regime by reference to its own goals and purposes at the time of its formation: peaceful, 
sustainable, and equitable use.1037 The outer space regime has a mixed history; both 
successes and failures can be identified. In general, there is a good record of compliance 
with international law in outer space. While this seems like a good metric of 
effectiveness, the permissiveness and ambiguity of the regime make non-compliance 
unlikely. The OST regime prohibits few specific things, and “permits states wide 
discretion in initiating, continuing, dispensing with, and defining all forms of outer space 
activity.”1038 The ‘province of mankind’ designation was accepted by the superpowers 
“on the general assumption that it will not really burden their programs and…they 
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themselves will determine unilaterally how it is to be implemented.”1039 But the OST 
regime did contribute to strategic stability during the Cold War; its institutions are 
credited with diminishing Cold War military rivalry and helping channel superpower 
competition into the realm of civilian science. Two of its component treaties – the OST 
and LTBT – are also important parts of the nuclear arms control regime. Finally, the 
outer space regime can be understood as a success because of its durability. Core regime 
components, such as non-appropriation, enjoy broad compliance and status as customary 
international law. But that durability is also a sign of rigidity, and science and technology 
in outer space have advanced considerably since the dense early period of regime 
formation. 
Several decades after most of the outer space regime entered into force, 
technological change, scientific knowledge, and ambiguous political geographies are 
undermining its effectiveness. The OST regime is confronted with new uses, new 
problems, and newly understood problems in orbital space. Each of these developments 
implicates the requirements for a functional regime that achieves peaceful, equitable, and 
sustainable use of EOS. The OST has no “built-in system for consultations and regular 
interactions,” because it was not designed to be easily updated in the light of new 
scientific knowledge or technological capabilities.1040 This is a regime design flaw 
because the interests of an increasingly large space ‘public,’ and the collective problems 
they face, change over time as a result of technological advancement and improved 
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scientific knowledge. The result is a regime that is ineffective in operation, and 
incomplete in scope.  
The outer space regime was built too fast, and then too slow. Its core agreements 
were negotiated during a period of strong internationalism, during which states could 
gain prestige through international cooperation.1041 The OST was signed, ratified, and 
entered into forced in the span of a single year. It took less than a decade to negotiate the 
rest of the OST-regime, and since the 1970s no binding international laws or treaties have 
been added. This concentrated burst of regime formation, followed by decades of 
inactivity, created three basic regime pathologies. First, the OST regime includes an 
anachronistic, but embedded, image of outer space that makes it poorly suited to current 
realities. This ‘frozen ontology’ of EOS includes the ideas that outer space is an infinite 
sink that contains no major threats, and states are the only actors. Second, the OST 
regime does not account for changes in the composition and distribution of space 
technology, and generally permits any technological uses that are not specifically 
outlawed. Third, the regime relies on a simplistic form of nationalization, which overly 
constrains the scope of both restrictions and obligations. These general regime 
pathologies are evident in four cases or issue areas: militarization, space debris, 
commercialization, and asteroid collision. 
The regime failed to de-militarize, or even de-weaponize outer space. Navigation, 
communication, and remote sensing satellites are vital supports to advanced military 
operations. Ballistic missiles can still traverse orbital space without legal violation or 
social disapprobation.1042 Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), which come in a variety of 
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forms and basing schemes, are not currently prohibited. Perhaps most concerning is the 
general recognition that the OST only bans the emplacement of weapons of mass 
destruction in space, leaving room for highly advanced conventional weapons. Indeed, 
the space policy of US President George W. Bush was widely seen as a move towards 
weaponizing orbital space.1043 The fear of an arms race in outer space continues to 
dominate discussion of space issues in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.  
The regime has failed to prevent the multiplication of debris present in orbital 
space. Debris has been added to the space environment since the first launches in the 
1950s and 1960s. Space debris has multiple sources, most of which are intentional or 
known by-products of launches, tests, and space systems past their useable lifetimes. The 
high speed of objects in the frictionless terrain of outer space makes collisions extremely 
damaging, and increases the risk of congestion and disruption. The biggest risk is 
‘breeding’ debris, which occurs when collisions cause more debris, which cause more 
collisions. The cascade or “domino effect” could degrade the usability of the space 
environment for all actors, a problem which was recognized in the late 1970s. The 
problem of debris is the subject of scientific consensus, and yet the regime includes no 
binding requirements regarding debris creation, and no collective efforts to find a 
solution to the problem.  
The regime is ambiguous regarding the activities of commercial space actors. 
While companies involved in launching payloads do require authorization by the 
‘launching state,’ the norms to which a state is responsible are undeveloped, and there is 
a reasonable risk of ‘flags of convenience’ or ‘spaceports of convenience’ system 
emerging. In terms of commercial resource extraction, there remains substantial 
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disagreement about whether, and under what conditions, a company can extract resources 
from a celestial body and claim them as private property. As asteroid mining moves from 
the speculative to the prototype phase, questions about ownership over entire asteroids 
will emerge. Companies are asserting that they can claim asteroids, while a surface 
reading of the treaty text suggests otherwise. 
Asteroids present a risk as well as an opportunity. OST declares that space is to be 
accessed and used for the benefit of all humankind, but is silent on the idea of risk and 
threat for all humankind. There is nothing about the risk of asteroid collision in the 
original treaty, because of geophysical ignorance of the threat at the time of regime 
formation. While the technology exists to track dangerous asteroids and comets, there is 
no dedicated international mechanism for doing so. Although there are many proposals 
for asteroid deflection when the need arises, no commercial or national actor has invested 
in the development of a capability that would protect the planet and benefit all of its 
inhabitants. The asteroid risk ought to be an easy case, because it is a well-understood 
threat to all humans, which can be mitigated by collective investment in tracking and 




Table 3 - Evaluation of outer space regime effectiveness 
 Success Failure 
Militarization No superpower conflict 
No WMD basing 
No nuclear testing 
ASAT moratorium 
Risk of PAROS 
ASAT testing 
Permits conventional weapons 
No ASAT ban  




Risk of privatization 
Flags/ports of convenience 
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Asteroid deflection Some detection 
Some deflection planning 
Underfunded detection 
No collective action 




The outer space regime has a “military heritage.”1044 Cold War rivalry was a 
crucial impetus for doing things in space, and military expenditures funded targeted 
research and the construction of the first space rockets and satellites. Military security 
and strategy drove much of the early regime building in outer space, especially 
concerning reconnaissance and nuclear weapons testing and basing (UNGA Resolution 
1884, LTBT, OST). EOS activities quickly came to be understood as a source of both 
security and insecurity. The ascendant position of satellites over territorial states was an 
advantage but also brought vulnerability: satellites could target and/or deliver weapons 
from space, and were vulnerable to weapons from the ground. Because satellites were 
very useful for commercial and military purposes, but very vulnerable to interference or 
destruction, users had a strong incentive to cooperate to achieve security. And yet the 
original regime is extremely permissive; it does not mention ICBMs or ASAT weapons, 
and it only prohibits the basing of weapons of mass destruction in space. During the Cold 
War, both superpowers “demonstrated creativity, persistence, and open checkbooks in 
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pursuit of diverse ASAT weapon systems.”1045 But they did not use ASATs against one 
another. 
 Although a de facto ASAT moratorium existed between the superpowers for 
many decades, “the reemergence of ASAT development and testing” in the 21st century 
calls into question the durability (or even existence) of the moratorium.1046 While some 
argue that the moratorium can still function as customary international law, the United 
States opposes any recognized agreement.1047 And the weak reaction to ASAT tests by 
the international community in the recent past demonstrates that customary international 
law against the development of such weapons is weak at best.1048 There is currently a 
strong sense that challenges to traditional space security are increasing.1049 The 
international community is “haunted” by the specter of weaponization, which may be 
triggered by strategic rivalry between the US and China, unintentional but misinterpreted 
collisions, or new and hostile rogue state actors.1050 The 2006 US National Space Policy 
added to concerns by approaching the “threshold of weaponization” without actually 
crossing it.1051 Indeed, there remain tendencies and attitudes in the US military that favor 
a form of spacepower or space command.1052 China, Russia, and the United States all 
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possess ASAT capabilities, latent or explicit.1053 In 2010, India announced the launch of 
an ASAT program. Even without adding new actors, ASAT capabilities are substantial. 
New micro-satellites increase the number and decrease the distinctiveness of potential 
ASAT weapons.1054 Because kinetic impact is so damaging to satellites, almost anything 
can be used as an anti-satellite weapon, so almost any space user can develop ASAT 
capability. 
Concern regarding the risk of ASAT use has placed the prevention of an arms 
race in outer space (PAROS) at the top of the agenda for the United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament (which has been stalled on the issue for over a decade, because of US 
opposition). New military competition in space is thought to be inevitable without a new 
and more comprehensive legal regime.1055 ASATs were already being researched at the 
time of regime formation, so why is OST ineffective at PAROS? The basic security 
situation for satellites (vulnerability) has not changed substantially in the last several 
decades, although the number and sophistication of ASATs have. With regard to 
achieving space security, some argue “technology has outpaced diplomacy.”1056 But the 
problem may be more fundamental than a lag between technological change and regime 
augmentation. 
Several features of the outer space regime undermine its ability to redress sources 
of military insecurity in space. First, the Cold War created a division between civilian and 
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military space programs and issues.1057 Domestically, NASA and the Department of 
Defense (specifically the Air Force) each handle space activities. Internationally, 
COPUOS deals with all space issues except for weaponization or militarization, which is 
a topic for the Conference on Disarmament. This decreases the linkages with other issues, 
and increases the influence of military actors and interests. Second, military doctrines 
regarding outer space “primarily build upon airpower doctrines,” a phenomenon most 
obvious in the United States, but also modeled by other militaries with space assets.1058 
Airpower doctrine emphasizes the strategic advantage of controlling the “high ground,” 
and calls for both anti-space and space-based forces. This analogy may distort the 
calculations relating force composition, structure, and posture to security objectives. 
Third, Article 4 of OST outlaws nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 
in orbit, but in outer space “just about anything could be a weapon.”1059 This feature of 
the OST regime cuts to the heart of the issue regarding continued insecurity in space: 
existing and proposed institutions rely on the distinctiveness of the threat.  
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The OST did seek to outlaw weapons in space, but determining what was a 
weapon and how to ban them presented a challenge for negotiators. The main axis of the 
early debate was between the peaceful/aggressive distinction preferred by the United 
States, and the military/non-military distinction preferred by the Soviet Union. Although 
the peaceful/aggressive distinction won out, it triggered a “long and continuous debate” 
about the meaning of each term.1060 The vast majority of space technology is ‘dual use,’ 
meaning that it is difficult to distinguish objects based on their potential for peaceful or 
aggressive use.1061 And although the superpowers wanted to protect their vulnerable 
military and commercial satellites, they also wanted to maintain the advantages of the 
‘high ground’ perspective and route (for ICBMs). The debate over the meaning of 
‘peaceful’ space activities demonstrated the futility of outlawing specific intentions in 
space, and the dual use nature of most space assets makes banning objects a non-starter. 
Both of these strategies suffer from a lack of distinctiveness; it is difficult or impossible 
to tell whether an object is intended to be used, or will someday be used, as a space 
weapon. While a few commentators argue that some types of in-orbit ASATs are 
distinguishable by the configuration of their rocket thrusters, this does not include the full 
range of potential ASAT systems.1062 Most conclude that defining space weapons in an 
effort to control them is not feasible.1063 So while the OST regime requires that ‘space 
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activities’ and ‘space objects’ must be for peaceful purposes, the only operative and 
effective prohibition has been the clear rule against placing weapons of mass destruction 
in orbit. 
Proponents of a new anti-ASAT treaty suggest that activities should be regulated 
or prohibited, including those that “intentionally create debris” and those that use force 
against other space objects.1064 There not currently enough momentum to expect a treaty 
in the near or medium term, primarily because of US opposition. But this strategy also 
replicates the distinctiveness issue. It will be difficult or impossible to discern whether a 
collision was intentional or unintentional; behavior can be threatening as a result of 
negligence or careful planning. There is a problem of discrimination, where a test or 
targeted use may indiscriminately harm non-target users. There is also a problem of 
attribution, because the prevalence of ambient and dangerous space debris increases the 
risk of unintentional damage, which may be misperceived as intentional and planned. The 
basic problem is the focus on regulating the intended activities of objects controlled by 
actors, which appears in the existing regime and also proposals for its augmentation. This 
represents a functional instead of spatial approach to governance in outer space. 
Understanding the difference between these approaches demonstrates that another way is 
possible. 
The functionalist approach seeks to regulate on the basis of what an object is 
doing, rather than where it is located, and therefore depends on the capabilities and 
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distinctiveness of space access technology. A functionalist approach outlaws 
weaponization of space by focusing on the weaponization of ‘space objects.’ This 
presents a category challenge: what is a ‘space’ object? A customary understanding has 
developed “to the effect that any object in orbit is in space.”1065 This type of definition 
has been described as “solipsism” because it depends on what humans can do with their 
technology.1066 Of course, what space objects can do changes with technological 
advancement; for example, the von Karman Primary Jurisdiction line, often used to 
demarcate the boundary of outer space, begins where conventional aircraft cannot 
currently venture.1067 The main challenge to the functionalist approach to delimitation is 
the so-called ‘aerospace plane’ or ‘near space vehicle,’ an as-yet un-achieved 
technological advance that would facilitate access to the legal gray area where satellites 
cannot orbit and planes cannot fly.1068  
The spatial approach, which is not present in the existing outer space regime, 
seeks a non-arbitrary dividing line, such as the density of air molecules, the altitude 
where air molecules stop rotating with the Earth, the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere, or the point at which meteors become luminous.1069 But scientists do not 
agree on the precise locations for most of these thresholds, many of which are constantly 
changing because of atmospheric dynamism. And no one feature commands superior 
logic or legitimacy for delimiting the outer space domain. Neither the spatial nor the 
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functional approach to delineating outer space is obvious or unchanging. The geophysical 
boundary is fuzzy, and technological capability is fluid over time. 
As a possible alternative to the existing OST regime, a spatial approach would 
eliminate the distinctiveness issue by prioritizing the features of the EOS environment as 
relatively free of debris, radioactivity, and electro-magnetic pulses. Defining the domain 
of outer space may seem arbitrary, but should not be understood as difficult. There are 
many geophysical differences between airspace and orbital space that make the two 
domains naturally distinct. Instead of the security of individual space assets, a spatial 
approach would prioritize a broader form of environmental security. It would thus 
prohibit intentional or negligent maneuvers that risk producing additional contaminants, 
especially debris. It would be the creation of debris, electromagnetic pulse, or 
radioactivity that makes a state liable or punishable, not the intention or the character of 
the object, or even the activity. Penalizing or prohibiting based on outcome relative to the 
outer space environment resolves the distinctiveness issue and collapses the 
civilian/military distinction. 
Space debris 
Orbital space is a unique security environment where users are highly vulnerable, 
and security is more interdependent than in other realms.1070 The lack of an atmosphere 
means that space objects can travel very fast in proportion to the volume they traverse, so 
the ‘effective distance’ in near Earth space is small.1071 This increases the risks of 
congestion and disruption. One form of non-military insecurity is the risk of space debris, 
which theoretically ‘breed’ when collisions cause cascades of break up. NASA defines 
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space debris as “artificial objects, including derelict spacecraft and spent launch vehicle 
orbital stages, left in orbit which no longer serve a useful purpose.” Space debris is not 
biodegradable, and the only natural mechanism for its removal is orbital decay, through 
which debris in LEO eventually falls into (and often burns up in) the atmosphere.1072 
Debris in higher orbits will eventually decay, but the timespans are much longer. In GEO, 
for example, debris is relatively permanent.1073 Many of these objects are very small, but 
dangerous because of their high speed and the difficulty involved in tracking them. 
Indeed, space debris tends to cluster in the most valuable orbits. Space debris is an 
“indiscriminate threat,” an enormous and, for many decades, under-appreciated problem 
for which the existing outer space regime has no solution.1074 The regime has been 
ineffective at securing safe access to the space environment, in large part because the 
delayed arrival of consensus about the threat meant that interests were poorly formed at 
the time of negotiation.  
The construction of the OST regime occurred during a period of ignorance about 
the geophysical-technological interaction that creates the space debris problem. NASA 
scientists recognized the hazard of natural space debris in the early 1960s, but 
anthropogenic debris was not an object of focused research until the mid-1970s.1075 The 
problem of multiplying orbital space debris was first described by NASA scientists 
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Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in their 1978 paper “Collision Frequency of 
Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt.” The phenomenon of ‘breeding’ or 
multiplying debris became known as the ‘Kessler Syndrome.’ According to Kessler 
himself, “nobody believed it initially.”1076 The idea of risk and limitation in orbital space 
contradicted the prevailing view that space was a “limitless environment” and a “virtually 
infinite sink for pollution.”1077 At the time of regime formation, the high seas analogy did 
not invite consideration of the risk of environmental pollution. During this period, the 
ocean was conceived as a “great neutralizer, with virtually unlimited ability to absorb 
noxious substances.”1078 
Despite this general optimism, the COPUOS Scientific and Technical 
subcommittee started discussing the issue of debris in 1980.1079 But the “flow of 
documents and papers” over the next decade “failed to stimulate speedy policy 
development at the UN.”1080 There was some unilateral, non-binding action by concerned 
space actors. NASA and the Department of Defense initiated mitigation practices in 
1982, and US Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush called for others to 
adopt techniques that minimize debris.1081 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, more and 
more scientists, scholars, and diplomats were growing concerned.1082 Articles in the 
journal Space Policy described debris as a “serious threat” about which “concerted action 
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is urgently needed.”1083 Even then, observers remarked on the disconnection between the 
“wide consensus” among scientists, and the inaction of space actors, policymakers, and 
diplomats.1084 The United States Office of Technology Assessment recommended an 
“international educational program” to make “the hazards of space debris better 
understood.”1085 
 During the 1990s the space law and policy community engaged in a general 
debate about how to define and achieve space security. By the late 1990s, a common 
understanding of the space debris problem prompted more widespread calls for a 
regulatory regime.1086 But disagreement about the actual extent of the threat still impeded 
progress on specific norms and rules.1087 Groups working on the debris problem included 
the Science and Technology subcommittee of COPUOS, the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee, and the International Organization for Standardization. In 2007, 
COPUOS and later the UNGA endorsed a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 
which are non-binding ‘rules of the road’ that encourage the adoption of practices and 
techniques that reduce debris creation (Resolution 62/217).  
These non-binding augmentations to the outer space regime are insufficient to 
address the debris problem. While the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines decrease the 
addition of debris from new launches, they are inadequate for preventing debris 
multiplication from in-orbit collisions. Kessler and other NASA scientists argue that to 
prevent the continued growth of orbital debris would require “100% compliance” with 
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the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, in addition to an active debris removal 
program.1088 And such compliance is increasingly unlikely, given the expanding number 
of space actors and types of space activities. Small satellites may be a special concern. 
Planetary Resources Inc. is investing in the creation of small 3-D printed space objects, 
and India just launched over 100 small satellites at one time.1089 These satellites radically 
increase the number of objects in orbit, and they are also unlikely to contain the necessary 
fuel and thrusters for post-mission disposal and active collision avoidance. Indeed, very 
few operational satellites have the capability to dispose of themselves post-mission, either 
by increasing their orbital decay or by moving to a ‘graveyard orbit.’ And “most of the 
current population does not have the capability to maneuver” for collision avoidance.1090 
Practical, economical, and effective debris remediation technologies do not yet exist.1091 
 Even with debris mitigation, collision avoidance, and remediation techniques, a 
basic condition of effectiveness is absent. One of the major obstacles to solving the debris 
problem is insufficient and uncoordinated ‘space situational awareness,’ or mapping and 
tracking of space objects. The United States maintains the most complete database of 
space objects, including active and operational space objects as well as debris. But even 
the US catalog does not track objects smaller than 10 centimeters, despite the technical 
ability to track objects as small as 5 centimeters.1092 No existing catalog of space objects 
is exhaustive, and most have discrepancies regarding numbers, sources, and orbits of 
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debris.1093 A coordinated system that collects and disseminates data about space objects is 
an important pre-requisite for debris mitigation and removal, but it will require enhanced 
communication and cooperation among space actors.1094 The information has to be 
comprehensive if it is to work, and a catalog has to work to gain credibility and authority 
among space users. A high level of accuracy in predicting collisions will be necessary to 
“minimize the number of false maneuvers and gain the confidence of the payload 
operators.”1095 
 The absence of investment in post-mission disposal, collision avoidance, space 
situational awareness, and remediation technologies can be explained by incoherent 
interest formation. Awareness of and interest in the debris issue is low, even among 
scientists; “the scale and severity of this problem does not appear to be widely 
understood.”1096 If awareness and interest were high, the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and 
2009 Iridium/Kosmos collision would have generated a public response.1097 This 
situation demonstrates the limitations of the expanded notion of space security that 
accompanied the formation of the OST regime. In the early Space Age, events like the 
Starfish Prime test (1962) and the Apollo 1 explosion (1967) generated a newfound 
commonality of interests, which expanded the notion of security to include reliable and 
safe access to space.1098 But this understanding of collective security – evident in treaties 
like LTBT, OST, and the Rescue Agreement – did not reach the level of environmental 
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security, which focuses on the quality of the environment instead of just the safety of 
space actors. Environmental security did not become the framework for understanding 
risks in outer space in part because debris was not a recognized problem. But the absence 
of an environmental security framework has decreased the visibility of the problem, even 
after the community of space scientists recognized the magnitude of the risk.  
 An environmental approach to space security could potentially contribute to the 
development of a more coherent and urgent collective interest surrounding space debris, 
and is especially suited to a domain like EOS that includes mostly spatial extension 
resources. This view was introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and proposes 
seeing the debris problem as “environmental in character.”1099 Outer space is thereby cast 
as a “natural environment which may be subject to detrimental changes caused by 
spaceflight activities.”1100 Defining outer space as “an ecological resource” would 
increase “understanding of the value of the environment itself” and import broad and 
long-term understandings of human interests from the environmental movement.1101 The 
environmental perspective on outer space would, for example, highlight “the 
responsibilities of this first space generation to all future generations.”1102 This approach 
understands space security as an environmental management problem.1103 When viewed 
from the perspective of any single actor, space debris appears as a diffuse and distant 
vulnerability. Preserving the space environment for future use depends on “every state’s 
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appreciation that its own self-interest lies in preserving this precious common good.”1104 
When the geophysical reality of EOS is foregrounded, “the central goal of preserving the 
operational space environment binds all space participants with a common purpose.”1105 
The first task, then, would be the improvement and centralization of space situational 
awareness, which serves as an indicator of overall environmental quality.1106 
 There are several ways in which the existing outer space regime is stymied by its 
failure to adopt an environmental approach. Article 9 of the OST requires state parties to 
“undertake appropriate international consultations” before engaging in an activity that 
would “cause potentially harmful interference” with other space activities. This part of 
the treaty is a general mandate to address the issue of interference, without specific rules, 
and has been described as “vague and insufficient.”1107 It is unclear whether the creation 
of space debris falls under the legal rubric of “potentially harmful interference.” The lack 
of mandated consultations by debris-creating space actors suggests that they either do not 
see debris creation as “potentially harmful,” or are simply ignoring their legal 
responsibility. It is note-worthy that Article 9 requires consultation in the event of 
“harmful interference with activities of other State Parties.” This demonstrates how the 
collective security approach overlooks harm to the environment. Space debris is not a 
direct form of interference, so it is easy to pretend that it does not qualify as “harmful” 
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because no specific actor is harmed. This view is also evident in the fact that a state is not 
liable for the “mere presence of orbital debris.”1108 
 The applicability of the Liability Convention to the issue of space debris is also 
uncertain, but generally treated as if there was no connection between the two. The 
Convention applies absolute liability to space actors that cause harm on Earth, and fault-
based liability in the case of harm caused in outer space. As per Article 1, the Liability 
Convention applies to “space objects” defined as including “component parts of a space 
object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.” All artificial and anthropogenic 
space debris is a space object, part of a space object, or part of a launch vehicle. Article 8 
clarifies that the ownership of outer space objects does not change depending on their 
location on celestial bodies, in orbit, or returned to Earth. International lawyers have 
interpreted this to mean “jurisdiction and control of a State over its space objects is 
permanent.”1109 So the text of the Liability Convention seems to clearly indicate that 
space debris ought to be understood as owned by the launching and/or registry state, 
which is therefore liable for any harm caused by it. There is no separate legal definition 
of “debris.” 
 This interpretation is unlikely to be accepted by the major space actors 
responsible for almost all of currently orbiting debris: the United States, Russia, and 
China. There are several ambiguous features of the relevant law that can be used to avoid 
the costs associated with liability. First is the problem of attribution: it is often difficult or 
impossible to prove the origin of a particular piece of debris.1110 Space debris is a 
problem more akin to ocean acidification than oil dumping; it is hard to keep track of 
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individual contributions to the problem. Second, it is difficult to ascertain fault. What if 
the launch occurred before debris was a known problem? What if the debris was a result 
of a previous collision? What if the damaged satellite could have but did not maneuver to 
avoid collision? The Liability Convention provides no answers to these questions.  
 Active remediation will be required to solve the debris problem, but the existing 
outer space regime discourages investment in the development or deployment of the 
necessary technology. In a 2011 article in Space Policy Brian Weeden provides a useful 
overview of the legal and political challenges associated with any future debris 
remediation project. Assuming that a remediation technique is demonstrated to work, its 
owner or the international community will have to make decisions about which debris to 
remove. There exists no consensus about which debris to prioritize, and there are several 
potential criteria (including ease of maneuver, size of object, and location in heavily 
trafficked orbits). Because there is no legal distinction between functional and non-
functional space objects, there may be disputes about whether a non-operational satellite 
is subject to removal. The owner may see the defunct object as a useful placeholder, a 
future ‘fixer-upper,’ or a stockpile of valuable intellectual property. Article 8 of OST 
explicitly provides for continuous jurisdiction and ownership over space objects, which 
creates a legal barrier to non-targeted debris removal.1111 And because debris removal 
technology will certainly be dual use, investment and operations may cause distrust 
within the space community. Remediation techniques that target defunct satellites are 
exactly an ASAT capability. And once removal is underway, there is a chance that 
                                                 




operations may cause additional unintentional hazards for space activity, such as 
accidental collision.1112 
 The problem of space debris was unknown and unanticipated at the time of OST 
regime formation. The early dominance of the high seas analogy did not encourage 
critical reflection on the possibility of environmental harm through pollution. Space 
actors, international lawyers, and the general public believed that space was a vast, even 
limitless, environment. The importance of effective distance and concentration of 
valuable orbital pathways was generally neglected in considerations of space security. 
The resulting collective security approach embedded within the regime makes it difficult 
for space debris mitigation, liability, or remediation to fit within existing institutional 
forms. An environmental approach to space security is the best way to confront the 
problem of space debris, because it creates a specific and coherent collective interest, and 
sidesteps attribution issues. 
Commercialization 
Like many international institutions, the OST regime is fundamentally state-
centric. It was created during a period in which state governments and/or militaries were 
the only space actors. The recent emergence of private space actors creates complications 
for the existing OST regime. In particular, the increase in space activity by private actors 
raises questions about their rights and duties in outer space. The basic problem is that the 
legal regime for private and commercial space enterprises is unclear, and subject to 
competing interpretations. A review of the relevant regime provisions, and a survey of 
private space activities, will set the stage for an analysis of the sources of this problem. 
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The original regime architects did not intend for the OST, a “Treaty on 
Principles,” to be a permanent code governing all aspects of space activity. The Treaty 
was just a modest affirmation of principles, offered in the annex of UNGA Resolution 
2222. One of these principles defines the relationship between member states and space 
actors, which is very similar to the flagging system present on the high seas.1113 Article 6 
of OST requires the “authorization and continuing supervision” of all space actors by 
states, who are responsible for enforcing the regulatory regime. Article 8 adds that states 
retain control and jurisdiction over their space objects regardless of their location. The 
OST therefore prohibits private and unregulated activity in space.1114 The Liability and 
Registration Conventions clarify which state has legal responsibility for space launches 
and objects. Article 1 of the Liability Convention defines the “launching state” as a state 
that “launches or procures the launching of a space object” and/or the state “from whose 
territory or facility a space object is launched.” Article 1 of the Registration Convention 
adds the concept of a “state of registry,” which is the launching state on whose register 
the space object is listed. Two UNGA Resolutions – 59/115 and 62/101 – add some detail 
to these concepts, but basically implore states to clarify their own practices regarding 
jurisdiction, registration, and ownership.  
 The commercialization of outer space activities was not on the horizon of 
feasibility when OST was negotiated. Private firms participated in the 1960s as 
contractors, and in the 1970s as providers of enhanced remote sensing data.1115 In the 
1980s, deregulation of communications satellites in many countries increased the 
involvement of private firms, including growing competition in the payload and launch 
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sectors.1116 The persistently high cost of launch technology has historically kept the 
number of space users low, but recent advances in computing, communication, and 
manufacturing have decreased the cost of satellites.1117 Today, multinational companies, 
non-governmental organizations, and venture capitalists are important space actors.1118 
Private investment in space now outstrips government investment, and the commercial 
sector is creating new markets without the direct assistance of governments.1119 While 
early space actors were immediately concerned with the survival and structural integrity 
of space objects, space enthusiasts now speak of achieving “maximum benefit for 
mankind” through “[opening] up outer space for development.”1120 Cross-national 
collaborations are also more common; “traditional distinctions between public and 
private, and domestic and international are blurring.”1121 There are currently four main 
sectors of the commercial space industry: satellites services, satellite manufacturing, 
launch services, and ground equipment. The development of small satellites boosts both 
satellite manufacturing and satellite and launch services, because it “promises to increase 
payload versatility while reducing manufacturing and launch costs"1122 
The last decade has been marked by an “increased acceptance of high-risk 
commercial space business ventures.”1123 American ‘space entrepreneurs’ advocate for 
private enterprise to take the lead on pioneering new uses for space, and a handful of 
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‘tech’ billionaires have formed companies to actualize this goal.1124 Planetary Resources 
Inc., Deep Space Industries, and the Shackleton Energy Company all have plans for 
commercial mining, either on asteroids or the Moon. Space X, Blue Origin, and others 
are investing in reusable launch systems to reduce cost.1125 The Golden Spike Company 
and Moon Express are focused on the prospect of tourist trips to the moon, although it is 
Space X that recently announced plans for a 2018 tourist trip around the moon.1126 Other 
potential commercial space applications include space business parks, fast global package 
delivery, movie studios, orbital transfer infrastructures, and energy and material support 
to the International Space Station or potential lunar bases.1127 Commercial space activities 
are understood as a “largely unexplored and untapped frontier.”1128 
 The multiplication of a large number of small, private space actors creates a risk 
that these new users will “operate independent [sic] of national policies.”1129 
Commercialization of space activities presents two basic challenges for the outer space 
regime: the question of private property, and the possibility of the emergence of a ‘flags 
of convenience’ system. Because the diffusion of space technology was delayed, and 
commercial space actors did not operate independently until the 1980s, the outer space 
regime was not constructed with these uses and users in mind. The basic regime flaw is 
that OST created a two-layer regulatory system (international-state) for what became 
three-layer regulation problem (international-state-private). Declaring outer space the 
‘province of all mankind’ established a weak res communis regime, which explicitly 
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excludes sovereign appropriation, but is unclear on the question of private property. The 
regime also assumes, but does not establish, a meaningful and substantive connection 
between states and private actors, as evidenced by the multiple criteria through which an 
actor can choose the state with which it registers. 
Most widely discussed is the question of private property. The prospect of private 
asteroid and lunar mining raises important legal and regulatory issues.1130 On its face, the 
principles and rules of the OST regime seem to prohibit private property in space. Article 
2 of the OST declares that outer space is “not subject to national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Some space 
scholars interpreted this provision to “bar any property rights in outer space 
resources.”1131 In the common law tradition, sovereignty is required for the recognition of 
private property. But in the civil law tradition, property rights are understood to be 
independent of sovereignty.1132 Article 6, which provides for state authorization and 
supervision, has been described as “the foundation of the de jure and de facto 
subordination of private interests in extra-terrestrial commercial development.”1133 
Although the view that the OST regime prohibits private property is “widely prevalent,” 
these interpretations of the treaty are increasingly challenged.1134 Actors on both sides of 
the debate have an incentive to resolve it: entrepreneurs and economic nationalists who 
favor private property want to redress the legal ambiguity that discourages investment, 
and OST traditionalists who oppose private property want to stem the tide of 
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commercialization before vested interests gain a major foothold in space activities. 
Because many space resources are non-exhaustible (or functionally non-exhaustible) and 
non-excludable, there are a wide variety of potential allocation schemes.1135  
 The Moon Treaty1136 (1979) offers an answer to this question, but none of the 
major space powers are party to it. Negotiations over the Moon Treaty were initiated by 
the United States and Soviet Union in the late 1960s, and the United States proposed the 
addition of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (CHM) principle in 1972.1137 The fact that 
many diplomats drew on an analogy with the deep seabed to precisely define CHM 
“triggered very clear perceptions of interest by all the governments involved.”1138 Article 
11 declares that “Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon [and other celestial 
bodies]…shall become the property of any state, international, inter-governmental or 
non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of 
any natural person.” By ruling out all these possible forms of ownership, the Moon as 
‘common heritage’ must be understood as requiring an equal benefit arrangement.1139  
After the initial proposal of the Moon Treaty, the US perception of its own 
interests regarding celestial bodies began a multi-decadal shift. US ratification was 
blocked by a coalition of industry and space activists, including the L5 society, a group 
that lobbies for space colonization.1140 A minority of legal commentators argues that the 
Moon Treaty actually justifies private exploitation, by describing only ‘in place’ 
resources as ‘common heritage,’ leaving the door open for removal and appropriation.1141 
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And indeed, a hypothetical ‘Moon Authority’ – like the actual International Seabed 
Authority – could license exploitation by private actors. But most interested parties view 
rejection of the Moon Treaty as crucial to “the opportunities and prospects for private 
enterprise development.”1142 Although at least one space lawyer asserts, “the Moon 
Treaty is very much alive,” its low number of state parties suggests otherwise.1143 
 The United States has recently taken the position that commercial space activity 
can involve the creation of private property. From the 1980s to the 2000s, the US 
government position was ambiguous and sent a “confused set of signals” about its 
support or discouragement of commercial space activity.1144 These uncoordinated signals 
came from multiple federal agencies, and were sometimes inadvertent. But recently US 
policy has shifted strongly in favor of private space activity. The 2015 Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act states “A United States Citizen engaged in commercial 
recovery…shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including 
to possess, own, transport, use, and sell.” 1145  This legislation is the first piece of US law 
governing private property in outer space, and some argue that it is invalid because it 
contradicts the OST. According to both customary international law and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (to which the United States is a signatory), 
international treaties take precedence over domestic law.1146 The Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act “carefully skirts this issue” by including a disclaimer that 
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the United States does not assert sovereignty, jurisdiction, or ownership over any celestial 
body.1147 
 Historically, the United States has played an important role in influencing the 
formation and interpretation of international treaties. In addition to the 2015 legislation 
described above, current policy of the United States government is beholden to the 
concerns of private actors, and seeks to avoid making any regulatory moves that would 
obstruct their space activities. A pro-business, anti-government ideology prevails in the 
United States Congress. The current House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space 
recently rejected the conclusions of an Obama-era report calling for new licensing 
schemes to comply with OST.1148 The Subcommittee’s Chair, Senator Ted Cruz, is 
calling for hearings to consider modifying the OST to create a more favorable business 
climate.1149 But the US ability to influence the interpretation of OST may be waning. The 
United States continues to lose market share and technological advantage in outer space, 
as capabilities and markets become increasingly diffuse.1150 US satellite manufacturers 
are also at a disadvantage, because US law treats certain types and components of 
commercial satellites as munitions. The associated “complicated license processing and 
long delays” discourage multinational companies from purchasing US sourced satellite 
hardware.1151 As a result of decreasing dominance of space activity, the US ability to 
dictate international space policy, or interpret regime text, by unilateral action or 
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declaration has greatly diminished.1152 For the foreseeable future, the debate about private 
property in space will remain unresolved. 
A second and rarely recognized emerging challenge to the effectiveness of the 
OST regime is the potential for ‘flags of convenience’ and ‘ports of convenience.’ It is 
interesting that this possibility has been generally overlooked, given the predominance of 
the high seas metaphor in shaping the outer space regime. The nationalization system, 
whereby every space actor operates under the authority and jurisdiction of a particular 
state (OST Article 6), is a way to solve the risks associated with ‘open access’ by 
bringing all users under a form of sovereign control.1153 But because leadership in 
commercial space activity provides a form of international power, states have an 
incentive to attract launch customers. Austria, for example, passed a domestic space law 
in 2011 designed to attract satellite operators “who may see Austria’s legal, political, and 
business environment as a favorable one.”1154 India, worried about commercial space 
competitiveness with China, is seeking to increase foreign investment.1155 The 
combination of high launch costs and national competition creates a risk of regulatory 
‘race to the bottom’ dynamics for the purpose of attracting investment from private space 
companies. 
The OST regime enables this situation. There is no international agreement that 
deals with launch services, and no prohibition on space actors choosing the launching 
state that best suits their interests.1156 There is a reasonable risk that space actors, 
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especially private companies, will choose to launch in countries that are non-members of 
various outer space treaties. It is even possible that those wishing to avoid regulations 
could launch from platforms in international waters.1157 UNGA Resolution 68/74 
recommends the development of national regulatory frameworks through legislation. 
Non-uniform national legislation, in addition to inconsistent ratification of regime 
instruments, creates unevenness in the international regulatory landscape. There are many 
possible regulations that private and commercial actors might seek to avoid. These might 
include, for example, national legislation that requires private space actors to provide 
resources to fulfill the obligations of the Rescue Agreement. The Rescue Agreement was 
always understood to need updating once spaceflight became commercial, but it remains 
an agreement among state parties.1158 Domestic enforcement of Registration and Liability 
Convention mandates could also be uneven, and encourage the development of a ‘flags of 
convenience’ system for space that weakens the overall enforcement and effectiveness of 
the outer space regime. 
Asteroid deflection 
None of the domain analogies drawn upon during the formation of the outer space 
regime would have been capable of capturing the catastrophic, even existential, risk of 
collision with another celestial body. The outer space regime does nothing to redress the 
risk of an asteroid or other near Earth object (NEO) colliding with the Earth. Collision is 
now generally understood to be inevitable, but this realization emerged after the core 
elements of the OST regime were negotiated. The first asteroids and comets were 
discovered in the 19th century, and the first NEO was discovered in 1932, but their 
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distance and trajectory made them non-threatening to the Earth. Astronomers in the 
1980s began to realize that NEOs were numerous, and many came “uncomfortably close 
to Earth.”1159  
Existing knowledge of the NEO threat suggests that all space and non-space 
actors have an interest in NEO detection and deflection. The risk is non-negligible: there 
is a roughly 1-in-1000 chance that an asteroid greater than 200 meters in diameter will 
strike the Earth this century. The mostly likely location, due to its size, is the Pacific 
Ocean. In this scenario, large tsunamis may swamp coastal megalopolises in Asia and/or 
the Americas (depending on the location of the strike).1160 If the NEO struck a continent 
instead, the follow on effects from injecting particles into the atmosphere, fires, or 
induced seismic activity could be severe. Humanity has a clear, definite collective interest 
in preparing for the detection and diversion of these scenarios: “An asteroid or comet is 
the only natural disaster that can wipe out human society and the only natural disaster 
that human society can prevent.”1161 And because the development and deployment of 
deflection techniques requires a long lead-time, starting now is imperative to avoid the 
risk of asteroid collision.1162 But the shared vulnerability of NEO collision has a unique 
feature than obstructs collective interest formation; unlike most natural disasters, “cosmic 
hazards are unusual in that they are not spatially selective…any point on the planet 
appears to have a similar chance of being struck.”1163 This randomness makes the threat 
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seem diffuse, when it is actually very acute in the places that are struck, with 
reverberating consequences that damage surrounding regions. And because the benefits 
of asteroid detection and deflection are (probably, hopefully) non-excludable, no single 
state is willing to invest substantial resources in this public good. 
 There is limited activity underway towards this end. Companies hoping to mine 
asteroids, like Planetary Resources Inc., are actively pursuing asteroid identification and 
tracking. But these companies are mapping the solar system in search of NEOs with 
different qualities, and may have commercial reasons to withhold the information they 
collect. Arthur C. Clarke first introduced the idea of a ‘Safeguard Survey’ in 1973, and a 
NASA-sponsored project of the same name was set up in the early 1990s.1164 But existing 
efforts are under-funded and insufficient, and humanity is currently in a situation where 
“a highly dangerous near-Earth-object could remain undetected until all chance of 
altering its course has passed.”1165 The barrier to sufficient mapping of the cosmos is 
political and financial, not technological.1166  
 Current technological feasibility is less certain in the area of deflection. From 
numerous studies and concepts, three “apparently realistic methods” have emerged: 
kinetic impact, gravity tractor, and blast deflection.1167 NASA’s initial default strategy for 
asteroid deflection was a nuclear explosion (blast deflection). 1168 But NASA’s current 
“Asteroid Impact and Deflection Assessment” mission is an international collaboration 
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with the goal of demonstrating a kinetic impact on a small asteroid in 2022. No deflection 
technique or technology has even achieved the proto-type phase. 
Because the outer space regime requires neither investment in the identification 
and tracking of NEOs nor facilitates coordination in deflection strategies, it fails to 
achieve security from outer space threats to Earth. But the regime also presents several 
legal issues for any space actor(s) who voluntarily pursues security from NEOs. These 
legal issues may deter attempts at developing a planetary defense, because they are sure 
to bring “political and academic condemnation, tabloid stories of cover-ups and failures, 
and lawsuits attempting to stop it.”1169 The pursuit of nuclear deflection strategies would 
arguably violate several parts of the outer space regime. The 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty prohibits “causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in…any other nuclear 
explosion.” This would ban both nuclear explosions as a technique of changing the 
orbital path of an NEO and nuclear explosion as a means of breaking up an asteroid.1170 
OST prohibits the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but 
“celestial objects that provide little warning time…could only be deflected if a system is 
already developed and stationed in outer space.”1171 Another major issue is liability. It is 
possible that, in the course of a deflection attempt, a country could inadvertently create a 
different type of risk. For example, blowing up an asteroid with a nuclear weapon may 
turn one large object into hundreds of small radioactive objects that might still strike the 
Earth. Another scenario involves an incremental conventional deflection technique like a 
‘gravity tractor.’ It may occur that this technique moves the NEO, but not enough. 
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Instead of striking country A, the NEO strikes country B.1172 Under the Liability 
Convention, any damage to the Earth caused by a space object entails ‘absolute liability.’ 
But since the space object that causes the damage – the NEO – is not itself registered or 
launched by any state, these provisions may not apply in the event of botched deflection. 
                                                 





Figure 22 - Expected impacts of asteroid collision, From Hewitt, Kenneth. “Social Perspectives on 
Comet/Asteroid Impact (CAI) Hazards: Technocratic Authority and the Geography of Social Vulnerability.” 












Figure 23 - Folly of ignoring asteroid risk, From Hartwell, William T. “The Sky on the Ground: Celestial 






The outer space regime has failed to solve the problems of militarization, 
commercialization, space debris, and asteroid deflection. Because outer space is 
politically constructed as a global commons, many proposals for augmenting the regime 
focus on privatization schemes.1173 The explanation of the current regime’s failure to 
serve interests and avoid problems elaborated here suggests a different direction for 
regime augmentation. The basic problem with the outer space regime is that it was built 
too fast, and then too slow. The OST and follow-on agreements are founded upon 1960s 
and 1970s knowledge of the space environment and what humans would be able to do 
there. This incomplete knowledge resulted in several distortions. In terms of practices, 
negotiators focused more on space vehicles than satellites and appropriation instead of 
exploitation. They did not anticipate the potential of technological diffusion to a large 
number of private actors. Interests were, in general, poorly formed. While a broader 
notion of ‘collective security’ did emerge and drive the regime, the resulting treaties are 
poorly equipped to deal with issues of environmental and existential insecurity. Shared 
problems were therefore understood as historically familiar state-to-state competition and 
conflict, as opposed to the quality and character of environment that contains primarily 
spatial extension resources. 
 The chances are low that negotiators in the late 1960s and early 1970s could have 
designed a regime that remains effective today. Even if they had better maps and theories 
about the orbital environment, planning for technological change would require 
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something close to omniscient technological forecasting. Technology changes at an 
unsteady pace in uncertain directions, which makes both its composition and distribution 
difficult to predict. But the OST was not designed with flexibility or adaptation in mind, 
and the amendment process is moribund. While this persistence without augmentation or 
reform could be understood as laudable durability, from another perspective “the OST 
suffers from neglect.”1174 The early period of vigorous and comprehensive regime 
formation has been replaced with obstructionism and apathy. This situation can be 
understood as a ‘lag’ between the shared problems and collective interests that have 
emerged over the last several decades, and the institutions tasked with and designed to 
deal with them. 
Because effective distance and orbital dynamics make EOS small and integral, the 
increased density of space activities forces an either/or choice. Commercial development 
cannot occur sustainably in the absence of a debris control regime, and with the 
continuing possibility of ASATs. A space traffic control regime, suggested elsewhere, 
could serve three sets of interests: commercialization, debris control, and ASAT 
prohibition.1175 The best version of this regime augmentation would incorporate the 
lessons generated from the evaluation and criticism of the existing regime provided here.  
 The choice of “shared conceptual framework” affects calculations of interests and 
characterizations of problems, and serves as a focal point for bargaining and 
persuasion.1176 Political decision makers continue to reify the state-centric framework 
embedded in the outer space regime, which distorts the identification of interests and 
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problems.1177 The result is sovereignty-centric systems of registration, liability, and 
ownership that complicate the effective regulation of space activities. In contrast, the 
materialist geopolitical prescription for reforming the outer space regime emphasizes the 
limits of analogical reasoning and the potential dysfunction of constructed political 
geographies. Instead of viewing outer space as a global commons just like the high seas 
or atmosphere, it should be approached as a unique planetary domain with increasingly 
understood and technologically accessed material features. The geophysical and 
technological contours of issues in outer space determine which solution sets are most 
viable. The framework of environmental security has the advantage of encompassing the 
entire volume of orbital space, while focusing on the patterns of orbital pathways and 
orbital decay. The spatial approach to delimitation sidesteps the distinctiveness issues that 
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Conclusion: Planetary Geopolitics, the Territorial State System, and 
Regime Design 
 
 In one sense, it is hard to understand why humankind has been unable to 
effectively manage shared planetary domains. The ‘long peace’ after World War II 
created sweeping opportunities for international cooperation, despite the antagonisms of 
the Cold War. In the last few decades, technological innovation has reached qualitatively 
new heights in terms of computing, sensing, and surveillance. Earth system scientists 
have, through coordinated data collection and theory building, refined and brought into 
focus a picture of dynamic planetary spaces that is more detailed and accurate than ever 
before. It seems that humankind, and especially governments, have in the 21st century all 
the tools and models required for modern scientific management of shared planetary 
domains. Yet even with the information, the capability, and the political opportunity, 
global commons regimes (GCRs) for the ocean and outer space remain generally 
ineffective at achieving their goals. The geopolitical approach taken here offers part of 
the explanation: regime builders have historically pursued ill-suited territorial 
approaches, naturalized status quo technological systems, and embedded snapshot images 
of the domains that regimes are tasked with managing. In other words, existing regime 
designs have created a dysfunctional relationship with the ever-changing material 
context. 
This chapter considers the implications of the overall argument about GCR 
ineffectiveness for larger questions and broader debates about the relationship between 
the territorial state system and world order building. In general, the findings of previous 
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chapters suggest that incremental reform and minor modification of the state system will 
be insufficient for confronting contemporary problems in the ocean and outer space. The 
first half of this chapter synthesizes the overarching critique of status quo approaches to 
global governance in non-terrestrial spaces, by focusing on a set of design flaws in 
historical and contemporary GCRs. While these findings are not dispositive, they make 
an important contribution to the larger conversation about human survival and prosperity 
in the Anthropocene. 
 These criticisms also point to prescriptions for regime design, which this 
concluding chapter outlines in general terms. Although the “contours, nature, and scope” 
of emerging and future problems are “unprecedented and partially unpredictable,” 
scholars of global environmental governance have a normative obligation to generate 
guidance for creating regimes that can be both durable and effective.1178 The history of 
failures in global commons governance suggests the need for a new political paradigm, 
which will require “creative and architectonic theorizing” on the part of scholars. The 
application of geopolitical theory to GCRs is part of a larger effort to “rethink, 
reconfigure, and reemploy the basic conceptual components of political theory and 
practice” for the purpose of innovating regime theory as applied to non-terrestrial 
spaces.1179 In drawing conclusions about effective regime design, it forwards proposals 
for “appropriate adjustment” in existing governance architectures.1180  
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From the historical case studies, several general inferences can be made about the 
conditions of effective non-terrestrial governance in the Anthropocene. Because each 
non-terrestrial domain is unique, it is difficult to make specific but generalizable 
prescriptions about rules, norms, and decision-making procedures. Instead, this chapter 
outlines a set of design principles, a strategy that facilitates the generation of rules and 
norms that are “relevant and useful in a diversity of contexts.”1181 In general, diplomats 
and policymakers are not thinking and planning at the appropriate spatial and temporal 
scales. They place too much faith in technology, and assign too little importance to 
scientific knowledge production. As a result, they tend to build regimes that are 
fragmented, brittle, and outmoded.  
 The cases of the ocean and outer space demonstrate that state actors have failed to 
take the insights of contemporary environmentalism seriously enough. Environmental 
goals are overshadowed by “so-called high politics issues” like security and economic 
growth, which dominate the policy agenda.1182 Economic growth “remains the lodestar of 
most politicians.”1183 The ocean governance regime in particular is “subject to this over-
riding political-economic regime focused on growth and sheer volume.”1184 The 
application of new environmentalist understandings about nature and environmental 
change would radically alter the priorities, assumptions, and directives of GCRs. In 
regards to the global commons, environmental activism “combines universalistic moral 
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concern with a conception of a collective human interest.”1185 Several examples illustrate 
the vast gap between environmentalist proposals and status quo governance architectures. 
John Terbough advocates general restraint in access and exploitation, and wholesale 
public embrace of science.1186 Daniel Botkin calls for a rejection of steady-state 
conceptions of goals (like ‘maximum sustainable yield’), in favor of focusing on the 
achievement of rates of change that facilitate adaptation.1187 Ursula Heise proposes a 
form of environmental world citizenship, where we ‘lean in’ to de-territorialization and 
globalization in order to dissolve territory-based affiliations.1188 Daniel Deudney calls for 
wholesale ideational and institutional change, including the recognition of inter-
generational sovereign publics, a federal-republican Earth Constitution, and Earth 
nationalism.1189 While there is diversity among these proposals, three common themes 
stand out: prioritizing scientific understandings, dissolving and replacing national 
conceptions of interest, and creating new forms of centralized coordination, decision-
making, and management. This project connects a criticism of existing regimes with 
modified versions of environmentalist prescriptions.  
 Underlying these proposals is an integrated and sophisticated understanding of the 
planet as a set of interdependent systems and processes. The natural sciences have 
introduced a “paradigmatic shift toward an earth system perspective” that has yet to truly 
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take hold in the governance of non-terrestrial spaces.1190 This unified perspective is 
evident in labels and categories like ‘Earth system science’ and ‘biogeochemistry.’1191 
The Earth-centric paradigm involves concepts of global environmental change, earth 
system analysis, sustainability science, and resilience theory. Most critically, this new 
paradigm implies that the Earth itself is the appropriate unit of analysis; “Boundaries 
between local and global are systematically broken down in both theory and research 
practice.”1192 The Earth-centric paradigm presents an interesting challenge to the study of 
global commons regimes, which tends to reify the institutionalized separation between 
planetary domains like the ocean, atmosphere, and outer space. A wholesale embrace of 
the Earth-centric paradigm implies an important and fundamental shift in regime theory 
and practice. Of course, whether or not this shift occurs depends in large part on the 
social, political, and psychological obstacles to adopting a fundamentally new approach 
to global governance. But there is value in entertaining alternative perspectives, which 
“allows us to see the world afresh, revealing patterns and connections that may be 
obscured in our standard worldview.”1193 
The role of the social sciences in this new Earth-centric paradigm is poorly 
defined, but the geopolitical approach connects its insights with the history of global 
commons regimes. Planetary geopolitics generates a critique of existing regimes, and 
prescriptions for regime augmentation, with reference to the Earth system perspective. 
This includes observing technological growth as a whole, aside from state interests, and 
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approaching Earth system science as a unified endeavor to uncover and explain globally 
interconnected geophysical and ecological processes. Earth system science represents an 
alternative cognitive framework for approaching governance in non-terrestrial domains, 
and addressing the collective action problems that emerge in the global commons. It also 
implies the need for drastic shifts in the structure and function of global commons 
regimes. The regime pathologies identified here point to three fundamental flaws in the 
design of existing GCRs, from which we can infer three design principles for effective 
governance. 
Design flaws     Design principles 
Territorial state system   Centralization 
Artificial domain divisions   Forecasting and flexibility 
Time Horizons    Scientific knowledge production 
 
Global Commons Regimes 
 Identifying the fundamental problems with existing GCRs is an important pre-
requisite to the formulation of solutions, and the construction of more effective regimes. 
Major reforms and augmentations are often disregarded as politically and practically 
infeasible. While political and practical obstacles are real and important, it is a mistake to 
use their existence as a reason to normalize, and even naturalize, the status quo. This 
section problematizes three consistent features of GCR design, in order to demonstrate 
the need for new design principles. 
Territorial State System 
The idea that the territorial state system is at the root of contemporary human 
problems is relatively common in academic scholarship. This basic critique emerged in 
the early years of the Cold War, when technological change wrought major changes to 
international economics and society. Realist John Herz argued that the advent of nuclear 
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weapons made sovereign states obsolete as security providers.1194 The mathematician 
John von Neumann thought that effectively dealing with technological progress was 
impeded by the overly narrow and under organized state system. For him, the state 
system stymied the safety mechanism of expanding political integration as the scope of 
technology expands.1195 Futurist Buckminster Fuller referred to an “utterly obsolete 
sovereign separateness,” which impedes both understanding of the global situation, and 
effective coordination and cooperation.1196 The criticism persists in more recent 
scholarship. Ulrich Beck has provided a sweeping critique of “methodological 
nationalism,” which pervades the work of historians specifically, and social scientists 
more generally.1197 Paul Harris has railed against the “cancer of Westphalia,” while Susan 
Buck notes more mildly “absolute sovereignty is an idea whose time has passed.”1198 
Agnew and Muscarà have argued that the conventional account of a “totally territorial” 
spatial organization of world politics relies on outdated and problematic assumptions 
about how and where sovereign power functions, the division between domestic and 
foreign, and the boundaries of society.1199  Richard Falk has rejected the ethos and praxis 
of the “old Earth,” which he describes as “the primacy of national interests as modified 
by the priorities of economic globalization.”1200 After the 1972 Stockholm conference, 
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Falk concluded that “the global intergovernmental mechanisms of problem solving and 
policymaking were deficient from the perspective of global public interests due to the 
primacy of national interests and Western dominated geopolitics.”1201 Clearly, the 
territorial state system has been recognized as an insufficient organizing framework in the 
face of global-scale challenges more generally, and global environmental governance 
specifically.  
Despite these Earth-centric criticisms, the territorial state system is deeply 
embedded within governance of non-terrestrial spaces, where regimes are built upon 
state-centric ascriptions of cause and consequence, and nationalistic calculations of cost 
and benefit. Negotiators and diplomats “still operate within the parameters of a nation-
state system inherited from the twentieth century.”1202 The GCRs they have constructed 
are ‘international’ insofar as they represent the aggregation of and negotiation between 
national interests, and ‘global’ in that they cover areas beyond national jurisdiction. But 
these regimes are not ‘planetary’ in scope and scale, and GCRs embody a basic myopia 
about the places they are intended to manage. Regime theory has the same problem as 
regimes themselves: even theories of global environmental governance remain 
circumscribed by an “ontological focus on the nation-state system and international 
diplomacy.”1203 Existing theories of GCRs “share a state-centric myopia” compounded 
by neglect of broader changes, such as new scientific understandings of Earth systems 
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and processes.1204 This section describes how GCRs embed and reify the territorial state 
system, and gestures towards a possible alternative framing.  
One conventional view of international regimes is that they modify, constrain, 
and/or pool state sovereignty in a way that potentially undermines the hegemony of the 
territorial state system.1205 Under this view, regimes are the beginning of an alternative to 
the state system. In contrast, Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist argue that GCRs actually 
“reproduce the existing international order in having a state-centered point of 
departure.”1206 GCRs were produced from an “institutional mold” that relies on borders 
and states, and which therefore tends to have a poor fit with global environmental 
problems.1207 Most obviously, territorialization and sovereign control has been a  “typical 
response” to problems associated with open access to the commons; “the first resort of 
those concerned with the degradation of the commons is most frequently state 
regulation.”1208 But even open access designations, like those in orbital space and the 
‘areas beyond national jurisdiction,’ require national flagging for all vehicles, and 
national systems of regulation and enforcement. And the membership of all GCRs is 
restricted to state actors, despite the fact that private and commercial actors represent 
most of the activity in non-terrestrial spaces. Although res nullius was generally rejected 
as a framework for incorporating non-terrestrial spaces into the territorial state system, 
the alternative of res communis still fundamentally affirms the basic categories and 
practices of territorial states. The more radical alternative of res publica was either 
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rejected out of hand, or aborted in failures such as the modified International Seabed 
Authority and the Moon Treaty. 
The conceptual and political framework of the territorial state system has served 
humanity poorly in the governance of non-terrestrial spaces. State actors tend to act on a 
myopic and stunted perspective of interests and problems, elevating parochial, state-
specific preferences and agendas that do not serve the collective or long-term interests of 
humanity as a whole. Thinking about problems through state-centric approaches has 
obscured the fundamental disruption of planetary systems, and therefore has weakened 
and diverted the motivation and urgency to redress collective problems and supply public 
goods. In several cases, scientific consensus about the scope and depth of risks associated 
with global warming, ocean acidification, and space debris was not sought, recognized, or 
acknowledged by policymakers. The knowledge was there, but did not easily fit within 
categories of national interest, which are dominated by domestic calculations of strategic, 
economic, and military advantage. The problem with state-centered orientations towards 
non-terrestrial spaces is that they include little incentive to focus on the whole of 
planetary spaces, and to consider the whole of global interests. Even when scientific 
consensus is widely disseminated, the state-centric perspective often confounds effective 
action. Oran Young describes a “tragedy of private property” which could easily be 
reframed as a ‘tragedy of nationalization.’ The basic message is that nationalization does 
not necessarily result in incentives for sustainable use, because there are rational reasons 
for an individual, or an individual state, to liquidate a stock of resources in a short period 
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of time.1209 Notions of strategic, military, and economic competition between states are a 
source of such short-term and self-centered incentives. 
The establishment and articulation of the territorial state system was an “act of 
collective human imagination,” but that does not mean that it is easy to now escape. 
Indeed, the emergence of the state system may be “the single most important shift in 
political consciousness of the last 500 years.”1210 Any attempt to undermine or replace the 
political geography of the territorial state must reckon with the problem of sovereignty: 
both its material manifestations (like national militaries, borders, and trade policies) and 
our psychological attachment to it. Replacing the lens of the territorial state system will 
require a “revolution in human consciousness” in order to overcome the “particularities 
of national experience…special interests and bureaucratic rigidities.”1211 The national 
perspective, like the state system itself, is extremely durable. The primary experience of 
most humans with the physical environment is immediate and local, and this produces 
parochial identifications.1212 When circumscribed experience combines with nationalism 
and state-level policy-making, the result is narrow interest formation that precludes 
investment in the idea of a global public. Non-terrestrial spaces may provide a unique 
opportunity to challenge the psychological and political hegemony of the territorial state 
system, because they do not contain obvious borders, and because there exist nascent and 
persuasive alternative images of these domains. 
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           We cannot effectively reject the state-centric framework unless a powerful 
alternative symbol emerges, a new ‘whole Earth’ image that can usurp existing concepts 
in the minds of policymakers, diplomats, and the general public. An over-arching 
conceptual framework is important for political ordering insofar as it “widens 
enormously our mental panorama” and serves as a “faculty superadded” to our basic 
perceptions, assisting us in “practically adapting us to a larger environment.”1213 Singular 
images of the Earth can orient diverse groups towards the same issue, generating patterns 
in problem perception and interest formation that harmonize collective efforts to avoid 
shared vulnerability and achieve mutual benefits.  
A common perceptual framework is the foundation for a new community of 
association and affiliation. In John Dewey’s terms, it reveals global and planetary publics 
and turns them into global and planetary communities. The ‘whole Earth’ images of the 
early Space Age did not effectively displace the conceptual framework of the modern 
territorial state system, but a more powerful symbol could. The timing is right for a new 
shift in global consciousness, as knowledge about and fear of climate change, sea level 
rise, and ocean acidification becomes increasingly mainstream. The image that prompts a 
shift must be constructed and refined by scholars of global environmental politics with 
the problems of governance in the global commons in mind. 
 The theoretical approach of planetary geopolitics is a step in the right direction. 
Its reliance on scientific discourse “denies the existence or importance of the national 
state,” because it prioritizes maps and explanations that do not contain or include 
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territorial concepts.1214 This can be understood as a grand project of place making, which 
builds connections between spatial extension and human community. Earth system 
science generates an integrated image of the planet, which implies that the notion of 
‘place’ can be scaled up so that “the whole earth is recognized as a home to the human 
species.”1215 In this view, the integrated scientific image of the planet is like a cognitive 
and psychological opportunity to reorient how we perceive, internalize, and respond to 
understandings of interest and problems. The ultimate aim would be to reformulate 
regimes from the perspective of the human community on planet Earth. In terms of what 
these institutions would entail, Frank Biermann’s Earth System Governance has several 
specific recommendations for overcoming the territorial state system. These include 
limiting state autonomy and constructing governance architectures that express and 
defend “the interests of the international community.”1216 This could be done by altering 
established concepts in customary international law, to decrease the legal standing of 
states and increase the legal standing of those acting on behalf of “the interests of the 
international community as a whole.”1217 Biermann’s ultimate aim for this process of 
institutional change is “a fundamental reconceptualization of the notion of state 
sovereignty.”1218 
Domain Divisions 
 The ocean and outer space cases demonstrated the importance of the distinction 
between the actual material world and the imperfectly constructed picture of it that 
human users, policymakers, and consumers carry in their heads when making decisions 
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about interacting with that world. Scientific knowledge production has been relatively 
recent compared to uses of non-terrestrial spaces. But existing GCRs are designed to fit 
with “perceptions of the extent and linkage between issues.”1219 GCRs have historically 
embodied a particular pathology: ‘frozen ontology,’ or the embedding and reification of a 
progressively outdated understanding of the material features of the ocean, atmosphere 
and outer space. John Vogler identified this “mismatch between physical systems and 
issue areas” as a “consistent theme” in GCRs, and argues that it is “obstructive to the 
solution of commons problems.”1220 Especially important is scientific information about 
chains of cause and consequence, and the scope and scale of negative effects. In general, 
outdated information signals outmoded regimes, or those that are not functional relative 
to their purposes and goals. Vogler explicitly contrasts the “holistic view of the 
commons” associated with environmentalism and natural science, and the “partial and 
fragmented” nature of regimes.1221 Young also notes the difficulty in matching 
institutional and ecological boundaries; “separating distinct ecosystems is ultimately 
somewhat arbitrary and may emerge as a barrier.”1222 
 Neither Vogler nor Young generate regime design principles from the mismatch 
between the material context – ecology, geography, technology – and institutional forms. 
Young prefers to work within existing paradigms and pursue reform rather than renewal 
or restructuring. Vogler describes GCRs as “hopelessly fragmented.” 1223 Although he 
notes the existence of an argument about congruence between natural and political 
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geography, he describes it as “impractical,” citing nonspecific “strong” political 
obstacles.1224 Of course these obstacles exist, but Vogler seems to imply that they are 
inevitable, and forever insurmountable. He does not see radical political potential in the 
“ever more holistic conception” of planetary spaces, processes, systems, and 
problems.1225  
Perhaps ironically, it is the military that seems most willing to push in the 
direction of cross-domain unity for the purposes of planning and acting. Captain Mark 
Redden (USN) and Colonel Michael Hughes (USAF) argue that thickening domain 
interrelationships are a product of evolution in military capabilities, as opposed to “the 
physical attributes of the individual domains.”1226 This is only a partial geopolitical 
argument for collapsing artificial domain distinctions, because it is based on 
technological capability alone, and not the material features of planetary environments. 
But its conclusions are similar in form: Redden and Hughes argue that the military should 
move beyond “geographic stovepipes” that “[lag] the transformational nature of current 
opportunities and challenges in the global commons.”1227 The alternative they suggest is a 
“paradigm shift to a macro perspective” and “holistic approach” that focuses on one 
“complex, interactive system” instead of distinct domains.1228  
 There is also a political-economic argument to be made for the dissolution of 
divisions between the non-terrestrial domains. The spatial features of the global economy 
reach into and across all the global commons. Three examples illustrate the scale of 
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interconnections. Advanced industrial mining – and the gigantic multinational companies 
that pursue it – have pushed their interests into the formation of both the ocean and outer 
space regimes. The dynamics of complex international long-distance fishing economies 
significantly explain the patterns and persistence of the over-fishing problem. And it is 
ultimately the fossil fuel economy that drives the problem of climate change, and 
industrial agriculture that causes marine hypoxia and dead zones. In sum, we cannot 
expect to solve problems or maximize interest satisfaction in one domain without 
intervening in another. 
 Planetary geopolitics entails theoretical thinking on a planetary-scale, which is to 
say above and beyond and across and within all planetary domains. Earth system science 
continues to progressively undermine the notion that the ocean, atmosphere, land, and 
orbital space are best understood as separate and distinct from each other. Global 
environmental problems also reveal cross-domain interdependence. ‘Global warming’ is 
now understood as a set of inter-linked and multi-domain phenomena: climate change, 
ocean acidification, and sea level rise. Global circulation models reveal “complex 
interdependence between oceans, poles and atmosphere.”1229 Many ocean problems 
cannot be resolved without regulation in another domain. Pollution, acidification, and 
excess heat come from the atmosphere. Plastic detritus and toxic agricultural chemicals 
come from the land. Autonomous submarine-seeking drones operate under the ocean, on 
its surface, and in the air. Even orbital space is connected, in that the public goods it can 
provide have impacts on other parts of the Earth. Satellite-based Earth monitoring already 
provides important information about the ocean, atmosphere, and land. It could 
potentially provide much more, as raw observational material for the refinement of 
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scientific theories about Earth system processes, and especially planetary problems like 
climate change and over-fishing. Another public good – dealing with the risk of asteroid 
collision – also requires action in space for a benefit achieved on Earth. Planetary 
geopolitics thereby demonstrates that solving collective problems and achieving mutual 
benefit in global governance requires weakening or eliminating the perceived, but 
artificial, distinction between the ocean, atmosphere, land, and outer space. 
Time Horizons 
Interest formation and problem definition are also plagued by the problem of time 
horizons. More specifically, scientific consensus about future impacts is downplayed, 
overlooked, and even obstructed in cases where it contradicts parochial interests in 
continued exploitation. Problems like space debris, ocean acidification, and chemical 
pollution more generally are diffuse and delayed, and therefore tend to play an under-
sized role in negotiations over GCRs. A short-term and narrow perspective on interests 
and problems is self-defeating, because “addressing environmental problems effectively 
often requires an informed, long-term perspective.”1230 To the degree that time scale 
issues have emerged in negotiations, they have been mostly focused on the past. Legal 
concepts like “state responsibility, international liability, reparation, or compensation” are 
all tied to the idea that past behavior shapes present obligations. Of course, these concepts 
are “unlikely to be broadly accepted,” in large part because present generations refuse to 
carry the blame from past generations.1231 Perhaps more critical for ineffectiveness, 
however, is the lack of attention to the future, and especially the existence of problems 
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for and interests of future generations. The ocean in particular has been called “the largest 
biotic and abiotic patrimony for future generations.”1232 
 John Dewey’s notions of public and community provide the conceptual 
foundation for this critique of interest formation and problem definition, but the criticism 
itself contradicts his claims about democratic political forms. Dewey defines the public as 
“all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent 
that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.”1233 
Daniel Deudney explicitly points out that “material contexts will determine the scope of 
publics,” which change with advancements in technology.1234 In the case of the ocean and 
outer space, this “human consequence group” clearly extends to future generations, given 
the nature and persistence of global environmental challenges.1235 The central challenge 
of global governance is to generate communities (self-aware publics) and governance 
(Dewey refers to “government”) that fit the scope of the global public. Deudney argues 
that the proper basis of global governance is therefore an “intergenerational public.”1236 
 Dewey endorses the philosophy and practice of democracy more than its 
empirical institutional forms. But the idea that democracy protects the popular interest is 
challenged by the problem of inter-generational publics.1237 In general, short-term 
thinking by mercurial citizens and election-focused representatives pervades 
democracies. There is no institutional representation for future generations of citizens, let 
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alone future generations of humanity writ large. The “time structures” of planetary and 
political systems are incongruent and out of sync.1238 For Stephen Gardiner, democracy 
facilitates the “tyranny of the contemporary” and “inter-generational buck passing,” such 
that current populations have little or no motivation to effectively redress problems that 
are long term or “backloaded.”1239 Laura Westra argues “the unquestioned acceptance of 
the primacy of democratic institutions…presents the major obstacle to the prevention of 
public harms.”1240 For her, the problem is that corporate interests are not challenged or 
balanced by an “overarching conception of ‘the good’,” so the democratic aggregation of 
preferences is “routinely manipulated.”1241 Although neither author uses the language of 
publics and communities, both argue that democracy routinely fails to recognize the scale 
and scope of publics (in space and time).  
 This criticism of unit-level democracy applies equally or more so to the GCRs 
evaluated here. In many cases, their ineffectiveness is a result of overlooking the true 
spatial and temporal extent of the global public. Issues like ocean acidification and space 
debris would loom radically larger in terms of interests and problems if the true 
community-of-consequence were recognized. Enlarging the time horizon for cost benefit 
analysis would likely result in more cautious, environment focused approaches to global 
governance.  
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Building Planetary Regimes 
The sources of regime ineffectiveness identified in this project have important 
implications for improved regime design. The key idea is that the most effective 
institutions are isomorphic with the material context, across both space and time. 
Achieving isomorphism is a supreme challenge, because models and political forms 
borrowed from other regimes are unlikely to match with a unique planetary domain. We 
cannot rely on analogies or models, or simply scale up institutions that function at more 
local scales.1242 The ocean is radically unlike outer space in physical form, so we should 
not expect functional regimes in these domains to look anything alike. The achievement 
of an isomorphic regime requires relying on a constantly evolving scientific image of the 
domain in question. But the arguments about artificial domain division considered above 
imply that the appropriate scale and scope of the political community, and collective 
governance, may be the Earth itself.1243 An isomorphic regime would not reify an 
artificial, or purely socially constructed, domain distinction. Perfect isomorphism requires 
perfect information, and is therefore impossible. But a rough or serviceable isomorphism 
between GCRs and material systems can be achieved. This section considers three design 
principles for fashioning isomorphic regimes to govern non-terrestrial spaces.  
Centralization 
There is currently no consensus in the regime theory literature about whether 
fragmentation in governance architectures is good or bad, but there are many arguments 
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on both sides.1244 Arguments in favor of fragmentation include the increased speed of 
negotiation and entry into force of agreements with fewer members.1245 Reducing 
membership can also result in “more progressive and far-reaching” agreements.1246 
Fragmentation can make it easier for actors to enter into agreements, and tailor those 
agreements for specific regions or groups.1247 However, fragmentation inevitably results 
in agreements that do not take the interests of the global community into account. This is 
one reason why most developing countries prefer inclusive multilateral negotiations, 
which allow them to present a unified, and therefore stronger, position in defense of their 
interests.1248  
The stakes of ignoring global public goods and shared vulnerabilities in the global 
commons are very high. Fragmented regimes are unlikely to be interested in or able to 
redress space debris, ocean acidification, over-fishing, or asteroid collision. The 
emergence of Earth system science as a general and unified endeavor tells us something 
important about global governance: the elimination of stovepipes in the former implies a 
need to reject stovepipes in the latter. More powerful centralized governance institutions 
could theoretically address many of the issues and challenges found in non-terrestrial 
domains. The example of anti-piracy measures during the Pax Britannica demonstrates 
the value of jurisdictional scope and centralized enforcement capacity. An additional 
capacity is necessary in the Anthropocene: a central institution or organization serving as 
a clearinghouse for scientific knowledge, such that consensus is formed and disseminated 
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in a more efficient manner. This function might also expedite the transformation of the 
global and inter-generational public into a self-aware and politically mobilized 
community, by providing a forum for an “increasingly intensive consultative process – 
involving those who deploy and those who are affected” by technology in non-terrestrial 
domains.1249 Centralized institutions offer an opportunity to think about the consequences 
of global technological systems as a whole. The magnitude of the impact of current 
technologies, and likely future innovations, must be considered as a whole in relation to 
the Earth systems they operate in and exploit. Because of the interdependence of 
planetary systems, notions like ‘carrying capacity’ and ‘ecological footprint’ are best 
considered as a whole. This is critical to defining the cost of human use activities at 
global scales, as the state-specific benefits are already well-known. 
 The implications of centralization for regime design go beyond the creation of 
“coordination mechanisms” proposed by Young.1250 Biermann argues in Earth System 
Governance that we need “global stewardship,” which he says is different from 
“centralized management.”1251 But the specific agenda Biermann lays out very much 
takes places at the center of global politics. Biermann proposes a “transformation” of the 
United Nations system in favor of a “reformed global institutional architecture of earth 
system governance.”1252 The idea is to produce a “much needed overarching institution 
and decision-making system that coordinates, and hence strengthens” hundreds of distinct 
agreements.1253 Integrated governance “may promise a higher effectiveness in terms of 
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solving the core problems” in what have been historically treated as distinct issue 
areas.1254 Biermann outlines several specific institutional blueprints, including for a 
World Environment Organization, a Global Environmental Assessment Commission, a 
World Environment Fund, a Trusteeship Council for Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, 
and a UN Sustainable Development Council. This governance architecture centralizes 
jurisdiction, capacity, and scientific knowledge production. Biermann also flatly rejects 
the territorial state system as the appropriate framework for earth system governance. He 
argues that consensus-based international decision-making leads to ‘lowest common 
denominator’ governance architectures, and should be replaced with different types of 
qualified majority voting and circumscribed state sovereignty.1255 Although Biermann 
recognizes that political obstacles and functional challenges obstruct this vision of 
empowered centralization, he advocates for a “realistic utopianism.”1256 
 Deudney’s “Global Village Sovereignty” offers several ideas for how to make 
centralization more realistic, and even possible, by focusing on the identity ties that help 
generate a community out of a mere public. A requirement for tapping into the strength of 
national affiliations is a “here feeling” or attachment to place. The emergence of nation-
states, some of continental size, has already scaled up the identity affiliations of billions 
of humans. Deudney points to the “planetary evocation of place” in photographs of the 
planet from outer space, and also suggests that Gaian Earth religions offer conceptual and 
normative resources for appreciating the Earth as a shared home.1257 The centralized 
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scientific image of the planet, when treated as the appropriate object of governance, can 
also support the psychological transition to viewing the Earth as a home. 
 The design principle of centralization undermines reliance on the territorial state 
system and artificial domain divisions as determinants of the appropriate scope and scale 
of governance. The institutional blueprint implied by the principle of centralization would 
require a massive transformation of the existing world political order. Despite the 
obvious difficulties that realizing such a program entails, it is nevertheless valuable, and 
even essential, to articulate holistic indictments and formulate transformative 
architectures. Richard Falk suggests that reorientation away from the fragmented state 
system “is already latent in the body politic,” and that awakening more people to “its 
urgent necessity” is a crucial step in activating its potential.1258 Although the construction 
of centralized governance architectures faces many obstacles, there is reason to believe 
that the process of centralization may be self-reinforcing, insofar as it creates a new locus 
for identity and interest formation. 
Forecasting and Flexibility 
Both Fuller and Biermann understand the issue with global governance as a 
failure to ‘steer’ human activities and societies towards positive change. And in a real 
sense, the project of International Relations is “to gain some control over where we are 
going.”1259 The concept of steering implies both durability and change: a vehicle still 
exists despite traversing spatial distance. Effective steering, and effective governance, 
requires a balance between durability and flexibility. The ideal is a permanent 
organization or institution that can confront unfolding complexity and make the on-going 
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decisions required to adapt to new knowledge and new circumstances.1260 Maintaining 
congruence with the material context over time, and responding to an evolving cost-
benefit analysis, requires a “secure minimum capacity to adapt.”1261 Yet flexibility is not 
universally seen as an institutional virtue, even in situations of uncertainty.1262 And there 
are many reasons that inflexibility is the norm, including decision-making gridlocks, 
status quo biases, entrenched powerful interests, and general “institutional arthritis.”1263 
Regime inflexibility is a fundamental design flaw that occurs when scientific knowledge 
and technological capability are treated as if they are unchanging. 
Centralization and flexibility are often understood to be competing design 
principles. Decentralization is associated with adaptation and innovation, because smaller 
organizations can make changes more quickly, and a larger number of organizations can 
increase the diversity of institutional forms. It may be true empirically that 
decentralization correlates with flexibility, but the combination is likely to facilitate the 
wrong kind of flexibility: ‘race to the bottom’ dynamics and pursuit of parochial interests 
to the detriment of collective ones. Centralization can help key adaptation and innovation 
to a specific catalyst for change: scientific knowledge production. And even if 
centralization makes flexibility more challenging, it does not make it impossible. 
 Achieving flexibility and adaptiveness to changing material conditions requires 
close attentiveness to the leading edges of scientific consensus formation and 
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technological innovation and diffusion. Young emphasizes the need for “early warning” 
and “rapid response.”1264 The centralization of scientific knowledge production, 
synthesis, and dissemination described above can assist in keeping regimes updated in 
light of changing scientific consensus. The goal is to close the gap between scientific 
discovery and regime response, to avoid a repeat of the delayed coming-to-terms with 
space debris, asteroid collision, and sea-level rise, among other examples. Institutionally, 
this could take many forms, including scientific advisory panels, research clearinghouses, 
or even technocratic leadership. The institutional goal is to support the collection and 
dissemination of credible scientific data, and to more closely connect scientific consensus 
formation with alterations in the rules and norms of GCRs.  
 Another design feature that could support flexibility and adaptation is 
technological forecasting. This is already a common endeavor in the worlds of venture 
capitalism and intellectual property, but rarely appears in discussions of regime theory or 
regime design. There is, however, growing academic attention to the razors’ edge of 
technological change by scholars of accelerationism, transhumanism, and artificial 
intelligence. The Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies offers an example of 
comprehensive technological forecasting, but for the purpose of taking advantage of 
‘techno-progressive’ possibilities. In general, the Institute is concerned with exploiting 
technological opportunity rather than avoiding techno-genic calamities. Techno-
forecasting should also be used for the purposes of restraint and regulation. Tracking 
change in technological composition and distribution would support goal achievement in 
two ways: by updating our understanding of what technology needs to be regulated, and 
by identifying and harnessing technology that supports regulatory functions. Tracking 
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new technologies of exploitation, access, and surveillance could help regimes identify 
emerging collective action problems and take advantage of new possibilities for 
verification.  Whether technological forecasting would trigger new mandates for adoption 
and diffusion, or regulations on design and injunctions against use, depends on whether 
the emerging technology supports or undermines the goals of the regime. Submarine 
drones, for example, could be usefully evaluated for their potential to support or 
undermine the Law of the Sea Treaty, as a way to inform new rules and norms about their 
deployment and use. Micro-satellites could be evaluated for their likely contribution to 
space debris. This kind of forecasting and assessment is the best way to ‘steer’ 
technological change, instead of sleepwalking into new technological worlds that we only 
‘choose’ in a diffuse and uncoordinated way. 
 The political obstacles to achieving and maintaining a functional fit with 
ecological and geophysical planetary systems may be significant. Participants in regime 
maintenance and augmentation must be active, incentivized, and supported with 
resources (whether from home governments or elsewhere). Once rules and norms are 
adjusted to account for prevailing material circumstances – reflecting contemporary 
scientific consensus and technological capability – the constellation of user interests must 
be configured to maintain compliance. In some cases, the connection between parochial 
and collective interests may be sufficient to achieve self-enforcement. In other cases, 
especially those which concern the interests of future generations, surveillance, 
enforcement, and adjudication must be capable of identifying and punishing non-
compliance. This project does not contain solutions to many of the social and political 
obstacles to achieving and maintaining a match with the material context. But it does 
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present a set of design principles for achieving effective governance of non-terrestrial 
spaces. GCRs will be increasingly effective and successful to the degree that they can 
create institutional capacity for forecasting and flexibility. 
Science and Technocracy 
Perhaps the single most consistent theme of a geopolitical theory of regimes is the 
importance of scientific information for the design and function of effective GCRs. 
Indeed, scientific knowledge production is more important than ever, because in terms of 
shared problems, “the direction of change is from the visible, concentrated, and well 
known toward the invisible, diffuse, and unfamiliar.”1265 When there are gaps in 
knowledge about the scale and character of shared vulnerabilities, this situation opens 
discursive space for dangerous modernist fictions that enable over-use and over-
exploitation.  
Design principles for large-scale commons that involve investment in scientific 
knowledge production have already been introduced. Paul Stern, for example, argues for 
investment in science to understand the consequences of resource exploitation, and 
integration of scientific analysis into more general deliberation among stakeholders and 
monitors.1266 Biermann envisions a Global Environmental Assessment Commission, 
which could serve as an “institutionalized early warning voice of the global change 
research community.”1267 Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian called for “progressive 
internationalization of capabilities for gathering and assessing information” about non-
terrestrial domains in 1975.1268 And scientists themselves are asserting a more central 
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role, through activist organizations like the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, Pugwash, and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Indeed, “pleas 
for drastic change in global governance are becoming a frequent feature of scientific 
gatherings.”1269 The involvement of the scientific community in uncovering chains of 
cause and consequence in the midst of complexity is crucial to regime success. Scientists 
discover, define, and disseminate information about environmental problems. They also 
help devise solutions, through efficiency improvements, remediation techniques, and 
even technological alternatives. Scientists need to keep doing this, but with more 
intensity and support from governance institutions. 
The special authority of scientific knowledge has important implications for 
regime design possibilities. Regimes can support the legitimacy and credibility of science 
by maintaining fidelity to the ideals of scientific knowledge production through 
disciplinary norms, such as blind peer review, data transparency, iterated experiments, 
and independence from special interests. These norms support the production of less 
biased and political scientific consensus, but institutional pressure for the provision of 
definite answers, quotas, and thresholds also must be lifted. Adopting a precautionary 
approach to access and exploitation can flip the scientific burden of proof in a way that 
reduces this pressure. In contemporary GCRs, scientists are often asked to identify limits 
on use under conditions of uncertainty. A precautionary approach could delay 
authorization of uses until a reasonable certainty is achieved. It may also minimize the 
risk of abuses of power, by requiring strong evidence to justify new activities.  
The case chapters demonstrated the serious value in identifying and reducing 
scientific uncertainty, or lack of consensus. Uncertainty generates competing 
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interpretations of the truth, and “resource users may be tempted to act as if the most 
optimistic projections…are valid, with the result that there is a pressure for undue risk 
acceptance.”1270 Scientific knowledge competes on a contested terrain – there are lots of 
other powerful discourses controlling the conception of a domain, its uses, and possible 
impacts. Incomplete scientific understanding increases reliance on knowledge generated 
by users, who have a vested interest in justifying their continued exploitation. This 
situation is rampant with regard to governance of global fisheries.1271 Uncertainty may be 
inevitable in the natural world, but there is value in identifying areas of persistent 
uncertainty, and areas where consensus knowledge is possible. And reducing uncertainty 
in the context of independent (legitimate and credible) scientific institutions is critical to 
strengthen the position of scientific knowledge relative to the narratives and interests of 
corporations, religious fundamentalists, and other conservatives that often overpower the 
voice of scientific reason, and the weight of scientific consensus. 
 The insights of planetary geopolitics could be used to support a strong version of 
technocracy, or rule by experts (specifically, scientists and engineers). Scientific 
disciplines already correlate with the divisions and distinctions among natural systems, 
although these fields are continuously refined. The emergence of unified paradigms like 
Earth system science and biogeochemistry resulted from growing recognition of the tight 
interdependence among Earth systems. An ideal match might correlate natural systems, 
scientific disciplines, and governance institutions. The idea would be to bring the 
institution closer to the scientific endeavor, as opposed to bringing the science and 
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scientists into the institutional context. This might facilitate scientific knowledge 
production, consensus building, and information dissemination among the actors most 
closely associated with a particular material issue area. Perhaps the regime itself – or 
regime practitioners, monitors, and enforcers – should be engaged in fieldwork, mapping, 
modeling, counting, and tracing material phenomena in the area of management. In this 
technocratic ideal, scientific organization (by discipline, subject matter, and technique) 
shapes institutional form instead of the territorial state system. 
 A major challenge with this vision is the need to identify when scientific 
‘consensus’ is actually compromise, or suppressed controversy, as these situations are 
likely to produce beliefs of fact that are significantly biased by external interests and 
influence. Scientific consensus provides information that exceeds the “the lay person’s 
range of normal experience,” and defines “the scale of problems, the ground for conflicts 
and the scope of solutions.”1272 It is authoritative and powerful, and therefore self-
interested actors have an incentive to frame ideas that benefit them as ‘consensus 
knowledge.’ The authority of scientific consensus stems from its status as legitimate, 
salient, and credible information about non-terrestrial domains.1273 Yet commons regime 
theory has under-invested in questions about trust and conflict over information “about 
the definition, causes, and/or severity of a problem, and the adequate solutions.”1274  
A common criticism of technocracy is that it is anti-democratic, because decision 
makers are not held accountable to the wishes of the public. This criticism applies more 
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or less depending on the particular governance arrangement, and discipline/sector 
specific governance may be less offensive to democracy than more oligarchic forms. But 
the ideal of scientific independence certainly trades off with notions of democratic 
accountability. Opponents of technocracy argue that what is needed is “more societal 
control of science,” and democratic control of scientific priorities and research.1275 One 
major concern with prioritizing democratic accountability is the inability of citizens, or 
even democratically chosen representatives, to seek out, recognize, and internalize 
educated and especially long-term conceptions of their own interest. This is one major 
difference between the design principles for the global commons offered by Paul Stern 
and those offered here – while he prioritizes accountability to “the wider set of parties 
affected,” I argue that the locus of decision-making should be with experts, not lay 
people.1276 
Conclusion 
 Survival and prosperity in an era of planetary-scale human interaction requires a 
re-orientation towards governance of the global commons. In short, existing GCRs are 
not good enough. They are insufficient to achieve sustainable and equitable use of the 
ocean and outer space, and to avoid the worst catastrophes of over-exploitation, pollution, 
and disruption of Earth system processes. Although many scholars laud the durability and 
broad membership of the ocean and outer space regimes, this is a symptom of shifting 
baselines and lowered expectations. We do not need regimes that last – we need regimes 
that work. The central flaw of existing GCRs is a mismatch or misfit with the evolving 
conditions of, and knowledge about, the planetary material context. Regimes lag 
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technological change and new scientific knowledge. As a result, they pursue poorly 
formed and increasingly outdated conceptions of interests and problems.  
 Regime theorists from diverse schools of International Relations have produced 
important insights about regime design and effectiveness, but these theories do not tell 
the full story. A paradigm shift in regime theory that elevates material contextual 
variables would reveal previously submerged and overlooked factors that have significant 
explanatory power. The cases examined here offer an initial step in this direction, and 
demonstrate the utility of adopting a geopolitical approach in the study of global 
commons regimes. Planetary geopolitics provides a different type of explanation for 
regime failure, and generates a specific set of design principles for regime augmentation 
or reconstruction. The ideal GCR is constructed to be maximally isomorphic with the 
features of the geography, ecology, and technology of the domain of management. This 
entails a political geography with the appropriate scope and scale, extended time 
horizons, and attentiveness to the composition and distribution of global technological 
systems. It requires careful assessment of what we do and do not know about planetary 
spaces and systems, and investing substantial effort in the creation of scientific maps, 
theories, and models of non-terrestrial spaces. 
 The social, political, cultural, and economic obstacles to this ideal vision are 
significant and robust. Any major changes that close the gap between “horizons of 
feasibility” and “horizons of necessity” will require a popular social and political 
mobilization to generate a transformative degree of political will.1277 Agendas for 
reformulation must be energized, while inaction and complacency must be 
problematized. The unwillingness of major actors to entertain more active, expansive, 
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and capable regimes should be characterized as a threat to the global human community. 
There are risks to centralized technocratic administration, but these pale in comparison to 
the dangers of unchecked global environmental destruction. If even a rough isomorphism 
between regimes and the planet is impossible to achieve, then a different kind of response 
is required. Instead of complacency and lowered expectations, the superior option may be 
radical relinquishment and restraint. But if the human community intends to continue 
expanding uses in, and extracting benefits from, planetary spaces in the next century, a 
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